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1 GAMBLING WITH GAEA

In recent years, the profile of environmental activism has started to change as a result of governmental failure. The original activism has dissipated and the broad consensus that was forming around the measures needed to tackle climate change has fractured. Successive failed Earth summits have disillusioned and demoralised a large number of environmentalists, who now see no hope in the political terrain. As George Monbiot wrote, the Rio Earth summit was a wave goodbye. The powerful, organised and well-funded lobby behind climate change denial has done its worst and had its triumph, denying the possibility of an active and informed citizenry powering a creative politics from the base upwards. Instead, corporate control at the top has been confirmed, at the cost of the health and well-being of the planet and the people on it. They should be proud.

The result is a despair in political ecology and a willingness on the part of some environmentalists to abandon the difficult terrain of politics, ethics, human nature and change in human behaviour entirely in favour of technological fixes. In other words, the deniers greatest success lies not in the denial of the science of climate change, which is stronger than ever, but in driving environmentalists from the terrain on which they can do most to address climate change – politics.
The defeat of political ecology, or at least the arrest of its advance, is fostering a new kind of environmentalism, one that replaces politics with technology. James Lovelock, Stewart Brand, Mark Lynas and George Monbiot (who only needs to embrace GM food to become a full member of the club) and others can be found in this new breed of environmentalists who are demanding that the approach of ‘Greens’ to climate change needs to change. The same people whose advocacy of technological fixes is born of despair in the capacity of human beings to change their behaviour, can be found calling most vociferously for Greens to change their minds and abandon their distinctive principles. 

The despair of politics is understandable. Ecological issues are the biggest issues in politics, with implications for all humankind. And yet they are low down on the public agenda, included by parties in their election manifestos merely to tick the "green" box. All parties promise to be the greenest government in history, only to dilute and remove what little environmental legislation and regulation exists when they attain office. And then they claim that they are the ‘true greens’ in that their policies are the only policies that will protect the environment.
Well, we are all ‘greens’ in that we are all dependent on nature’s life support systems. The depletion of key resources and the environmental impacts of industrial activity affect us all and make wise resource management vital and urgent. Addressing this issue should be a priority of government. Instead, politicians, subject to the short term perspective of the electoral cycle, are more concerned with manipulating and massaging their vacuous public image through PR and promotion.
In the past couple of years there have been growing demands that ‘the greens’ abandon certain principles and policies with which they are most identified and embrace the contributions that certain new technologies can make to resolving the environmental crisis. The ‘greens’ – whoever they may be - need a ‘clause 4’ moment asserted articles in the press. Why? With the environmental issue on the public agenda to stay and with the UK electing its first Green MP, there is less crisis in the green movement than there is in the natural environment. The planet and the human species are in a far worse condition than the ‘green movement.’ And that’s even without pointing out that the abandonment of clause 4 separated the Labour Party so much from principle that all the political power it achieved was pointless and lacked direction.
A couple of books have received plenty of publicity these last couple of years, both arguing for ‘the greens’ to abandon their most cherished principles and become advocates of nuclear power, biotechnology, GM food and geoengineering. This amounts to moral and political disarmament and can be resisted. So it is worth looking more closely at what these proposals amount to and what kind of thinking – and politics – lies behind them.
Stewart Brand opens his book Whole Earth Discipline with the quote: ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ Mark Lynas entitles his book The God Species.
The books then focus almost exclusively on technology and offer technological solutions to the environmental crisis. There is nothing on morality, an explicit repudiation of ‘ideology’, a little on social practices, and a disdain of politics which always seems to slant against socialism and the left.
There is a basic flaw running through these books and the clue is there in the references to god and gods. The environmental crisis ought to have concentrated minds and caused us to take the notion of natural limits and planetary boundaries more seriously. However, far from coming to terms with the Faustian bargains which lie at the heart of modernity, the inversion of means and ends, the enlargement of means at the expense of ends, Brand and Lynas instead come to invest our technologies with a divine power. Brand and Lynas do not revalue the dignity of human beings as moral beings capable of assuming responsibility for their powers and exercising choice. Instead, they equate power with technology. This is the Faustian delusion at its most crude. Far from resolving our predicament, Brand and Lynas do not even recognise it. They cannot see that the price for Faustian pacts is now being demanded. Instead, they still think that our technology, reliance upon which has brought us to this predicament, will save us. It soon becomes apparent that what Lynas and Brand and their ilk are offering is a massive gamble dressed up as a technological fix. The irony is that the claims made for technology are pitched at such a high level, overriding so much within culture and politics and ethics, that they are likely to rebound. 

This gamble can be refused. What Jacques Ellul identified decades ago as ‘the technological bluff’ can be called. We can refuse the bribe of the megamachine. The promise of salvation through technology has never been rendered so bare. The basic rationale of the gamble urged on us by Lynas and Brand is not the pull of a better life but the push of environmental necessity. The old promise of science and technology has never sounded so weak. 

Against assertions that our divinity is located in our technology, we can retort: 

God does not play Dice with Gaea.

Which brings us to James Lovelock and his Gaia thesis. It is worth wondering why, when the environmental crisis has allowed us to recall the name of Gaia, the goddess of the Earth, from the ancient past, divinity remains firmly and exclusively male in these books emphasising our technological power. For all of the talk of gods in the books by Lynas and Brand, there is one single solitary reference to ‘goddess’, by Brand, and even then it is a passing reference to Lovelock’s Gaia, in parenthesis. Lovelock’s Gaia, it has to be made clear, is not the Gaia of myth but a Gaia of science. Lovelock is proud that Gaia is a scientific theory and he loathes any New Age associations. Fine. Except that Gaia as proposed by Lovelock is a machine rather than an organism. Lovelock believes that Nature is alive, but he admits he can’t offer any scientific proof to back his intuition. Strictly speaking, the Gaia that James Lovelock presents scientifically is a self-regulating machine more akin to cybernetics than organicism. So, in addition to the books by Lynas and Brand, it is worth also examining James Lovelock’s book from 2009 The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning. In the arguments of technocrats, Gaia has vanished already. And perhaps she was not even present in Lovelock’s argument from the start. In Lovelock’s cybernetic perspective, Gaia is no more than the ghost in ‘the machine.’

I propose to develop my case in three parts.

In the first part I shall discuss Lovelock’s Vanishing Face of Gaia, Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline and Lynas’ The God Species in turn. I shall take these books on with respect to specific points, examining the cases made for nuclear energy, biotechnology, GE food and geoengineering. In addition, I take issue with the mode of argumentation adopted in these books. Far from being a balanced discussion of the arguments, the authors display a highly tendentious approach, exhibiting a tendency to set up straw men, to stereotype and caricature, to adopt of selective approach to the evidence, to pose false antitheses, and portray alternative views in the worst possible light. I also comment on the books as a concealed, covert politics, a politics which hides behind the supposed neutrality of science and technology and which expresses itself in a series of casual sneers at ‘environmentalists’, ‘greens’, ‘leftists’, ‘extremists’, ‘anarchists’. It all amounts to a consistent repudiation of ‘the left’ in politics and a denigration of the connection of the Greens with the Reds. 

In the second part I shall set the books by Lovelock, Brand and Lynas within a broader philosophical discussion of human power. Above all, I call for the integration of our moral and technical capacities so as to achieve a balanced development of the human ontology. This also requires a deeper understanding of the human essence and how it flourishes only when we find our true place within nature.

In the third part I address the anomaly that whilst the new ecological sensibility is developing under the auspices of Lovelock’s Gaia thesis, the arguments are of a piece with H.G. Wells’ old fantasy of ‘Men as Gods’. Men? Gods? Mark Lynas writes of human beings as ‘the god species’. Why not the Goddess species? Brand says we are as gods and so must get good at being as gods. Machines and men, men and gods, gods and monsters. It’s the Frankenstein tale writ large. To become as gods, it is as well to know where we have come from. To have a future, we need to remember our origins. We can easily rewrite Brand’s quote to gain a fuller sense of who we are and what we need to do: ‘we have been as gods for too long, but now we HAVE to get good as being goddesses’. So I want to know whatever happened to the Goddess and all the other goddesses. To make things very clear from the start, this does not involve rejecting patriarchy for matriarchy, for tearing down technological urban civilisation and going ‘back to Nature’. It seems so obvious that as the ancient world of the goddess was overthrown by monotheistic world of the single white male, men dominated over women, war replaced peace, civilisation suppressed nature. Go back to nature and peace and harmony will reign once more. If only things were so simple. The world of ‘the Goddess’ was never so benign. It was a world where natural necessity and biological imperatives rule. The danger is this, if we fail to assume conscious control of our technical powers, we will be driven by the social necessity of an expansionary techno-industrial civilisation to transgress planetary boundaries and as a result be thrown back into a world of harsh natural necessity. That’s the Gaia that Lovelock threatens us with. 

Unravelling this little riddle lies at the heart of the critique I offer and the principles I outline. 

I have a feeling that Lovelock’s Gaia is not the true Earth Goddess at all. I think she is more a machine, like the robot woman in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis. Lovelock doesn’t mean this at all. Indeed, Lovelock identifies the extent to which scientists can invest their models with existential significance, mistaking their ideal representation for the reality.

Most governments and many large multinational corporations now either buy the services of these forecasters or establish their own prediction units. These highly talented groups, equipped with some of the most powerful computers now available, gather and sift the information of the world and use the resulting data to build hypotheses, or models, as they are more usually called these days, which are then continually refined until the future can be seen with what appears to be no less clarity than were the pictures on our early television screens. Parallel with this new development in 'futurology', more and more scientists are conducting their researches by reference to similar models. Experimental measurements are made and entered in a computer, where they are compared with the predictions of a hypothesis. If there is disagreement, the evidence is examined for errors, or the model is discarded and another tried to find a better fit. When the scientist who gathers the experimental facts is also the model builder or a close colleague, this works very well indeed. The rapidity with which the computer can perform the otherwise brain-racking labour of endless arithmetic makes this a potent combination and the hypothesis most suited to promotion to a theory is soon selected. Unfortunately, most scientists live their lives in cities and have little or no contact with the natural world. Their models of the Earth are built in universities or institutions where there is all the talent and the hardware necessary, but what tends to be missing is that vital ingredient, information gathered first-hand in the real world. In these circumstances it is a natural temptation to assume that the information contained in scientific books and papers is adequate, and that if some of it does not fit the model then the facts must be wrong. From that point, the fatal step of selecting only data which fit the model is all too easy, and soon we have built an image not of a real world, which might be Gaia, but of that obsessive delusion, Galatea, Pygmalion's fair statue. (Lovelock 2000 ch 8).

Lovelock is right to point out the dangers of mistaking scientific models for the real world and he is also correct to warn of the dangers of such science being pressed into the service of money and power. But for all of his reputation as an independent scientist, Lovelock has made a career working for government and industry. 
I have a hunch that Lovelock’s Gaia is not the living organism of ancient wisdom – the ancient Goddess Gaea - but a self-regulating cybernetic machine operating according to laws of its own. The scientists, of course, are those who will claim knowledge of those laws and will no doubt be prepared to sell their knowledge to money and power. If this is the case, the odds are that we are going to be led astray again. This part makes it abundantly clear that James Lovelock’s Gaia is not the original Gaia at all, and this is no bad thing in itself. The original Gaia is a world before good and bad, a premoral and amoral world in which everything, life and death, is a natural cycle of no moral significance. This part argues that Lovelock’s Gaia is a composite of the purposeless, lifeless ‘Machine’ on the one side and amoral Nature on the other. These two sides of Gaia are not opposites, though, simply two sides of the same scientistic coin. Lovelock’s world is the system world of the scientist, all objective laws and imperatives and completely devoid of meaning and morality. Although he believes Nature to be a living organism, he ‘wholly agrees’ that ‘the cornerstone of the scientific method is the postulate that Nature is objective.’

Which begs the question again, whatever happened to the link between women, nature and divinity?
Me? The urban fox, I am sceptical of big claims and promises, but will check them out to see what I can find lying around them. Isaiah Berlin distinguishes between the hedgehogs who have the one big theory and the foxes whose views are provisional, conditional, fine, understated and subtle. It all depends. As a fox, I have a taste for the hedgehogs, the big thinkers whose systems cover an awful lot of ground – Plato, Spinoza, Hegel – and can bring a lot more to the surface. If you shoot for the moon and miss, you’ll still be living among the stars. 

Ah, but a Man's reach should exceed his grasp, Or what's a Heaven for?
ROBERT BROWNING,    Andrea del Sarto

So, maybe, that is the central message of this long, rambling excursion into science and ethics and mythology and art and everything. The environmental crisis is multi-faceted and requires more than one kind of reasoning. The challenge is to proceed as though more than one approach were valid at any one time. We need to develop a long term strategic capacity for the common good of all, whilst nevertheless being cautious and flexible as we go forwards. We have to think like hedgehogs but act like foxes.

Any divine spark we have comes from the moral law within and how we express it without in relation to each other, to all forms of life and ultimately to our environing conditions. That’s the natural and the built environment. We need to take moral responsibility for our powers and the results of our praxis at the same time we come to respect Nature and the planetary boundaries supporting life. 

In 2006’s Earth in the Balance, Al Gore expresses his disbelief at some of the things he is hearing coming from the mouths of supposedly sane and sober scientists.

In discussions of the greenhouse effect, I have actually heard adult scientists suggest placing billions of strips of tin foil in orbit to reflect enough incoming sunlight away from the earth to offset the larger amount of heat now being trapped in the atmosphere. I have heard still others seriously propose a massive program to fertilize the oceans with iron to stimulate the photosynthesis by plankton that might absorb some of the excess greenhouse gases we are producing. Both of these proposals spring from the impulse to manipulate nature in an effort to counteract the harmful results of an earlier manipulation of nature. We seem to make it easier to consider even harebrained schemes like these than to consider the seemingly more difficult task of revisiting the wisdom of those earlier manipulations, which don't seem to have a healthy relationship to their context, for they are in the process of destroying it.(Gore 2006 ch 11).

But what struck Gore as a manifest madness just a few years ago is now being presented as a ‘new’ environmentalism. The likes of Chris Goodall can be found calling upon Greens to ‘grow up’. These proposals have nothing to do with growing up at all; they are regressions to ancient delusions and fantasies. Despairing of political and cultural and psychological changes, the fixers see the looming environmental problem and have recourse to the only tools left – the new technologies. 

The idolatrous veneration of technical power is an ancient human folly and delusion. Becoming good at being gods, properly understood, is a call to moral responsibility and social control. This is a question which encompasses much more than technology. There is an imbalance in the perspectives of the planetary engineers, an imbalance which stems from a myopic interest in the power of new technologies, disregarding social context, moral purpose and imagination. My perspective is grounded in the work of Lewis Mumford. (Peter Critchley, Lewis Mumford and the Moral Architectonics of Ecological Civilisation 2012). If human beings are ‘the God species’, then it is not on account of their technology. For Mumford, what distinguished human beings from other animals, was not the use of tools (technology) but our use of language (symbols). Human beings were symbol makers before they became tool makers. If homo faber came before homo economicus, then homo symbolicus came before both. Human beings are symbol-making animals, creators of signifying and self-creating symbols.

Mumford’s views are pertinent in setting social evolution in the context of the interaction between technological development and the social and symbolic construction of technology. It is that construction that goes missing in the perspectives of planetary engineers, with the result that human technologies are reduced to a crude technoscience concerned with expanding material power and wealth, not wise use and well-being within a democratic technics.

Mumford argued that the sharing of information and ideas is natural to human beings, and remained the foundation of society even as it became more technological complex. It is not technology that makes human beings ‘gods’ or moral beings, capable of assuming responsibility, but this ‘pooling’ of information and ideas as humanity advances into the future.

My use of the word "technics" corresponds to Mumford’s meaning and use. For Mumford, technology is but one part of technics as a whole. The word technics derives from the Greek tekhné, meaning art, skill and dexterity and not just technology. This conception combines both technology and technique. In Mumford’s perspective, therefore, technics refers to the interplay of a social milieu and technological innovation - the "wishes, habits, ideas, goals" as well as "industrial processes" of a society. In Technics and Civilization, Mumford writes: "other civilizations reached a high degree of technical proficiency without, apparently, being profoundly influenced by the methods and aims of technics." This one-sided approach is very much in evidence in the writings of the planetary engineers. If we are serious about addressing the looming ecological catastrophe, we need that broader conception of technics. We are not short of technologies. The task is to set these technologies in a social and cultural and moral milieu.


A few more remarks on Mumford are in order here, to clarify the position taken in this book. In The Myth of the Machine Vol II: The Pentagon of Power, Mumford criticizes the identification of constant, unrestricted expansion, production, and replacement through technology with progress. He lists the ‘current achievements, projects, promises’ of the likes of Herman Kahn, B. F. Skinner, Glenn Seaborg, Daniel Bell — ‘to say nothing of even more untrammeled technocratic minds.’ And Mumford asks ‘are these only silly fantasies that no person of normal intelligence would seriously entertain? Unfortunately no: it is impossible to exaggerate.’ Well, the fantasies have got sillier. 





That is the ‘men as gods’ thesis laid flat. The planetary engineers call for men to get good at beings gods, yet ‘assuming personal responsibility and exerting personal effort’ – ethics and politics – is discarded as utopian compared to the assertion of technical power. Reading Mumford makes clear the extent to which this supposedly brave and bold new technocratic thinking is nothing but the same-old delusional modern mind in its senile dotage.
In his works, Mumford shows the extent to which the objectives of the technocratic mind actually work against technical perfection, durability, social efficiency, and overall human satisfaction. The technologies which the planetary engineers propose are the 'megatechnics' that Mumford criticised for failing to produce lasting, quality products. Against megatechnics, Mumford offered ‘biotechnics’, an organic model of technics which achieves balance, wholeness and completeness. Organic systems direct themselves to "qualitative richness, amplitude, spaciousness, and freedom from quantitative pressures and crowding. Self-regulation, self-correction, and self-propulsion are as much an integral property of organisms as nutrition, reproduction, growth, and repair." 

From Technics and Civilization (1934), Mumford distinguished two forms of technology: polytechnics versus monotechnics. Monotechnics refers to technology as an end in itself, oppressing humanity as it proceeds along its own trajectory. Polytechnics embraces many different modes of technology to provide a complex matrix within which to address and resolve human problems.

In fine, in face of the ecological crisis that now besets human civilisation, we need a biotechnics and polytechnics that lead us to the ecological society. Instead, the planetary engineers are offering us monotechnics and megatechnics to entrench and extend the power of the Megamachine. 

Planetary engineering is a failure of imagination, of nerve, of faith in human potentials. It is the plea of pessimists and poltroons. It is shallow, superficial, a waste of time and resources because it fails completely to address the real causes of the environmental crisis. 

Lewis Mumford wrote: ‘the difficult we do immediately; the impossible will take a little longer’ (Mumford  Letters 1972:149). For the great marine biologist Jacques Cousteau, ‘the impossible missions are the only ones which succeed.’ Forget the impossible, the planetary engineers won’t even attempt the difficult. Instead, they do the easiest, most obvious thing in the world – they look at the environmental crisis and throw new technologies at it. The challenge is to set our technologies within a broader technics, taking in morals, ideas, culture, social relationships. 
And the ecology of the planet. 

At the level of wisdom, any genuine environmentalism arises from that part of our being that remains in touch with the ecology of the whole earth, and is concerned first of all to care for and conserve natural things rather than manipulate and modify them. Environmentalists seeking to indulge their infantile technological fantasies have plenty of outlets in business and politics and do not need the Greens. The demands that Greens ‘grow up’ politically can be safely ignored as the voice of a very old and very tired politics, the old politics of ‘progress’ that is very visibly imploding. We are used to stories of the god that failed, but some keep the faith. They can be ignored.

Before coming to the ‘harebrained’ techno-fixing of Stewart Brand and Mark Lynas, I shall examine the case of James Lovelock. I shall begin with a general view on Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis before focusing on The Vanishing Face of Gaia specifically. For reasons developed in the text, there are strong reasons for believing that James Lovelock’s Gaia may not be all that it seems, an Earth Goddess containing a vision of a peaceful and egalitarian culture that lives lightly on the land. On the contrary, Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine, with laws of its own, accessible only by expert scientists. Whilst many have hopes for a Gaian holism, Lovelock’s Gaia seems to present a rationale for a technocracy.

2 THE RESURRECTION OF GAIA

In the 1970s there was a revolution in our perception of the earth. The space explorations sent back pictures of the earth as a fragile green and blue globe with drifts of white cloud swirling around it. At the same time, the revolution in information and communication technology has brought the population of the planet closer together, fostering a global awareness. The world is now seen and experienced as a living organism rather than an inanimate habitat devoid of meaning.


The idea of the earth as a living organism is goes back to prehistory and can be found in all of the creation myths. In Timaeus, Plato refers to the female world soul as the demiurge. The first scientist in the modern era to propose that the world was alive was James Hutton. At a meeting of the Royal Society in Edinburgh in 1785, Hutton declared that the earth was a 'superorganism' and that its proper study should be physiology. In the late nineteenth century, Yevgraf Maximovich Korolenko stated that the 'Earth is an organism'. This view influenced scientist Vladimir Vernadsky, who, in 1911, defined the term 'biosphere' in modern terms as 'the envelope of life, i.e. the area of living matter ... of the Earth's crust occupied by transformers which convert cosmic radiations into effective terrestrial energy'. (Lovelock 1989: 9-10) Ecologist F. E. Clements also used the term ‘superorganisms’ to describe the way that groups of plants form living entities with their own characteristics.

So James Lovelock’s Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (1979) was not such a new look at the Earth at all but a return to an older way of thinking which some scientists in the era of mechanical materialism had been groping back to, but which most scientists had long since abandoned. However, insofar as people today have some idea of the planet as being a living organism, beyond what their own senses, feelings and intuitions tell them, this can be attributed to James Lovelock. Lovelock developed the idea whilst working with the American space programme at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Adopting the name Gaia, the Greek goddess of the earth, Lovelock explained his insight:

the entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the Earth's atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts. (Lovelock1989: 9)


In contradistinction to the Darwinian view that asserts that life has adapted to evolving planetary conditions, Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis holds that 'the physical and chemical condition of the surface of the Earth, of the atmosphere, and of the oceans has been and is actively made fit and comfortable by the presence of life itself'. (Lovelock  1989: 152) The right balance of gases in the atmosphere necessary to support life on earth is the result not of chance but of the ongoing process of life. Evolution refers to the way that the Earth uses its resources to achieve a new equilibrium and support life forms. 
Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis extends the notion of an ecosystem to include the whole of organic life as well as a good part of the inanimate world. The hypothesis argues that the Earth is a self-regulating organism which ensures that the conditions of life on Earth are maintained in such a way as to be ideal for the evolution of complex life forms. In support of the view is the relative constancy of the climate, the constant high level of oxygen (21 per cent) and nitrogen (78 per cent) in the atmosphere and the low level of salt in the sea. These conditions seem to involve more than chance and coincidence. In the beginning, there was virtually no oxygen or nitrogen in the earth's atmosphere, their presence issuing as a result of the activities of bacteria and the process of photosynthesis. The climate is maintained within the limits which support terrestrial life by means of a feedback system which compensates for changes in the climate by adjusting the rates at which gases such as oxygen, methane and carbon dioxide are produced and removed from the atmosphere. 

The atmosphere, the chemistry of the oceans and the geology of the earth have been so radically altered by biological activities that they cannot be considered apart. Gaia keeps the planet fit for life by regulating the chemical and physical environment. Life would thus seem to swim against the general current of entropy. (Lovelock  1989: 23).

Lovelock identifies some parts of the earth as 'vital organs', the disturbance of which would cause the whole organism of the earth to malfunction. He gives examples of the tropical areas and the seas close to the continental shores: 'Here man may sap the vitality of Gaia by reducing and by deleting key species in her life-support system; and he may then exacerbate the situation by releasing into the air or the sea abnormal quantities of compounds which are potentially dangerous on a global scale.' (Lovelock  1989: 121). Lovelock advocates ‘wise husbandry' so as to permit the proper functioning of Gaia, a view which savours a great deal of the new theology of ‘stewardship’. To this end, Lovelock identifies organic practices and international conservation areas as two measures which would allow the earth to function well so as to maintain its equilibrium. This is of a piece with the vision of Virgil in the Georgics, ‘on working the Earth.’ 

Lovelock can be praised for many things. Before criticising Lovelock’s views at length from a moral and political perspective, it is worth recognising Lovelock’s scientific achievements, which are substantial. By extending the idea of an ecosystem to the earth as a whole, Lovelock has demonstrated the central importance of ecology to life on Earth. Lovelock’s Gaia enlarges and enriches ecology by conceiving species within their physical environment together to form a single system, and developing mathematical models which demonstrate that 'increased diversity among the species leads to better regulation' and therefore to greater robustness. (Lovelock  1989: 51 62). The view that greater complexity generates greater stability in an ecosystem is therefore confirmed. 

Lovelock is also to be praised for adopting a holistic approach, not against but in addition to the reductionist approach. There is a tendency to split this debate into a choice between holism or reductionism, as thought these are mutually exclusive. A painting would be nothing without details, but the details only have meaning when interrelated with each other on a broad canvas.

No one now doubts that it was plain, honest reductionist science that allowed us to unlock so many of the secrets of the Universe, not least those of the living macromolecules that carry the genetic information of our cells. But clear, strong, and powerful though it may be, it is not enough by itself to explain the facts of life. Consider Jacques Monod's Martian engineer. Would it have been sensible to have dashed in with a kit of tools and disassembled analytically the computer he found? Or would it have been better, as a first step, to have switched it on and questioned it as a whole system? If you have any doubts about the answer to this question then consider the thought that the hypothetical Martian engineer was an intelligent computer and the object he examined, you.

The holism that Lovelock justifies serves to check reductionist attempts to drive life, meaning, purpose, telos out of the universe.

This is not how Lovelock himself develops his argument, mind.

I wholly agree with Monod that the cornerstone of the scientific method is the postulate that Nature is objective. True knowledge can never be gained by attributing "purpose" to phenomena. But, equally strongly, I deny the notion that systems are never more than the sum of their parts. The value of Gaia in this debate is that it is the largest ecosystem. It can be analyzed both as a whole system and, in the reductionist manner, as a collection of parts. This analysis need disturb neither the privacy nor the function of Gaia any more than would the movement of a single commensal bacterium on the surface of your nose.

And this brings us to the critical points. For all of the image of the Earth Goddess, Lovelock’s views are not so far removed from the mechanicists, the reductionists, and the neo-Malthusians who interpret evolution in terms of selfish genes battling for survival. If the Earth is a living organism, and if human beings are to use their intelligence to fit the contours of Gaia, as Lovelock argues, then to argue that the objectivity of Nature is the cornerstone of the scientific method and hence that true knowledge has nothing to do with purpose simply flags up the limitations of science with respect to the whole of life. Life, certainly human life, is more than natural cycles and biological imperatives. Is Gaia? The holism of Lovelock’s Gaia refers to a mechanical system. Certainly, Gaia can be studied as a system, as something which is more than a collection of parts. But a truly holistic vision requires purpose. Human beings are teleological beings and this is something that science cannot handle. The question is whether this teleology is a part of Gaia or is the ancient Earth Goddess merely a metaphor for amoral and impersonal biological imperatives.

Lovelock argues for a 'coevolution' of life and the inorganic which emphasises the enduring, evolving interdependence of the parts which join together to form Gaia. (Lovelock  1989: 34f). But his view is limited to Gaia as a system. Lovelock’s insistence on true knowledge being the result of scientific method excludes morality from this ‘co-evolution’ and leaves his proposals curiously adrift. Lovelock can urge respect for Gaia but human beings are moral beings and cannot empathise or sympathise with a system. When Lovelock writes on the religious aspects of Gaia, his failure to take morality seriously is really shown in sharp relief. At times, Lovelock is in danger of drifting off into the mysticism of Nature worship that he abhors.
Lovelock criticises ‘Greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ so often that it is plain that he is not one of them, he is against them. That begs the question of just what Lovelock has in mind when he urges that human beings learn to fit Gaia. Lovelock has made many controversial statements, dismissing the increase in acid rain and the hole in the ozone layer as minor problems. Lovelock is similarly dismissive of the problem of pollution, which he considers to be an inevitable consequence of life at work. The concept of pollution is anthropocentric and 'may be irrelevant in the Gaian context'. (Lovelock  1989: 110 111). Lovelock’s view here highlights the central flaw in his position. Lovelock takes his stand on scientific method. He declares nature to be an object. From this objective perspective, there is no such thing as pollution, nature recycles wastes and the what goes round comes round. Lovelock, from a strictly scientific standpoint, is correct. This is the same Lovelock who depicts the Chernobyl nuclear disaster as a non-event compared to the Bhopal disaster. Lovelock’s rotten moral calculus is worth exposing at length. At Bhopal, he argues,

an accident at a pesticide plant released forty tons of methyl isocyanate gas into the night air. The cloud drifted over the town and killed 3,800 people instantly and many times more in the weeks that followed. The Bhopal disaster is usually cited as the world's worst industrial disaster, but how often do the media mention it compared with the much lesser disaster at Chernobyl?’ (Lovelock 2009 ch 4).

In the film Monsieur Verdoux, Charlie Chaplin is on trial for marrying and murdering rich widows and stealing their money. He defends himself by reasoning that he has killed only a few women whereas, in wars, millions are killed. ‘Numbers sanctify’ he says from the dock. This kind of moral equivalence is a perversion of morality and begs the question of the nature of Lovelock’s Gaia. Arguing that the only basis for knowledge is to examine Gaia as a objective system, Lovelock lacks any moral foundations to justify his arguments. This is revealed clearly here, not only with respect to the crude moral calculus employed with respect to Chernobyl and Bhopal but with respect to his view that the concept of pollution is ‘anthropocentric’. Well it would be wouldn’t it. What else would it be to human beings? It may come as news to scientists, but human beings as moral beings do tend to be anthropocentric. It is comments such as this which reveals that Lovelock lacks a moral position for the simple reason that he sees no need for one. Human beings are not moral beings at all within Gaia as a system, they are just natural beings functioning within the whole. Pollution is an anthropocentric concept. There is no need to get sentimental about death. Pollution doesn’t exist for nature. All waste is recycled. Human beings are merely ‘Food for worms’ as Shakespeare had Falstaff declare.

Nature will carry on. No wonder that Lovelock concludes that there is 'no urgent cause for concern about man's activities'. (Lovelock  1989: 110 111). It all depends on one’s perspective. Lovelock’s Olympian disdain of anthropocentrism really betrays a certain inhuman coolness with respect to human beings. We have seen this scientific mentality at work too many times in the twentieth century for us to be comfortable with its resurgence today. 
Lovelock is a firm defender of nuclear power as a 'clean' source of energy: 'I have never regarded nuclear radiation or nuclear power as anything other than a normal and inevitable part of the environment.' (Lovelock 1989: 174 175). Lovelock claims that 'breathing is fifty times more dangerous than the sum total of radiation we normally receive from all sources'. Lovelock’s views mirror those of his friend Michael Allaby who, in his excellent book, Living in the Greenhouse: A Global Warning argues that the problem of global warming can be solved ‘if only we can bring ourselves to accept that nuclear power is environmentally preferable to the burning of coal, oil, or gas. (Allaby 1990 ch 8). With nuclear power, electricity can be generated without releasing any greenhouse gases at all. Allaby laments the fact that

Environmentalists have made this a contentious issue and have aggravated a genuine public anxiety about nuclear power until it has become a wholly irrational fear. (Allaby 1990 ch 8). 

Lovelock also refers to opposition to nuclear power as being on ‘unreasoning fear.’ (Lovelock 2009 ch 4). 

Lovelock is firmly on the side of science. Whereas the idea of Gaia as Earth Goddess would appear to foster the veneration of the planet, Lovelock is horrified by the ‘New Age’ and slams environmentalists with their 'reactionary "back to nature" campaign'. He claims that such groups are 'mostly anarchist in flavour’ and ‘would hasten our doom by dismantling and destroying all technology'. (Lovelock  1989: 117 123). 


Lovelock’s views here betray a political prejudice that has nothing to do with science. Environmentalists proposing that we go ‘back to nature’ are few and far between. Deep ecology has been subject to some criticism along these lines, but even here misunderstandings abound (see Dobson and Lucardie ed 1995 ch 2). Environmentalists propose alternative technologies which can be used by local people and communities. To assert that environmentalists want to dismantle and destroy all technology is errant nonsense, an unreasoning political rant that colours the rest of Lovelock’s arguments. Environmentalists advocate a democratic technics which contrast markedly with Lovelock’s preference for the authoritarian technics of nuclear power.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of nuclear power may be, it has to be a curious anomaly that a man who issues a ‘final warning’ with respect to global warming and urges that human beings fit the contours of Gaia at no point questions the necessity of exponential energy increases and instead concentrates on the problem of how to supply these energy demands in a way that avoids releasing greenhouse gases. Within those limited parameters, shaped wholly by prevailing social relations, then the nuclear gamble is indeed preferable to certain death by runaway climate change as a result of global warming. But if nuclear is the answer, we had better ask another question. Living lightly on the land requires that we scale our energy requirements back to sustainable levels rather than attempt to escape planetary boundaries via nuclear power.

Lovelock assumes the high and ever increasing level of energy requirements because he is a staunch defender of industrialization. Hence his inability to see criticism of particular technologies within specific social relations as anything other than an attack upon ‘all’ technology. For all of the talk of a Gaian sensibility, Lovelock speaks with the voice of overweening science. He is remarkably optimistic with respect to the ability of industrial societies solving their environmental problems: 'When urban industrial man does something ecologically bad he notices it and tends to put things to right again.' (Lovelock  1989: 121). There has been no shortage of attention drawn to our ecological problems for decades now, but it is taking urban industrial civilisation an awful long time to put things right again. Hence the title of Lovelock’s last book The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning (2009).

The human relationship with Gaia
For all of Lovelock’s reference to Nature as a ‘system’ and an ‘object’, there is no doubt that the popularity of the Gaia hypothesis in environmental circles can be attributed to the way it identified Nature as something more than a primitive force to master and the planet as more than a spaceship travelling around the sun. Ironically, for all of the talk of Gaia as a living organism, Lovelock admits that he can offer no rational basis for this view. In terms of strict science, Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine. We should bear this in mind when Lovelock starts to draw inferences from Gaia with respect to human behaviour.
Lovelock identifies three crucial aspects of Gaia which should change the relationship of human beings to the Earth. Gaia has a 'tendency to optimize conditions for all terrestrial life', its 'vital organs [are] at the core, as well as expendable or redundant ones mainly on the periphery'; and its responses to changes for the worse 'must obey rules of cybernetics'. (Lovelock  1989: 127). 
Physical laws are not, course, moral laws. To state that human beings must obey rules of physiology and eat and breath etc is not to argue for a moral position. No moral choice is involved. So far, so clear. The problems come when scientists start to state scientific laws concerning the way that reality operates before going on to draw up rules for human behaviour. Such views may well have profound implications for the way that human beings behave in the biosphere. But a biospheric politics and a biospheric ethics remain a politics and an ethics and are not to be read directly from the science. Lovelock supplies the scientific basis for such a politics and such an ethics, but his own work is deficient in both respects. 
It is also worth noting that his view of Gaia is perfectly consistent with Darwinian natural selection. Lovelock’s position is quite schizophrenic. In one moment he is arguing that Gaia is a self-regulating system, implying that the parts have no creative autonomy within the whole, the next moment he recognises human beings as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’ capable of creative agency. That view requires a political and an ethical position that is more than a reflection of physical laws.
Lovelock identifies human beings as part of the Gaian process of self-regulation, and 'as the transfer of power to our species proceeds, our responsibility for maintaining planetary homeostasis grows with it, whether we are conscious of the fact or not'. That implies that human beings play an active rather than a passive role within Gaia, a view which begs – but does not receive in Lovelock – a clear and consistent moral and political position. Certainly, Lovelock gives us the basis for a partnership ethic, in that the Gaia hypothesis holds that man is 'a part of, or partner in, a very democratic entity'. (Lovelock  1989: 131 145). However, this democracy involving human agency proceeds within some very narrow parameters. Lovelock warns that Gaia can eliminate any species that disturbs the balance of life on earth: 'Gaia is not purposefully antihuman but so long as we continue to change the global environment against her preferences, we encourage our replacement with a more environmentally seemly species.' (Lovelock  1989: 236). That’s the way it is with systems, they ‘act’ without conscious design or purpose. They have an existential significance that human beings are denied, but they lack moral meaning. Our anthropomorphism is made secondary to natural ‘rules’ we ‘must obey’.
It is worth emphasising that, for Lovelock, it is technology that is central to creative human agency, that our technological power makes it imperative that we take responsibility for the planet. The problem is that there is little sense that this is a moral responsibility for Lovelock, it is more a case of good engineering and technocratic planetary management. For Lovelock, human beings are not managers in the Christian sense of stewardship. Insofar as Lovelock has an environmental ethics, he believes that human beings act like shop stewards, representing other species in the bigger enterprise of Gaia. (Ryle 1991; Lovelock 1991)

Lovelock’s metaphor is telling. He sees the human species not as ‘the god species’ but as Gaia’s proletariat, capable of making the odd demand, but in the main having to knuckle under and succumb to the rule of an exploitative boss. The metaphor also implies a conflict of interests, a separation of human beings from Gaia. 

It is difficult to discern a consistent viewpoint. Lovelock’s inadequate treatment of ethics and politics gives his statements a fragmented character. Although Lovelock does demand that human beings assume responsibility for their role within Gaia, certainly with respect to technology, and whilst the idea of Gaia as a democratic entity does supply the basis for a partnership ethic, Lovelock can be very gloomy and pessimistic with respect to human prospects. Indeed, when he argues that human beings have not evolved the strategic thinking capacity required for survival, it is difficult to know why they should be invested with responsibility for regulating the earth, let alone how they could do the job. Perhaps necessity is a learning mechanism and human beings learn to solve problems that Gaia has set. The historical record alone does not suggest that the human race is anything like the god species in this respect. Our best hope remains an Aristotelian teleology.

The Need For An Environmental Ethic
In the simplest sense, an enlightened self-interest holds that individuals act with a supra-individual regard so as to serve their own self-interest. An environmental self-interest holds that since Nature is a part our Self, protection of the environment coincides with our self-interest. In which case, the term 'environment' ceases to have meaning. Thus, ‘as we discover our ecological self we will joyfully defend and interact with that with which we identify; and instead of imposing environmental ethics on people, we will naturally respect, love, honor and protect that which is of our self. (Devall 1990: 43)
This would resolve the moral issue of why need to bother about the environment? Since it is not in the immediate interests of individuals to, for instance, give up air travel, the use of a car, meat, for some vague, abstract good, then it follows that individual freedom needs to be restrained one way or another - by social control, ethical norms or environmental policies. Of course, one can argue that this restraint permits a greater freedom for individuals through the flourishing of the whole. But at some point a Gaian philosophy has to bite in terms of politics and ethics. To leave the question open simply invites Nature’s harsh, indifferent necessity to determine outcomes, without favour or fairness. 
One might wonder what there is of ethics when the world is conceived of as our body. If human beings are so much a part of Nature, then the scope for an independent moral position is narrowed. This is a problem for deep ecology. 'How can the individual self maintain and increase its uniqueness while also being an inseparable aspect of the whole system wherein there are no sharp breaks between self and the other' (Devall and Sessions 1985: 65). This is, as Arne Naess points out, 'a difficult ridge to walk: to the left we have the ocean of organic and mystic views, to the right the abyss of atomic individualism' (Naess 1989: 165). The failure to establish moral foundations makes it likely that any approach will flounder on these twin reefs of mystic holism and atomistic individualism. These are not alternatives but two sides of the same amoral coin.

A Gaian philosophy risks being confined to just those groups in society which are more ecologically sensitive than others, or whose relative affluence allows them to engage in a post-materialism denied others. Either way, not many will be able to share the fulfilling experience of a mystical identification with Nature. It sounds appealing but in a world of some seven billion people there is no substitute for engaging with pragmatic politics on the basis of an environmental ethics. Yes, from a scientific perspective, pollution is an anthropocentric concept. There are plenty of those in the world of human beings. Public policies, tax and spending, a binding ethics are all required to induce people to alter what Lovelock would call their wasteful anthropocentric behaviour. If scientists forget this, Gaia will indeed impose her harsh necessity. Instead of a democratic politics on the basis of Gaia as a ‘democratic entity’, Nature will impose an ecological dictatorship to bring the ecologically insensitive masses into shape. What is most worrying is the extent to which James Lovelock is prepared to go as a proxy for Gaia, arguing for the suspension of democratic government and preparation of the rule of the warlords and a lifeboat ethics which decides who shall live and who shall die (Lovelock 2009). It seems that scientists who eschew politics and morality very easily engage in wild megalomaniac flights as spokespersons for Nature.

Mary Mellor writes well on this kind of lifeboat ethics and eco-fascism:





Mary Mellor’s words show the extent to which what scientists understand by Gaia may differ radically from Green, feminist, and socialist conceptions, indeed from all conceptions, including religious conceptions, which see nature as alive and proclaims the equality of all souls.

The extent to which human beings, ontologically, are a part of Gaia is only indirectly relevant to the moral dilemma of the relation of the individual good to the common good. Gaia as an ecosystem may well be more than the sum of its parts, but this does not mean that it necessarily forms a moral community. It depends on whether we expand the circle from the human community outwards or from the biocentric community inwards. Throughout the course of history, the moral community of humanity has expanded from the smallest units outwards, from the family or tribe to city-state and nation, from nation to 'united nations' and empire and finally to embrace the whole human race. This process of expanding the moral circle continues to this day (Lucardie 1990: 57-73). Whilst racism, sexism and xenophobia are still rife on the planet, we have the universal ethic with which to contest them. There are also growing attempts to expand our moral community to encompass the animal kingdom, and even further to encompass the planet. Peter Singer’s book The Expanding Circle offers some cogent and compelling arguments in favour of such expansion as not just possible but desirable. For Barbara Noske, we should approach animals not as machines, but in the manner that anthropologists approach alien tribes, learning their language rather than imposing ours (Noske 1992: 203-17). Ironically, at the same time that she is arguing this, scientists continue to reduce human beings to the status of machines (From Crick to Blakemore, this obsessive reductionism characterises science). So much the worse for science, if that is all it amounts to. In time, we may become ecologically sensitive members of a moral Community of Life, treating all living beings with equal respect and showing reverence for the whole web of interconnected life. But we will do so by affirming the moral worth of human beings, as well as of life as such. 

But the question remains, is this an ethic or an ethos? The path of the mystic identification with Nature is a return to the circularity of Nature, but being absorbed into nature’s natural cycles is not a moral position, it is a position which lacks anything by way of autonomy. Individualism is not transcended but is simply flipped to become its twin, holism. Where once there was the antithesis between individual and whole, now, in the unio mystica, the distinction between individual and whole simply vanishes. To identify the ecological self with Gaia is to follow the path of the mystics all the way back to a subjugation of the necessity and imperatives of natural cycles. Whilst the psychological appeal of this Gaia self is strong, its moral status is weak. Lovelock tends to shun moral arguments altogether, referring to morality as having no part of science, and strongly emphasises that the interests of human beings are bound up with – subordinate? – to Gaia. In which case, Lovelock’s tetchiness concerning anthropomorphism betrays a frankly biocentric perspective. No wonder he condemns environmentalists for their concern with humanity as a whole rather than with what is necessary for planetary health. Lovelock’s criticism implies that the good of humanity and the good of the planet are mutually exclusive, and that the former should be sacrificed to the latter, for the greatest salvation of the greatest numbers. For those Greens and environmentalists concerned with the sustainability of life and social justice as a single process of co-evolution, a Gaian biocentrism which lacks a moral foundation is, at best, an evasion, the end of a long evolutionary process in which human beings have struggled to conquer necessity rather than the beginning of a world of moral freedom beyond that necessity.

Although there are times when Lovelock implies that human beings are a virus on the planet – read how celebrates the way wildlife has sprung back to life in the absence of human beings around Chernobyl, read his Malthusian arguments concerning population – at his best, he argues that the human species is Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’, an integral and important part of Gaia (Lovelock 2009). It is not the human race as such but specific human practices that are responsible for planetary difficulties. But Lovelock’s awareness of bad practices does not lead him to temper his optimism with respect to technology. On the contrary, Lovelock is now calling for extensive geoengineering of the Earth, unifying the sciences in a planetary perspective in order to manage the human role within the evolution of Gaia. Lovelock 1991).

In The Ages of Gaia (2000), Lovelock begins his Epilogue with Blake’s demand that Jerusalem be built in England’s green and pleasant land. Lovelock identifies his own ideal with that of Blake. 

So what should we do instead? My vision of a future England would be like Blake's to build Jerusalem on this green and pleasant land. It would involve the return to small, densely populated cities, never so big that the countryside was further than a walk or a bus ride away. At least one-third of the land should revert to natural woodland and heath, what farmers now call derelict land. Some land would be open to people for recreation; but one-sixth at least should be "derelict," private to wildlife only. Farming would be a mixture of intensive production where it was fit so to be, and small unsubsidized farms for those with the vocation of living in harmony with the land.

It is a familiar view. It should be. It is the old arcadian myth which has seduced many people in the past and will seduce many people more in the future. But it is a myth. It expresses a yearning to return to simpler times. Moreover, there is much more to Blake’s Jerusalem than this. The irony is that Lovelock, who is so vociferous in his criticism of environmentalists for being against ‘all technology’ and for advocating a reactionary ‘back to nature’ ethos, should opt for a nostalgic vision for the pre-Second World War countryside, the land of his formative years. It seems that Lovelock has not escaped the yearning to go back home, no more than anyone does. There is no going back, only forwards.

Mechanical science and organic nature
Whilst the Gaia hypothesis undermines mechanical science in arguing that the Earth is a living organism, Lovelock remains firmly within the paradigm of mechanistic materialism. In his computer models of Gaia, Lovelock reads his views of society into nature. He isn’t the first and he won’t be the last to do that. In Lovelock’s model, the environment and species exerting controls on each other is 'a metaphor for our own experience that the family and society do better when firm, but justly applied rules exist than they do with unrestricted freedom'. It should come as no surprise, then, that Lovelock’s ethical position amounts to an appeal to 'enlightened self-interest' (Lovelock  1989: 52).. In other words, we are still in the world of eighteenth century rationalism and nineteenth century utilitarianism.
Lovelock is certainly correct to warn us that Nature as Goddess is neither benign nor benevolent, but that Gaia is 'no doting mother tolerant of misdemeanours, nor is she some fragile and delicate damsel in danger from brutal mankind. She is stern and tough, always keeping the world warm and comfortable for those who obey her rules, but ruthless in her destruction of those who trangress.' (Lovelock 1989: 212). The goddess is both the giver and taker of life, both necessary to the natural cycle of things. This is Kali, the Mother Goddess as devouress. 

It is worth mentioning that Lovelock has expressed a personal desire to go into space as well as entertained the prospect of human beings colonizing other planets. With his friend Michael Allaby, Lovelock wrote The Greening of Mars. Whilst this was a work of science fiction, Lovelock holds that the 'real job of science is trying to make science fiction come true'. (Lovelock to Ryle).
Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine, an organic machine but a self-regulating machine all the same. Hence Lovelock’s interest in cybernetics, a mechanical science which is concerned with self-regulation systems of communication and control in living organisms and machines. Lovelock’s Daisyworld is a cybernetic model of a planet, designed to show the importance of different environmental variables. 
The circular logic as opposed to linear logic of cybernetic systems is worthy of mention, suggesting a return of Gaian science back to the circularity of nature. That said, Lovelock’s approach is mechanical, with chthonic nature wheeled on only in the form of a threat of the dire consequences to follow for upsetting the Goddess. The systems approach shows that the climate and chemical composition of the earth are kept in homeostasis for long periods until some internal contradiction or external force 'causes a jump to a new stable state'. (Lovelock 1989:13). Lovelock’s computer models purport to show that Gaia's regulatory processes proceed through mechanistic means only, obeying the laws of chemistry and physics. It is surely not insignificant that this aspect of Lovelock’s Daisyworld programme has inspired the creation of a computer game which puts the player 'in control of Gaia' and enables him – I suspect it will be a him - to move mountains, destroy whole continents, create new life forms and colonize other planets. The game allows megalomaniacs to indulge in the Promethean fantasy of human omnipotence. (Brian Walker, 'Battle for the Aped', Guardian (21 February 1991). Whilst that may seem harmless enough as a computer game, fantasies create mentalities. And, as Lovelock urges, the ‘real job of science is trying to make science fiction come true'.

Such views identify Lovelock as a technocratic utopian. For the technocratic utopian it is systems and tools that matter, not human action and behaviour. The means and the mechanisms are the change agents, not human beings. Historically, such technocratic visions are a dead end. They reproduce the problems they are supposed to tackle on a scale enlarged by technology.

Gaia, immanent purpose and God

Lovelock is honest enough to admit that his belief that Earth is a living organism lacks a rational basis. By rational, Lovelock means scientific. He notes how his scientific colleagues accuse him of anthropomorphism.

I can already hear Pecksniffian colleagues complaining, 'You are doing it again - anthropomorphizing the Earth, talking of it as alive.' But I say to them, 'If it is not alive then how can it die?' And die she will when the sun's heat becomes more than can be withstood. (Lovelock 2009 ch 3). 

Friendly scientists often ask me: Why do you keep on talking about the Earth as alive? This is a good question, and there is no rational answer; indeed to some of my friends my suggestion that the whole planet is alive is not only 'scientifically incorrect', it is absurd. In reply I say that science has not yet formulated a full definition of life. Physicists and chemists have one definition, biologists another, and neither is complete. But this does not persuade many of my friends because they think they know by instinct or intuition what is alive, and in no way does the Earth meet their criteria for life. Instinct and intuition are powerful and cannot be denied, and so my assertion of planet-sized life is discounted as an eccentricity. (Lovelock 2009 ch 7).

Lovelock’s comment is revealing in that it makes clear the extent to which his Gaia thesis remains within the remit of mechanistic science. The idea that Gaia is a living organism is non-scientific, and hence dismissed by scientists. Even Lovelock's closest colleagues have sought to distance themselves from Lovelock’s speculation as to what Gaia implies beyond the science. These scientists are careful not to upset fellow scientists.
So, perhaps, Lovelock has been wise in his caution, particularly given the trouble he had even getting his thesis heard by scientists in the first place. This reveals more about science and scientists than Gaia, though. Perhaps Lovelock is wise to stick to the science, for the next step would lead still deeper and further, into the regions of religion and ethics, even mythology, abodes which are strictly forbidden to the brave soldiers of the scientific age, the nether regions populated by spooks and demons, which threaten unspeakable terrors, all manner of bogies which inhabit the nursery-rhymes learned by the children of science as part of their potty-training. Iris Murdoch once remarked, "It is always a significant question to ask of any philosopher: what is he afraid of?" (Murdoch 1985: 72.) The question should be put to scientists too. At the funeral of Francis Crick, his son declared that what made Crick tick was not fame and fortune but the desire 'to knock the final nail into the coffin of vitalism'. Strange that scientists should be so concerned to deny that living organisms are truly alive, rather than explicable in terms of physics and chemistry alone. 
The microbiologist Lynn Margulis, who worked closely with Lovelock in developing the idea, rejects the notion that the earth is alive or that Gaia is an organism: 'Rather Gaia is an extremely complex system with identifiable regulatory properties which are very specific to the lower atmosphere.' (In Bunyard and Goldsmith, eds.,1988). And, to be fair, this is all that Lovelock himself offers on Gaia in terms of scientific justification. Michael Allaby also warns against Gaia worship. Gaia is not a person, still less is she a goddess. Instead, Gaia is a morally neutral concept, 'no more than an aspect of the planet Earth, a way of describing the way things are'. (Allaby 1989:112). Gaia is therefore a metaphor and has nothing to say about final ends or goals. The processes of Gaia are wholly mechanical. Allaby compares the self-regulation of the earth with the governor on a steam engine. (Allaby 1989: 95).

All that is fine if we remain at the level of scientific explanation. Of course, what is of most interest is what the Gaia thesis implies with respect to human behaviour. And it is in the interstices between science as description and explanation and human practice and ethics as things people do that things get messy. For Lovelock does not leave Gaia at the level of description. Lovelock’s scientific work clearly has practical and moral implications with respect to the way human beings relate to the Earth. Here, Lovelock issues a ‘final warning’ and yet still pulls his political and moral punches. Unlike, for instance, Rupert Sheldrake, who seeks to develop the idea of the Earth as a living organism much further, Lovelock denies the teleological interpretation of Gaia, with respect to both the earth's and humankind’s ability to plan and have foresight. There is no immanent purpose to be discerned in nature. That’s fine, in that it is consistent with the Judaeo-Christian tradition which holds that it is the moral agency of human beings that brings meaning and purpose to life. All that Lovelock offers here is a dismissive reference to value-judgements as having no part of science. He is right with respect to the philosophical convention, but he misses the significance of that statement. If all there is is a morally neutral Nature and a science limited to description and explanation, human beings are cut adrift in a world without meaning. The scientific case that Lovelock offers is insufficient to deliver meaning. We can accumulate all the knowledge in the world, but it will not increase meaning by one iota. Our problems will remain unresolved so long as facts are not guided by values.

Worse than this, however, is the way that Lovelock attempts to sneak a moral position by the back door. He breaks the philosophical convention he asserts by deriving an ‘ought to be’ from Gaia’s ‘is’. This is a tendency rather than a developed position, but it runs throughout Lovelock’s writings. Lovelock notes that the whole planet seems to act as if it were celebrating a 'sacred ceremony'. And this makes Gaia a religious as much as a scientific concept: 'She is of this Universe and, conceivably, a part of God. On Earth she is the source of life everlasting and is alive now; she gave birth to humankind and we are part of her.' (Lovelock 1989:205 206).

OK, but what kind of religion? The great danger is that a lack of clarity on ethics leaves us wide open to the oldest snare in history, the yearning to go back. At very many points Lovelock writes of Gaia in a manner that suggests nothing less than the old Mother Goddess, the giver and taker of life, paying no mind either way. Ultimately, the Gaia hypothesis is not capable of being tested, which leaves its status as a science in the air. As an attempt to convey the sense of nature as a living organism, the Gaia hypothesis has been invaluable with this proviso – the position of moral neutrality is not only unsustainable, it is a dangerous moral evasion. The old Mother Goddess will easily fill that vacuum, leaving human beings at the mercy of her amoral necessity. The ancients knew well that the veneration of the Goddess of Nature entailed crucifixion and dismemberment. Such is the price to be paid in the natural cycle of the seasons. Human beings are expendable from a Gaian perspective. Whatever mass stupidity human beings engage in, life on earth would continue in some form or other. Many ecological campaigns make reference to the endangered planet or some such notion. Actually, it is human beings who are more in danger than the planet. Indeed, as Lovelock’s references to the Edenic paradise that has emerged at Chernobyl in the absence of human beings make clear, there are Gaian grounds for arguing that the extinction of the human species could be advantageous to other forms of life. It is pure anthropomorphism on our part to protest and make a plea for our continued existence. That may sound inhumane, but it is a perfectly logical development of Lovelock’s reasoning.
Herein lies the fundamental ambiguity of Lovelock’s concept of Gaia. In reanimating nature, the Gaia thesis affirms that the universe is more like a living organism than a machine. Bringing the earth to life implies that Nature, of which we are a part, has intrinsic value and that its interests as a whole are worthy of human consideration. But this is a moral position, not a scientific position. The moral interpretation of Gaia fosters an ecological sensibility based on a reverence for life.

But that view has more to do with the moral capacity and dignity of human beings than the science of Gaia. Restricted to science, we are confronted with Gaia as a mechanism devoid of purpose and meaning. Nietzsche wrote of a world of power beyond good and evil, but Gaia as natural necessity amounts to reverting to a world before good and evil. For scientists to shout ‘anthropomorphism’ here simply reveals how little science has to offer human beings in the attempt to relate to Gaia. As a living organism, a system, Gaia will continue to regulate and sustain itself with or without human beings. If human beings want more say in their future, they have to start acting as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’ and carve a sustainable role out for themselves in the universe. This goes beyond scientific description and explanation to incorporate a Gaian knowledgeability within human moral praxis.

3 LOVELOCK’S FINAL WARNING
James Lovelock The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning (2009 Allen Lane)

Scepticism, pessimism and the ‘dismal science’
Lovelock begins with an argument that identifies him as a ‘sceptic’. That’s fine in itself. All scientists are sceptical, in that every issue is open to question, every conclusion is conditional. Lovelock’s argument, however, is stronger than this. He criticises the IPCC as a consensus and targets the interests of ‘managers of politicians’ behind the supposed inadequacies of climate science. 

When I criticize the IPCC consensus, I am most of all criticizing the lack of wisdom among managers and politicians who forced (I suspect unwilling) scientists to present the conclusions of different national and regional climate centres this way. (Lovelock 2009). 


This is a view we have heard from deniers of climate change. They consistently attack the notion that there is a consensus with respect to anthropogenic climate change. It is a view that Bjorn Lomberg took in The Sceptical Environmentalist. Lomberg was frequently cited by climate change deniers as supporting their case. Lomberg now admits the case for anthropogenic climate change. Lovelock isn’t a denier, but his scepticism serves to undermine the global political efforts to change public policy and foster business and social practices moving the planet in the direction of the low carbon economy.

This may also be why national governments and international agencies are reluctant to fund observation and measurement but ready to fund models. Measurements by scientists are much harder to contest. It is said that truth is the first casualty of war and it seems that this is also true of climate change. If I am more right than the consensus, it alters profoundly the best course of individual and political action. Simply cutting back fossil-fuel burning, energy use and the destruction of natural forests will not be a sufficient answer to global heating, not least because it seems that climate change can happen faster than we can respond to it and it may be irreversible. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 

There is certainly a case for arguing that science and politics are a poor mix. But that is just the nature of the beast. Politics is not directly responsible to, still less determined by, the science. The world could never be governed by ‘truth’ as Lovelock naively implies. It is evident from the first that James Lovelock lacks a sense of politics, something which is a serious deficiency in someone who so frequently moves from the descriptive to the prescriptive. The research on climate science amounts to hundreds of thousands of papers and articles. The ‘truth’ is contained in that immense body of work. Governments and political agencies concerned with policy making simply lack the cognitive resources required to assimilate and act on research of this weight; they lack the expertise and the time. Governments need to distil the essence of the research. At the same time, government must also balance all other pressures in the process of governing. Lovelock may lament this, but this can easily be turned against Lovelock. Climate science is difficult and is not clear in its conclusions. Scientists have spent lifetimes producing highly conditional truths. Governments and policy makers must in the meantime govern and make public policy that affects the lives of millions of voters and taxpayers and their families. Lovelock laments the ‘lack of wisdom’ amongst managers and politicians. This is a cheap shot that betrays an almost complete innocence of politics on Lovelock’s part. James Lovelock is an independent scientist who lives his life in his shed at home. That is a private world. There are 7 billion people on this planet, requiring a public realm subject to and responding to myriad demands and pressures. ‘Managers and politicians’ are confronted with a surfeit of information day after day. This requires wisdom. It used to be called prudential judgement. The world cannot be governed by science, and the controversies concerning climate science show why this is the case. Lovelock takes his stand on the ‘truth’ here, but he does not monopolise the truth, no more than any other scientist. Governments face many competing forms of the truth from scientists and have to form general conclusions. Whilst truth is conditional and provisional, governments have to govern, which means that every day they have to act. There is no private shed to retire to in the public world.

Lovelock’s snit that ‘It is said that truth is the first casualty of war and it seems that this is also true of climate change’ is an explicit statement that the climate change consensus is politically driven and that its purported truths are falsehoods. More than a decade ago Bjorn Lomberg caused a storm with The Sceptical Environmentalist. He was the darling of deniers. Lomberg’s point that we could be wasting precious resources on account of institutional inadequacies remains, but Lomberg now accepts the case for anthropogenic climate change. Making wild statements like this, Lovelock is playing with fire. Deniers who claim that climate science is pseudo-science, made up by people with axes to grind, make precisely these claims. They once cited Lomberg as an authority. They can do so no more. Lomberg has revealed himself to be extremely untrustworthy in the climate and energy 'debate'.

There is a point to be made about ‘consensus’ in science. There is a case for avoiding condensing the mass of specific research within large volumes, instead adopting a more focused approach with respect to specific pieces of research. Broad generalisations always risk error and simplification. But this is a problem with any attempt to translate scientific research into public policy. There is a real problem here that Lovelock does not address. He takes his stand on the science, he demands that governments respond to the science, and yet he laments the failures and simplicities of governments and politicians when they attempt to act on science. Lovelock doesn’t seem to appreciate what politics is and what politics involves. Of course, the drive for consensus is not proper science. Of course, it has been forced on scientists by government and politics. But how else is scientific research to be turned into public policy? Politicians and policy makers are not experts and are not to be derided for that lack of expertise. It is for scientists to make the policy implications of their work more clear. As soon as the science entails political action, scientists like Lovelock turn tail and run. This puts a very big question mark of resting politics on science. It places a massive question against the role of science in politics. It also suggests that scientists like Lovelock would not be happy unless and until scientists formed the government, in the manner of Plato’s philosopher kings. I suspect that that with the pressures of public office, Lovelock would soon be retreating to his potting shed in his garden.

Lovelock argues forcefully that attempts to cut back fossil-fuel burning, energy use and the destruction of natural forests will not be enough to deal with global warming. It has taken an eternity for the governments and peoples of the world to get this far, and now Lovelock tells us that it isn’t enough, since ‘climate change can happen faster than we can respond to it and it may be irreversible.’ It can certainly be said that there is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy to Lovelock’s doom laded scenario. He decries the science and the politics and claims that it may already be too late. One day, with this approach, it will be.

Consider: the Kyoto Agreement was made more than ten years ago, and it seems that we have done little more to halt climate change since then other than almost empty gestures. Because of the rapidity of the Earth's change we will need to respond more like the inhabitants of a city threatened by a flood. When they see the unstoppable rise of water, their only option is to escape to high ground; it is too late for them to do anything else, as it is for us to try to save our familiar world. (Lovelock 2009: ch 1).

But this is not an argument against the failures and inadequacies of government and politics as such but against the particular politics which puts money and profit before human and planetary well-being. Politics is not all of a piece. A pro-capitalist public agenda may well undermine public efforts to clean up the environment. It has been known. But to damn all government and politics as such amounts to a political disarmament. It denies the possibility of political ecology as an alternative government and politics. We are left with the engineers, with techno-science in the service of an already constituted government and politics. 
As for the argument for adaptation, if human beings are clever enough to adapt in the face of ‘unstoppable’ climate crisis, then they are certainly smart enough to start making the changes necessary to avoid the climate crisis in the first place. Lovelock knows fine well that seven billion people cannot escape to the higher ground. Does he mean outer space or heaven? Lovelock, we know, is enthusiastic about space travel. But if he thinks science alone will save us he is deluded.

So we can note three big claims that Lovelock makes, that the climate science consensus is not true science, that government and politics are bereft of wisdom, and that international agreements make no difference. That is a miserable view. It’s like a football team that is three goals down before a ball has been kicked. It’s difficult to know what politics could do on Lovelock’s reasoning. 

It is as well to highlight the pessimistic strain at the heart of Lovelock’s argument. Back in the 1980s Murray Bookchin argued that ecology is set to replace economics as the ‘gloomy science’ and Lovelock’s work, or the prejudices that lie behind it, prove the point. (Bookchin 1991: 18-21).

Bookchin writes: ‘Today, the term "dismal science" appropriately describes certain trends in the ecology movement-trends that seem to be riding on an overwhelming tide of religious revivalism and mysticism. I refer not to the large number of highly motivated, well-intentioned, and often radical environmentalists who are making earnest efforts to arrest the ecological crisis, but rather to exotic tendencies that espouse deep ecology, biocentrism, Gaian consciousness, and eco-theology, to cite the main cults that celebrate a quasi-religious "reverence" for "Nature" with what is often a simultaneous denigration of human beings and their traits. Mystical ecologists, like many of today's religious revivalists, view reason with suspicion and emphasize the importance of irrational and intuitive approaches to ecological issues.’

Bookchin is sceptical of notions "self-realization" achieved through the immersion of the personal self in a hazy "Cosmic Self," a "'self-in-Self' where 'Self' stands for organic wholeness."
Bookchin criticises Lovelock for his ‘strident condemnations of human beings as the source of the ecological crisis’. There is no analysis of asymmetrical relations of class power in Lovelock. Instead, "we" are all responsible for the environmental crisis. For Lovelock, the word "we" implies a shared responsibility for the environmental crisis, with no distinction at all to be made between rich and poor, the strong and the weak, the elites driving the capitalist system and the victims of their rapacious global policies. "Our humanist concerns about the poor of the inner cities or the Third World," Lovelock declaims, "and our near-obscene obsession with death, suffering, and pain as if these were evils in themselves-these thoughts divert the mind from our gross and excessive domination of the natural world. Poverty and suffering are not sent; they are the consequences of what we do." Our? Who exactly? We? Who is we? And ‘what we do’ reflects choices, decisions, politics.

Lovelock makes no class distinction precisely because his argument is devoid of social analysis. He continues to argue as though the environmental crisis is one of shared responsibility. It is "when we drive our cars and listen to the radio bringing news of acid rain [that] we need to remind ourselves that we, personally, are the polluters." Accordingly, "we are therefore accountable, personally, for the destruction of the trees by photochemical smog and acid rain." 
Bookchin comments: ‘The lowly consumer is seen as the real source of the ecological casts, not the producers who orchestrate public tastes through the mass media and the corporations who own and ravage Lovelock's divine Gaia. The ecology movement is too important to allow itself to be taken over by airy mystics and reactionary misanthropes.’
Whilst Bookchin’s charges might sound unfair, much of what Lovelock writes is reactionary and is misanthropic. Lovelock lacks any sense of politics and ethics as the humanisation of the human species through the evolution of the species. In its original form politics concerned creative human self-realisation. The word politics derives from the ancient Greek polites, meaning those interested in public affairs. The antonym is idiotes, those interested only in private affairs. Politics in its original sense is human salvation, integral to the realisation of the human telos. Aristotle distinguishes a genuine liberty in a public context from the licence of 'doing what one wants'. For Aristotle, living according to the public realm, the constitution, politics properly understood,  is not 'slavery' but 'self-preservation' (P V.ix 1981:332) or 'salvation' (Politics trans Barker 1958:1310a). That is the kind of political wisdom we need now. This sense of politics is wholly absent in Lovelock. Frankly, his approach seems schizophrenic. On the one hand, he despises politics for its anthropomorphism – well it would be, wouldn’t it? – embracing an almost mystical reverence for Gaia in the process; on the other hand, he demands the use of the most controversial and dangerous technologies to ensure the survival of the few. Lovelock’s politics are all about the survival of the few. A politics worthy of the name concerns the salvation of all humankind. Lovelock repudiates this in favour of a lifeboat ethics:

By putting humanity first, and neglecting Gaia, too many greens have sown the seeds of their own destruction and, if they persist, ours as well; they could mitigate their error by dropping their delaying tactics against nuclear energy. More importantly, they would then be helping to power the lifeboat not, as now, sabotaging its engine. (Lovelock 2009). 

That seems to be as crass a piece of illogic as there could be. Lovelock premises the case for nuclear on the massive energy required by the growing cities – after previously slamming cities for using up resources – only to criticise the green rejection of nuclear energy as a case of putting humanity before Gaia. It’s the need for nuclear energy that Lovelock asserts that is a case of putting humanity before Gaia. The extra energy Lovelock demands is required for continued and unsustainable expansion, as Lovelock well knows. Nuclear energy is required to keep big business as usual in business. Lovelock dismisses alternatives: ‘It is absurd to think that we in the UK can alter the Earth's response in our favour by using wind or solar voltaic energy.’









Lovelock presents his version of the ‘God Species’ argument:

The most frequent response from my green friends to the grim message in my last book was: 'You can't say things like that. It gives us nothing to hope for.' This was a good criticism, which helped to clear my mind and let me understand why messengers are said to have a short lifespan. I realized that I had said much about the imminent catastrophe but too little about how we could try to ensure our continued presence on the Earth, giving our descendants a chance in the hot world that soon may come. We are the intelligent elite among animal life on Earth and, whatever our mistakes, Gaia needs us. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 





This may seem an odd statement after all that I have said about the way twentieth-century humans became almost a planetary disease organism. But it has taken Gaia 3.5 billion years to evolve an animal that can think and communicate its thoughts. If we become extinct she has little chance of evolving another. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 

It would be interesting to compare this argument with the old theological arguments for God having made ‘man’ in ‘his’ own image. Reason separates us from the animals and places us at the top of the hierarchy in the Chain of Being. It would also be interesting to compare the argument with Teilhard de Chardin’s noosphere and omega point, the idea that human beings are evolving a collective intelligence which encircles the planet. It would have been wonderful if this aspect of the argument had been fully explored and developed, coming to be related to natural cycles and integrated within the web of life. Instead the overwhelming focus is upon technology, a poor surrogate for true divinity.
Lovelock lacks the insight and imagination to make the case for humanity as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’. Instead, he flip-flops between strong assertions of human technological power and assertions of human passivity within Nature.

When I am warned that my pessimism discourages those who would improve their carbon footprint or do good works such as planting trees, I'm afraid I see such efforts as at best romantic nonsense, or at worst hypocrisy. Agencies now exist which allow air travellers to plant trees to offset the extra carbon dioxide their plane adds to the overburdened air. How like the indulgences once sold by the Catholic Church to wealthy sinners to offset the time they might otherwise spend in purgatory. Thirty years ago I foolishly planted 20,000 trees, hoping to restore to nature the farmland I had bought. I now realize it was a mistake: I should have left the land untouched and let an ecosystem, a natural forest, emerge filled with biodiverse and abundant life, in Gaia's own time. Unlike a mere plantation, such a forest could evolve, or die if it had to, as the climate changed. Planting a tree does not make an ecosystem any more than putting a liver in a jar fed with blood and nutrients makes a man. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 
Agreed, there is a strong element of hypocrisy and even futility in plenty of the environmental practices individuals and businesses engage in. Environmentally damaging business carries on as usual, but ‘good works’ make people feel as though they are making a difference and that something is being done of benefit to the environment. But this is not an argument against all ‘good works’ as such. It is an argument against hypocrisy and futility. Further, there is a need to recognise that enduring change comes at the level of individual psychologies and practices, in changing the world human beings change themselves. There is a worldchanging aspect to good works which proceeds from a change in personality. In engaging in good works, individuals find a role to play themselves in a wider movement for change, building a new character for themselves in the process. As for Lovelock’s argument for leaving the land untouched, why does this not apply to his strong case for nuclear? Lovelock speaks with two voices. He is very pro-active with respect to technologies and actions he favours, but justifies a hands-off Gaia approach to those ‘green’ actions he dislikes.

So it is with all of us: our world has changed for ever and we will have to adapt, and to more than climate change. Even in my lifetime, the world has shrunk from one that was vast enough to make exploration an adventure and included many distant places where no one had ever trod. Now it has become an almost endless city embedded in an intensive but tame and predictable agriculture. Soon it may revert to a great wilderness again. To survive in this new world we need a Gaian philosophy, and to prepare ourselves to fight a barbarian warlord out to seize us and our territory. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 

So that is all the civilisation made by the ‘God species’ amounts to? A continued dependence on a ruthless, indifferent, mean Nature and a need to become barbarians in order to fight barbarians? Lovelock argues for a Gaian philosophy, arguing that the human species has been evolved by Gaia to be an ‘intelligent elite amongst animals’. And what have we done with this intelligence? We have wasted the plenitude of nature to create not a civilisation for all but a lifeboat for the few.

Lovelock should consider the conclusion to Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. MacIntyre draws parallels between today and the fall of Rome. ‘This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament.’

The barbarians have already seized us and our territory. They have been exploiting the Earth and its resources for quite some time now. It is part of our predicament that we cannot see this. James Lovelock, like other technocrats, cannot see that their advocacy of new technologies isn’t in the interests of survival at all but equip the barbarians driving the destruction in the first place. Good works and good intentions produce many forms of hypocrisy and futility. Lovelock can no more see this than those beguiled souls planting a tree.

Lovelock’s argument is not motivated by hope for the better but driven by fear of the worst. Fear and politics are rarely a good mix. Thomas Hobbes, theorist of the state as the machine and monster Leviathan, declared that 'my mother bore twins, myself and fear'. His whole philosophy of authoritarian power was an attempt to overcome his dread and insecurity. Bear this in mind when considering the political implications of Lovelock’s statement that ‘Our gravest dangers are not from climate change itself, but indirectly from starvation, competition for space and resources, and tribal war.’ (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 

The themes of fear, competition, war and survival run throughout Lovelock’s argument:

In a small way the plight of the British in 1940 resembles the state of the civilized world now. At that time we had had nearly a decade of the well-intentioned, but quite wrong belief that peace was all that mattered. The followers of the peace lobbies of the 1930s resembled the green movements now; their intentions were more than good, but wholly inappropriate for the war that was about to start. The fundamental flaw of the green lobbies now is revealed in the name Greenpeace; by conflating the humanism of peace movements with environmentalism they unconsciously anthropomorphize Gaia. It is time to wake up and realize that Gaia is no cosy mother that nurtures humans and can be propitiated by gestures such as carbon trading or sustainable development. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 

Lovelock’s argument doesn’t make any sense at all. It isn’t coherent and it lacks consistency. Lovelock’s argument is riddled with inconsistencies.

Because I am old I often think of Gaia as if she were an old lady of about my age. I can already hear Pecksniffian colleagues complaining, 'You are doing it again - anthropomorphizing the Earth, talking of it as alive.' But I say to them, 'If it is not alive then how can it die?' And die she will when the sun's heat becomes more than can be withstood. Those of us who have thought about it see her lifespan extending no more than 500 million years from now. It sounds a lot, but since she is now 3.5 billion years old she has already lived nearly 88 per cent of her life. If I can reach 100 then, intriguingly, at eighty-nine as I write, I am now the same relative age as Gaia. (Lovelock ch 3 2009). 

Lovelock rejects the anthropomorphism of Greenpeace in one chapter, only to argue that anthropomorphism is necessary, unavoidable and justifiable in the next chapter. In one chapter he denounces the idea that the human species can destroy Gaia as hubris, only to in the next chapter that Gaia can indeed die. The science might be good, but Lovelock is a positive menace in spreading the message of ecology. He needs to spell out more clearly what he thinks our position and role within Gaia is, what kind of mutual influence is at work.

Lovelock states openly that the human species is unique in its evolved intelligence. ‘We are the intelligent elite among animal life on Earth and, whatever our mistakes, Gaia needs us.’ Gaia needs us. Lovelock makes statement after statement about what Gaia needs. Lovelock not only unconsciously anthropomorphizes Gaia himself, he seems to claim the exclusive right to speak for Gaia. Many a time when I read Lovelock stating what Gaia ‘needs’ I hear the words of Norman Bates, ‘mother isn’t feeling herself today’. Gaia is indeed ‘no cosy mother’. Much of what Lovelock writes sounds like he has a taste for a little maternal discipline and punishment. At times it sounds like Lovelock has put on Gaia’s dress in order to indulge his own misanthropy.

Lovelock’s schizophrenic approach makes a certain political sense. Like every spoilt child, Lovelock likes getting what he wants. When others get in his way or see things differently – it’s called politics – he runs and tells his mummy to stop them and punish them. There is a consistency in Lovelock’s targets – he rejects environmentalism as politics. So who does he think will act on the science?

The association of green politics with appeasement is beneath contempt. There was an alternative approach to the fight against Fascism in the 1930s, the one adopted by those who volunteered to fight Franco in the Spanish Civil War. There are many green activists who are at war on the environmental crisis. I suspect that Lovelock has even less time for green activists who challenge the law directly. (Although he does ask where all the Swampys have gone).

Lovelock needs to be challenged on this. Greens all over the world can show the tangible benefits of their activism. It is less than clear what Lovelock can show for his efforts. If his case concerning the climate crisis and what needs to be done to resolve it was clear, then why is he still having to make it in 2009? A final warning? What happened to all the other warnings?

Lovelock writes books demanding that the human race see Gaia as alive and to change its ways accordingly – then he proceeds to attack those environmentalists who do seek change for anthropomorphism. They have got it wrong in some way. How does this work? Of course human beings are anthropomorphic. To make any sense, Lovelock’s view must entail a human commitment to sustainable living. Yet he condemns Greenpeace’s commitment to some such thing as a futile gesture. Other than nuclear energy to fuel the status quo, Lovelock is depressingly short on solutions. But to attack human beings for anthropomorphism is remarkably dumb. Does he really think the human race, in numbers sufficient to count, is going to be motivated to change by value free science alone? Lovelock writes that ‘Gaia, even though we are a part of her, will always dictate the terms of peace.’ (Lovelock ch 1 2009). Maybe, since we are a part of Gaia, then we are party to the negotiation of those terms.
Lovelock’s view here implies complete political passivity and fatalism. And that begs the question as to why Lovelock is issuing a ‘final warning’. The terms of the peace will be dictated not by us but by Gaia. Anything the human race attempts is mere anthropomorphism, as well as being futile. Lovelock’s final warning is therefore likely to fall on deaf ears.
Lovelock applies his argument against greens and political activists. He plainly doesn’t realise that the argument against politics as anthropomorphism applies also to himself and his own recommendations. Of course, Lovelock can defend himself by arguing that arguments for nuclear etc are merely an attempt to adapt and survive on basis of the terms dictated by Gaia. Fine, but greens can say the same about sustainable living. There are other ways of adapting and surviving.

There is another aspect of Lovelock’s argument which needs comment - dualism. Lovelock talks as though Gaia and the human species are independent of each other. If the human species is a part of Gaia, as Lovelock claims, and if Gaia has evolved the human species to be intelligent, then it would follow that the application of human intelligence fits the needs of Gaia. Gaia needs the human species in order to be herself. Lovelock argues some such thing when he claims that ‘Gaia needs us’ as an evolved intelligence. So in what way does Gaia dictate terms against us rather than with us? Any terms that Gaia dictates are terms we dictate to ourselves. It is our conceptual apparatus integrated with planetary cycles and rhythms that shape our thoughts and actions. 

Lovelock evokes the Dunkirk spirit. This is not encouraging. The last throw of the dice of a political leader or party about to go under is to call for the old Dunkirk spirit.

Back in May 1940 we woke to find facing us across the Channel a wholly hostile continental force about to invade. We were alone without an effective ally … We need another Churchill now to lead us from the clinging, flabby, consensual thinking of the late twentieth century and to bind the nation into a single-minded effort to wage a difficult war. We need a leader who will stir us all but especially to stir those young green activists who so bravely protested against all forms of desecration of the countryside. Where are the 'Earth First' battalions, and where have Swampy and his friends gone? (Lovelock ch 1 2009)

Lovelock’s question concerning ‘Swampy and his friends’ can be answered directly and clearly – the activists have got political and have started to engage in the kind of long range strategic thinking and practice in politics that is required. A coherent, sustained political effort aiming at fundamental transformation is more effective than guerrilla struggles at the fringes of development. It is also the kind of ‘green’ politics that Lovelock snipes against in his book.

Lovelock has the makings of the ‘God species’ argument. 

What has most moved me during the writing of this book is the thought that we humans are vitally important as a part of Gaia, not through what we are now but through our potential as a species to be the progenitors of a much better animal. Like it or not we are now its heart and mind, but to continue to improve in this role we have to ensure our survival as a civilized species and not revert into a cluster of warring tribes that was a stage in our evolutionary history. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 


Indeed yes. The planet is one big lifeboat and there is room enough for all, not just for some. This is why the anthropomorphic route is the best option. It begs the question why, whenever environmentalism takes a political dimension, Lovelock charges its adherents with anthropomorphism? The distinction between human beings as they are and human beings as they could be is impeccably Aristotelian and puts the accent on essential potentialities. Realising those and exercising them as human capacities integrated with environing relations – social and natural – does indeed point to further evolution as a civilised species. Excellent. Lovelock warns against our reverting into a cluster of warring tribes. Yet at other points in his argument, this does seem to be what Lovelock envisages. Time and again, Lovelock rejects environmentalism as politics. He is particularly scathing about international agreements. 

if we implemented in full the recommendations made at Bali within a year, far from stabilizing the climate, it could grow hotter not cooler. This is why I said in The Revenge of Gaia, 'We live in a fool's climate and are damned whatever we do.'

Well of we are so damned, why does Lovelock go to such great lengths to advocate nuclear energy? It would be better to let Gaia bring the curtain down on a failing species and let the survivors, suitably chastened, rebuild, a new but wiser species. Instead, Lovelock would saddle survivors with radioactive waste to last them tens of thousands of years. Cursed be the ground thy walk upon – for previous generations having walked upon it. Generations not yet born would be denied the Eden we have so callously thrown away.

Lovelock is plainly sceptical of the association of ‘big science’ with ‘big government’. If we were to add ‘big business’ it is clear that he has a point. 

Until we know for certain how to cure global heating, our greatest efforts should go into adaptation, to preparing those parts of the Earth least likely to be affected by adverse climate change as the safe havens for a civilized humanity. In choosing havens safe from serious climate change we will need the guidance of the IPCC and perhaps they should be tasked to do this. Most importantly, we have to stop pretending that there is any possible way back to that lush, comfortable and beautiful Earth we left behind sometime in the twentieth century. The further we go along the path of business as usual the more we are lost. (Lovelock ch 2 2009).

I would argue that it is adherence to ‘business as usual’ – it’s called capitalism - that is saddling science and government with the impossible task of curing global warming. The institutional international framework is not geared to change in the cause of ecological health and well-being but to managing the global political economy. It follows that we will get only those policies and only that science which fits big business as usual. To this extent, Lovelock is right. We need to broaden his concept of adaptation into a conception of civilisation building, empowering human beings in their everyday practices and in their social groups as change agents capable of building the new world from the local level upwards. 

There is a strong suspicion that science has become institutionalised, something which confines it within a failing system.

I sense the onset in science of a battle between those who live by theory and those of us who go out on to the Earth to observe and measure. The observers are the Cinderellas of science and always have been. Charles Darwin did not travel the Earth to prove a theory. He was a supreme observer and naturalist: the theory was developed later, some of it after he had died. The ocean is truly an aqua incognita and vitally important for the climate because it stores most of the extra heat of global warming. It is right to build theories of the ocean even though we know so little about it, but quite wrong to use them to make policies. First they must be tested by long-term observation and measurement, and that I think should be our first priority. (Lovelock ch 2 2009).

This is wrong on a number of levels. No scientist just goes out and observes, records and measures. Always, always, there is a theory which motivates the action in the first place and which shapes the questions we ask and allows us to distinguish the significant from the insignificant. But this is wrong with respect to Darwin. The idea that Darwin travelled the Earth without a theory is errant nonsense. This is tantamount to saying that there was just as much possibility of Darwin coming back from his voyages with a theory about navigation, international piracy, or cultural relativism as a theory of evolution. Darwin had a theory, that’s what guided his observation. The idea that Darwin was a humble empiricist amassing a number of accidental and discrete facts, with no connection to theory, is an old-fashioned view, born of a dominant methodological atomism. Lovelock presents Darwin as a simple empiricit with a gentleman’s contempt for theory. Biologists such as Stephen Jay Gould have set the record straight here (Stephen Jay Gould, The Panda's Thumb). The point matters because the failure to take theory seriously leads to a remarkably blinkered view. Human beings have to develop the ability to go beyond sensory practices and see the world beyond the end of their own noses.
Even worse, even though Lovelock knows fine well that we are running out of time – indeed, in places, he argues that it is already too late – he asks for time for further research before formulating policies. This sounds like the old ecological parable concerning the frog in the jar that is being heated. The changes in temperature are so minute and incremental that the frog waits and waits and waits for certain proof of heating dangerous to life. By the time the proof comes, the frog has been boiled. My view is that Lovelock’s call to postpone public policy and instead engage in long-term observation and measurement is a classic case of paralysis through analysis. A frog would have the instincts to get out of the boiling water. It seems that our best scientists are much more clever that this.

Lovelock’s theoretical innocence and political naivety leads him badly astray. This is most clear in his praise of Nigel Lawson's An Appeal to Reason as ‘thoughtful’. In what way? Lawson states a case for reason which is so general as to be trite. These are norms of rationality which are shared by all researchers and academics, and require no great insight. I don’t remember Nigel Lawson respecting these norms when it came to the Big Bang of 1987. Lawson was deaf to appeals to reason then, when any number of economists warned that liberalising finance would imbalance the economy and permit financiers to gamble their way out of economic reality and leave future generations picking up their gambling debts. I remember it well. I remember political economist Derek Routledge giving us chapter and verse on the deleterious economic consequences likely to follow the Big Bang at Liverpool Polytechnic in 1987. I have learned to distrust Lawson’s reason. 

Yet, even with the benefit of hindsight, Lovelock praises Lawson to the rafters. ‘His book reads like a breath of fresh air coming from an open window in an overheated conference room. Most climate-change deniers fail to hide a vested interest in the status quo and are unconvincing or even boring. But here is a book denying global heating written with passion but still a proper detachment, as if the author were the defence counsel for the deniers of climate change.’ (Lovelock ch3 2009).

On point of fact, unless I have misread his position, Nigel Lawson doesn’t actually deny the science of climate change and global warming at all. Not in its fundamentals in any case. He is careful lest he himself be portrayed as against scientific reason. Lawson is more concerned with the political and legislative implications of the findings of climate science. He is concerned to prevent political actions that impair private money-making. So Lovelock’s grasp of the issue may well be shaky.

Far from being a breath of fresh air, Lawson’s book smells like a cess pit. Lawson simply makes a general appeal for reason with which few would argue. The deniers of climate science are very good at claiming reason for themselves. The point of the strategy is clear. It implies that those who propose anthropogenic climate change are against reason. Geologist and climate change denier Ian Plimer concludes his rabid assault on environmentalists – they are communists, atheists and Pagans – with the words of Pope Benedict XVI. These words are worth quoting and pondering.

It is important for assessments in this regard to be carried out prudently, in dialogue with experts and people of wisdom, uninhibited by ideological pressure to draw hasty conclusions, and above all with the aim of reaching agreement on a model of sustainable development capable of ensuring the well-being of all while respecting environmental balances. Human stupidity is only exceeded by God's mercy, which is infinite. 

A sane and sober viewpoint, indeed. I wholly concur with the words of the Pope. But don’t let anyone think that the likes of Plimer and Lawson are full of humility. For Plimer, the influence of human activity on planet Earth needs to be put in some perspective. What he means is that, compared to the power of Nature or God, human efforts are puny. Whatever will be will be. In the meantime, business as usual can be carried on apace. Plimer wants licence to despoil and pollute and degrade and destroy – Nature can take it.

Nigel Lawson appeals to reason. Reason would be a very good idea indeed. But it is interesting to contrast the appeal to restrain our attempts to alter our practices so as to live lighter on the land – this is all an irrational waste of time, effort and money – with the continuation and indeed the acceleration of the exploitation of nature. Plimer and Lawson and their ilk are the greatest activists on the planet. John Prescott spoke the blunt and honest truth with respect to Lawson’s Global Warming Federation – it’s not so much a think tank as an oil tank. Yet Lovelock takes Lawson’s side politically even as he rejects Lawson’s view on the science.

I think that he is right to criticize the hype that goes with the public response to global heating. But I wholly disagree with his denial, and think there is only the smallest possibility that the world will not grow hotter…. Lawson's book forces us to think about the Earth and what we are doing to it in the larger context. I applaud his astringency and his disapproval of the trendy populism that now attaches to anything and everything seen as green. (Lovelock ch 3 2009). 

Trendy populism? Trendy populism? In the recent UK council elections, the Green Party stood candidates in every seat. Result after result showed a hundred or so votes cast for the Green candidate, trailing in fourth or fifth, with occasional bright spots. If only Green politics were more trendy and popular! There are far easier ways of being populist in politics than being Green. If Lovelock means the Greenwash that applies to business wanting to appear environmentally friendly, then let him say so. Even here, hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue. It is evidence that an ecological sensibility is seeping into the social and psychological fabric of modern culture. If Lovelock means the way that people across all sections of society are paying lip service to green ideas, then isn’t that at least the beginning of the change in consciousness that is required? If he is referring to environmentalism as politics, then his view is manifest nonsense. Greens in politics are not as popular as the major mass parties. Trendy? Isn’t this the trend we want? This is disappointing stuff. Just how does Lovelock think people are going to respond to his ‘final warning’? If Lovelock can’t see what lies behind Lawson’s attempt to expropriate reason and deny it to others, then he is politically naïve and, as such, a positive menace to the cause of environmentalism.

Lifeboat ethics and politics

Lovelock does understand that behind the failures of big government and big science lies big business as usual. 

Our contemporary industrial civilization is hopelessly unfitted to survive on an overpopulated and under-resourced planet, deluded by the thought that clever inventions and progress will provide the shoehorn that fits us into our imaginary niche. I think it is better if we accept and understand how poor is the chance of our personal survival, but take hope from the fact that our species is unusually tough, has survived seven major climate catastrophes in the last million years, and is unlikely to go extinct in the coming climate catastrophe. Geneticists, interested in the evolution of humans, have observed that at one time in the last million years we passed through a genetic bottleneck in which our ancestors might have been as few as 2,000. Gaia, fortunately, is much tougher and as a living planet has survived for over a quarter the age of the cosmos. (Lovelock ch 3 2009). 

The argument makes some grim evolutionary sense. It is not, however, a reassuring argument and, indeed, so diminishes hope as to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The argument really does amount to saying that it is pointless doing anything. All we can do is just wait for the crash and start again with the fittest. In depriving people of hope, Lovelock prepares the ground for this crash.
Lovelock denounces the thought that our ‘clever inventions’ will save us as a delusion. Lovelock’s view here has the merit of having human beings face fearlessly the consequences of having lived as gods for far too long. But it does beg the question as to why Lovelock is so determined to saddle the survivors with the long term hazard of nuclear waste. Those citing Lovelock as a source highlight his advocacy of nuclear power. They tend to miss the fact he thinks it’s all pretty hopeless anyway and that technological salvation is a delusion. Lovelock in this instance denies that our ‘clever inventions’ will save us. Yet he falls prey to that delusion himself, making very strong claims for nuclear power, biotechnology, GM food and geoengineering. At other times, he demands that we learn to live lightly on the land.

What is certain is that it is our duty to survive. Our greatest efforts therefore should go to learning how to live as well as is feasible on the soon-to-be-diminished hot Earth. (Lovelock ch 3 2009). 

I couldn’t agree more. But this is more than survival, this is sustainable living, learning to live well on the planet. The problem is that Lovelock keeps ruling essential features of it out as futile. Lovelock condemned greens for their concern with ‘humanity as a whole’. There should be more attention paid to Gaia, he argues. In making that argument, Lovelock compared civilisation as a lifeboat. For Lovelock, there is no room for humanity as a whole on this lifeboat in the ‘heat age’.

In certain ways we are like the passengers aboard a ship that has diverted to take on board refugees escaping from some drought-stricken land. To the refugees we are their lifeboat, but the captain and officers of the ship have to decide how many we can take - who can be allowed to board and who must remain and take their chances? Fairness suggests a lottery, but common sense rules out so simple a selection. The sick, the lame and the old would have to stay behind and take their chances along with passengers who felt called to help them. On ships it used to be women and children first, but some men would be needed - what would be the right ratio of the sexes? I suspect that it would not be far from equal, for that is the proportion that natural selection has chosen. (Lovelock ch 3 2009). 

This is miserable, mean, inhumane rubbish, the kind of immoral science that paved the way for Nazism in the past. That the strong should care for the weak used to be considered the essence of ethics in a civilised society. Lovelock eliminates the very ethic upon which civilisation was built – those who care are left behind. Lovelock doesn’t see the strong evolutionary case for an ethics of care, the fact that human beings need each other in order to be themselves. He emphasises crude survival in a competitive sense. He doesn’t see that such attitudes foster an aggression, egoism, and rapacity that is self-defeating in the long run. Lovelock’s lifeboat will be subject to constant mutiny. 

We shouldn’t be surprised at this callous discarding of ethics, of course. The global economy is already organised around exploitative and alienative relations that generate inequality and injustice, needless socially induced poverty and famine for some, excessive riches for others. To claim that there is anything natural about this is a libel against Gaia.

‘There is no simple number for the carrying capacity of the Earth for people’, continues Lovelock. ‘It depends on the way the people live.’ Indeed yes. The problem is not one of the number of people but how they live. Looking at this more closely destroys notions of a shared responsibility for environmental crisis. The consumption patterns of some are environmentally irresponsible. Environmentalists are trying to secure a sustainable modus vivendi that recognises civilised standards and decency for all. Lovelock derides them as ‘green puritans’. ‘Like the skier who accidentally starts an avalanche, there is little we can do to stop its destructive course.’ This means that ‘all our efforts to become carbon neutral, to put on sandals and a hair shirt and follow the green puritans’ are ‘pointless’. Not that Lovelock thinks much has a point anyway. ‘Can we go back to business as usual for a while and be happy while it lasts? We could - but not for long.’ (Lovelock ch 3 2009). Like Leo Blum in The Producers, all we can do is sit there repeating ‘no way out, no way out.’ So why is James Lovelock writing a book on the subject? Why does he offer ‘a final warning’ if he thinks nothing can be done? Every writer of a book is an optimist. If a book couldn’t make a difference, then there would be no point writing it. 
We need to reject Lovelock’s taste for lifeboat ethics and politics. Any problem is easily solved if you are prepared to write off the lives of billions of human beings. But isn’t Gaia going to do that anyway?
‘Gaia, like God, helps those who help themselves’ argues Lovelock. It is indeed a co-evolution, the belief in God as an expression of the moral law within each and all of us. That’s how humanity as a whole gives itself an ideal and sets about achieving it. And God is about much more than technology. Lovelock is a big advocate of technology, but only specific technologies.

It was not enough in 1939 to dig personal air-raid shelters, nor is it now enough to genuflect with small green gestures; nor to put windmills and solar panels on the roof to supplement the electricity supply; nor to hold meetings before that great religious symbol of spin, the giant white wind turbine and sing hymns about salvation for the planet. 

Lovelock is good at denigrating the sources of renewable energy. The same point applies to the advocacy of nuclear power, biotechnology, GM crops and geoengineering. Technology in any of its forms is not God. It is not technology that matters but how we use it. The argument can no more rest on nuclear and fossil fuels than it can on tide, wind, wave and solar power. We need to ask questions about energy use, why we need so much energy and what we achieve with so much energy use.

 Lovelock urges that ‘not only must we survive but we must stay civilized and not degenerate into mob rule where gang leaders promote themselves as warlords.’ That is precisely what the ‘greens’ Lovelock persistently derides are arguing for. But this scenario of mob rule and gang war is precisely what Lovelock is inviting with his grim ‘we’re doomed’, nothing can be done, lifeboat ‘ethics’. Above and beyond the international and institutional level of big government, business and science we need effective local action now. Yet Lovelock is concerned ‘most of all’ with securing supplies of food, clothing and, if we continue with city life, energy. 

Shouldn’t we be more concerned with changing our way of life to reduce demands on resources and energy? That seems obvious but it seems that few think it is possible. Hence futile technological gambling.
Lovelock knows this. Having dismissed the futility of the ‘Green puritans’ he evokes the old war time spirit.

Just as in 1939 we had to give up on a massive scale the comfortable lifestyle of peacetime, so soon we may feel rich with only a quarter of what we consume now. If we do it right and with enthusiasm it will not seem a depressing phase of denial but instead, as in 1940, a chance to redeem ourselves….Whatever happens, it will be quite a change from the banalities of city life now. 

Isn’t this better put in terms of building an ecological way of life? This is what ‘Green puritans’ keep arguing. So why does Lovelock keep taking cheap shots at the people who are acting to bring about this change, giving strength to climate change deniers’ claims about ‘eco-zealots’ in the process? One could argue that Lovelock is interested only in the science and that he lacks interest and expertise in politics. The problem is that that does not stop Lovelock from dabbling in politics to an alarming degree. For all of the insistence on cool scientific appraisal, Lovelock indulges himself with some wild undisciplined speculation.

Orderly survival requires an unusual degree of human understanding and leadership and may require, as in war, the suspension of democratic government for the duration of the survival emergency. (Lovelock ch3 2009). 

Who guards the guardians? Once democratic government has been suspended, it tends not to come back. Those invested with power are usually reluctant to hand it back. Unless one really does believe that the Guardians really do have the public good at heart and that Lenin really did serve the objective interests of the proletariat. Max Weber warned marxists at the beginning of the century that the self-dissolving dictatorship of the proletariat is a chimera and that the political reality would evince a dictatorship of the officials. We have been this way before and it wasn’t pleasant.

I suspect that effective action to sustain this island community will come from some form of internal tribal coherence and rare leadership, not from international or European good intentions. With luck the same will apply with the other havens. (Lovelock ch3 2009). 

This sounds depressingly like Max Weber’s demand for charismatic leadership as the only hope within a routinised, bureaucratised capitalist modernity. The clause that Weber had written into the Weimar constitution to allow for the possibility of rare leadership was exploited to the full and led to the rise of Hitler to power. Internal tribal coherence? Isn’t that the old Volkish myth? On balance, international good intensions remain our better bet. Lovelock thinks that ‘there will be time enough for internationalism during the stability of the long hot age.’ What stability is that in light of the suspension of democracy and the warring of tribal states? And make no mistake, that that is what Lovelock envisages.

We have no option but to make the best of national cohesion and accept that war and warlords are part of it. For island havens an effective defence force will be as important as our own immune systems. Like it or not we may have to increase the size of and spending on our armed forces… As in war there could be the rapid application of new technology to climate and survival problems. I hope that it will work, but I do not think humans as a species are yet clever enough to handle the coming environmental crisis and I fear they will spend their efforts trying to combat global heating instead of trying to adapt and survive in the new hot world. So let us prove Garrett Hardin wrong when gloomily he said in 1968 that our condition is truly tragic; for in tragedy there is no escape. We can prove him wrong by surviving. (Lovelock ch3 2009). 

Lovelock’s argument for war and warlords would seem to prove Hardin right. This is the end of civilisation and the beginning of an immoral eco-fascism driven by the ruthless biological imperatives of natural survival. That Lovelock is seriously and strongly advocating the extension of nuclear power whilst preparing for a future of war and rule by warlords is plain madness. 
There are alternatives, we can employ our resources better than this. Let’s look at Lovelock’s call for increased spending on arms. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute calculates global arms spending at $1.738 trillion (2011 figures). How much more expenditure would Lovelock require for security? Surely, a truly ecological approach looks to redefine the concept of security as part of the same process whereby we restructure the economy in a more ecologically sound way. A century dominated by war has  issued in a concept of security which is defined almost exclusively in military terms. The military budgets of nations dwarfs those for foreign aid. It is all about choosing life over death. In the twentieth century, the means of production have been transformed into means of destruction. Instead of measuring a country's power in what it can destroy, we need to redefine power in terms of what nations can build together. This is a kind of internationalism we can start engaging in as an alternative to military concepts of security. This new concept of security would look less at military threats and more to the problems posed by climate change, population growth, water shortages, and food shortages. These are the ecological threats that generate and intensify social collapse and political instability. True security must be based on policies for dealing with these.
Redefining security in a conceptual sense entails its redefinition in fiscal terms. The world has a huge military budget, with costs continuing to spiral as a result of greater technological sophistication. And where one nation spends, another must follow. Ultimately, the nations are bidding against each other, wasting more and more resources. 
The enormity of a $1.7 trillion military budget gives the lie to the claim that we lack the resources to save civilization. The fiscal resources are already there. It is the political and psychological resources that are deficient. The military establishment, with military bases scattered around the world, armies and fleets in every sea and every continent, will not save civilization. That kind of imperialism belongs to a past age. We need to redefine the concept of security and achieve the goal of a safe and sustainable planet by expanding food production, redistributing resources to achieve even development, stabilising population, by building wind farms and solar power plants, and by building schools and hospitals to give everyone a decent standard of living. That is to build a world without refugees.

Energy sources and energy policy
When it comes to energy sources and energy policy, Lovelock begins with an assertion of human insignificance with respect to Nature. We are ‘deluded’ if we think that the human presence on the Earth is all that matters’. But I wonder who is truly deluded here. It is Lovelock calling for increased arms spending and the rule of the warlords to save civilisation. To argue that civilisation can only be saved in this way is the biggest delusion of all. Lovelock is impressed by human insignificance. 

when considering energy and our use of it we must never forget that the natural flux of energy and those essential gases oxygen and carbon dioxide from the biosphere is nearly twenty times larger than all of our emissions, and it changes as the world warms. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 
We are bemused by carbon, and when we talk and think about our abuse of the Earth we concentrate almost exclusively on greenhouse-gas emissions from transport and industry and from domestic heating and air-conditioning. We try to convince ourselves that if we sufficiently improved our carbon footprint all would be well again and business as usual could continue. In reality increasing numbers of people increases the population of livestock and of the area of land we use for ourselves. True enough, the world total of domestic and industrial emissions of 30 gigatons of carbon dioxide annually is far too great, but so are the consequences of too many people competing for land with the natural forests of the world. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

This is nonsense and dangerous nonsense to boot. Lovelock’s attitude to the need to reduce carbon emissions is cavalier to say the least. It has taken an eternity to get government and industry pointed in the right direction, let alone moving. But it is happening. A low carbon economy is not only well worth achieving, it is well within our grasp. Of course, there is a serious point here, that all we could be achieving is a more efficient way to destroy the ecology of the planet. An expansionary economic system will continue to grow, whether the energy it uses is efficient or inefficient. But in Lovelock’s argument there is no analysis of the capital system and its expansionary drive, no relating the exponential demands for energy to the accumulative logic of capital, no recognition of social inequality, class, exploitative relations, consumption patterns, nothing. Instead, politics and society are just bracketed out for a dreary recitation of old Adam’s weaknesses. And, condemning environmentalists for a ‘business as usual’ approach, Lovelock assumes the continuation of the biggest business of all – the symbiotic relation of the state and capital. This is risible, the kind of approach that gives ecology a very bad name. Looking forward to the suspension of democratic government, increased arms expenditure and rule by the warlords is inevitable given Lovelock’s assertion of political paralysis. We can affirm the commitment to achieving the low carbon economy by connecting the changes necessary to achieve it with broader social and political changes which serve to check the expansionary drive of the economy.

That lack of analysis of the capital system in terms of the asymmetrical distribution of resources, exploitation, class and control seriously hobbles Lovelock’s argument and turns it ugly in places. This comes out clearly in his strong advocacy of nuclear energy as being able to see us through the troubled times ahead when the climate changes and there are shortages of food and fuel and major demographic changes.

Those in Britain should think of the troubled years of the 1970s and early 1980s, when industrial conflict over coal threatened electricity supplies. It was the availability of nearly 30 per cent of the electricity we used from nuclear energy that sustained the nation and prevented the quarrel turning into a civil war. The only thing that prevents an immediate build of new nuclear electricity is legislation put in place by previous governments and unreasoning fear. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

Priceless!!!! Frankly, this is side-splittingly funny. Lovelock refers to the Miners Strike of 1984-5 as a ‘quarrel’. Lovelock does not see the politics involved, doesn’t see the question as one of class power and exploitation. Lovelock’s words are very revealing in a political sense. The miners – and the working class in general in struggle – put the fear of god into the ruling class. There are only two value creating forces in the world, labour and nature, and capital wants a free lunch at the expense of both of them. The miners were a powerful section of the working class and were deliberately engaged in conflict as part of a general and systematic assault on the power of labour in general. Lovelock uses the term ‘civil war’ because he is too sensitive a soul to recognise the reality of class war. Ralph Miliband in Divided Societies (1989) argued that the class struggle is always being waged. If you do not wage the class struggle from below, the ruling class will be waging it from above every single day as a condition of its own survival. Lovelock ignores the realities of class politics and celebrates nuclear energy for the way it allowed the country to avoid ‘civil war’. I wonder in whose class interests nuclear energy worked? Welcome to the brave new world of mass unemployment and call centres. But Lovelock’s justification of nuclear energy here is very revealing politically. It is a power source that undercuts working class power and serves to maintain an exploitative and expansionary class system – centralising power and supporting the very economic system that is wrecking the planet. Let’s use nuclear energy to avoid class war, let’s have a centralised energy source removed from the people. Being charitable, we could say that Lovelock is a political buffoon who should stick to science. This would be too simple. There does appear to be a consistency in his political views. Time and again he takes aim against the left and against ‘greens’. He is entitled to do so, so long as he spells out his politics as politics rather than hiding his politics behind science. And I am certainly not going to accept accusations of ‘unreasoning fear’ from a man who argues for the suspension of democratic government, lifeboat ethics, increased arms spending, nuclear power and the rule of the warlords. Reason shows alternatives to all of these. Lovelock wouldn’t appreciate being accused of an ‘unreasoning stupidity’.

Lovelock employs a rather underhand mode of reasoning. His book is littered with assertions presented as arguments like this one:

I think we fail to welcome nuclear energy as the one good and reliable power source because we have been grievously misled by a concatenation of lies. Falsehood has built on falsehood and is mindlessly repeated by the media until belief in the essential evil of all things nuclear is part of an instinctive response. Here are some of these untruths and their refutations:
Nuclear energy emits large quantities of carbon dioxide and is therefore as polluting as burning fossil fuel. This is nonsense: a nuclear power station while running emits no carbon dioxide at all. 

And on and on Lovelock goes, setting up straw men and knocking them down with unsubstantiated assertions. One would be in a better position to determine the truth or falsehood of these claims and counter-claims if Lovelock actually named some names and identified the sources of these claims. ‘The media’? Who are they? There is a wealth of research which states the case against nuclear on every ground from safety to finance. That research extends to volumes. Lovelock’s ‘yes it is’ ‘no it isn’t’ knockabout is worthless. It’s a dialogue of the deaf, and the pro-nuclear lobby are every bit as biased as the anti-nuclear activists. One says black, the other says white. Lovelock’s reasoning here is more in the manner of opinion than knowledge. He doesn’t actually engage the serious research. The idea that the problem is merely falsehood spread by mindless repetition by ‘the media’ beggars belief. Which media? The problem with the media is that it cannot take sides on truth and falsehood but must represent a variety of platforms for reasons of balance. The idea that the media has been propagating anti-nuclear propaganda is not born out by the facts, far from it. In fact, the issue is so mind-numbingly boring, there isn’t much coverage at all. And what there is is hedged in with qualifications, lest one side or the other allege bias.

Lovelock gives us assertion after assertion, packed with all manner of logic chopping, selective use of evidence, setting of false antitheses, category mistakes, and hazy relativism. ‘Nuclear is hardly dirty compared with the rest, and the figure given includes all emissions over its entire operation, taking into account mining and processing the ore and decommissioning and waste disposal.’ He contests what goes into these figures and what is left out of those figures in order to show that nuclear is the most efficient and the least expensive. ‘It is often said that nuclear waste is uniquely deadly and will persist for millions of years and poison the global environment. All pollution by chemical elements persists. Lead pollution from a mine, smelter or the factory where it is made into things for commerce lasts for ever; and the same is true of mercury, arsenic, cadmium and thallium: these toxic elements are permanently with us.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). As every six year old knows, two wrongs don’t make a right. According to Lovelock, nuclear waste fades away. ‘In 600 years the high-level waste from a nuclear power station is no more radioactive or dangerous than the uranium ore from which it originated. Far more importantly, there is hardly any nuclear waste to worry about. The yearly output of waste from a 1000 MW nuclear power station is enough to fill a London taxi. Now perhaps you see why I would welcome its burial at my home in Devon. It would be a useful source of heat.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 
Lovelock dismisses the claim that there is a shortage of uranium as ‘utter nonsense’. ‘Another falsehood is the claim that the emissions from nuclear installations are a threat to life and health. Nuclear radiation is natural and a normal part of our environment: we and all life evolved with it. The total emissions from the UK nuclear industry are 500 times less than that of the radon gas we breathe every day of our lives. Radon comes from the rocks and soil and is natural.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 
And on it goes. Every claim against nuclear is a falsehood. It makes you wonder what all the fuss has been about. It makes you wonder why, without government backing, particularly financial backing, no private business or insurance company will go within a billion miles of nuclear. We now read of the Japanese government bailing out the private company responsible for the Fukushima disaster to the tune of billions. It was the only way the company could continue operations. No government, no nuclear.

We heard scientists making the same claims that Lovelock makes in the days after the Fukushima disaster to manage the news. If nuclear is so safe, it begs the question why the Japanese government was panicking in the aftermath of the disaster. People may not be experts on the science, but they are no fools and know when they are being lied to and manipulated. Lovelock’s arrogance is a good reason why the general public tends to trust its intuitions and instincts against scientists. That doesn’t make intuition and instinct correct, of course, and it doesn’t make the science wrong. But government and science have often been involved in a conspiracy against the people and the people are right to be suspicious. That can only damage science.

Lovelock claims that the belief in the essential evil of all things nuclear is part of an instinctive response created by the media building falsehood on falsehood. The media may well have reported CND marches and such like, but that doesn’t mean that it took sides one way or another. But I can argue for this instinctive response as referring to something deeper. Human beings have evolved an instinctive mistrust of every crackpot theory merchants and chancers and false prophets put before them. Human beings survive over millennia because they have learned to trust the tested, the sound, the applicable. There are sound evolutionary reasons behind the instinctive reaction against nuclear and its adherents. And the sight of scientists in the aftermath of Fulushima telling us all that there is nothing to worry about at the same time that the Japanese government, the scientists and engineers were plainly panic stricken does not encourage public faith in the experts. 
Lovelock returns to his attack on ‘the media’. ‘These errors would be harmless were they not continuously propagated and amplified by all branches of the media. Much of it is unconscious. Here is an example from a piece by a favourite columnist of mine, Matthew Parris, writing in the Spectator recently. He had this to say: 'Nuclear Power. A method of generating electricity which, like road traffic accidents (which killed 3,000 in Britain last year), poses an appreciable risk to life and limb’.
So this is Lovelock’s great case against the media? This is lame.
First of all, a journalist, a programme, a documentary, a news item etc is not the media. For every Matthew Parris putting the case against nuclear, it would be easy to find other writers and journalists putting the case for. Even the ‘greens’ that Lovelock derides can be found doing this, George Monbiot in The Guardian, for instance, regularly puts the case for nuclear. Secondly, Lovelock cannot resist pointing out that the deaths on the roads far outweigh deaths from accidents having a nuclear cause in the UK. Zero he proudly states, as if this is the end of the argument. More people die playing golf. But has Lovelock searched for evidence for excess deaths due to the indirect and long term influence of nuclear power? Of course he hasn’t. He specifically focuses on accidents. To repeat, if nuclear is this safe, why the need for safety to the nth degree at nuclear power plants? 
Thirdly, we need to note that Lovelock avoids dealing with the scientists who are against nuclear power, he does not engage with the research and instead picks a fight with Matthew Parris!!!!! No contest, you might think. Except that Parris’ instincts beat Lovelock’s reasons any day. Governments know it, insurers and businesses know it, and local people know it too. Most of all, those who run nuclear plants realise that the need for the highest safety standards derives from the fact that nuclear is dangerous.

Lovelock goes in search of the real villains who give nuclear a bad name. He asks who benefits from propaganda. ‘The media does to some extent but generally, I repeat, innocently. The main benefactors of anti-nuclear propaganda are much more sinister, but let's consider the media first.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

Good stories require a cast of demons and angels; in war, whether cold or hot, figures like Stalin or Hitler can easily be cast as arch-demons and we can play the role of angels. In the looming global environmental war the truth is that we all are the demons, and this is not an acceptable role for us; still less is it acceptable to story-writers. We have had to invent new angels and demons. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

And so nuclear is the demon. This is just facile. There is no shortage of angels and demons for the press to get their teeth stuck into. There is nothing more likely to put a glass eye to sleep than a discussion of the relative merits of energy sources. As far as press and public are concerned, there is nothing duller than the discussion of energy sources. These debates go on with complete public indifference. ‘The green lobbies and political parties owe their existence to the unending flow of good stories about environmental disasters.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). That claim bears a second reading – ‘environmental disasters’ are the ‘good stories’ to which green lobbies and political parties owe their existence. The comment is thoroughly offensive in the implication that greens welcome environmental disasters rather than work hard to prevent them, publicise their ill effects for all life forms and act to deal with the aftermath. But it is also an attempt to damn greens by tautological reasoning – of course environmental disasters are instrumental in generating an increasing environmental awareness. It would sound the knell of the human race if it didn’t. Pain in the body tells the mind that something is wrong, deal with it. Human beings respond to disasters, learn from them, change course, modify their behaviour. If someone burns their hand in a fire, you warn others that fires are dangerous. It doesn’t mean that someone burning their hand is ‘good news’, and Lovelock’s claim that that is how greens see environmental disasters is beneath contempt. Lovelock dismisses Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring as ‘a globally effective scare story’ that ‘started the modern green movement.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). The conclusion seems clear, then, that ‘the modern green movement’ is grounded more in fear than in reason.

So, on a local scale, was the 1970s television series The Good Life, where we the viewers could identify with the angelic good efforts of an ordinary couple to be 'green'. The baddies were the usual suspects: oil polluting the sea and killing birds; coal that had to be dug by overworked and underpaid miners, both the products of malign multinational companies moved by nothing other than profit. We always forgot or ignored that for most of the time the coal industry was nationalized so we were the owners of this polluting industry as well as the users who generated the pollution. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

This is the final straw!!! Is Lovelock claiming that the ‘sinister’ forces conspiring against nuclear are Felicity Kendall and the Yorkshire miners? It’s an outrage!!!  James Lovelock has had a pretty free ride with his Gaia hypothesis, but if you look more closely into what he writes, the man’s reasoning is flaky and his politics are ugly. He goes on to portray Chernobyl as a non-event that has brought about a veritable New Eden amongst the nuclear waste. Nuclear energy was cheap, safe and secure, Lovelock opines (Three Mile Island, Windscale anyone?)

It took a medium-sized industrial accident in a Soviet nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the Ukraine to trigger the monstrous anti-nuclear energy story that has haunted the world ever since. The accident, a steam explosion, happened in an unstable reactor that was undergoing an unwise and improperly planned experiment. The whole sad event was a sequence of false steps that could only have happened under the corrupt statist politics of the Soviet Union. (Lovelock ch 4 2009).

Read that again. A nuclear accident is the result of a sequence of false steps that could only happen under ‘corrupt statist politics’. Has Lovelock ever studied history? He begins his book lamenting the lack of wisdom on the part of governments. The idea that states and politics ever proceed as they ought, making no mistakes, is utterly naïve and dangerously so. How would the rule of the warlords that Lovelock anticipates be any different from a corrupt state politics? In light of history, Lovelock’s claims that a nuclear accident could only be the result of a series of false steps under a corrupt state is not very reassuring. A year after his book was published, modern, developed, democratic Japan was hit by the Fukushima disaster. And let us also mention that the Soviet state was so corrupt and backward that it sent the first man into space. But let’s look at the way Lovelock develops his case with respect to Chernobyl.

The seventy-five people killed were almost all either plant workers or those called in by the state to clean up the mess. It was a trivial event compared with the industrial disaster in the city of Bhopal in India where, in the early hours of the morning of 3 December 1984, an accident at a pesticide plant released forty tons of methyl isocyanate gas into the night air. The cloud drifted over the town and killed 3,800 people instantly and many times more in the weeks that followed. The Bhopal disaster is usually cited as the world's worst industrial disaster, but how often do the media mention it compared with the much lesser disaster at Chernobyl? (Lovelock ch 4 2009).

This is philosophically illiterate and morally disreputable. Lovelock is deliberately setting up a false antithesis. Right thinking people will condemn both Chernobyl and Bhopal disasters and damn the political and economic forces behind them. Individuals and groups who condemned Chernobyl would also have been most vociferous in condemning Bhopal. I could extend the list to the people being swept out of the rainforests, the Ogoni people in Nigeria, the people being thrown off their land all over the world. The media doesn’t give much attention to them either, but neither does James Lovelock. Lovelock is engaged in a twisted moral calculus here. The fact that one industrial disaster claimed more lives in the short run than another is not evidence that the lesser disaster is ‘trivial’. There were more people killed on the Titanic than the Burma railway, but it doesn’t follow that the latter was ‘trivial’. The really galling thing is that Lovelock has the temerity to denounce critics of nuclear as ‘unreasoning’. His own reasoning is feeble. What we need to look at is the extent to which all deaths, injuries and disasters are preventable and avoidable. Nuclear disaster is avoidable and should be avoided – by refusing to go down the route of nuclear energy. 

Lovelock also shows some realisation that he understands that his position is a minority one even within the scientific community. He starts off by blaming unreasoning fear and media propaganda only to have to acknowledge that the main body of scientists are against his view. He picks on Matthew Parris and Felicity Kendall. It would have been better if he had engaged with the scientific arguments. He expresses his ‘concern over the reticence of scientists to reject the falsity of these anti-nuclear allegations, and their unwillingness to engage in the larger cause, our survival.’ In other words, scientists do not in the main reject the falsity of the anti-nuclear allegations. To the non-obscurantist this could simply mean that there is truth in these allegations.

Lovelock sneers at the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and Greenpeace as ‘the first believable and effective environmental angels’, referring to their ecclesiastical leader Monsignor Bruce Kent. He could have mentioned that the anti-nuclear campaign also had top of the range scientists like Einstein and Rotblat as well as great rationalist philosophers like Bertrand Russell behind it, but it serves Lovelock’s purposes to cast the movement in theological terms. It’s not ‘real science’, just ‘unreasoning fear’. 

So we come to the real sinister forces conspiring against nuclear.

It would be naive to expect energy companies to stand aside and see their profitability hampered by inexpensive nuclear energy, and the same must be true for the thwarting of national aspirations. The cash flow of nuclear industry is tiny compared with that of oil, gas or coal companies, and the money available for advertising the advantages of nuclear is proportionately less. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

Lovelock has to be joking. He has already mentioned the coal strikes as a threat to the nation’s energy as a reason for nuclear. Lovelock has no interest at all in communities controlling their energy, which is why the miners were feared and targeted. Nuclear energy is the power for the centralised control of political and business elites. 

Of course, vested interests in oil, coal and gas may well attempt to turn governments against nuclear. But Lovelock’s argument applies to an assertion of economics over against ecology in general. It would be naïve to expect capital in general to stand aside and see their profitability hampered by the Green collar economy of eco-socialists. The sinister forces are much more numerous and more systemic than Lovelock thinks.

Fear of nuclear has become so deeply entrenched that if an engineer in a Japanese nuclear power station drops a wrench on his foot and needs first aid it is given headline exposure in our newspapers as a 'Serious accident in Japanese nuclear power station'. The death of a hundred or more Chinese miners in an underground coal mine explosion rates not more than a small paragraph in the depths of the same paper. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

Again, the latter does not invalidate the former. These are false antitheses which are used by second rate minds to skew the argument in their direction. Work conditions in China are an issue for the same people concerned to fight in favour of renewable energy other than nuclear. The one does not preclude the other. But, talk about speaking too soon, Lovelock just had to labour the point about Japanese nuclear power stations being safe.

What I have just written is no exaggeration. In July 2007 an earthquake in Japan shook a nuclear power station enough to cause its automatic shutdown; the quake was of sufficient severity - over six on the Richter scale - to cause significant structural damage in an average town. The only 'nuclear' consequence was the fall of a barrel from a stack of low-level waste that allowed the leak of about 90,000 becquerels of radioactivity. This made headline front-page news in Australia, where it was said that the leak posed a radiation threat to the Sea of Japan. The truth is that 90,000 becquerels is just twice the amount of natural radioactivity, mostly in the form of potassium, that you and I carry in our bodies. In other words, if we accept this hysterical conclusion, two swimmers in the Sea of Japan would make a radiation threat. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

Talk about tempting fate. A year after this was published came the Fukushima disaster. I wouldn’t be surprised if Lovelock dismisses this disaster as ‘trivial’. File under not-trustworthy. This argument has scientistic hubris all over it. It is ironic that Lovelock ends his case for the safety of nuclear power with an earthquake in Japan that had no adverse consequences. One year later came Fukushima. Lovelock should take his myopic reasoning to the people of Fukushima. A clear case of game, set and match to the ‘hysterical’. An interesting word that Lovelock uses here. It used to be applied by male chauvinists to women to deny the legitimacy of their grievances. It was rot then, and it is tommyrot now.

Lovelock turns next to renewable energy. ‘Renewable energy is something that comes from Gaia whereas fossil fuel and nuclear energy are man-made and therefore dirty. This is wholly untrue and a myth that goes back at least to Rousseau.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). I have learned to judge the depth of any thinker or argument by the approach taken to Rousseau. The second rate minds opt for the obvious line that Rousseau was a ‘back to nature’ philosopher. He plainly wasn’t, as is evident to anyone who has ever read him. Rousseau’s comments on agriculture and metallurgy go back to Genesis and were concerned to check the simplistic assertion of uni-linear progress. Human beings are out of paradise and are now responsible for how they use their knowledge. ‘Best of times, worst of times’ as Dickens wrote. For the record, far from arguing for a return to nature, Rousseau argued for the transition from the natural to the civil state. It’s a common misunderstanding that is reinforced by repetition. Rousseau looks forward to the realisation of human nature, not backward to a lost nature. Just read The Social Contract. But with his straw man set up, Lovelock proceeds to knock him down. ‘We imagine that somehow we can all live naturally and that natural energy and organic food are fundamentally different and better in quality than what is manufactured.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). Who imagines this? Even Prince Charles, who promotes organic food, acknowledges the need for modern science and industry. That is always missed in the criticism because it is easier to knock over a straw man.

Lovelock argues against wind and wave as being no more natural than nuclear. ‘All the energy we use, except nuclear, is second- or third-hand solar energy, and the term 'renewable energy' makes no sense in our present world. So what makes it so attractive even to hard-headed businessmen? They are attracted by the subsidies offered by governments driven by the pressure of a fashionable and trendy green ideology. The same persuasive force makes them penalize what is perceived as ungreen: coal, oil and nuclear energy.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

‘Trendy green ideology’? I have no idea what Lovelock is arguing for, since he demands that we recognise ourselves as part of Gaia. It makes one wonder just what content his Gaian philosophy actually has, since he plainly loathes greens and environmentalists. He comes out against wind, wave and solar power and in favour of nuclear power, he thinks international agreements on climate change are worthless, and that changes in the direction of a low carbon economy are not enough. There is a very good chance that he will be struggling for support. But arguments that the only thing driving support for renewable energy is the subsidies to which business help themselves puts him firmly on the side of the climate science deniers.

Lovelock has the nerve to dive into philosophy and is soon in trouble.

The adjective 'renewable' is used as a human value judgement: it has no basis in science. But because we are not gods and goddesses who can produce energy or matter from nothing, we have to obey the laws of the universe, and surprisingly this implies that anything we make is natural. (Lovelock ch 4 2009).

Note how Lovelock uses the distinction between fact and value to denigrate morality. This dualism can work both ways, on the side of morality against science. Science is on the wrong side of the fact/value divide for it to pronounce on the good. Science must remain silent on values on the basis of this distinction. The causal relations and physical imperatives that science reveals by way of explanation has no moral import. Having asserted the fact/value distinction to silence morality, Lovelock proceeds to draw an ‘ought-to-be’ from an ‘is’. ‘We have to obey the laws of the universe’. Lovelock is out of his depth here. There is a clear distinction between physical laws and moral laws. A physical law is not a moral law. If Lovelock had read his Rousseau closer he would have found a good example of the principle of self-assumed obligation. Human beings are obligated by laws that they themselves have had a hand in making. This is the creative role of morality, affirming the dignity of human beings as moral beings. There is no such recognition in Lovelock, just the assertion that human beings must obey physical laws, as though these are moral laws. 

Lovelock cites the philosophical rule that you cannot derive an ought-to-be from an is, only to break it. And this is only the beginning of the problem. Not everything natural is good simply on account of being natural. Plenty that happens in nature is morally undesirable. Hence Rousseau’s argument to move beyond natural appetites and desires to the civil state, hence the natural law which sees nature through the eyes of reason.

Lovelock dismisses wind energy: ‘I must declare a special personal dislike of large wind turbines onshore.’ This is the man who has parodied the views of those against nuclear energy as ‘unreasoning’. ‘I am proud to be called a Nimby, for my backyard is the countryside and I see that land as the face of Gaia.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). This is the dead giveaway – Lovelock wants the human race off the planet. No wonder he targeted the green concern for ‘humanity as a whole’.

‘To survive on these islands with a population perhaps as large as 100 million requires a constant and reliable source of electricity from indigenous fuel. It would be madness to attempt it without nuclear energy. It is sad that so many of the green movement and their intellectual followers still oppose nuclear on grounds as insubstantial as a fear of hellfire and Satan.’

Not only is that caricature, I am less and less sure that hellfire and Satan are that insubstantial. 

Lovelock engages in some hoary old special pleading, citing C. P. Snow’s The Two Cultures. ‘From about 1980 the humanists have been victorious, and the credibility and character of scientists and engineers has been downgraded.’ He just cannot be serious. Has he not heard of Richard Dawkins and Stephen Hawkins? If anything, the veneration of science has gone to such extremes that we are not far from scientism. It is impossible not to read a book these days without a reference to neuroscience and how it explains everything, even Bob Dylan’s songs, so much so that the new term ‘neuroscientism’ has been coined. 

Much of the failure to prepare for and counter global heating comes from the inability of otherwise able politicians and civil servants, who are only rarely scientists, to understand the message from good scientists and engineers, and distinguish between genuine and alternative science. Too often the strident over-optimistic cries of entrepreneurs or trade lobbies trump sound and practical advice. Global heating is already here and we cannot afford to wait any longer. We need to start preparing our defences now. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

That insistence works only at the most general level. Prepare against what? Since we don’t quite know what is coming, it isn’t clear how precisely we need to prepare. How high will the seas rise? How great will the floods be? How hot will the temperature be? The consequences of a 2C temperature increase will be different to the consequences of a 4C increase. And beyond 4C it is anyone’s guess what the planet will throw at us. Pompous idiots will declare generally that human beings will do what they have always done, and adapt. Adapt to what? 

Lovelock also completely ignores the political difficulties in marshalling the international community to prepare for climate change. Angela Merkel is a scientist, and a good one at that. She has consistently tried to lead the international community in taking action on the climate and has consistently seen her efforts thwarted by business lobbies. The interesting thing is that Merkel has pushed for agreements which Lovelock dismisses as futile whereas it is the likes of non-scientist Nigel Lawson and the Global Warming Federation who have been most active in blocking agreement. And Lawson has been most vocal in saying that human beings will adapt.






Energy and the city

Lovelock comes to the city.

More than 50 per cent of the world's inhabitants now live in cities, and in the wealthier nations over 90 per cent are urban dwellers. The trend is for more and more to leave the country for a new life in the city. I suspect that a well-run city uses less food and energy than a civilization of villages and isolated farms; certainly less than the distributed exurban communities that surround most of the developed world's towns today. (Lovelock ch 4 2009).

What? He ‘suspects’? Shouldn’t he check his facts before going to print? Cities are very wasteful of energy. There is enough research out there to show this. The question is how we can make cities liveable habitats that live lightly on the land. We need more than suspicions before we make a positive argument one way or another.

Have you ever thought what would happen to London, or any other major city, if there were no electricity for a week? This is what could happen if we put faith in green energy to run our lives. (Lovelock ch 4 2009).

I have to confess that I have no idea what Lovelock is arguing for. He issues a ‘final warning’ concerning Gaia, yet defends the very industrial, urban and capitalist system that is driving the ecological crisis. He explicitly denounces and derides the efforts of those working towards an alternative ecological society. The point is not to develop green energy to run a wasteful and inefficient capital system which continues to expand in an exponential manner. Of course that wouldn’t work. The problem is not with green energy but with the demands that an urban and industrial system makes upon nature. The system is unsustainable. It’s a twisted logic that blames the resources for running out. If I didn’t know any better I would think Lovelock is a virus planted within the green movement to spread confusion. He is certainly very effective in checking green alternatives. He attacks them at every point.
Lovelock commends the decision to back the nuclear industry against those ‘reliving the fun of marching to Aldermaston proclaiming the need to make Britain a nuclear-free zone.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). At 92 Bertrand Russell was arrested in an anti-nuclear protest. Lovelock at the same age is looking forward to going to the moon in one of Richard Branson’s rockets. Who really is having the ‘fun’ here? And at whose expense?

Lovelock condemns ‘the Luddite legislation that could delay by ten years attempts to rebuild our nuclear industry.’ (Lovelock ch 4 2009). Luddite? I don’t think Lovelock has a clue about what Luddism was as a political movement. Luddism was not anti-technology, it wanted to use technology for the common good. An ideal for our times, surely. Lovelock earlier called for ‘rare leadership’ in politics. My vote goes to Ned Ludd.

If the Earth does move to or near the hot state, more than 4°C hotter than now, only a limited area of land will be available for the natural ecosystems to share with us. It would probably be unwise of us to take more than 30 per cent of this area for ourselves, and to allow for expansion and mistakes it would probably be better to aim at no more than 10 per cent. Failure to keep the natural ecosystems of the land would leave the Earth's self-regulation entirely to the ocean ecosystems, which are, in a hot world, partially disabled by the formation of a warm top layer deprived of nutrients. A hi-tech, compact civilization would have these advantages: food synthesis would lessen its impact on the planet, and the widespread desert of this calorific planet would be an ample provider of solar electricity. Such a civilization gives us the chance to cease being a burden on Gaian regulation, and time to learn how to complement it. A high standard of living with women empowered and well educated would perhaps provide an automatic curb to population growth. If this were global in extent, disruption by war might be less likely. (Lovelock ch 4 2009). 

This sounds fine, except that it is not clear how it squares with Lovelock’s case for cities, for nuclear energy and for the rule of the warlords. Lovelock’s vision is schizophrenic and shows evidence of shallow reading and understanding.

The History Of Gaia Theory

Lovelock seems quite possessive of Gaia. We know the name Gaia derives from Greek mythology and means Earth Mother. Lovelock wants Gaia for science.

So the Gaia concept was born at the peak of the New Age - contemporary with Woodstock and the Beatles, which perhaps accounts for why so many scientists still regard it as part of the plethora of New Age nonsense which was around at the time. (Lovelock ch 5 2009).

On balance, I think that New Age nonsense will do less damage than warlords armed with nuclear power. Lovelock seems overly sensitive here. He seems nervous of what other scientists may think. ‘Richard Dawkins is an extraordinarily talented author and persuader and in his book he vented his scorn on the Gaia hypothesis with the powerful erudition that he now uses to censure theology. (Lovelock ch 6 2009). Lovelock is paying Dawkins too much respect here. Dawkins’ critiques of theology are characterised much more by bigotry than by erudition – factual errors, misquotes, slanders, extreme positions, exceptions presented as norms, a selective approach to evidence, you name it, he’s guilty of it. The book The Dawkins Delusion by Alister McGrath (2007 SPCK) gives ample evidence of this. Lovelock of all scientists should know this. ‘From then on it became impossible to publish any paper on it in a mainstream journal; the peer reviewers were convinced by Dawkins and other eminent biologists that Gaia was mere New Age fantasy.’ What? Could it be that the powerfully erudite Dickie Dawkins had got the science badly wrong? He did, and as a result of bigotry rather than reason. I am less concerned with the science here than the evidence of blinkered, bigoted thinking on the part of scientists. Lovelock lets this pass. ‘We’re all friends now’ seems to be his attitude. But that attitude of prejudice and bigotry on the part of scientists would still apply to the rest of us. ‘The most distinguished Darwinist biologists, William Hamilton and John Maynard Smith, both became friends in the late 1990s even though Maynard Smith had earlier referred in public to Gaia as 'an evil religion'. (Lovelock ch 6 2009). All’s well that ends well. But to dismiss something as ‘an evil religion’ is bigotry, not reason. And if that’s what scientists say to each other, imagine what their opinion of the rest of us is. It’s time to investigate neo-Darwinism a lot more than we have done. There are some very odd, anti-human strains in this ideology. And it is ideology. Human beings are meaning seeking animals. The hatred against religion is plainly anti-human.

Lovelock says something very curious which reveals something odd about the scientific mind.

Friendly scientists often ask me: Why do you keep on talking about the Earth as alive? This is a good question, and there is no rational answer; indeed to some of my friends my suggestion that the whole planet is alive is not only 'scientifically incorrect', it is absurd. In reply I say that science has not yet formulated a full definition of life. Physicists and chemists have one definition, biologists another, and neither is complete. But this does not persuade many of my friends because they think they know by instinct or intuition what is alive, and in no way does the Earth meet their criteria for life. Instinct and intuition are powerful and cannot be denied, and so my assertion of planet-sized life is discounted as an eccentricity. (Lovelock ch 7 2009).

Hang on, instinct and intuition tell us that Earth is alive, as ancient beliefs show clearly. Those who work the land have no trouble at all identifying the Earth as alive. It’s our smart-arse scientists that says otherwise. For scientists the world is ‘dead matter’, without life, without purpose. Talk about paralysis through analysis. Lovelock admits that his assertion that the Earth is alive has no ‘rational’ basis. He should learn to stop hurling the epithet ‘unreasoning’ against those who disagree with his favoured positions. Instinct and intuition have evolved over millennia and serve us well against those who denigrate the tried and tested as ‘scientifically incorrect’. Such scientists will say ‘grey’ when the rest of us shout elephant. The sun rises and the sun sets. We could not live our lives by the letter of the laws of science.

To Be Or Not To Be Green

Lovelock’s argument turns ugly when he spells out what he means by green as against those of the modern era. Lovelock longs for the good old days of a ‘benign’ environmentalism, the days before politics raised its ugly head, left wing politics that is.

In the days before Rachel Carson exploded her green bomb, being green was a joyous thing - it was to celebrate the beauty and seemliness of the natural world, and this feeling was surely why many joined or supported environmental movements….  The natural world existed outside the cities and seemed unspoilt and untouched; in no way did we realize that the evergrowing numbers of humans were inadvertently beginning to destroy their world. Then in the 1960s Rachel Carson showed us that the products of our industries - pesticides that farmers used - were massively killing birds in the countryside. Silent Spring marked a watershed that separated the old innocent world of naturalists and poets with a sense of wonder at the beauty of the Earth from a new world of ignorant but streetwise urban-dwellers with a sentimental view of nature, who saw destructive intruding species such as the grey squirrel and the Canada goose as needing protection. I would be glad to know if anyone used the word 'green' in the older naturalist sense before it became a word denoting such anthropogenic environmentalism. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 

Lovelock keeps employing the terms ‘anthropogenic’ and ‘anthropomorphism’ as dirty words. Lovelock should come off it. If he wants to make a strictly scientific argument, he is entitled to. But when he ventures into the world of politics and ethics, then he is in the world of human beings. There is more to this world than physical laws and cause-effect processes. Lovelock’s denigration of anthrocentric views sheds some light on that the scientific mind thinks of human beings. Cool, indifferent, inhumane.
Lovelock also has a nerve for claiming that whereas being green was a joyous thing in the good old days. It is Lovelock himself who refers to ‘New Age nonsense’. Certainly, the science of those naked hippies dancing in the fields might be ropey, but they always seemed to have a good time getting back to nature. There are plenty in today’s green movement for whom being green is a joyous thing. Or at least it should be. It may have escaped Lovelock’s attention, but the space for such joyous environmentalism is diminishing rapidly. Earlier, Lovelock referred to nuclear critics wanting to relive the ‘fun’ of the CND marches. The globalisation of communications means that we are increasingly aware of the damage being done to the environment all over the world. We can still have joy in our local environments but it is difficult to be content with that when the ice caps are melting and the Arctic is being explored for oil. We have lost our innocence and no amount of nostalgia will bring it back. I shall make a prediction. If the human species does have a future, then it will be due in large part to the movement of environmental responsibility inspired by Rachel Carson. 
Lovelock also makes an erroneous contrast between the old innocent world of naturalists and poets who viewed the beauty of the Earth with a sense of wonder and the new world of ignorant but streetwise urban-dwellers with a sentimental view of nature. The poets were part of a Romantic reaction against urbanisation and industrialisation, who became more sensitive to nature the more they became aware of its destruction. They too were condemned for having a sentimental view of nature. As for being ignorant, aren’t we all ignorant? No one person knows everything. Even the most learned person doesn’t know more than a fraction of the knowledge that is out there. Intelligence has nothing to do with the possession of knowledge and everything to do with the ability to access, assimilate and apply it. 
It would no doubt be easy to find an urban dweller ignorant of the countryside. How would a country dweller like being told that their views on the urban world are ‘ignorant’ because they don’t live in the town or the city? There are plenty of people living in rural areas all over the world who are actively participating in the modern environmental movement, attempt to retain or regain control of their practical affairs. If there are urban outsiders offering support, good on them. Isn’t that what we want?
Lovelock slams what he calls ‘anthropocentric environmentalism’. He has a nerve, frankly. Lovelock’s entire argument for using the proper noun ‘Gaia’ is based on such anthropomorphism – he states clearly that this is the only way human beings are going to identify with the Earth. Lovelock goes through the issues, picking and choosing his arguments and his targets, accusing those he dislikes of the very things he himself does. And there is plenty of caricature in Lovelock’s argument too. At least the political environmentalists are seriously addressing the political economy of the ecological crisis. Compare this with Lovelock’s call for democratic government to be suspended and the rule of the warlords in its place. This is the kind of eco-fascism that gets environmentalists into trouble.

Lovelock wonders whether Rachel Carson thought of herself as 'green'. He asks this question as part of an attempt to set up a contrast between ‘real’ nature and nature as an artificial construct. 

In the 1970s we ceased to be illuminated by the qualities of the natural world and began to see and hear nature through televisual images; often what we saw was filtered or distorted by the thoughts of the presenter. Sometimes we were lucky and saw the real world of nature through the eyes of Sir David Attenborough, but too often it was a politicized account of pollution from industry. Those who were green this way had feelings of guilt and regret; increasing knowledge that once brought wisdom, joy and understanding now confirmed that our carbon footprints were blacker than sin.’ (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 

Does Lovelock seriously mean that there is no environmental crisis, no problem with pollution, no problem with carbon emissions? He is very good at caricaturing green arguments by couching them in theological terms like ‘blacker than sin’. But Lovelock himself is guilty of the cheapest theodicy. That’s how he refers to politics in his arguments. He refers to ‘a politicized account of pollution’ as though pollution is not a political issue. But let’s play Lovelock’s game here. Let us give a scientific account of pollution. What follows? If not political action – and all action leading to change is politics – then what? For Lovelock, the concept of pollution is anthropomorphic. Nature recycles all wastes, so there is no pollution problem. Only if you are a human being personally concerned with being poisoned. Human beings tend to be concerned with such things. Does Lovelock think we should simply see ourselves as part of the waste that Nature recycles? With charges of anthropomorphic environmentalism, it seems so. Pollution most certainly is a political issue. Lovelock is entitled to take his stand on science, in which case he should stop intervening in politics. He can give his scientific account, and since it lacks political and moral relevance, we can safely ignore him. 

Of course, there is nothing more political than an attempt to take politics out of the environment. We need to know what interests are involved, who is responsible, what economic arrangements shape production, what political decisions determine policy in the area and what pressures they are subject to.

Lovelock’s attitude towards politics merits further comment. I would proceed from the Aristotelian conception of politics as creative human self-realisation, the politikon bion or public life that human beings need in order to realise their natural potentialities. Lovelock keeps switching his argument. On the one hand, human intervention in nature is natural and we have been geoengineers since the invention of fire; on the other hand, Lovelock proposes some abstract ‘nature’ that operates by its own laws, free from human eyes. Against Lovelock we can argue that politics is always natural in the Aristotelian sense. Politics is always anthropomorphic. Further, nature is always mediated, whether by televisual images or anything else that human beings do. Human mediation is ‘artificial’, but it is what human beings do naturally. Earlier Lovelock accused Rousseau of propagating the ‘myth’ that agriculture and industry are ‘artificial’, unnatural and therefore wrong. Now he is employing the same reasoning against the way we see nature via modern technology. Who is promoting myths of a return to pristine nature now? The inconsistencies in Lovelock’s argument are so many and so great as to render much of what he says next to useless. In politics, such loose and contradictory reasoning could prove to be a positive menace. It is difficult to cite anything in this book in support of an argument, since Lovelock’s argument is flawed, his logic split and with plenty of opinion and prejudice masquerading as science.

‘Despite this, I am still a green in that early twentieth-century sense, with views moulded by that older benign philosophy.’ (Lovelock ch 8 2009).

Hardly benign. The older green philosophy was benign with a small ‘b’ in the way that there can be a Nazism with a small ‘n’. Consider the likes of Konrad Lorenz and how his ‘green’ philosophy was quite compatible with Nazism. He wasn’t alone in this. Plenty of the older greens were conservatives or reactionaries, from Roosevelt in America and Smuts in South Africa. This older green philosophy traces it lineage back to Malthus and his concern with the ‘surplus population’ and back to Darwinism and the survival of the fittest. Eugenics, euthanasia, war as natural, nature red in tooth and claw, it’s all there in the old ‘benign’ green philosophy. ‘I know that I am wholly outdated but I acknowledge that I was partly responsible, unconsciously and unintentionally, for the change from a simple green celebration of delight to narrow restrictive faith.’ (Lovelock ch 8 2009).
What narrow restrictive faith is this? This is the same James Lovelock who expresses horror at the association of Gaia with ‘New Age nonsense’. Nonsense it may be, but if dancing sky-clad under the full moon can be called a ‘narrow restrictive faith’, I would love to know what James Lovelock gets up to in his spare time.

‘When we claim Rachel Carson as the founder of the green movement we forget that like the old school naturalists she had an innocent love of the wilderness and countryside that her several other books reveal, especially The Sea Around Us.’ (Lovelock ch 8 2009). Yes, that love is still there, it’s just that there is less and less of the wilderness and the countryside to enjoy. That’s the point, that’s why there is a need to develop a political dimension. Why else would anyone want to engage in something as miserable, boring and unrewarding as politics?
So now we come to it. James Lovelock now reveals his true colours. His wonder at nature really conceals a black misanthropic heart.

What caused the emergence of a militant green ideology was the transforming of her [Carson’s] warning that our industries threatened wildlife to the message that our industries threatened us as individuals. This is what turned being green from possessing a sense of wonder with concern for the natural world into a partisan and contentious political cause, which at best was no more than a partial expression of the humanism of Christianity or Socialism, and at worst an anarchic extremism. (Lovelock ch 8 2009).

The political inadequacy of Lovelock’s argument, his naïve refusal to address politics in a serious manner, exposes him to the criticism of extremism he is quite happy to throw at others. Read that passage about the future belongs to war and warlords again alongside the call for the suspension of democratic government. Lovelock seems to think this is old fashioned benign ecology. I suggest it is the anarchic extremism of the rich and powerful.
Leaving aside the tendentious politics here, it would be interesting to know how Lovelock proposes to tackle the ecological crisis? Does he really think that the masses, filled with wonder at the sight of nature, are going to march to the cause of nuclear power? Lovelock plays down the impact of pollution and carbon emissions. He then cites the evidence for the fact that Gaia is in trouble and issues a ‘final warning’. To act on such a warning entails politics. At which point Lovelock goes into denial mode and castigates those environmentalists serious enough about the environment to make a change as ‘contentious’, ‘anarchic’ and ‘extremist’. He wants the old ecology, yearning for the days of ‘apolitical’ ecology, the kind of anti-politics that fed into Nazism and other such ‘benign’ philosophies that read off their morality from nature ‘red in tooth and claw’. The question remains, how does Lovelock propose to make a change? We have learned the hard way to be very suspicious of those who make big and dramatic claims concerning doom and disaster but are shy of politics. That’s the kind of political vacuum that is easily filled by some very unpleasant and nasty forces. That kind of atavism justifies some very extreme politics. Lovelock has a nerve, frankly, in predicting that we are facing a future of ‘lifeboat’ ethics concerned solely with survival, issuing a ‘final warning’, and then castigating those environmentalists who are working to generate the very ecological consciousness he demands. Of course, it is possible that, for all of his talk of the unique intelligence of the human species, he doesn’t like human beings much. He would have this in common with many of the old ‘benign’ ecologists. Hence his love of the countryside away from the ‘ugly’ cities with all those people. Hence his horror when he thought he saw a caravan – people!!!!– on a deserted beach where he enjoyed walking. Lovelock tells the tale of a walk he had along the Cornish coast:

As we walked we were immersed in a gentle stream of cool, clean sea air and our ears were full of the sounds of gulls and breaking waves. It was easy to imagine that this was a scene untouched by the artefacts of man. But it did not last. There on a larger patch of sand, ahead and below, was a caravan. On the beach it seemed monstrous, out of place and in fact illegal. Our vision of peace was shattered; if caravans in a place like this became the rule there would be no escape from the noise, the intrusion and the ugliness of urban life. We walked on in indignation, but as if by magic the ugly caravan dissolved in the sunlight to become a patch of sand, dark rock and a pool of seawater. By a trick of light and scene, our two minds had simultaneously perceived the false image of a caravan and our feelings and prejudices had filled in the details, making it seem real. (Lovelock ch 7 2009). 

Lovelock at least identifies his misperception for what it was, the product of his prejudice. I would suggest that his castigation of greens as militants, anarchists and extremists is also born of illusion. Lovelock’s nature is going but he misidentifies the forces who are taking it away and turns his ire on those who are working to protect it. The political inadequacy of Lovelock’s argument, his naïve refusal to address politics in a serious manner, exposes him to the criticism of extremism he is quite happy to throw at others. 
Lovelock patently fails to understand the extent to which ecology is now a political issue. He is aware that there is an environmental crisis, hence his reference to a ‘final warning’. He is calling for action, for change. That’s politics. Yet he yearns for a return to the old ‘benign’ days of green philosophy when ecology was a science and a walk in the country. If you want those days to return, you are going to have to engage in politics and build the future ecological society. Lovelock instead damns the new environmental as a fusion of left and green philosophies. 

The industrial poisons were said to be the products of industries that cared only for profit. The left were then able to say that we were all the victims of those old enemies of Marxism, the capitalists - and now they were not merely exploiting us, they were poisoning us as well. Green intentions were even more distorted when they were combined with those of highly respected anti-nuclear weapons organizations, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, CND. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 

Well done James Lovelock. In a passage he betrays the green movement into the hands of its critics. Green philosophy isn’t genuine science, it is politics. Worse, it is left wing politics. With the failure of socialism, all those left wingers with nowhere to go joined the greens. Priceless. This reasoning crops up in all of the work of climate science deniers. It runs throughout Plimer’s book. But just think about it. A moment’s thought reveals it to be so inane that only a nincompoop or reactionary could believe it. Since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 capitalism has fought tooth and nail against communism and socialism. Hitler and Mussolini were backed as bulwarks against Bolshevism, Spain was plunged into civil war and all over the world dictatorships of every stripe were propped up or knocked down to ensure the survival of capitalism. Does anybody seriously think that there is a  ‘consensus’ (stroke, conspiracy) of world scientists who have made up the science of global warming to intellectually and politically arm communists, socialists and anarchists in the cause of world wide anti-capitalist revolution? Having gone to such lengths to see off Communism, the idea that climate science and the green movement is a Trojan horse bringing down capitalism from within is risible. The strength of the association is simply this – capitalism is an expansionary economic system that is depleting the Earth’s natural resources and despoiling the planet. The old socialist critique of capitalism remains valid, therefore anyone serious about protecting the planet must embrace socialism and criticise capitalism. That’s a lesson that James Lovelock refuses to heed. Fine. He should clear off in Branson’s rocket and leave the politics to those who have the nerve and the nous to address the issues seriously.
Lovelock should explain how the recognition of socio-economic causes of the environmental crisis implies a distortion of green intentions. How is developing a serious political profile a distortion of green intentions? To Lovelock, green politics seems to mean no more than a trip out to the countryside or a ramble by the babbling brook. So long as there are no caravans and people to ruin his view. Lovelock himself refers to the way that business determines government priorities, so he is not ignorant of the issue of political economy.

Lovelock turns next to the fusion of pacifist and green thinking in the formation of Greenpeace. He refers to the testing of ever larger nuclear weapons, with people worrying that the world had become well and truly contaminated with radioactivity.

I was never an enthusiastic supporter of any of these movements because as a working scientist I knew that the sensitivity of the instruments we used to detect chemicals and radiation was so exquisite that traces of them a thousand or even a million times less than a harmful quantity were easily detectable. There was in fact hardly any significant contamination with poison anywhere, except at the bomb test sites or on the farms where pesticides were spread. In Carson's time wildlife, especially birds, suffered greatly from the excesses of agribusiness, not only from pesticide poisoning but also from the removal of hedgerow nesting sites and other massive changes in farming practice that seriously affected their habitats. The green movement was concerned with what happened to people who consumed the farmer's food and only marginally with the natural world. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 

A green philosophy is concerned with all of Nature as an interconnected web of life, so Lovelock can stop playing one off against another. Greens are often accused of being misanthropes who prefer nature and animals to people. Now Lovelock is saying greens are concerned with people more than the natural world. This isn’t genuine ecology, with recognition of interconnection, but an either/or divide and conquer. It’s an old trick in politics and old hands in this game spot it immediately. It gives us grounds to suspect Lovelock’s argument as a whole. Lovelock simply doesn’t have the nerve to take a political stand. He opts out of political ‘controversy’ and lets others take the strain. He is the kind of scientist who is eaten alive by the real forces that run the world. No doubt he will wring his hands and bemoan how stupid the human race is and how it deserves to die out in large numbers. But at no point has Lovelock attempted to make the case for a real change for the better, at no point has he engaged in politics. Instead, from the touchline, he snipes at those ‘greens’ and ‘environmentalist’ who have attempted to make a difference. Who are these ‘greens’ and ‘environmentalists’? All of them it seems. Worse, he indulges in a kind of patronising ‘as a scientist, I know better’ condescension that repels rather than attracts. How many times have such scientists led people up the garden path? Too many for us to suffer this kind of intellectual bullying. 
Lovelock’s ‘apolitical’ stance is, of course, a form of politics, a politics of the most craven and duplicitous kind, a politics which keeps existing power relations preserved and protected. ‘Benign’ is the word that Lovelock used to describe his ‘green’ philosophy. Safe is another word, safe for the status quo. He attacks business as usual constantly and yet has no politics at all with which to challenge the status quo. Ultimately, it is impossible not to draw the conclusion that Lovelock’s Gaia – the ‘final warning’ is just one big self-fulfilling prophecy and that Lovelock actually quite welcomes the prospect of the Earth Goddess devouring her human children. That kind of cruel, merciless, pitiless attitude characterised the old ‘benign’ green philosophy that Lovelock prefers over the ‘militant’ anarchists and extremists who have sought to develop a political dimension to environmentalism. In fine, there are very good reasons for green politics to be very careful of associating themselves with Lovelock’s Gaia, it is far too redolent of the old ‘red in tooth and claw’ nature of the scientists. Lovelock’s approach is apolitical in the manner of a nazism with a small ‘n’. But it certainly paves the way for the real thing.

Lovelock plays the theme of media distortion and unreasoning fear for all it is worth. Bear in mind that this is the man who is so concerned by the environmental crisis that he demands that we embrace nuclear power. I say show some real guts and face the music. Human beings have brought themselves to the Judgement Day. Nuclear energy is just another puny attempt to escape the day of reckoning.

But Lovelock plays down the problems of pollution, claiming it has been minimal and hardly dangerous. Such callous disregard of the ill health and premature deaths suffered by working men and women all over the world should not surprise us from this source. It should be obvious by now that Lovelock, as a scientist indifferent to morality and to ‘humanity as a whole’, cares little for real people. We have seen this kind of science before. And we know where it ends. 
Lovelock resorts to the hoary old chestnut of the conspiracy theory, the self-sustaining industry of lobbies, lawyers, and legislators. This is news? Anyone with a smattering of knowledge of political economy understands the corporate capture of the state. But it’s not a conspiracy. There is no need for a conspiracy. Perhaps Lovelock should have tried to understand what the left he disparages was saying about the symbiotic relation of the state and capital. No, his targets are environmentalists. He cites Michael Crichton’s A State of Fear, which describes the conjunction of vested interests that linked academic scientists, the media, the green lobbies and the legal establishment. ‘In his fiction it is a conspiracy, but in real life the attraction between the parties involved is enough to make conspiracy unnecessary. We must never forget that conjunctions of this kind can do great harm.’ Marx wrote that ‘The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.’ (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973). He didn’t mean that the bourgeoisie did the actual managing in person but that the link between state and capital was so close that the imperatives of the process of private accumulation were understood, accepted and facilitated at the level of policy. 

Do we get anything like this level of political acumen in Lovelock? No. Instead we are treated to another denunciation of ‘the political left’.

As I have said, in the latter part of the twentieth century the green movement was largely on the political left. Then a slow recognition that capitalism seemed to work better than most forms of socialism, hastened by the collapse of Soviet communism in Russia and Europe, moved green thinking on to a liberal humanist high ground that saw the threat to the Earth mostly in terms of the immediate consequences for the welfare of people. There was still no realization that ultimately harm to the Earth system, Gaia, was more serious than harm to humanity. Slowly it dawns that the Earth may be more powerful than we are and now threatens us, and at last we hear the cry, 'We must save the planet!' There is I think a long way still to go. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 





Nigel Lawson suggests that the present-day green movement is a new religion. To some extent I agree with him, as one who was once an old-style green: I am dismayed by the iconic significance of a giant wind turbine on a green hill. It seems to mock the Cross. You see this new icon in full-page advertisements for the energy companies, especially those companies that sell energy from fossil fuel. It sanctifies their hypocrisy and their intention to continue with business as usual; they know that wind energy, because of its inefficiency, is no threat to their main line of business. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 

That’s what counts as political and socio-economic analysis in Lovelock. Why would the political left be hand in hand with capitalist companies to continue business as usual? And what exactly is wrong about being a ‘new religion’? So long as it is religion we are talking about rather than the idolatry of state, capital, money, commodities…. Marx identified capitalism as the new religion from the start. ‘Accumulate, accumulate, that is Moses and all the prophets!!!’ Against this worship of mammon, it really is about time we had a new religion.

The concept of Gaia or of the world of nature has never appealed to town-dwellers, except as entertainment. We lost contact with the Earth when our food and sustenance was no longer immediately and obviously dependent on the weather. Our fish, meat, fruit and vegetables now come from the supermarket, and only a rare flood or heavy snowstorm impedes a Tesco harvest. When the weather is cold or hot the thermostat takes care to keep our internal environment comfortable. Howling wind and lashing rain against our storm-proof windows can enhance our sense of cosy comfort and not, as they once did, bring fear of a crop lost as the grain was driven into the muddy fields. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 

OK, but earlier Lovelock was wrongly denouncing Rousseau for being the source of all the back to nature myths. Lovelock switches his stance according to expediency. When he wants to justify new technologies, he portrays greens as wanting a return to some pristine nature. When greens propose action, he denounces them as ‘ignorant’ ‘extremists’ with a sentimental view of nature. Now Lovelock years for a return to some long lost golden age.

Much too slowly some begin to understand that the welfare of Gaia is more important than the welfare of humankind. The science of Gaia confirms the threat to the Earth but allows us to continue the older naturalism where normally the Earth is benign but like ancient goddesses sometimes ruthless, and only humans are sentimental. To be truly green we have to rid ourselves of the illusion that we are separate from Gaia in any way. We are as much a part of her as anything alive and we should feel tied, as in a good and loving marriage, until death us do part. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 

This is just so poorly written it would take too much time to rebut. It is a scarcely reasoned mysticism, frankly. One minute Lovelock castigates greens for yearning to go back to a pristine nature that no longer exists, the next he is invoking nature as a vengeful goddess, arguing for a primal unity with Gaia that sounds like nothing more than a yearning for the blissful peace of the womb. 

It needs to be emphasised that Lovelock’s Gaia is not the mythical Earth Goddess at all but a machine. In writing of the way that patriarchy turned Athena into ‘a sexless thing, neither man nor woman’, Jane Harrison concludes: "To the end she remains manufactured, unreal, and never convinces us. . . . We cannot love a goddess who on principle forgets the Earth from which she sprang." It is for this reason that Lovelock’s constant assertions that we must identify with Gaia are doomed to fail. Human beings are sentimental, are anthropomorphic and cannot empathise with a machine. To the extent that they do, they are victims of idolatry. That is not a Goddess we are venerating but Moloch, and such worship entails not survival but self-immolation. That is a condition of alienation. Not only has human praxis re-made nature, it has created a civilisation, a built environment that, beyond control and comprehension, appears in monstrous form. Gaia is divorced from earth precisely because she now represents the human-made. This would point in the direction of the God Species thesis, evolution as a co-evolution between ourselves and both our fabricated and natural environment. We empathise with Gaia because we share the same flesh and blood.

Lovelock describes Gaia as ‘ruthless’ and human beings as ‘sentimental’. This is not merely a recognition of the fact/value divide but an aggressive assertion of the primacy of fact over value. Natural processes and causal chains are physical, morally indifferent. We can have scientific knowledge of Nature and offer explanations of Nature’s operation. But human beings are meaning seeking creatures who must go beyond physical fact. Lovelock’s view is one-sided. What Lovelock calls ‘sentimentality’ is actually morality and refers to the moral freedom and choice that is the core of human dignity. James Lovelock cannot see it. It is a failing he shares with many scientists. Lovelock refers with a sniffy disdain to ‘human value judgement’, saying ‘it has no basis in science.’ But this fact/value distinction can easily be switched around. Scientific explanation has no business in morality and politics. Respecting the fact/value divide, scientists should know their place and remain there. Scientists supply the knowledge and the information, but they cannot tell us how we ought to act. Science must remain silent on morality.

The source of Lovelock’s problems lie in this tendency on the part of scientists to assume that the fact/value divide applies only to others rather than scientists. Lovelock’s conception of Gaia falls on the wrong side of the fact/value, means/ends, object/subject divide for him to tell us how we ought to behave. This is worth a closer look. If knowledge is construed on the basis of science alone, and you will comprehend God/Nature in only one aspect. The factual. This is the aspect that the Hebrew Bible calls Elohim. This is the impersonal God of creation. This is the God of Spinoza. When Einstein was asked if he believed in God, he replied: 'I believe in Spinoza's God, who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings'. 

But this is not God as such, just one aspect of God. This is James Lovelock’s Gaia. Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine. An organic machine, but a machine no less. Lovelock believes but cannot rationally prove his Gaia is alive. His colleagues tell him that his view that Nature is alive is ‘scientifically incorrect’. Indeed it is. But that doesn’t mean that Nature isn’t alive, it just exposes the limitations of science and scientific explanation. If I wanted to measure the depth of the sea with a tape measure that extended to five feet, I would gain only five feet’s worth of knowledge. That isn’t the external world as such, just the extent of my knowledge of the external world armed with a five foot tape measure. Our knowledge of the external world, is our knowledge of the external world, not the external world as such.
I have no doubt that Lovelock is genuine when he expresses his belief that Gaia is alive. It is worth emphasising that Spinoza was also called a 'God-intoxicated man' by Novalis (see my book Spinoza – The Rule of Reason.) Einstein too understood the importance of the religious spirit. ‘To know an answer to the question, 'What is the meaning of human life?' means to be religious.’ (Albert Einstein). This is why I objected to Lovelock repeating Nigel Lawson’s view that environmentalism is a ‘new religion’. Whether a religion is new or old hardly matters, the crucial question is whether it is a genuine religion. That is a much more profound question. Green spirituality, of course, taps into the oldest religion in the book, the veneration of the ancient Goddess, Gaea as the Mother of all that is living. We are not dealing with a ‘new religion’ at all. The Goddess is first encountered in myth, the Mother of All at the Dawn of All. The Homeric-era "Hymn to Earth" renders her thus:

To Gaea, mother of all of life and oldest of gods, I sing, 
You who make and feed and guide all creatures of the earth, 
Those who move on your firm and radiant land, those who wing 
Your skies, those who swim your seas, to all these you have given birth; 
Mistress, from you come all our harvests, our children, our night and day, 
Yours the power to give us life, yours to take away. 
To you, who contain everything, 
To Gaea, mother of all, I sing.

Strange that Lovelock, the man who has played a key role in resurrecting the ancient Earth Goddess, should have overlooked this. And note the spelling, “Gaea”, and not “Gaia”. Lovelock has mis-named and maybe misidentified the Earth Goddess all along. I have continued to use the name ‘Gaia’ throughout, since it is the name most people are familiar with. But I prefer ‘Gaea’.

Lovelock slams the windfarm on the top of a hill as an impoverished version of the Cross. He is right, but that criticism applies against those for whom technologies are divine powers, not greens who want to restrict technology to being the servant of higher ends and purposes. It is a criticism that certainly applies to James Lovelock’s advocacy of nuclear power. He espouses the nuclear cause with missionary fervour and blind devotion. And it is a criticism that certainly applies to Nigel Lawson and his ilk, all those who mine and exploit the Earth for monetary riches. That kind of idolatry is intrinsic to the capital system. In Civilisation, the conservative Kenneth Clark referred to the ‘new religion of gain’. He compares and contrasts New York with the Gothic cathedrals. 

But New York, after all, was made by men. It took almost the same time to reach its present condition as it did to complete the Gothic cathedrals. At which point a very obvious reflection crosses one's mind: that the cathedrals were built to the glory of God, New York was built to the glory of mammon - money, gain, the new god of the nineteenth century. So many of the same human ingredients have gone into its construction that at a distance it does look rather like a celestial city. At a distance. Come closer and it's not so good. Lots of squalor, and, in the luxury, something parasitical. One sees why heroic materialism is still linked with an uneasy conscience. It has been from the start.

The ‘new religion’ which makes a mockery of Jesus and the cross is the religion of mammon, money, gain. And that is the religion of the capital system. ‘Accumulate, accumulate, that is Moses and all the prophets’ wrote Marx. So Lawson’s and Lovelock’s accusation that the green movement is a new religion can be turned back against them. 

The prophets of the secular world have dis-godded nature whilst appropriating the religious impulse to salvation and recycling it as the end of material progress. Heaven on Earth delivered by economic growth and technological expansion. It is not just that this progress as salvation is a new religion, it is that it is a false religion, an idolatry and an abomination. And the point applies to modernity, not to the green critics of the environmental damage done by the modern idols.

Elohim is the God of creation whose signature we can read in the natural world as a world of fact. It is not the personal God of revelation. This is the God of the world of values. This is a world which forms no part of science, Lovelock states, failing to appreciate the full import of that distinction. Lovelock, like Spinoza before him, can see God in the universe in terms of causal processes and physical law. But the personal God of revelation, God as the consecration of the personal, evades science. Lovelock can call for all he likes for human beings to recognise our dependence upon Gaia and to understand that human health and well-being depends upon planetary health and well-being. But his concept of Gaia is too intellectual, too abstract, for any genuine empathy to be possible. Human beings need the meaning that comes with morality. Lovelock calls this ‘sentimental’; in truth, it is the moral dignity that defines our humanity. Take that moral dignity away and human beings are no more than bone, gristle, sinew, muscle, chemical processes. That Lovelock so easily dismisses the moral dignity of human beings with a term like ‘sentimental’ is cause for alarm with respect to his approach as a whole. It indicates a view that human beings are nothing more than survival machines.
Einstein understood the predicament. ‘The world’, Einstein argued, ‘shows a perfection of means, and a confusion of ends’. Elohim, the God of Creation, must be supplemented by the personal God of revelation. Fact and value, means and ends, must be reunited. Collapse one term into the other and the problem is sublimated rather than resolved. One of the worst aspects of the militant new atheism promoted by Dawkins, Grayling and Harris is that it confirms and indeed increases the gap between science and religion, making it less and less possible to achieve a synthesis of fact and value. Hence Lovelock’s embarrassment lest Gaia be thought unscientific by his scientist colleagues. Science does not constitute the whole of knowledge and truth. Wittgenstein – himself a man of science, an engineer, saw this clearly: ‘To believe in God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. To believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.’

In addition to Elohim, the Bible reveals another face of God, Hashem, ‘the name’. This is the face turned to us in love. This aspect of God is found in the relationships that each human being has to other. The face of God is seen in the face of the human other that carries the trace of the divine Other. 
The only way we can see the face of Lovelock’s Gaia is by intellectual appreciation, by scientific knowledge. This applies also to Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura – the idea that God and Nature as interchangeable, all life united as one within the one single substance. The purpose of Spinoza’s philosophy is to attain the intellectual appreciation of reality as the one single substance. This is what Spinoza calls amor intellectualis Dei – the intellectual love of God/Nature. For Spinoza, the aim of the wise should be to rise above the illusory perspective which sees things sub specie durationis (‘under the aspect of time’) to achieve that ‘absolute viewpoint’ which sees the universe as God sees it, sub specie aeternitatis ('under the aspect of eternity').  Only with the intellectual love of God/Nature will human beings be truly free. Thus the basis of Spinoza’s ethics is an objective, 'selfless' view of the world. 
Einstein declared that he believed in the God of Spinoza, revealed in the orderly harmony of natural processes and indifferent to human thoughts and actions. That is the God of Creation rather than the personal God, the God of morality and love. Einstein also argues: ‘The religion of the future will be a cosmic religion. It should transcend personal God and avoid dogma and theology. Covering both the natural and spiritual, it should be based on a religious sense arising from the experience of all things natural as a meaningful unity. Buddhism answers this description.... If there is any religion that could cope with modern scientific needs it would be Buddhism.’
Spinoza and Einstein present a noble vision. But it is a God of the philosophers and the scientists that Spinoza and Einstein offer. It focuses upon just the one aspect of God, the God of Creation, accessible by scientific understanding. This is a God open only to intellectual appreciation. As a result, it deprives human beings of their own moral worth, their own divinity. This is God as a Nature which is amoral and indifferent to human beings.

This is a one-sided conception, not incorrect, but incomplete, lacking a moral perspective that gives natural processes meaning. Einstein expressed precisely this understanding when he said that science without conscience will doom us all. There is a need for the concept of Hashem, a moral concept that opens the soul to other souls, that allows us to see the divine presence in compassion, generosity, kindness, understanding, forgiveness, mercy. God/Nature as a factual universe is blind and indifferent. On this basis, Lovelock cannot offer reasons why anyone should care. Gaia doesn’t care, that much Lovelock makes clear. Values, he states, form no part of science. So who cares if all we have is Elohim, the God of Creation? What we have, as Kant argued, is the moral law within us. With this we create space for God by ‘good works’, protecting the weak, speaking for the voiceless, relieving the poor, feeding the hungry, healing the sick, sheltering the homeless and fighting for justice. God lives in the moral law within and is expressed in relationship, in empathy, in interpersonal understanding, and solidary exchange. These are what Martin Buber called I-Thou or I-You relationships, in contradistinction to I-It relations. God or Gaia as an ‘It’, a scientific object, falls far short of what is required. We cannot empathise with an object, an ‘It’. 
The personal God of revelation involving I-Thou relationships has a role for all of us to play. In this conception, we identify our moral law within with the moral dignity of others and therefore make common cause for the good. As a result, we become partners with God in the work of love. The feminist artist Frieda Kahlo captures this idea perfectly:


The Love Embrace of the Universe 1949 Kahlo

This goes much further than the intellectual appreciation which is all science can offer. We do not become as gods. Instead we become God’s partner. God needs a partner, God needs relationship. As Lovelock himself states, ‘Gaia needs us’. We thus enter what physicist John Wheeler called a participatory universe. The physicist is the atom’s way of knowing about atoms. To explain what he means by his observer-participancy conception, Wheeler refers to an old Hebrew legend in which Jehovah and Abraham are arguing with each other as to which of them is better able to account for the world as it is. Jehovah tries to assert his authority over Abraham, 'You would not even exist if it were not for me.' 'Yes, Lord, that I know,' Abraham replies, 'but also you would not be known if it were not for me.'

That resolves James Lovelock’s problem of relating humanity and Gaia. It is not a case of one or the other, or one over the other. Lovelock keeps insisting on the priority of Gaia, only to call for human beings to identify with Gaia. That is, at best, a relationship of mistress and servant. Lovelock has the idea when he argues that Gaia has evolved the human species as an intelligent species whom she needs to do her work. When Lovelock argues that ‘Gaia needs us’, he is nearly there but not quite. He cannot see beyond scientific knowledge. This only reveals one face of Gaia, Gaia as indifferent causal processes and natural imperatives. Human beings are dependent on Gaia, claims Lovelock. Yes, James, we know, but Gaia would not be known without us. This is to call for a co-evolution of humanity and nature, of humanity within nature’s interconnected web of life. This requires more than scientific knowledge of the world of fact and calls on us to activate our moral dignity. This is human freedom as moral choice. Gaia on her own cannot live within the free human soul. The God/Nature in which human beings participate is a relationship of intersubjectivity, the meeting point of the subjectivity of each with the subjectivity of others and of all together with the inwardness of God. 

The religious dimensions of Gaia

Lovelock comes to the religious dimensions of Gaia.

The recognition that we are the agents of planetary change brings a sense of guilt and gives environmentalism a religious significance. So far it is no more than a belief system that has extended the concept of pollution and ecosystem destruction from the local to the planetary scale. Maybe it will grow into a faith but it is still nascent and its dogma not yet properly codified. An environmentalist with a religious inclination might ask, 'Was the discovery and use of fire our original sin? Were we sinful to continue to pollute the planet?' For most of us the contrite expression of 'Mea culpa!' in a deep green voice is not appropriate. We know that we have made appalling mistakes but we have cast aside the old idea that we are born evil and now acknowledge that the whims of our fickle natures were amplified by technology, so that like a drunkard driving a tank we have accidentally trashed our world. Guilt is inappropriate; we seek restitution and the restoration of our lost world, not punishment.
Even if we had time, and we do not, to change our genes to make us act with love and live lightly on the Earth, it would not work. We are what we are because natural selection has made us the toughest predator the world has ever seen.
The Tyrannosaurus was displaced even by small mammals. It is as absurd to expect us to change ourselves as it would be to expect crocodiles or sharks to become, through some great act of will, vegetarian. We cannot alter our natures, and as we shall see the bred-in tribalism and nationalism we pretend to deplore is the amplifier that makes us powerful. All that we can do is to try to temper our strength with decency. (Lovelock ch 9 2009).

These passages expose the moral rottenness at the core of Lovelock’s argument. We do not have to change our genes to come and love and live lightly on the Earth. Murder, violence, pillage, aggression, selfishness etc are not the norm of everyday human life. Over the centuries we have learned to develop our moral sensibilities to expand the circle of justice. Human beings learn. To reason that natural selection has made human beings the toughest predator the world has ever seen frankly damns us according to a rigid biological determinism. So why issue a final warning if the die is cast? Someone should tell Lovelock that no-one believes in this kind of biological determinism any more. Even Dawkins argues that we have the power to override our genes. Dawkins also makes it clear that the selfish gene is quite capable of allowing altruistic, cooperative behaviour. Compared to the work now being done, Mark Pagels’ Wired for Culture, for instance, Lovelock’s crude biology belongs to another era – the era when green philosophy was ‘benign’, eugenics had widespread political support, and the world was on its way to war. We don’t need a repeat.

We became the Earth's infection a long and uncertain time ago when we first used fire and tools purposefully, but it was not until about two hundred years ago that the long incubation period ended and the Industrial Revolution began; then the infection of the Earth became irreversible. Ironically this was the time when Malthus first warned of the danger, and James Hutton and Erasmus Darwin first glimpsed the nature of a living Earth. (Lovelock ch 9 2009).

Lovelock is comparing the human species to a virus, an infection. This is misanthropy masquerading as science. Lovelock earlier castigated critics of nuclear energy as ‘unreasoning’, but the description of human beings as ‘the Earth’s infection’ is an irrational nihilism. There is a stronger case for arguing that the human species is the creative intelligence at the heart of the purposive universe. Lovelock himself gives a version of this argument earlier, arguing for human beings as having evolved as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’. This conception of the human species as the God Species may well be the only way forward, if we understand this to mean partnership with God, a co-evolution. Lovelock’s eco-catastrophe and collapse merely follows business as usual. Lovelock issues a ‘final warning’ but it isn’t at all clear that Lovelock is actually proposing an alternative to eco-disaster. On the contrary, he seems to relish the prospect.

The disease that afflicts the Earth is not just climate change -manifest by drought, heat and an ever-rising sea. Added to this there is the changing chemistry of the air and the oceans, and the way the sea grows acidic. Then there is the shortage of food for all consumers of the animal kingdom. As important is the loss of that vital biodiversity that enables the working of an ecosystem. All these affect the working of the Earth's operating system and are the consequences of too many people. Individuals occasionally suffer a disease called polycythaemia, an overpopulation of red blood cells. By analogy, Gaia's illness could be called polyanthroponemia, where humans overpopulate until they do more harm than good.

People are the problem. Lovelock writes generally of ‘too many people’. What people? He doesn’t break ‘the people’ down in terms of energy demands and consumption patterns, he doesn’t examine social relations, class structures, distribution of resources. How convenient for the rich and the powerful. Existing power relations are protected and the victims of climate change get the blame. If they weren’t alive, they wouldn’t be starving and dying. It’s not that these are new issues. This is pretty basic stuff, but Lovelock adopts a crude, broad brush approach that overlooks the real issues. ‘We’ are an infection, Lovelock writes, failing to distinguish between different groups and classes within prevailing social relationships. The victims of environmental crisis are bracketed in the same group as its perpetrators. There is a need to avoid evasive notions of shared responsibility and examine specific social relations. But that would be politics wouldn’t it, something which Lovelock bemoans as introducing ‘contentious’ ideas into his ‘benign’ world of the old green philosophy. One can be kind here and simply say that Lovelock is a political naïf who is simply out of his depth on these issues. One could be cruel and argue that his views clearly point in the direction of an eco-fascism, quite deliberately too with his talk of wars and warlords and migrations and pitiless nature. Hitler was very big on this pitiless character of nature. It was his god. Erich Fromm’s The Fear of Freedom is very good at exposing Hitler’s worship of Nature as this vast ruthless power.

Usually Hitler tries to rationalize and justify his wish for power. The main justifications are the following : his domination of other peoples is for their own good and for the good of the culture of the world; the wish for power is rooted in the eternal laws of nature and he recognizes and follows only these laws ; he himself acts under the command of a higher power—God, Fate, History, Nature; his attempts for domination are only a defence against the attempts of others to dominate him and the German people. He wants only peace and freedom. Fromm 1960 ch 6).

The second rationalization, that his wish for power is rooted in the laws of nature, is more than a mere rationalization ; it also springs from the wish for submission to a power outside oneself, as expressed particularly in Hitler's crude popularization of Darwinism. (Fromm 1960 ch 6).


Lovelock’s insistence that ‘it is our duty to survive’ by learning how to serve Nature (Lovelock ch 3 2009) savour so much of what Erich Fromm writes about Hitler that his argument is worth quoting at length.

This instinct of self-preservation leads to the fight of the stronger for the domination of the weaker and economically, eventually, to the survival of the fittest. The identification of the instinct of self-preservation with power over others finds a particularly striking expression in Hitler's assumption that "the first culture of mankind certainly depended less on the tamed animal, but rather on the use of inferior people". He projects his own sadism upon Nature who is "the cruel Queen of all Wisdom", and her law of preservation is "bound to the brazen law of necessity and of the right of the victory of the best and the strongest in this world".

Fromm wrote The Fear of Freedom in 1960, yet it is not difficult at all to apply what he wrote of Hitler’s worship of Nature to what Lovelock writes with respect to Gaia. ‘For him the superior power to which he submits is God, Fate, Necessity, History, Nature. Actually all these terms have about the same meaning to him, that of symbols of an overwhelmingly strong power. (Fromm 1960 ch 6).

Read the following passage and substitute Lovelock for Hitler and Gaia for Nature.

The power which impresses Hitler probably more than God, Providence, and Fate, is Nature. While it was the trend of the historical development of the last four hundred years to replace the domination over men by the domination over Nature, Hitler insists that one can and should rule over men but that one cannot rule over Nature… He ridicules the idea that man could conquer Nature and makes fun of those who believe they may become conquerors of Nature “whereas they have no other weapon at their disposal but an 'idea'". He says that man "does not dominate Nature, but that, based on the knowledge of a few laws and secrets of Nature, he has risen to the position of master of those other living beings lacking this knowledge". There again we find the same idea : Nature is the great power we have to submit to, but living beings are the ones we should dominate. (Fromm 1960 ch 6). 

That passage should be born in mind when discussing the arguments of scientists who assert that scientific knowledge of the workings of Nature is the most important knowledge there is and that it is such knowledge that constitutes the norms of rationality against which human beings should be judged.
Lovelock certainly believes that Nature is all powerful. It is also evident that Lovelock doesn’t believe that the human race is an intelligent species at all. Earlier, he identified the human species as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’. But read this passage closely. 

We are deeply impressed by the power of our weapons, yet they are puny compared with the most powerful weapon of all: creative intelligence. Consider how many of the great and powerful empires have been brought down by ideas alone. Civilizations destroy themselves with ideologies that, like computer viruses, disable their operating systems. Gibbon looked on Christianity as a virus that disabled the mighty Roman Empire. Could Marxism have enfeebled great states in the twentieth century and caused the death of tens of millions? Now we have the urban green ideology, perhaps the most deadly of them all.

This is packed with so much historically illiterate and politically biased rubbish that it is hard to know where to start, let alone finish. People who read a great deal come across arguments like this quite often. I call them pancakes, in that they are so easily flipped to reveal another side. Lovelock begins by writing of ‘creative intelligence’ only to write of the power of ideas to destroy. But if creative intelligence has brought down civilisations, it has also built civilisations and sustained them over centuries. Ideas build civilisations. Lovelock chooses a bad example with respect to the Roman Empire. It wasn’t creative intelligence at all that brought down Rome. Rome fell as a result of its material excess inducing moral and intellectual enfeeblement. Rome was built on ideas and absorbed plenty from Egypt and Greece and elsewhere to sustain itself over centuries. Further, if Christianity was a destructive virus, how is it that the Roman Catholic church is still going strong, with some one billion adherents the world over? 
This is just loosely reasoned prejudice rather than serious history. Which great state is this that marxism enfeebled? The Russia of the Tsars? Nine million casualties in the Great War, soldiers at the front without footwear. For the record, there were two Russian revolutions. The Tsarist regime collapsed as a result of its own corruption and stupidity. This is Lovelock revealing himself for what he is – a plain common and garden reactionary. The only thing missing from this diatribe is the French Revolution and how the ideas of Rousseau brought down the lovely kings and queens of the ancient regime. 
It is interesting to speculate why Lovelock missed out Fascism and Nazism, surely the deadliest ideas of all in the twentieth century, bringing down Italy and Spain, nations with great history and culture. Perhaps the close connection of the ideas expressed by these murderous regimes with scientific ideas of Darwinist biology and eugenics and other such moral filth reminds Lovelock too much of his own ‘benign’ green philosophy.

Lovelock has a nerve to abuse ‘urban green ideology’ as being the ‘most deadly’ ideology of them all. Why urban? Is he invoking the old Volkish myth of the Nazis here? For Lovelock to bracket all greens together like this is just plain lazy. Yes, some practices are dangerous in that they delude people into thinking the problem is being solved when it isn’t. It wastes time and it wastes money. Is this comment generally applicable to the wide range of green practices the world over? Hardly.
It is well to be suspicious of thinkers who play so freely with the lives of others. Read the book closely and Lovelock is actually arguing that it is too late to change and that the human population of 7 billion will likely be reduced to 100 million or 500 million. Somehow, to describe Lovelock’s own idea as ‘most deadly’ just doesn’t do the scale of extermination he envisages true justice. 
For all of the hype surrounding the Gaia thesis, it is depressing to read Lovelock’s discussion of moral and political implications and see staring us in the face a stark restatement of the early twentieth century ‘survival of the fittest’ argument. Those ideas, we had thought, had died a well deserved death with the Nazis, but it seems that there is something about the scientific approach to life that keeps them alive.

The Catholic monk Mendel taught us genetics, and the Anglican scientist Charles Darwin, natural selection and we may see both of their ideas in rapid action as this century unfolds and the Earth moves towards its next state. Let's hope that selection chooses from among us those better able to live with Gaia as well as with each other. Are we yet intelligent enough to be a social animal capable of living stably with Gaia and with ourselves now and on the changed Earth that soon will come? As I see it, our hope lies in the chance that we might evolve into a species that can regulate itself and be a beneficial part of Gaia. I wonder if in the great gene pool of all humanity there are the genes that could be selected to meet this goal.

And there you have what Lovelock’s argument really amounts to, the survival of the fittest. That’s why he lacks a morality and a politics. He doesn’t need them. Natural selection is doing all the work. And perhaps that’s the ‘final warning’. The human race should use its creative intelligence and come forward as a social species concerned with the good of each and all; or nature and necessity will do the job destructively. Even worse, some scientist disdainful of morality will select our genes for us.
God had better help us, because this kind of science won’t.

Our first imperative is to survive, but soon we face the appalling question of who we can let aboard the lifeboats? And who must we reject? There will be no ducking this question for before long there will be a great clamour from climate refugees seeking a safe haven in those few parts where the climate is tolerable and food is available. Make no mistake, the lifeboat simile is apt; the same problem has faced the shipwrecked: a lifeboat will sink or become impossible to sail if too laden. The old rules I grew up with were women and children first and the captain goes down with his ship. We will need a set of rules for climate oases. (Lovelock ch 9 2009).

And Lovelock has the nerve to call the greens ‘extremists’. The rich and the powerful will be drawing up these rules, or so they think. The problem with Lovelock is that, in ruling out green politics as futile, he strengthens the hand of those already in control and taking the ship down. Maybe this is the ‘final warning’ to humanity. Wake up and seize control of your lives, or have the rich and powerful preside over a cull.

We are not, as the puritans would have it, some wretched species deep in sin. We could have a great and proud future as the people from whom some future Adam and Eve may evolve, progenitors of a species closer to Gaia and which might serve within her as our brains do in each of us. 

Lovelock has no right to keep abusing ‘puritans.’ Lovelock has repeatedly argued that our genes make us aggressive, violent, rapacious, greedy. He is the one who argues that human beings have evolved to be the most efficient predators in history. Now he envisages a new Eden through the use of the creative social intelligence.

As a planetary intelligence we have already shown Gaia her face from space and let her see how truly beautiful she is compared with her dead siblings Mars and Venus. We could have a future in communion with our living planet to make her strong again and able to counter the disabling impacts that are due.
Thinking this way, how could anyone be a pessimist and imagine that the global heating crisis is the end for us or even Gaia? We will probably both survive and from our descendants could evolve the wiser species that could live even closer in Gaia and perhaps make her the first citizen of our Galaxy. (Lovelock ch 9 2009).

If we know this now – and we do – why is it impossible to develop a politics that embodies this planetary intelligence. Put crudely, Lovelock seems to think that the human species will only learn the hard way. That, frankly, is optimistic. The fittest who survive eco-catastrophe will be those most red in tooth and claw. It may take time to build up civilisation to the scale it is at presently. It makes more sense to use our existing technology more wisely within a broader technics. All that Lovelock offers is natural selection. What about the many more who do not get selected? Lovelock’s indifference suggests he has taken on the guise of Gaia as Elohim, as fact detached from value; he sees himself as the Earth Goddess, a Miss Whiplash for the new Millennium. The veneration of the Great Mother in an urban civilisation is always a form of decadence and regression. We no longer live in and by the cycle of nature but have created a second nature by our own praxis, a world of institutions, structures and systems. Our task is to ensure that second nature is so fitted to first nature as to preserve the Earth’s life support systems. Any return to Gaia will be the result of regression to primitivism or eco-catastrophe. Lovelock condemns the ‘urban green ideology’ as deadly but, as Stewart Brand argues, we live on a city planet. We are now an urban species. A reversion to Gaia in this context can only be the result of breakdown. In an urban world, Gaia must necessarily go from fertile life force to sadomasochistic sex goddess. The Goddess as Dominatrix. Lovelock’s Gaia as machine savours more of Moloch than Goddess, a human-made machine that will demands sacrifice to systemic imperatives. Lovelock is passive with respect to politics, Brand, as we shall see, is passive with respect to history. There is little sense here of creative human praxis, of human beings as change agents capable of incorporating an ecological knowledge back into their action. That opens up a split between humanity and Gaia, a gap that cannot be closed by science. Lacking a sense of human beings as the creative agency within the historical process, Lovelock ultimately is left cloaking primitivism with a scientific sophistication, inviting history to circle back on itself. Only then, reduced to nature at its most necessitous, will we see the face of Gaia. A little reading of the literature on the Mother Goddess will reveal that nature is not benign and blissful and bountiful, but connects sex with necessity, cruelty, and violence. 

Lovelock demonstrates an awareness of the challenge that Gaia offers to religion and humanism alike: ‘the churches of the monotheistic religions, and the recent heresies of humanism and Marxism, are faced with the unwelcome truth that some part of their old enemy, Wordsworth's Pagan, 'suckled in a creed outworn', is still alive within us.’ (Lovelock 2000 ch 9). However, ‘Wordsworth’s Pagan’ challenges capitalism and its rapacious relation to Nature most of all. For all of Lovelock’s antipathy towards left wing politics, no-one spoke out more passionately against the capitalist exploitation and despoliation of Nature than Wordsworth. Wordsworth asks in one poem:

‘Is then no nook of English ground secure / From rash assault?’  

Another poem has the answer:

‘a Power, the thirst for Gold / That rules o’er Britain like a baneful star, / Wills that your peace, your beauty, shall be sold ….’

It is time we saw ourselves in the world we have created. We need not see ourselves as gods, just cease worshipping our powers in the alien forms of state and capital, technology and bureaucracy, money and commodities. This is to achieve self-knowledge, seeing the world as our own product. That calls for balance with Nature rather than absorption into unmediated Nature. Nature is disturbing enough to the human psyche as a ghost in the machine, but when she is invited through civilisation’s front door she becomes a very dangerous guest. Be sure that it is Nature you are inviting into your home. That may not be the benevolent mother of psychic memory at all. Long before Jesus Christ, the ancients knew that subordination to nature is a crucifixion and dismemberment. The worship of nature is not a freedom but an enslavement. 




4 STEWART BRAND – GETTING GOOD AT BEING GODS
A review of Stewart Brand Whole Earth Discipline (2009).

The Moral and Intellectual Foundations

Brand begins with the quote: ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ That would seem to be a moral question. But as the opening sentence in the book makes clear, Brand is identifying divinity with knowledge and hence power.

Climate change. Urbanization. Biotechnology. Those three narratives, still taking shape, are developing a long arc likely to dominate this century. How we frame them now will affect how they play out. Illusions abound on all three subjects, but their true nature is knowable. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

That’s a good confident start. The problems we face are not beyond our comprehension and control. Agreed. Brand is also correct when he explains his claim to divinity further. Where once he ‘encouraged individual power’, now he seeks to develop ‘aggregate power.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). This entails a recognition that the forces behind economic and environmental crisis are supra-individual forces which require collective mechanisms of rational control, coordination and cooperation. There is a need to develop long range strategic thinking for the common good over against short term individualistic choices.
Brand’s statement in favour of knowledge is consistent with a strand of thinking which identifies human beings as self-conscious creators of their own history, at least in part. Marx is the most prominent philosopher in this tradition, but there are many others. Vico, for instance, and his principle verum ipsum factum, which affirms that the truth of a thing is conditional upon having made it. Then there is Hegel who affirmed the progress of human reason to the consciousness of freedom. We can have knowledge of our powers for the very reason we are their creators, authors and instigators. We can be at home in a world of our making. Hegel writes well here:

The ignorant man is unfree because he faces a world which is foreign to himself, a world within which he tosses to and fro aimlessly, to which he is related only externally, unable to unite the alien world to himself and to feel at home in it as much as in his home. (Hegel).

Human powers are knowable and it is upon this knowledge that freedom as self-determination depends. But there is a crucial aspect to this progress to freedom which Hegel identified. ‘I am at home in the world when I know it, still more so when I have understood it.’ We need more than knowledge, we need understanding, meaning.
There is every reason for human beings to live up to this potential and become conscious of their role as creative change agents. Environmental problems have come to a head in the form of climate change. ‘It's a whiplash moment for everyone’, Brand comments. This means that ‘Greens are no longer strictly the defenders of natural systems against the incursions of civilization; now they're the defenders of civilization as well.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). That’s an onerous responsibility which implies that Greens must help people become conscious of human creative agency throughout history. This is more than defending civilisation, this is to create the first self-conscious civilisation in history. 

In his Articles on India, Marx repudiated the ‘little communities’ of past civilisations (he was referring to India but he made the same remarks with reference to Europe’s Feudal past) since ‘they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never-changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Kanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow.’ In good Hegelian manner, Marx takes his stand on the cunning of history. ‘The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. (Marx AIC SE 1973). 

In other words, Marx justifies British imperialism in India, involving the destruction of Indian civilisation, since it brings about progress in the consciousness of freedom. Against the sovereignty of nature, Marx justifies a self-conscious humanity as the sovereign of circumstances. This is what Karl Popper called historicism and moral futurism. Hegel referred to the slaughterbench of history. Notions of human forces being ‘unconscious tools’ are treated with suspicion these days. The most striking thing about Marx’s argument is the way that it sets Nature and human society in antithetical relation. Marx rejects the ‘brutalizing worship of nature’ associated with a dependence on external circumstances in favour of human beings becoming the sovereigns of circumstances. 

Marx’s argument fits the ‘God Species’ thesis like a glove. Knowledge is power and it expands human consciousness of freedom. Of course, human beings as change agents should reject the ‘brutalizing worship of nature’, but does this apply to every form of veneration? Is worship as such ‘brutalizing’? Marx well knows that we have exchanged a natural necessity for a social necessity, a determination by external nature by a societal determination of economic imperatives. All forms of idolatry are ‘brutalizing’ in that they deny human knowledge and power. But the question remains, are other forms of veneration possible, enhancing the human spirit and perfectly consistent with human dignity and indeed power? This requires understanding, meaning. There is some suspicion that Marx may have neglected the moral dimension of this project, enclosing us even further within the new idolatry associated with the state, capital, money, commodities, things in general, rather than enabling us to transcend it. This points to the need for a transcendent vision, a moral and political idealism as an intellectual and psychological presupposition of human action. Marx either lacked this transcendent vision or concealed it so effectively within his emancipatory project that it was buried beneath political expediency. The result was that his philosophy failed to make good its emancipatory promise. This transcendent vision affirms the existence of an objective morality, the idea that 'good' and 'evil' are built into the universe, exist within each human being as the moral law, and are integral parts of reality. Marx rejected the idea of the universal as unalterable, arguing that the human essence unfolds throughout historically specific social relations as a result of human action. This is true. But Marx is an essentialist rather than an existentialist, something which means that he must hold some notion of morality as ‘objective’. We do not create ex nihilo but on the basis of our essence as potentiality. The 'good' therefore emerges as a cluster of qualities, ways of life which correspond to the nature of the benevolent universe itself and enhance the human ontology. It follows that human beings are to be raised to be worthy of their essential selves, regardless of their immediate inclinations. The good is that which enhances life; the bad is that which is destructive of life, which is a diminution of life. This is how Marx is to be understood when he criticises human subjugation to external circumstances. The nature worship of past civilisations shackles human beings to mere actual existence whereas the good requires contact and union with the ultimate and benevolent reality of the universe. 
I would argue strongly that the failure to establish the transcendent vision at the core of his politics seriously hobbled Marx’s project from the start. It’s there, but buried behind ‘laws’ of history and economics. I would also strongly argue that the failure to develop this transcendent vision will continue to undermine other seemingly emancipatory projects, with the result that assertions of human power and knowledge come to be detached from human ends and end up in the service of power as an idol. We return to the subjugation of human beings to external necessity, whether this is Nature or God, in a variety of social forms – the state (the new idol – Nietzsche), bureaucracy (‘without regard for persons’ Weber), money, capital (‘Moses and all the prophets’ Marx), commodities, technology, mechanised, organised war. There are any number of modern gods demanding sacrifices.

So the argument that since human power, its character, its exercise and its consequences, are all knowable, human beings can and indeed must become as gods has to be supported by a transcendent vision which affirms notions of good within the benevolent universe, objective morality, the human species with a unique nature and destiny. This is a moral question. There is an inherent moral dimension within the whole emancipatory project. The end is a civilisation which corresponds to and enhances the human ontology, which respects the dignity, indeed the divinity, of human beings as lying in an inherent moral capacity. An emancipatory project would be meaningless in the absence of these moral and intellectual presuppositions at its core. This is not to play morality against knowledge, technological or otherwise, but to argue for the integration of moral, cognitive and technological capacities. An emancipatory project would be meaningless if it was constituted by the principles of transcendence only. But knowledge without transcendence merely reproduces the ‘is’ on an ever larger scale. It abolishes the future.

The purpose of this introductory argument has been to set out a moral and intellectual framework to meet the challenge that Stewart Brand sets before us, that human beings should not only become as gods but get good at living as gods. The solution to a problem depends upon its being adequately stated in the first place. Is this what we get from Brand? No. What we get is a wide-eyed optimism with respect to human technical power. Morality is luxury, an irrelevance.

When roles shift, ideologies have to shift, and ideologies hate to shift. The workaround is pragmatism—"a practical way of thinking concerned with results rather than with theories and principles." The shift is deeper than moving from one ideology to another; the shift is to discard ideology entirely. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

This can be disposed of quickly. For Plato, ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. ‘Know thyself’ read the inscription at Delphi. Without ‘theory’ as some kind of reflection, there is no human life, only animal existence. If this is what Brand wishes to reduce human beings to, he should cease making rather large claims about the survival of civilisation. Without theory, without values, without a reflective approach to means and ends, there is no civilisation. This passage effectively sums up what is wrong with Brand’s approach. History is full of men and women who just obey orders whilst asking no questions, who elevate ‘getting things done’ to the status of high principle, as though the truth, the right and good are merely ‘what works’. Such explicitly anti-theoretical pragmatism is a blight because it is an invitation to shut down thought. The pragmatist speaks no truths to power and asks no questions of power, other than ‘how high’ when told to jump. Which is tragic, since unless more and more people start to do some hard thinking about the planetary condition, it is less than certain that civilisation will be around for that much longer. This would certainly save us all that concern with difficult theories and principles, since there would then be nothing to reflect upon other than basic survival. Brand’s approach attempts to reduce us to such unthinking pragmatism at a time when the space for hard thought exists and when such hard thinking would pay off in the long run.

Such pragmatism serves the status quo. To reduce ideas and principles to ‘results’ is the crudest ideology of all. Under such blinkered pragmatism, leaving existing institutional parameters unchanged, the future is no more than the present enlarged. This is the Tony Blair view – what works. What works depends upon ethical, social and institutional parameters. Brand simply assumes these parameters and removes them from public controversy and debate. In this respect, Brand’s argument is plainly ideological in Marx’s critical sense of a set of ideas which serve to conceal the true nature of reality so as to preserve existing power relations. Ideology is ‘a particular, distorted kind of consciousness which conceals contradictions.’ (Larrain 1979 ch 2). Pragmatism conceals a whole number of contradictions and conflicts, to the benefit of existing power structures. Against Marx’s critical notion of ideology, which enables us to see through existing relations, Brand reverts to Napoleon’s old ‘scorn of ideologists’. To Brand, ideology is just a set of ideas. And if that crude notion isn’t bad enough, he thinks we can dispense with ideas. We need waste little time dealing with this moral and intellectual disarmament. Ideas are not luxuries and irrelevancies. Human beings map their world with ideas, living by them and living up to them. I have written at length on this in my book Philosophising through the Eye of the Mind (Peter Critchley 2010). In that book I challenge the way that those who take ideas seriously are dismissed for being ‘up in the clouds’. The ideas of philosophers may be generated in some abstract and ethereal realm, but they do not stay there. Human beings draw the map of humanity and redraw the map of the world with ideas, showing the path to freedom beyond common sense through reason. Ideas that may seem to be ‘up in the clouds’ come down to earth and change ‘the real world’ for the better. 

Brand’s callous disregard for ‘ideology’ undermines any argument he may make from the start. In arguing about knowledge, power, gods, divinity, we are engaged in philosophy. To really understand any field of human activity we need to subject it to fundamental questioning. Any field of human activity – education, religion, science, law, medicine, music, art – proceeds from fundamental principles and methods and these can be subjected to questioning. It is no coincidence that the best practitioners in each field of human activity are interested in its philosophy. 

This isn’t to deny that philosophy involves abstract questioning which seems too remote from ‘real life’. Is there any meaning to life? Does the universe reveal intelligence, unity or purpose? What really exists? What does 'exist' mean? Is mind subject to matter, or is it possessed of independent powers? What is 'mind', and how does it relate to 'matter'? What do we know? How do we know it? Do we know anything at all, or is everything we think we know just hypothesis? Do human beings have free will, or is everything we do determined by prior causes and circumstances? Are human beings anything more than tiny lumps of impure carbon and water? Are 'right and 'wrong' just matters of opinion? Why be good? What is the good life and how do we achieve it? If there is evolution, is it evolution towards some goal? 
Whilst these questions may seem abstract, they do actually go to the core of what it is to be human. As Plato stated, ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. It is Brand who premises his argument on the assertion that human beings need to get good at living as gods, so he can certainly be criticised for his dismissal of ideas, culture and morality. Brand leaves the human condition unexamined and unaltered. What makes that dangerous rather than merely ignorant is the way he exalts technical power and knowledge to god-like status. 

If Brand refuses to see this and still takes the blunt engineers view of ‘what works’, he needs to consider these questions:
Is it ever right to go to war? Do human beings have rights? Do animals have rights, and if so, are they the same as or different from human rights? Can abortion or euthanasia ever be justified? Never? If charity begins at home, how far does it extend? Should we care about people dying of hunger and disease in other parts of the world? How much is an elephant worth? How much should be spent on health and welfare? 

Anyone who thinks that ideas, ‘ideology’, philosophy are irrelevant in being remote from the real world simply isn’t thinking enough. Examine any of the conflicts in the world today, the disagreements which are the stuff of politics and the grist of television shows and phone-ins, and one will be confronted by clearly expressed ideas concerning freedom, peace, equality, justice, democracy, rights and the meaning of the good life and happiness. Regardless of the quality of the debate, all this argument represents a form of philosophising. Ideas and values are plainly important, for the simple reason that we live by them. And we may die by their absence. Human beings are meaning seeking creatures. The presentation and defence of ideas and values is an integral part of what it is to be a human being. These questions are not irrelevant at all but are of immediate practical concern in the world we live.

Brand states that ‘Good intentions, good values, even high energy are not enough in themselves.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). Who has ever claimed that they are? The phrase necessary but not sufficient applies here. Whilst intellectual and ethical foundations may not be sufficient in themselves, they most certainly are necessary. Brand ignores this necessary foundation, which means one of two things: either Brand’s technocratic assertion of power will lack moral and intellectual direction or it will proceed on existing foundations. Either way, the project will misfire at best or backfire at worst.
Brand is aware of the importance of moral, intellectual and cultural parameters. He believes that conservation’s intellectual core is outmoded:

land degradation is caused less by material factors—such as population, technology, and fossil fuel use—than by our outdated cultural values and assumptions, particularly our ingrained tendency to treat nature as a warehouse of market commodities. To succeed, conservation has to confront these cultural flaws and do so in ways that are orchestrated and deliberate, not haphazard and indirect. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

Very true. But this is the case against those who reduce the ecological problem to science and technology. Brand opens by arguing that the crucial shift is to discard ideology altogether. By ideology he means ideas and values. The solution to outdated cultural values and assumptions is not to abandon cultural values and assumptions as such but to discard the old ones and embrace new ones. Brand throws the baby out with the bathwater, which leaves his project without foundation. On this reasoning, science and technology remain on the wrong side of the fact/value divide and will continue to misfire through misapplication. Those who assert that time is too pressing for ethical and ideological examination are not offering solutions only a reproduction of the same problems enlarged by technological application. 

Brand plainly thinks that our technology will be our salvation. His faith is touching, but a little alarming at the same time:

Earth will be fine, no matter what; so will life. It is humans who are in trouble. But since we got ourselves into this fix, we should be able to get ourselves out of it. (Brand ch 1 2009).

Adolf Hitler 1945. Human beings can get themselves out of the fix they are in, but only by understanding how they got themselves in the fix in the first place. Brand’s cock-eyed optimism with respect to technology doesn’t follow at all. You’ve made your bed, now you can lie in it seems more appropriate. It would be more correct to argue that our powers have escaped conscious and common control but since they are our powers, we can at least look forward to subordinating them to our ends. Brand may indeed mean some such thing. The problem is that his focus is so overwhelmingly on the means that the clear danger is of extending these means to displace ends. That is why we are in the fix in the first place. What Brand does say about human nature and ethical possibilities is very discouraging.

The best way to think about climate change I found in a book that seems to be about something else—Constant Battles (2003), by Harvard archaeologist Steven LeBlanc (with Katherine Register). Drawing on abundant archaeological and ethnological evidence, LeBlanc argues that humans have always waged ferocious war. In all societies from hunter-gatherers on up through agricultural tribes, then chiefdoms, to early complex civilizations, 25 percent of adult males routinely died from warfare. No one wanted to fight, but they were constantly forced to choose between starvation and robbing the neighbors. Their preferred solution was the total annihilation of the neighbors. (Brand ch 1 2009).

It’s the killer ape thesis. Proceeding from the assertion that human beings should live up to the status of gods, Brand quickly reduces us to primitive basics. But, as any good Aristotelian can tell you, you judge a thing by its character at the end of its development, not its beginnings. Human beings are a work in progress. Brand takes us back to origins, primitive societies where wholesale slaughter was common and cannibalism was practised for nutrition and not just for ceremony. War and conflict are innate. The abundant "cooking stones" at many archeological sites are actually ammunition—sling missiles. Cities were walled to defend against outsiders.

So what is Brand’s great vision? ‘Humans perpetually fight, LeBlanc says, because they always outstrip the carrying capacity of their natural environment and then have to fight over resources.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). 

Is Brand reading a particular view of human nature back into the evidence? Human beings fight in times of surplus. There must be other reasons, for the reason that humans haven’t always fought wars. The causes of human conflict needs to be linked to the rise of cities, states and divine kingships – civilisation in fact. But Le Blanc’s view in itself doesn’t say much other than the obvious – human beings fight over scarce resources. To be meaningful, that statement must be accompanied by a conceptions of needs and necessity. How can the definition of scarcity be culturally regulated so as to be less pressing a problem? This is more than some law of nature. Human beings have lived well beyond natural necessity for centuries now, but the scale of war and conflict have grown. Rather than read this as a general ‘constant battles’ view of nature, we need an understanding of the relation of societies to carrying capacity that focuses on specific social relations in the historical process. In terms of natural resources and technical capacity, there is no necessary reason why human beings cannot manage their social interchange with nature so as to remain well within the carrying capacity of the environment. If we are still outstripping that capacity, the reasons are to be sought in the false necessities and imperatives of the social system, not nature, whether the nature within or the nature without. The assertion of ‘constant battles’ can be rejected.

So why is Brand so enamoured of the constant battles thesis?

Native peoples developed arcane knowledge of how to find and prepare difficult foods because they'd eliminated all the easy food sources. Peace can break out, though, when carrying capacity is pushed up suddenly, as with the invention of agriculture, or newly effective bureaucracy, or remote trade, or technological breakthroughs. (Brand ch 1 2009). 


This is correct, so far as it goes. The problem is that peace doesn’t break out since, as we push up the carrying capacity via technological breakthroughs, we become slaves to a new necessity that causes us to increase the demands on the environment. We need to break that cycle rather than keep expanding its scale and scope. Our conception of scarcity is always relative to our definition of need and necessity. Straight away we can spot the false premise being established by Brand to justify the false solution – technology will be our saviour. If it was that simple, we would have been saved centuries ago. Technology is an integral part of the fix we are in. It is not the cause of the fix. Technology is politically and ethically neutral. It is a faithful mirror of ourselves. If we are greedy, if we are driven by wants, if we are slaves of appetite and desire, then so too will be technology. Our idea of scarcity will always be expanded. That is why we never break the cycle of necessity, even as we push up the carrying capacity. More of the same is not the solution. The changed relation to technology and hence its changed character is part of the solution. This is what is so frustrating. The likes of Brand are so close to the solution and yet end up missing by a mile.

Brand is optimistic that war and violence are on the wane. 

Only in the last three centuries, LeBlanc points out, have advanced states steadily lowered the overall body count to where just 3 percent of the world's people die from warfare these days, even though a few of the remaining wars and genocides have grown to world-war scale. Instead of butchering all their enemies in the traditional way, states merely kill enough to achieve a victory; then they put the survivors back to work. States also use their bureaucracies, advanced technology, and international rules of behavior to raise carrying capacity and sometimes even develop a careful relationship to it. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

Apart from a couple of world wars….!!! How many tens of millions were killed in those wars? The argument is reminiscent of the claims made for new energy. The efficiencies of new energies reduce the relative output of pollution but so encourage the continuation of the practice as to result in increases in absolute output. We produce more pollution, only more efficiently. Matt Ridley has also argued that life is getting less and less violent in terms of death per head. It still leaves the question of the scale and scope of war in the modern world. The explanation of the paradox can be found in Weber’s rationalisation thesis. The modern world evinces a tyranny of abstraction in which bureaucratic institutions and organisations and systemic imperatives proceed ‘without regard for persons’. Personal violence may well be diminishing. But the violence of abstraction is all around us in the confines of our iron cage. The major wars have been wars of greed and trade and markets and resources. They are not wars of natural survival and necessity but of artificial necessity, of abstract powers. And those wars are expanding. We return to the conception of needs and necessity.

Brand doesn’t pose that question. He presumes that we are already at peace. His warning is that our ‘civilized sophistication could collapse if carrying capacities everywhere are lowered by severe climate change. Humanity would revert to its norm of constant battles for diminishing resources. Peace lovers would be killed and eaten by war lovers.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). It’s a view that completely fails to spot the source of violence in existing civilisation and the way that our technical capacities have eclipsed our moral capacities to the detriment of our living environment. The fact that we are outstripping our carrying capacities now, as a result of systemic necessity and accumulative imperatives, completely evades Brand. That is a dangerous blindspot since it leads him to propose solutions within unaltered institutional parameters. 

Civilisation and Infrastructure
Brand is certainly correct to warn of the dangers of civilisation collapse. ‘With climate change under way, we have to make a choice. If we do nothing or not enough, we face a carrying-capacity crisis leading to war of all against all, this time with massively lethal weapons and a dieback measured in billions.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). 

This is fundamentally correct. The likes of James Lovelock seem to welcome this dieback. The survivors are few but will be better fitted to Gaia’s needs. That savours more than a little of what Marx castigated as the ‘brutalizing worship of nature’ subjugating human beings to natural necessity. But we will have been brought here by our failure to creatively live up to the promise of our invention and ingenuity. That promise remains and constitutes Brand’s whole thesis. He quotes Le Blanc with enthusiasm.

For the first time in history, technology and science enable us to understand Earth's ecology and our impact on it, to control population growth, and to increase the carrying capacity in ways never before imagined. The opportunity for humans to live in long-term balance with nature is within our grasp if we do it right. It is a chance to break a million-year-old cycle of conflict and crisis. 

Isn’t this the old Enlightenment promise in a nutshell? It is not that the promise is to be denied but that we need to avoid its one-sided statement. The missing components of ideas, values, culture, psychology, social relations and institutional frameworks need to be restored so that science and technology are guided by ends we have supplied ourselves, not had imposed on us by external systems, imperatives and necessities. Brand is aware of the dialectic of Enlightenment, the way that emancipatory potentials can be frustrated and take the form of repressive realities.

Civilisation is at risk, but civilisation is the problem. The key positive feedback in the current Earth system is us. Accelerating wealth (especially in developing countries these days), a still-growing human population, and accelerating industry are pouring overwhelming quantities of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.’ (Brand ch 1 2009).

That this is true means that we need more analysis of the social relations at the heart of this civilisation so as to explain why its expansionary dynamic is causing us to systemically outstrip our carrying capacity. Brand quotes biologist Tim Flannery here, "The metabolism of our economy is now on a collision course with the metabolism of our planet." 
The facts on climate change are alarming, with some scenarios of five and six degree warming eliminating the greater percentage of the human population. Human beings will do as they always do and adapt, deniers like Nigel Lawson casually and callously assert. The few who will survive no doubt will adapt. They will have no choice in the matter. The rest are doomed. How to stabilize the climate is a question of energy. We have twenty-five years to level off at 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 in the atmosphere. We are currently at about 387 ppm and rising at more than 2 ppm per year. The goal of 450 ppm entails a global temperature rise of about 2°C (3.6°F), which means, in the words of scientist Saul Griffith, "large loss of species, more severe storms, floods and droughts, refugees from sea level rise, and other unpalatable, expensive and inhumane consequences." 
That might seem drastic but it is the best case scenario. Brand quotes Griffith to show how much the various energy sources offer.

So, Griffith says, "Imagine someone said you need 2 terawatts of wind, 2 terawatts of photovoltaic solar, 2 terawatts of solar thermal, 2 terawatts of geothermal, 2 terawatts of biofuels, and 3 terawatts of nuclear to give you 13 new clean terawatts. You add the existing 1.5 terawatts of biofuels and nuclear that we already use. You can also get 3 terawatts from coal and oil. That would give humanity around 17.5 terawatts—that allows for a little growth over the 16 terawatts we currently use. What would it take to do all that in 25 years?"
Here's the answer: "Two terawatts of photovoltaic would require install​ing 100 square meters of 15-percent-efficient solar cells every second, second after second, for the next 25 years. (That's about 1,200 square miles of solar cells a year, times 25 equals 30,000 square miles of photovoltaic cells.) Two terawatts of solar thermal? If it's 30 percent efficient all told, we'll need 50 square meters of highly reflective mirrors every second. (Some 600 square miles a year, times 25.) Two terawatts of biofuels? Something like 4 Olympic swimming pools of genetically engineered algae, installed every second. (About 61,000 square miles a year, times 25.) Two terawatts of wind? That's a 300-foot-diameter wind turbine every 5 minutes. (Install 105,000 turbines a year in good wind locations, times 25.) Two terawatts of geothermal? Build three 100-megawatt steam turbines every day—1,095 a year, times 25. Three terawatts of new nuclear? That's a 3-reactor, 3-gigawatt plant every week—52 a year, times 25."

Wind, wave, tide, solar, the research and the debate goes on, in an interminable cycle of claim and counter-claim. In an important sense, the debate concerning the relative merits of different energy is a phoney debate. The economic system we have will demand all the energy it can acquire and more. Notice how a reduction in energy is ruled out from the start. Flannery refers to the metabolism of ‘our economy’ as colliding with the ecology of the planet. The recourse to the metaphor of ‘the economy’ allows us to talk past the problem – the capital system, its accumulative logic and its contradictory dynamics. The problem of too much and increasing energy demands as a result of an expansionary economy organised around private accumulation is left unaddressed and unaltered in order to search for a technological solution. The increasing demands for energy inputs are not related to natural necessity but are the inevitable accompaniment of an economy organised around an accumulative logic. This is why human beings are outstripping their carrying capacity, no matter the extent to which technology expands it. That is why scarcity is always with us.
Adding it all up gives us an an area about the size of Australia — ‘Renewistan’ (Griffith) — covered with stuff dedicated to generating humanity's energy. This will also require transmission lines, energy storage, materials, and support infrastructure. ‘Technically, it is possible. Industrially, humanity has the collective capacity. But politically, 1 don't sec how. But we have to try. Why else bother to be human and be in this game?’ (Griffith). 
The same argument applies to morality – doing more with less through a change in values – but this is always ruled out as unlikely. The technological solution is also unlikely for the same reason – failure to relate the problem to the accumulative imperative of the capital system. Everything else is a solution to another problem. Time and again we return to the question of the examined life and human ends. The constant racking up of material quantity is the problem, not the solution. 

Brand is on the right lines when he notes that ‘between headlong industrial capitalism and a necessarily patient natural capitalism is a pace gap that is hard to bridge.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). Brand does not bridge that gap with a moral or anthropological change in the human condition but with science and technology. 

With infrastructure, however, we already think in terms of duration and responsibility, so it's no stretch to extend that thinking to natural systems. When there are problems with built infrastructure, we're used to solving them with science, engineering, collaborative public agreements, and financial instruments such as bonds and public-private contracts. Those tools apply just as well to natural infrastructure. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

Ah yes, the rationale for the technological fix. The problem is that we have already been applying these tools to natural infrastructure. Capitalism is built upon the technological mastery of nature, the manipulation of nature by technique and organisation. This is why there is a pace gap between industrial and natural capital in the first place. Brand’s argument only makes sense if he proposes to speed up nature’s processes by artificial means. He does, hence his support for nuclear, biotechnology, GE food and, in a more qualified sense, geoengineering. Natural capital is thus absorbed within industrial capital. Marx wrote that there are two sources of value, nature and labour. He also referred to the way that the capital system made the human being an ‘appendage of the machine.’ ‘In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as its living appendages.’ (Marx Capital I 1976 ch 25 15). Brand’s argument amounts to making nature to an appendage of the economic machine.

Brand’s argument would make more sense if he sought to close the pace gap by fitting industrial capital to natural capital. This requires a critique of the capitalist relations of production which organise the productive forces within the process of accumulation. From this angle, technique and organisation can be emancipated from the narrow aim of accumulation and fitted to the contours of nature’s life support systems. But Brand doesn’t frame the argument this way. Where Marx saw productive forces constrained by social relations of production, Brand treats science and technology in abstraction from political and social relations. This implies that these relations will be preserved. Given that this will be technology in the service of global capital accumulation and hence continued economic expansion, then the human race has had it.

Brand argues that although humans have been building infrastructure for thousands of years, it's still an intellectual no-man's-land. He claims to be unable to find any economic theory of infrastructure. ‘One wry definition of infrastructure is: "something gray, behind a chain-link fence." The message is: "Don't look, don't touch, don't even think about what this gray thing is for." We're trained to overlook infrastructure.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). 
Again, Brand is right. But the problem is one of modern mechanistic materialism which breaks down wholes into discrete parts and cannot see their interrelation and design within the bigger picture. But a good place for Brand to start looking is not in economics but in political economy, the greatest thinkers like the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, Ricardo, JS Mill, who located the functioning of the economy within environing relations, within social, moral and natural frameworks and infrastructures. Brand should also look at the Vico-Hegel-Marx idea that human beings build their world as an alien realm and come to appropriate it as a human product infused with human meaning. This is more promising terrain than notions of a self-regulating ecology and economics, but it also begs some controversial political questions concerning power, technique, organisation, authority and control. There is a reason why the apologists for the capital system run marxism out of town and continually refer to ‘greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ as marxists and socialists. They rule out any intervention and regulation that do not facilitate capital accumulation. Books innocent of a critique of political economy are always likely to go awry.


At some point, human beings have to assume conscious control of their powers. The difficulties of that task are shown by the fate of Marx’s attempt to achieve some such thing. Get it wrong, and a moral, political and ecological wasteland opens up in front of us. Brand sets his sights high, to live well as gods. But the stakes are high. Any disparity between ambition and ability and we are back in the Faustian world with a vengeance.
Brand takes his stand on the fact of human creative power. ‘Never mind terraforming Mars; we already live on a terraformed Earth. We've been inadvertently adroit at it for ten millennia, even heading off an ice age.’ The problem is that our transformations are now excessively carbon-loading the atmosphere so as to threaten runaway climate change. 

The terraforming thus far has been unintentional. Now that we have the curse and blessing of knowing what's going on, unintentional is no longer an option. "Nature" can't be counted on, having been compromised long ago. Gaia is no savior, since "she" likes ice ages and doesn't mind hot ages either. We're left with intention, with conscious design, with engineering. We finesse climate, or climate finesses us. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

So human beings have no option but to become the God Species, applying our intelligence to technique and organisation so as to invest our transformations with intentionality, purpose and design. Leaving things alone is not an option. Gaia will devour us. 

Brand is surely on the right lines here. Human beings have been transforming nature and transforming themselves from the start. It is better to get good at using that natural capacity rather than allowing human action to be driven by false imperatives and systemic determinations. This needs to be done not in opposition to Nature but by fitting an ecologically enlightened technique and organisation to nature’s life-support systems. James Lovelock argues some such thing but doesn’t give it sufficient emphasis. Indeed, Lovelock gives the impression that this integration of the human species within Gaia will come only after the eco-catastrophe. Brand wants to avoid this doomsday scenario by using science and technology. The problem here is that his proposals presume a continued antithesis between humanity and Nature, a struggle for mastery of the one against the other. That is already what is happening.

Of the tools that come to hand, this book will examine four that environmentalists have distrusted and now need to embrace, plus one we love that has to be scaled up. The unwelcome four are urbanization, nuclear power, biotechnology, and geoengineering. The familiar one is natural-system restoration, which may be better framed as megagardening—restoring Gaia's health at every scale from local soil to the whole atmosphere. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

After promising so much, Brand proposes no fundamental change whatsoever. Instead, he gives us the same old mastery of nature but with – supposedly – better new technologies. There is no transformation of modalities and mentalities at all. A genuine resolution of the environmental crisis requires that we become conscious of our transformative powers and employ them to ends we have freely chosen, fit our technique and organisation within nature’s life support systems, organise our carrying capacity on a sustainable basis and respect planetary boundaries. 
Instead of this, Brand offers the full application of new technologies within an unaltered system. All of which promises capital that it can have its cake and eat it – it will. In 1969 urban theorist Lewis Mumford wrote: "I think, in view of all that has happened the last half century, that it is likely the ship will sink." We are so far gone that it seems impossible to think of solutions outside of the machine mentality. Frankly, it is either a moral conversion on the scale of the old axial religions, global marxist revolution or game over. A crude technologism bereft of politics is hopeless in face of the task in front of us and will be easily co-opted to the continuation of the capital system.
Brand rules out change as the result of a social movement. ‘The scale of the climate challenge is so vast that it cannot be met solely by grassroots groups and corporations, no matter how Green. The situation requires government fiat to set rules and enforce them.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). The situation requires both top-down political action and bottom-up social movement, each buttressing the other. Brand’s view implies that change will be top down and led by government or not at all. But the evidence that governments will act against business imperatives in favour of ecology is thin to say the least. The power of the state is secondary and derives from the private economy. It follows that the state must facilitate the process of accumulation as a condition of its own power. The argument for rule by government fiat implies the primacy of politics over economics and, as such, runs against the grain of the global capital system. We need a global political ecology in the manner of Hegel, an ecological Sittlichkeit which connects the institutions of civil society to the institutions of government. Action therefore proceeds from both the bottom up and the top down within a coherent framework.

The goal of the environmental movement is to manage the commons well—meaning for everyone and for the long term. A great service would be to inventory and praise the countless environmental organizations and success stories that have kept the commons—air, forests, soil, oceans, animal life—as healthy as they are. I'm not doing that here. Another important service would be to inventory and condemn the innumerable cases in which governments, companies, and property owners have done their best to mismanage the commons for private and short-term gain, meanwhile disparaging and thwarting environmentalists. It would be fun and useful to compile a bestiary of such behaviors and examine their constituent pathologies, but I have other fish to fry. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

But politics and business are the biggest fish of all and the ones most in need of frying. The aggregative power that Brand argues for is possible only with a change in the way we do politics and business. The environmental and economic problem is one of private appropriation, short-termism and individualism – that is how the whole system world is rigged up. We need to establish the institutional framework of ‘aggregative power’ so as to ensure a long-term strategic capacity for the common good. Failure to achieve this means that any technocratic solution will be applied within the mentalities and modalities of the failing system. That’s why as soon as I hear a writer claiming to be against or above ‘ideology’ my heart sinks. There follows more well-meaning proposals abstracted from political, cultural and psychic realities.
Brand praises the compendia of environmentalist tools and skills, organic farming and community gardens, "appropriate technology"—solar, wind, insulation, bicycles - handmade houses, bioregionalism, restoration, and "reinhabitation" of one's natural environment. My criticism is not that he is ignorant of such things. It’s just that he rules out the possibility that the Green counterculture could be strong enough to constitute the new civilisation in time to avoid eco-catastrophe. Brand thinks we are already out of time and therefore have to embrace nuclear, bio-technology and geoengineering. In what way do any of these contradict capitalist expansionary imperatives? None. They allow business to go on not merely as usual but at ever accelerating scales. The problem is just postponed and will come back again in bigger form. That’s what happens with technological evasions, they fix nothing and make the long-term problem greater.

Science has long informed the environmental movement. Now it must take the lead, because we are forced to enter an era of large-scale ecosystem engineering, and we have to know what the hell we're doing. (Brand ch 1 2009).

Brand argues that a "city planet" needs city power—grid electricity. ‘At present, the best low-carbon source is nuclear.’ Brand argues that nuclear and genetic engineering fit into a climate-driven Green agenda in reducing the impact on the natural infrastructure. 




Quoting the medieval German saying "City air makes you free", Brand declares ‘The move to town is a liberation.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). This is complacent. It all depends. Brand claims that whereas Gandhi idealized villages, in truth they are a cesspool, a den of ignorance and narrow-mindedness. This is how Marx justified British colonisation of India. This is how Lenin related to the Mir and Stalin to the peasants. This is just crude modernisation. We ought to know better than this. We can actually say something about the kind of town and city to be developed beyond modernisation. To say ‘the city’ is to say nothing. It is to point to a trend and extract a value. It is meaningless. Modernisation never does anything but modernize. 

Brand cites the example of one Rajesh Kumar Raghavji Santoki, 28, a man who tried farming for a year but had to give up in the face of a water shortage. He left for Surat and in just three years was earning more in a month than his farmer father earned in a year. ‘He owned a house, a motorcycle and a van.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). Brand makes this example bear a massive interpretative weight.

Multiply his motivation by 900 million—the 70 percent of India's 1.3 billion still living in rural areas. Multiply it by 2.8 billion, the number of people still rural throughout the developing world. At the same time that opportunity in the cities is becoming more attractive, in many places the countryside keeps getting rougher. The land is depleted by overuse, land-holdings shrink as they are divided among successive generations, and civil strife is a frequent threat. Many of my contemporaries in the developed world regard subsistence farming as soulful and organic, but it is a poverty trap and an environmental disaster. (Brand ch 2 2009). 


As though a shift of this scale from rural to urban areas is going to leave the distribution of opportunities unaltered. The promise of greater and easier returns in the towns has always drawn people from the land. That’s not news and it’s not the problem. Brand uses this fairly trite observation to take a sideswipe at subsistence and by implication organic farming. He should cite his target here. Here is the ubiquitous straw man. Few of the very many serious writers on these subjects idealise subsistence farming as ‘soulful and organic’. I can’t think of one. I judge the quality of a book by the strength of the contrary arguments it criticises. The weaker the contrary voices, the weaker the overall argument tends to be. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

Brand has also deliberately conflated subsistence and organic agriculture. The clue is in the name – ‘subsistence’. The odds are it won’t be as productive as agribusiness, industrial agriculture and – see where Brand is leading – GE agriculture. But subsistence is not the same thing as organic farming and is not sustainable agriculture. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

Brand can be challenged on this. There is no need for GE crops. Agricultural productivity and sustainability go together. The contemporary system of agribusiness generates social, economic, and environmental costs, from urban overcrowding and pollution to land degradation. A sustainable agriculture would include greater efficiency in water-use; reduced use of pesticides; agroforestry (both to maintain nearby forest resources and to improve carbon sequestration); conservation tillage. All of this can be done now. The technical and financial resources exist to achieve this sustainable system of agriculture. The reason it isn’t done is due to the myth that the industrial agriculture which prevails is more efficient. It isn’t. 
The February 15 2006 edition of Environmental Science & Technology contained a study which showed that sustainable agriculture techniques introduced to developing-world farms in the previous ten years improved farm yields by an average of 79 percent over four years. These results applied to all locations. The study covered 286 different projects and more than 12 million farms in 57 developing countries. A quarter of the crops studied — mainly maize, potatoes, and beans — saw yields increase by 100 percent. A half of the crops saw increases of at least 20 percent. The research team highlights three methods in particular: water-efficiency practices (including collective irrigation management, rainwater harvesting to cultivate formerly degraded lands, and water-shed-level conservation); soil management to improve organic-matter accumulation and carbon sequestration (including conservation tillage and no-till agriculture); and pest, weed, and disease control, emphasizing "in-field biodiversity and reduced pesticide" use. 

Brand’s arguments are characterised by a very selective approach to the evidence and have the form of opinion rather than knowledge. He also selects easy targets in order to prove the verity of his claims. Brand does not present the case for sustainable agriculture or organic farming at all, just points to inadequacies in current agriculture. Brand’s tendentious approach is designed to lead readers. So what is Brand up to?

Brand is setting up a false antithesis here in order to prove a point so general as to be worthless. The choice is not between city and country at all, it is not between GM food and organic or subsistence agriculture. Ecologists have long since acknowledged that a certain form of city living is more Green. Brand is appropriating this specific point to refer to city life as such. Actually, the real issue lies between different forms of city living. Having traduced the family farm and rural life, has Brand got the nerve to tackle the real problem – suburbia? I doubt it.
It is not enough to point to a trend from the country to the city and then make the claim that this is green. Cities can be socially unjust, economically inefficient and ecologically parasitic. They can also be liveable habitats. It all depends. I would argue that the way forward is to treat the city as civilisation in microcosm. If you can green the city, you can green civilisation. But the city is not in itself green. At times Brand gives the impression that Hegel’s old cunning of reason is at work and the trend to urbanisation in itself will do the job for us. Not so. We have to get good at managing change in a direction that serves human ends. Any process needs to be guided by ends we have established, rather than simply allowed to run its course. This is how the Victorians took over the process of urbanisation in the nineteenth century.

It can certainly be argued that sustainable living is facilitated by compact neighbourhoods within the city. With a community of some twelve homes per acre (the density of many traditional single-family neighbourhoods), then public transportation becomes cost-effective, stores have enough customers to situate themselves locally, and inhabitants have opportunities to walk and cycle. With a community of some forty homes per acre, streets come to life and everything becomes easier to provide and falls in price: heating, electricity, sewage lines, and other basic services. The more people share these services, the less impact they have on the planet. In fine, living in dense, urban neighbourhoods is an integral part of living in a more sustainable way. Compact communities make it easier to drive less, share more, and live more lightly on the planet. 
So it isn’t ‘the city’ as such that is part of the solution to the environmental crisis, but a particular kind of city. We need to manage the trend to greater urbanisation to ensure that it is ecologically benign. The denser the city, the more efficient it is. So I am not arguing against cities at all. On the contrary, the final volume of my seven volume study The City of Reason argues strongly in favour of the green city as a happy habitat consistent with the principles of urban ecology that volume 1 located in Plato and Aristotle. My problem with Brand’s argument is that it is too sweeping and broad brush, implying that urbanisation as such will be enough. Not so.
The point needs to be made that dense, urban communities use less energy and far fewer resources than do sprawling suburbs. There is nothing on the costs of sprawl in Brand’s argument for the city planet. That’s quite an oversight. There is a need to make a sharp distinction between urban living and suburban living. Suburbia destroys the ecology of natural areas, polluting local streams, despoiling the land and driving away wildlife. 

The city and the country are perfectly compatible so long as they are in symbiotic relation. The city needs the country, producing sustenance for body and soul, and the country needs the city, with all its diverse opportunities and productivity. As a result of this combination, human beings are able to appreciate the natural world rather than being a curse upon it. 
To acknowledge the problems afflicting city and country is not enough to reject either. Brand portrays the country as hopelessly inefficient and limiting and the city as a citadel of wealth and opportunity. Such a crude contrast doesn’t begin to do justice to the issue, or to appreciate the possibilities before us. Both city and country suffer from problems. Big cities suffer these problems in abundance, for the very reason they have attracted individuals in abundance. Trends and tendencies one way or the other will not necessarily resolves these problems. We are not helpless in face of these processes of urbanisation. Human beings are passive automata within chains of circumstances, but change agents able to manage the direction of change from within.
Most cities contain the basic elements and resources with which to become sustainable, healthy and productive - happy in Aristotle’s eudaimonistic sense of flourishing. We need to exercise our aggregative power consciously so as to direct transition in such a way as to realise the many potential economic, environmental, and social benefits. My problem with Brand’s argument is that he relies on general trends, implying that the transition will occur automatically. It won’t. To achieve the happy habitat will require cooperation, vision, and strategy on the part of all of us as citizens of the city planet.

Such a notion is quite distinct from the suburbia and the way it creates problems through sprawl, channels resources to the affluent communities, despoils nature. In the same way that subsidies for nuclear power undermine the competitiveness of renewable resources like wind, wave, solar, and hydro, so subsidies for sprawl work to hobble the greening of the city. 

There is a new to create a civic social movement of older cities, older suburbs, campaign groups, religious bodies, and little communities of all kinds, along with trade unions and local business leaders. These cross cutting interests look to the city as a whole and challenge the metropolarities at the heart of an unguided urbanisation driven by economic pressures.

The cities are often beset with difficulties as a result of an unguided process of urbanisation. Brand doesn’t shy from the problems and notes the poverty and inequality. Unfortunately Brand turns vices into virtues and argues in favour of low quality, low paid labour in the service of the rich. Not only does he fail to challenge the social inequality that this involves, he ignores the ecological waste associated with such divided cities. We can see here the damage done by Brand’s crude antithesis of inefficient narrow minded country and wealthy city full of opportunity.

This is tragic, given the fact that most cities have grown in places where nature was particularly bountiful in terms of water resources and farmland. So, as cities expand, good land is paved and the rivers are polluted with sewage and runoff. Brand laments the lack of a conception of infrastructure in our thinking and points to the need to bridge the gap between headlong industrial capitalism on the one hand and a necessarily patient natural capitalism on the other. Yet his sharp city-country divide is part of a gap that old methods of infrastructure open up between the urban world and the natural world. This separation underlines our ability to undertake intentional, long-term planning with planetary boundaries in mind.
The problem is that whilst cities can allow us to reduce our ecological impact on distant natural areas, at the same time the natural systems around cities are often despoiled. This points to the need to develop an urban infrastructure that allows us to live in harmony with the natural systems that sustain life. If we are to be members of a city planet then we need to conceive of the entire planet as our home. This highlights one major difficulty with the way that Brand celebrates the city whilst denigrating the country. The city planet can never be a wholly human place. When you stand on the top floor of a building and look out and breath the air, you are as much in nature as if you were stood at the top of a hill. The water flowing out of the tap comes from the skies and the rivers above and outside the city. The walls around you and the pavements under your feet are made of materials extracted from quarries and mines. Examine any aspect of city living, and it will not be difficult to trace its source back in nature. There is no city that is distanced from nature that is sustainable.
There is a need for human beings to manage change as though nature mattered. Lewis Mumford was correct to argue for the connection between cities and civilisation as a humanisation in history. But to have a history we need to respect planetary boundaries rather than live as though they didn’t exist. We need to live as planetary citizens, building cities to last. To live on this planet as if we planned to stay requires a civilization whose workings fit the contours of nature.

The trend towards increasing urbanisation is only the beginning of this project of greening the city. We need to act as planetary citizens and ensure that our cities form part of the fabric of nature. Brand just looks at already existing cities, with all their asphalt and concrete, cars and buildings, noise, horns, alarms, clanking machinery and suspended wires, rubbish tips and shanty towns. And in a Pollyanna-ish way he says ‘it’ll all turn out well’. It may well do. It may not. But this shifting of moral responsibility onto history hardly fits Brand’s call to become good at being gods and managing the transformations which we are unleashing upon the world. That implies an assumption of conscious control on our part, not a passive reliance on hopefully benevolent trends. ‘History’ as such, like Nature, is amoral. Karl Popper criticised Marx for his ‘moral futurism’. Popper was right to argue that such because something is inevitable doesn’t make it right, good or just. He was wrong about Marx, in that the future for Marx is constituted by human praxis infused with goals and ends and purposes. Material futurity needs to be shot-through with human consciousness, values.

That said, the greening of the cities may not be as difficult as it appears. More than half of the people on this city planet are under the age of thirty and about one-third are under the age of fifteen. Far too many lack employment and education and the opportunities to live well. A city planet makes sense if it is constituted by urban pathways which enable individuals to express their capacities constructively and so make their lives better. Cities are also iniquitous, divided within by a range of metropolarities. It is vain to propose some kind of escalator as does Brand, as though those entering the city can move from poverty to riches through hard work. Some can, many cannot. What can happen, if social division is not addressed, is that cities become a breeding ground for violence, crime, gang warfare, drugs, people trafficking, political extremism, terrorism, genocide. Creating urban pathways within the city is an essential strategy for building a better world. The process of urbanization is the context for achieving this. But the best way to build the city planet is to create planetary citizens.

There is too much by way of facile contrasts in Brand’s argument. For instance:

In developed countries like the United States the migration is from boring, lonely, and hard to exciting, busy, and pleasant—toward coasts, sun, and densely citified regions called megapolitan areas, such as the one encompassing everything on the eastern seaboard from Boston to Richmond, Virginia, or the one I live in, reaching from San Francisco to Reno, Nevada—"from sea to ski."

Many a country singer and folk singer has sung of those bright city lights, often out of nostalgia for a lost past and disappointment at finding out that all that glistens is not gold. All those people digging for gold in the streets  …. So we know the trend. Is this a good thing? Or is all our food going to be the synthetic produce of laboratories?


Brand takes his stand on the classical concept of the city. ‘According to some historians, "Civilization is what happens in cities." (Civilization and city are in the same Latinate word group, along with civil, civics, citizen, etc.)’ (Brand ch 2 2009). 
I would agree. I have written at length on this myself in The City of Reason (2004). But none of this diminishes the importance of land, farming, nature and countryside. The city needs nature’s life support systems. And the city needs to curtail its excessive demands on natures and its wasteful practices.

Brand gives a lot of general argument on cities, opining that one cause of their durability is that cities are the most constantly changing of organizations. OK, but it seems the point of this general observation is that Greens are traditionally against cities and need to embrace cities. Greens have long since been asking what kind of cities. There really isn’t time to waste going back to base camp. There is much question begging assertion in Brand’s argument: ‘Cities are horrendously expensive, both environmentally and economically, but they more than earn their keep. Cities make countries rich.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). In truth, we could do with some joined up thinking here, connecting cities to environing social and ecological relations. We also need some clarity on what concept of wealth is being employed. Is Brand still measuring progress by the accumulation of material quantity? How do cities relate to the capital system? To claim cities make countries rich begs the question of the long term viability of the capital system as well as ecological sustainability. Cities are always rich until the point of collapse.
Brand cites The Challenge of Slums, a 2003 UN-HABITAT report, which examined thirty-seven case studies in slums worldwide. The report concluded: "Cities are so much more successful in promoting new forms of income generation, and it is so much cheaper to provide services in urban areas, that some experts have actually suggested that the only realistic poverty reduction strategy is to get as many people as possible to move to the city."
That doesn’t sound like deep analysis at all. That sounds like drawing values from a given set of facts, with no attempt to relate those facts to wider connections. English football has been blighted by the FA coach ‘Bomber’ Harris whose statistics told him that most goals were scored from a long ball. So he trained all the young footballers to play the long ball. The result was that they struggled to control the ball, pass it accurately and keep possession – all the things crucial to getting into the position and the situation by which the goal scoring ball could be played. English football deteriorated through an emphasis on facts and tendencies as against proper analysis. It is no profound insight to say that the city promises riches. Many, many people have gone digging for gold in the streets. We can do better than that. If all the world’s poor moved to the cities, they would not cease to be poor. Brand has fallen victim to the local-global fallacy here.
It is difficult to know what Brand is arguing here. The global trend is towards increasing urbanisation. If living in cities is the solution to poverty, then we are already on a trajectory towards universal health and wealth in the city planet.

Cities have always benefited from what are called "economies of agglomeration"—density accelerates economic activity—and lately they have gotten a further boost from globalization. Telecommunications and markets bypass national borders ever more easily. In some developing Countries where the national government has been discredited, everybody just works around it. Aid organizations go straight to the cities, where the need is; and multinational corporations go straight to where the workers and emerging markets are, in the cities. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

So nothing needs to be done. The transformation is already underway and our problems are solved. If the trends are all positive, what’s the problem? It would appear that urbanisation is already swallowing the world and we are all going to be rich. Either way this, as far as it goes, isn’t news and isn’t the important issue.

What is worrying is the way that Brand refers to cities as some kind of superorganism that boosts efficiency.

A new theory is upsetting our idea of what cities are and can become. Through a phenomenon known as Kleiber's law, organisms become more metabolically efficient as they scale up—from shrew to elephant, say. Cities do the same. "One of the basic principles of cities is that it's more efficient to bring people together," says physicist Geoffrey West. "You need a little bit less of everything per person. It's the exact same way in biology. As animals get bigger, they require less energy to support each unit of tissue." But organisms move more slowly as they increase in size (compare a shrew's whirring heart rate to the stately thump of an elephant's heart), whereas cities speed up as they get bigger. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

Are we talking about cities here or machines? Citizens as human beings or as automatons? This superorganism is fantastic if you think that all human beings are a machines to be made more efficient. Brand premised his argument on civilisation, but his overwhelming emphasis is on ‘efficiency’. Notice there is no mention at all of the well-known and well-documented stresses and ailments of city life. So long as quantity accelerates.  It’s not that this metabolic efficiency is wrong in itself, it’s just that we need to know what concept of efficiency is being applied here. Are we still talking about civilisation as a genuine humanisation? Matthew Arnold answered the question ‘What is civilisation?’ He answered: ‘It is the humanisation of man in society’. Brand seems to be referring to the robotisation of humanity in the superorganic machine.

Brand pushes his claims against the notion of limits. He clearly thinks that cities can expand beyond planetary boundaries. It is at this point that it becomes clear that his City Planet is City against Planet. He cites a quote that ‘Cities can go on growing forever. Look at the invention of the steam engine, the car, the digital revolution. What these advances all have in common is that they allowed cities to continue growing.’ Of course, this could just be the loose talk that comes from hubris. If cities can go on growing ‘forever’ I would like to know how they will survive the Big Crunch when the sun implodes. The statement is remarkably cavalier with respect to planetary limits. We are already reporting water shortages around the world, already there are problems with the productivity of land. But Brand argues that ‘if cities are concentrators of efficiency and innovation, an article about the scaling paper in Conservation magazine surmised, then, "the secret to creating a more environmentally sustainable society is making our cities bigger. We need more metropolises."’ (Brand ch 2 2009). Brand is a contributing editor to Conservation.
That, of course, is a very big ‘if’. There are a lot of unchallenged assertions here but the claim of unlimited expansion reveals it all to be the same old hubris. The same old same old. It would be wrong to be too dismissive. Technology has been instrumental in sustaining seven billion people on the planet at living standards that far exceed past epochs. To repeat, technology is an integral part of living well on the planet. Further, it is not the importance of cities that is controversial – I am all in favour of city regions and the urban public realm and have written in their favour in The City of Reason. But the idea that the bigger the cities become, the more wealthy and efficient they become, along with the assertion of unlimited growth so that, ultimately, the world becomes one big sustainable city planet is question begging to say the least. There is no attempt to relate the city to its environs and to its resource base. Unless cities will eat their own wealth like Midas.

What drives a city's innovation engine, then—and thus its wealth engine—is its multitude of contrasts. The more and greater the contrasts, and the more they are marbled together, the better. The most productive city is one with many cultures, many languages, many neighborhoods, and more kinds of urban experience available than any citizen can keep track of. In this formulation, it is the throwing together of great wealth and great poverty in the urban stew that is part of the cure for poverty. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

In the first place, urban diversity is nothing compared to nature’s biodiversity; in the second place, towns and cities are increasingly characterised by homogenisation as a result of corporate takeover. There is not much diversity inside the machine.
It becomes plain that the purpose of this paean to the city is to diminish the natural environment. Brand is out to denigrate nature and the importance of nature to civilisation. Brand rejects the accepted theory which traces the origin of cities to the invention of agriculture. Anthropologists and historians argue that surplus food freed people to become specialists, thus opening up the era of cities, complex societies, chiefdoms, states. Brand builds his dissenting view on Jane Jacobs’ The Economy of Cities (1969). "Rural economies, including agricultural work," she wrote, "are directly built upon city economies and city work."
This begs the question of what created cities if it wasn’t agriculture? 

My guess, based on the "constant battles" view of history, is defense. The first urban invention, I'll bet, was a defendable wall, followed by rectangular buildings that allowed close packing of maximum residents within a minimum amount of wall. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

There is a wealth of literature on this subject. Countless specialists in the field of history and anthropology, and this Brand is ‘guessing’ on the basis of a favourite theory he has drawn from one book. It wouldn’t be the first time that a hunch has paid off. But bear in mind that Brand began his book by ruling out ideology. Then he casually builds his guesswork on a plainly ideological ‘constant battles’ view of history. And there is plenty of wishful thinking involved. The facts are made to fit the theory.
Brand is well aware of urban squalor and deprivation and poverty. He is, however, concerned to turn a negative into a positive. ‘But the squatter cities are vibrant.’ Brand refers to the narrow lanes and bustling markets, with food stalls, bars, cafes, hair salons, dentists, churches, schools, health clubs, and mini-shops trading in cellphones, tools, trinkets, clothes, electronic gadgets, and bootleg videos and music. ‘This is urban life at its most intense’ he declares. ‘It is social capital at its richest, because everybody in a slum neighborhood knows everybody else intimately, whether they want to or not.’ Brand does not see urban squalor and poverty but ‘a lot of people busy getting out of poverty as fast as they can.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). 

Brand oversells his goods. He portrays urban life in the squatter cities as an ideal Aristotelian polis, only to claim that the inhabitants, enjoying ‘social capital at its richest’, are busy trying to get out ‘as fast as they can’. If urban life is so rich, why would anyone be so desperate to leave? 

Wherever human beings are, there will be life. The vitality belongs to human beings, not to their environment. Of course, human beings, as social animals, create social capital when drawn together. Brand, on the one hand, describes the squatter city as social capital at its richest, but, on the other hand, describes the inhabitants as busy getting out of poverty as fast they can. Are they already living a rich life or not? If the city is so vibrant, why do the inhabitants want to leave? 

Brand refers to Mumbai: ‘with 17 million people more densely packed than anywhere else in the world. The city is half slum, yet it generates one sixth of India's gross domestic product.’ As if this is a good thing in itself. What if slave labour generated half of a nation’s wealth? Brand quotes Suketa Mehta, author of Maximum City (2004), wrote in 2007: ‘For the young person in an Indian village, the call of Mumbai isn't just about money. It's also about freedom. (Brand ch 2 2009). Yes, town air makes you free. We know the promise. People have responded to the lure of the cities and left the land for centuries in search of the opportunities offered by the city. To simply cite the call of the city is to say nothing. If cities do generate money and freedom, we need to know how, and we need to ensure that it is ecologically sustainable. 
Pointing to trends and making bold claims is not an argument. There is nothing new about the pull of the city to those living in the country. And the process of urbanisation is already underway. Which begs the question as to what Brand’s point is, other than to draw a veil over the social and environmental problems of the city as well as diminishing the importance of the countryside to the conception of sustainable living. Bear in mind that Brand is a strong advocate of new technologies and of engineering solutions to social and environmental problems.
This is a wonderful apology for global capitalism, the system that is using up the planet’s resources on an ever bigger scale, periodically crashing on an ever bigger scale. Brand’s book is a mass of facts and trends which are not in doubt allied to a mindless Panglossian futurism. Brand promises unlimited urban and economic growth and global prosperity and yet premises his argument on there being no space for ideology since time is running out. The truth is, whether this author realises it or not, he is simply after a sustainable energy source for an unsustainable economic system. Given his ‘constant battles’ view, the idea of developing a strategic intelligence and common morality is a non-starter. He said he trusts Lovelock’s judgement. I’ve read Lovelock. He is blasé about the deaths of billions of human beings and argues that we should suspend democratic government and be ruled by warlords armed with nuclear energy. Sane and sober it ain’t. This is the loss of nerve. There is a complete lack of moral fibre and creative intelligence in this kind of engineering as politics. The engineers have given up on human beings.
Fitting the trend away from interventionist politics towards private market solutions, Brand declares that ‘contrary to a standard assumption’, the wretched quality of housing in squatter cities is never the main concern of the inhabitants. ‘The sad fact is that when governments and idealistic architects try to help by providing public housing, those buildings invariably turn into the worst part of the slum.’ (Brand ch 2 2009) Yes, blame the public officials and bureaucrats for problems which derive from the iniquities of the private capital economy. It’s a standard device (see Coleman’s Utopia on Trial.). ‘The people who build the shanties take pride in them and are always working to improve them.’ (Brand ch 2 2009).

They don't worry about unemployment: Everyone works, including the children. They don't worry about telephone service: Everyone has a cellphone or access to one. Medical care is available, and so is food; famine is now a rural phenomenon. The greatest need in every squatter city is infrastructure—water, electricity, and sanitation. Not always the hotbeds of criminal activity that everyone assumed, some squatter communities are victimized by criminals from outside because they have no police protection. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

A little rose tinted perhaps? It depends how you spin the same facts. To state that shanty towns are ‘not always the hotbeds of criminal activity’ implies that they are hotbeds of crime in the main. There is a distinction to be made between slums of hope and slums of despair and there is no doubt that close social proximity can generate levels of solidarity and cultural and social capital that can form the strength of a city community. My fear is that Brand is using such everyday practical anarchism as a cover for broader forces and trends. Brand is not giving us a new version of Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid or Paul Goodman’s Communitas. On the contrary, the ‘vision’ is bourgeois and acquisitive to the core. Brand makes great play of a 2003 UN report, which found that ‘All slum households in Bangkok have a colour television. The average number of TVs per household is 1.6. ... Almost all of them have a refrigerator. Two-thirds of the households have a CD player, a washing machine, and 1.5 cellphones. Half of them have a home telephone, a video player and a motorcycle.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). 

There was no greater a city man than Socrates. Socrates walked around Athens, his eyes falling on all the goods on offer in the markets. Socrates declared, look at all the many things I don’t need.

Do people control their means of existence? Are they empowered at work? Can they exercise choice as citizens? What are their political rights? Are they citizens? Brand counts material things, the goods which the truly civilised city man Socrates thought ephemeral. Brand quotes Janice Perlman’s The Myth of Marginality (1976), who observed that the favelados "have the aspirations of the bourgeoisie, the perseverance of pioneers, and the values of patriots."
You couldn’t make it up. They have the ‘aspirations of the bourgeoisie’. Is that a good thing? Pioneers and patriots? That is, rapacious, greedy, egoistic, possessive, materialistic, grasping, snatching, the neurotic and paranoid backbone of the conquest of the New World and of the Fascist movement in history and politics. It is what Mumford castigated as the Yankee mentality. It has become the western mentality.

Everyone now lives in brick buildings, with electricity, water, and indoor bathrooms. All have refrigerators, TVs, cellphones, and washing machines, and are more likely to have microwave ovens and computers than are middle-class people elsewhere in Rio. Two thirds had left the favelas for more legitimate neighborhoods, but many who stayed now have genuinely luxurious wall tiling and furniture sets in their homes. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

Brand extols the virtues of this little self-built slum paradise, only to point out that two-thirds left when they got the opportunity. Brand quotes ‘a reporter from the Economist who visited Mumbai’ who wrote that "Everyone is working hard and everyone is moving up."
Ah, the Economist!!! The Economist has produced acres of wishful thinking concerning the market economy over the decades. The trends are ever onwards and upwards for the Economist. They are still up a new book by the writers on the magazine, hilariously with Matt Ridley, who cost the public realm billions when Northern Rock went belly-up on his watch, telling us that the future is rosy. The Economist is also telling us not to worry about climate change.

I’ve read far too many of this kind of new thinking to be impressed. It is never a good sign when the serious questions are dodged. Time is always limited. Time spent learning little from this kind of futurism is time lost for reading more worthy material. I can sum this book up in a few lines already. There’s a problem with the climate, the basic trends of the global economy are good if we trust private initiative and minimise government intervention, we ignore the hopeless utopianism of political radicals and dispense with the luxury of ethics, oppose Green politics and discard ideology and put our trust in technology. And all good things follow. I have read it all before. The idea that human beings are makers and creators who need to organise a long term intelligence and interventionism is a good one, if it can be detached from hubristic claims. 

Slums are the scene of a world-changing economic event, but it escapes notice because it's designed to escape notice. Squatters don't formally own land or property. They don't pay taxes. They take no part in any permit or licensing process. They pay no attention to government-approved exchange rates. And yet they thrive economically, charging each other rent for space in buildings with no legal ownership, employing each other in unlicensed businesses, and selling each other all manner of services and goods—some of the goods pirated, some of the services criminal. This is what is called the "informal economy." It is to economic theory what dark energy is to astro-physical theory. It's not supposed to exist, but there it is, and it's huge. (Brand ch 2 2009).

He’s right. Narcotics, mafia, organised crime, people trafficking, white slavery… it’s all built into the global economy. If you think that’s benign then you are a fool.

While the informal economy specializes in being invisible to the formal world, of course it is highly visible to itself. This is where the social capital of a dense community pays off. Without formal property title, everyone knows who effectively owns a building and may charge rent for a room in it. If you have a skill as a language teacher or identity card forger or whatever, there's no need to advertise: Your customers will find you, and the officials won't. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

But anyone who thinks that Brand is an urban anarchist should think again. The informal economy he celebrates works for the rich and the powerful. ‘The poor have time but no money, and the rich have money but no time; and so they deal. I find what needy people do with surplus time more interesting than what un-needy people do with surplus money. Ingenuity is the norm in the informal economy.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). 
Read that again. This is not even a barely concealed apology for iniquitous class politics, it is a celebration of an upstairs-downstairs society. We are back to the poor shining the shoes of the rich. What kind of deal can be struck between those who have all the power and wealth and those who have nothing but their bodies to sell? It’s called prostitution. Poor women, rich men. Read The Worm in the Bud by Ronald Pearsall (1993) to see what disparities in money and power entail in relations between men and women. Whatever argument Brand is making, it isn’t based on the city as civiliser. This is the city as cesspit. It makes it clear that engineers should stick to simple things like engineering.

There are other and much better ways of creating and sustaining social capital than illicit activities in an iniquitous economy. As Mike Davis himself reveals. In The City of Quartz argued that the ‘informal’ labour Brand celebrates is akin to a new slavery, low paid labour in the service of the rich and powerful. It seems that social injustice isn’t a problem for Brand, who makes no attempt to relate the division between rich and poor to class relations, exploitation, asymmetrical relations of power. It’s just one of those things.

‘This book was finished before the full effects of the world financial crisis of 2009 could be studied. Did the informal economy in the world's slums offer a refuge from it, or did people there suffer more than anybody?’ (Brand ch 2 2009).

If this is a genuine urban counter-economy building up within the shell of the capital system, fine, but the evidence that Brand cites makes it clear  that the informal economy is parasitic upon the wealth of the formal economy. When the formal economy crashes, the informal economy will go short.

‘Here's my prediction from March 2009: significant growth in the informal economy from more people retreating into it; significant growth in the crime economy, because it's always ready to exploit chaos; no change in the rate of urbanization. How wrong was I?’ (Brand ch 2 2009).
That’s a prediction? I’m not even going to waste time checking. Brand should have taken that to the bookies. The odds would have been so short as to be not worth a bet. It says something if Brand thinks that is insightful thinking. I’ll predict that Manchester United will make the top four in the English football league title sometime in the five years from 2012. How wrong was I? We know that the trend to increasing urbanisation is hard wired, we know crime goes up during economic crises and we know that when resources are cut back in the formal economy people fall back on the informal economy. It’s happened every time before in history. Every researcher in the field says so. Brand seems to think that this trite observation proves his other claims right. Hardly.
Having defended the slums, Brand turns to justify the corporations. ‘Researchers for The Challenge of Slums were surprised to discover that global corporations, thanks to global oversight by home governments and NGOs, often provide the best-paying jobs and best working conditions in developing-world cities, raising the standard for everybody.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). 
Surprise to whom? Frankly, this is so well known as to be trite. Galbraith made precisely these points in a string of popular books in the 1960s. Of course corporations offer the best paying, most secure jobs. We need an argument which is set within a much more substantial framework of political economy and ethics. The author here seems to be surprised by what he has just been reading.

Everyone in an informal economy lives in the gray area between legitimacy and criminality; over time they can go either way. Smart governments, NGOs, and corporations make it easy for people to move gradually toward legitimacy, because when they are more easily drawn into the criminal economy, it can be a disaster. A sense of the immense scale and damage of the criminal market can be found in the book Illicit (2005), by Moises Nairn. The total global traffic in drugs, arms, illegal workers (including sex workers), protected animals and plants, looted artifacts, stolen intellectual property, illegal money flows, etc., adds up to between $1 trillion and $3 trillion a year. The informal economy in the world's slums provides superb cover and a huge workforce for the growth of crime. (Brand ch 2 2009). 

With a couple of pages left in chapter 2, we finally get some reality. The problem with Brand’s argument is that it lacks a grounding in political economy. His argument is like a pancake, it depends which side you flip it. Both negative and positive aspects of the new cities need to be related to a bigger picture. All that Brand offers is a list and a hope based on some trends. We can flip the good and bad sides of the city back and forth without revealing anything about the forces and connections composing the city. And if an argument can’t get to the dynamics and drivers of the city within social relations, then it will have little critical purchase on the environing natural relations.

Brand concludes his second chapter on a positive note:

A city planet has every reason to learn to understand slums, to respect the people there, and to help clear the way for them to become full citizens. That in turn helps the world, for practical as well as ethical reasons. There's more to be said about what the world gains from its urban majority, and how. (Brand ch 2 2009). 







Brand opens chapter 3 with a bold claim:

Cities accelerate innovation; they cure overpopulation; and while they are becoming the Greenest thing that humanity does for the planet, they have a long way to go. (Brand ch 3 2009). 

Brand claims that cities are green institutions but still have a long way to go. In the previous chapter, Brand described cities as the oldest human institution, the cause rather than the consequences of the agricultural revolution. Cities have already gone a long way. If cities as such are the Greenest thing that humanity does for the planet, as well as being the oldest human institution, why is the city planet not already Green? Cities up to this point have required massive resources.
Brand moves from one innovation to another, showing how they are applied in the city. He spends pages on cellphones and shows how the electricity is supplied. The point? That the city spurs innovation and boosts connectivity. And farms grow potatoes. Picking an innovation, listing the details and shouting hurrah is no substitute for engaging in argument.
On the population problem, Brand declares that he was on the side of Paul Ehrlich’s population bomb thesis and against ‘ecosocialist’ Barry Commoner’s critique He admits that Ehrlich's predicted famines never occurred, largely as a result of the green revolution in agriculture. The whether and why/not of global famine is less important here than Brand’s antipathy to ecosocialism. As soon as I read Brand claim to have no time to waste on ‘ideology’, only to embrace the ‘constant battles’ view of history, it was obvious that his supposedly neutral and value free technical argument was going to be coloured. So Brand doesn’t like the ecosocialists. It’s no accident, then, that all of his proposals fit the contours of the capital system seamlessly. He advocates a whole range of new technologies but gives no analysis of the social relations within which these technologies would be organised and used. This bias is in Brand’s engineering design from the start.
Brand argues that the city is crucial to stabilising population. He quotes geneticist William Haseltine: "There's a very odd phenomenon which seems to be a cultural invariant: once women gain economic independence, they do not reproduce our species." Brand claims that ‘just the prospect of economic independence does the trick, and that's what moving to cities provides.’ (Brand ch 3 2009). 
Actually, it is economic development that does the trick, not just moving to cities as such. Brand’s analysis is shallow and amounts to trends and statistics. There are many factors behind female empowerment and these need to be connected together. There needs to be balance in the approach. To isolate particular instances and form general conclusions is asking for trouble. If all women moved to the cities enticed by the prospect of economic independence, the odds are that available opportunities will be swamped and continued economic dependence will be the result. There needs to be much deeper analysis of scale, complexity and quantity here. My old junior school headmaster used to tell a joke about a railway carriage packed with passengers, standing room only. The ticket inspector comes in and tells them that the carriage next door is empty. So all the passengers get up and move next door. It all depends on how the numbers are distributed. Brand’s assertions here are a recipe for disaster. It sounds like precisely what happens in early stages of industrialisation, with a century of public intervention and social reform following to clean up the mess.

Brand is similarly question begging on economics.

‘Because Japan welcomes no immigrants, it is facing the world's worst elder-care crisis. At Global Business Network, we predict that Japan's standard solution to labor problems will be applied. Highly sophisticated, lovable robots and robotic environments will take care of Japan's elderly, and then the technology will spread to the rest of the developed world.’ (Brand ch 3 2009). 

How does any of this relate to the declining rate of profit in Japanese business? There’s a big if here, but if Marx’s argument concerning labour as the creative agent producing value is correct, then substituting labour for robots will increase the technical composition of capital and lower the organic composition, with the result that less and less value will be added to the economy. This was Ramin Ramtin’s thesis in Automation and Capitalist Breakdown in the late 1980’s. If capitalist breakdown has been avoided, it has been because of massive – and unsustainable - public intervention and support. Japan has been in stagnation since the early 1990’s and the global economy too is showing a declining rate of profit. The new economic drivers are not the growth engines that the old drivers, from railways to cars, once were.

‘Many in the north will be tempted to dismiss climate disasters in the south as irrelevant rather than as harbingers of what will be coming soon enough in the north. Likewise, some in the south will want to play the victim, assigning all blame to the wasteful, greedy, colonialist, carbon-spewing north. 
A preferable outcome is that the young, urbanised south cranks up its rate of innovation and figures out its own ways to manage climate change, ideally with close engagement from the north. A wide array of best practices for climate adaptation could emerge in the south and gain global application. (Brand ch 3 2009). 

The engagement from the north will have to be great, given the fact that the north is wasteful, greedy, colonialist and carbon-spewing. If these practices carry on, the young urbanised south will be unable to innovate its way past the mass pollution of the rich north. Brand extols the virtues of squatter cities and their Green practices. Elsewhere, however, Brand explicitly rules out change as the result of a social movement from below. ‘The scale of the climate challenge is so vast that it cannot be met solely by grassroots groups and corporations, no matter how Green.’ So are the world’s squatter communities generating Green practices capable of global adaptation or not? We need to examine this option of grassroots revolution from below more closely, rather than pointing to existing trends. But, having praised the creation of rich social capital in the cities, Brand rules out social movement from below. He cites the architect Peter Calthorpe, who ‘had tried and failed to organize neighborhood communities, and moved to a houseboat on the end of South Forty Dock.’

He found he was in a place that had the densest housing in California, where no one locked their doors—where most of the doors didn't even have locks. Without trying, it was an intense, proud community. When Calthorpe looked for some element of design magic that made it work, he decided it was the dock itself, and the density. Everyone in the forty-nine houseboats on the dock passed each other on foot daily, trundling to and from the parking lot on shore. Everyone knew each other's faces and voices and cats. It was a community, Calthorpe decided, because it was walkable. (Brand ch 3 2009). 

Isn’t this the urban richness that Brand claimed was already happening within global cities? Calthorpe had tried and failed to organise such a community on land and so took to a boat. So which is it? Are we all to move to the city or to a boat. This argument has us all at sea on a sinking ship. 
Finally, Brand recognises the importance of the urban compactness proposed by environmentalists - zoning changes to allow 'secondary suites,' or in-law apartments; triplexes; narrow streets with houses that abut property lines; walkable neighborhoods; congestion taxes encouraging walking and use of public transit, reducing travel times dramatically. It is a pity that Brand doesn’t develop these kinds of Green interventions and innovations further rather than giving us pages of glossed trends and facts concerning the process of urbanisation. The trend towards greater urbanisation is not in doubt; the question is how we deal with it to green the city.

‘Peasant life is over unless catastrophic climate change drives us back to it.’ (Brand ch 3 2009). Famous last words. The world needs to retain the traditional skills and practical wisdom of those who work the land. Brand here sounds like Marx’s abuse of the ‘idiocy of rural life’. Lenin and Stalin hated the peasants. What possibly could go wrong?

The demographic literature refers often to the "bright lights" phenomenon that draws people to cities. Thanks to military satellite imagery, those lights are now visible to us from space. The night side of Earth, these decades, displays a dazzling lacework of light on the continents, with incandescent nodes at the metropolitan areas and a bright tracery of transportation corridors between them. That web of light is the sign to any visitor that they are approaching not just a living planet, but a civilized planet. What powers all that light? (Brand ch 3 2009). 

An alien looks down and sees artificial light. Brand calls this a sign of civilisation. When we look up, we can no longer see the stars because of all the light pollution. What else are we not seeing? Brand is more concerned with the energy problem than with the moral problem. There is a very famous quote from Immanuel Kant here which is pertinent. ‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe,: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.’ (Kant 1949: 258.)

We can longer see the starry heavens above us, we see only artificial lights. And we are less and less able to see the moral law within us. The world of instrumental rationality has extended means over ends, reduced morality to subjective value judgement, and cloaked the world in artificial light. Teilhard de Chardin argued for the noosphere as an intellectual film encircling the planet, a collective consciousness to which we all contribute, on which we all draw. That sounds like civilisation. Instead of this web of intelligence denoting human rationality and morality, Brand celebrates the web of artificial light. That light is blinding us to our true selves, hiding our real natures from us as effectively as it is hiding nature outside. Nature’s lights have been put out.

Nuclear – a necessary evil or a good?

Brand begins his case for nuclear with a quote: ‘Coal is the killer. Of all the fossil fuels, coal is the one that could make this planet uninhabitable. (Fred Pearce, New Scientist). We can agree with this. It is next quote that is contentious: ‘With climate change, those who know the most are the most frightened. With nuclear power, those who know the most are the least frightened. (Variously attributed).
Brand leads us to the obvious conclusion – climate change is frightening and the only choice is between coal/death and nuclear/life. Seems simple. So why the continued controversy over nuclear? Prejudice, ignorance, misinformation, propaganda, ‘the media’, vested interests in the fossil fuel industry, environmentalists more interested in politics than science. 
Can that be true? Vested interests, yes. But the idea that the world’s governments are being intimidated by environmental groups is incredulous to say the least. These groups have been continuously ignored at international conferences dealing with climate change, and that’s with a wealth of scientific evidence behind them. If nuclear were so obviously the answer, private companies would be queuing up. Instead, there has to be massive government underwrite for any nuclear project. 

Brand argues boldly: ‘Environmentalists have much less to fear in reality from the current nuclear power industry than they think, and much more to gain from new and planned reactor designs than they realize…. Nukes are Green; new nukes even more so.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). Brand cites James Hansen’s open letter to President Obama in defence of this view. ‘Coal plants are factories of death,’ Hansen wrote. ‘Coal is responsible for as much atmospheric carbon dioxide as the other fossil fuels combined.’ America needs a carbon tax ‘across all fossil fuels at their source’; the phasing out of all coal-fired plants; and ‘urgent R&D on 4th-generation nuclear power, with international cooperation.’ Hansen warned: ‘The danger is that the minority of vehement anti-nuclear 'environmentalists' could cause development of advanced safe nuclear power to he slowed such that utilities are forced to continue coal-burning in order to keep the lights on. That is a prescription for disaster.’ ‘One of the greatest dangers the world faces is the possibility that a vocal minority of anti-nuclear activists could prevent phase-out of coal emissions.’
Hansen and Brand propose to tax and phase out fossil fuels and yet think the biggest protest will come from a ‘vocal’ and ‘vehement’ ‘minority’ of anti-nuclear activists. Note how Hansen puts ‘environmentalists’ in inverted commas. That is designed to portray them as not real environmentalists at all but as political activists. This is a clear attempt to delegitimize all but the scientific voice. Sorry, democracy doesn’t work that way and scientists are very far from being fit to constitute a Platonic Guardian class. Note also the reduction of options to just the two, fossil fuels or nuclear. Politically, this viewpoint is risible. Hansen and Brand must surely know how little success a ‘minority’ of environmentalists have had in trying to force governments into taking serious action on climate, at Rio, Kyoto etc. The biggest blockers of environment change at these international conferences have been governments under pressure from vested interests, gas, oil, coal. Business in general loathes regulation. This is the biggest obstacle facing those trying to bring about change to the low carbon economy.
This demonisation of ‘environmentalists’ as political activists is self-defeating. The likes of Hansen and Brand may flatter themselves that governments will listen to reason, their scientific reason that is, but that’s not how politics works. Without substantial pressure for change, governments will not budge. Hansen and Brand lazily portray environmentalists as activists motivated more by the politics than by the science. That is exactly how vested business and political interests have described them, in an attempt to deprive them of a legitimate voice, allowing business to carry on as usual. It is a political disarmament which will leave nothing but sweet reason. Where is the evidence that government has ever listened much to what James Hansen has told them?

‘Nuclear power inspires in most environmentalists one particularly deep aversion. They recoil from the idea of passing on to endless future generations the care of the deadly poison of nuclear waste. That was my view as well until one day in 2002.’ (Brand ch 4 2009).

That’s interesting. Brand is now in his seventies. He is no fool. If he thought that nuclear waste was deadly as recently as 2002 then he must have compelling reasons for this view. His switch to a strong pro-nuclear stance contrasts with the weakening faith in nuclear. Increasingly, the industry is concluding that, never mind scientific certainty, the risk of significant climate change makes the option fiscally prohibitive.

Brand’s reasoning is dubious to say the least.

The more I thought about the standard environmentalist stance on nuclear waste, which I had espoused for years, the nuttier it seemed to me. The customary rant goes: "You have to guarantee that all the radioactivity in the waste will be totally contained for ten thousand years (no, a hundred thousand years; no, a million years), and if you can't guarantee that, you can't have nuclear power." Why? "Because any amount of radioactivity hurts humans and other life forms. It might get in the ground water."
What humans? The assumption seems to be that future humans will be exactly as we are today, with our present concerns and present technology. How about, say, two hundred years from now? If we and our technology prosper, humanity by then will be unimaginably capable compared to now, with far more interesting things to worry about than some easily detected and treated stray radioactivity somewhere in the landscape. If we crash back to the stone age, odd doses of radioactivity will be the least of our problems. Extrapolate to two thousand years, ten thousand years. The problem doesn't get worse over time, it vanishes over time. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

What kind of sleight of hand is this? Nuclear waste will become less of a problem because human beings in the future will become increasingly smarter and so more likely to generate solutions to any problems we have now. If we don’t become smarter and instead crash back into the stone age, then the problem of radioactivity won’t matter anyway. But Brand is certain that we and our technology will prosper. What Brand means is that whilst he doesn’t have a solution to the problem of nuclear waste now, future generations will. That is quite a ‘nutty assumption’ in itself. If arguing from unwarranted assumptions is invalid for ‘nutty’ Green critics, then it is also invalid for Panglossian Pollyannas.
 As for radioactivity being the least of our problems if we crash back to the Stone Age, that is as false an antithesis as there is. Assume our unimaginable capability, and the problem vanishes over time. Well let’s start this argument from capability now. How is radioactive waste less dangerous now because of our ingenuity and capability? We avoid the problem by an ‘unimaginable’ capability in the future. No problem, we’re going to invent technologies that permit endless economic growth with no adverse consequences for the environment. The actual means of this miracle do not as yet exist and are by definition ‘unimaginable’. They turn up when they turn up. So do other problems. In the meantime here is tonnes of radioactive waste. But don’t worry, something will turn up. And he calls Greens nutty!!! We can solve all problems by avoiding them. We can’t solve them but the future generations will. Note the disasters that follow letting engineers and technicians bracket politics out of the discussion. The whole world is going to go nuclear. Have these clowns seen the governments who infest the planet, the tyrants and oligarchs and genocidal lying maniacs. Do these scientists really think that nuclear technology will not be converted to military purposes? Do they really think that all these governments will respect safety standards? We will, of course, because we are civilised. That’s what they always say and we take it for granted. It’s not seventy years since Germany was ruled by Hitler. Sane and sober, he was not. But he had support at home and abroad. And we can all project forwards into the future. Two thousand years is nothing. Go back two thousand years and read the grim details of genocide the world over, cities razed to the ground, persecutions, executions. Go tens of thousands of years into the future. The idea that governments and peoples are going to be any less murderous than in the past is plain daft. Even if one accepts that nuclear is perfectly safe so long as government and business are responsible it its use, there are no grounds for believing that governments and business will always act responsibility. Lovelock writes that the Chernobyl disaster could only have happened under a corrupt state. Well, there have been more than a few of those in history. They are still will us.

Let us also note the pejorative references to greens and environmentalists. They are activists who ‘rant’, whose claims are ‘nutty’. 

‘My opinion on nuclear had flipped from anti to pro. The question I ask myself now is, What took me so long? I could have looked into the realities of nuclear power many years earlier, if I weren't so lazy.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Here it is. Here is the Damascian moment that is the stock in trade of these kind of arguments. ‘I was blind but now I see’. I now see, but they remain blind. The implication is that those who refuse to convert are condemned to the world of darkness through a wilful ignorance. This kind of reasoning is familiar from the Cold War. In The God that Failed, any number of former comrades queued up to confess their political sins. We once believed this, but now we are older and wiser and know better. As Edward Said sardonically commented, if you were so clever, what were you doing believing in a god in the first place? And that’s the point. Anyone capable of deluding themselves so much in the first place is more than likely to delude themselves again ever after. It is not a question of experience but of judgement, and judgement has to do with experience and knowledge. A fool can go around the world thrice over and still come back a fool. Of course, you can learn from experience. Many do not. The giveaway is the certainty. Where once Brand was certain that the world was black, now he is just as certain that it is white. Where once he was certain that nuclear was deadly, now he is certain that it is safe. Where are the shades in between? Where is the questioning that leads to wisdom?
Me? I am certain of nothing in science. I rule nothing out and nothing in. But I am cautious of those who are certain. J.B.S. Haldane summed up the world of uncertainty with which science deals: ‘My own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose’. I think we are beyond the old dualism of objective reality and subject experience; instead, it’s intelligibility that matters, and that restores the importance of experience, prudence, praxis. Perception is what counts, not laws of nature, not the application of techniques to dead matter. The world is alive, reflexive and we are in the middle of it, participating as change-agents. It is we who identify problems and generate solutions, not the contents of the tool box at our disposal. 'I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the old heaven and the old earth had passed away’.

The issue of energy is only cut-and-dried for those with set positions regardless of reason and evidence. Anyone who has argued for the seriousness of the threat of global warming is likely to have been frustrated or angered by the degree of denial expressed by sections of the public with respect to the climate science. I came across an argument that, for sound evolutionary reasons, the human race is predisposed to be sceptical towards ideas outside of experience. The human race has produced any number of crackpots with bright ideas. The human race cannot afford to waste time, energy and resources following all such bright ideas. This scepticism keeps human beings on the evolutionary straight and narrow. It is frustrating when it comes to trying to get acceptance of climate science. But then we come to Lovelock’s nuclear warlords and biotechnology and geoengineering and it becomes clear why an innate scepticism serves the human race well in evolutionary terms. One doesn’t need to be an expert to smell a rat in these arguments for nuclear energy. There are so many arguments to begin with. That nuclear energy is safe, renewable and efficient should be argument enough. Yet, time and again we meet this argument from necessity: ‘climate change is so serious a matter, we have to do everything simultaneously to head it off as much as we can’ (Brand ch 4 2009). No matter how bad things will get, they will be worse without nuclear. That is hardly a convincing argument. That is blackmail. It’s like defining politics as a choice between necessary evils. Even if you choose the lesser evil you should be clear that you are in still choosing evil. Brand is giving us an argument from necessity and necessity, as Pitt declared, is the tyrant’s plea. I prefer Camus: ‘He who says “no”, says “yes”, by affirming values beyond the boundary’. We need the wit, intelligence and insight to look beyond the boundary on this question. Nuclear is no solution and those who think it is can be criticised for a failure of nerve and nous. To repeat, why is political economy and the accumulative imperatives of the capital system off the agenda?

I argued years ago that the debate over energy sources is neither here nor there. The capital system must access as many energy sources as it can to support its accumulative imperative. It will take them all and there will still not be enough energy to power an ever expanding economy. The US has used more energy in the past half a century than the human race has in the whole of human history. Of course capital wants everything. Which means we are going to be forced into a nuclear gamble just to keep the profit system going. I have found the missing link between the anthropoid apes and homo sapiens – it is us. This is poor reasoning.

Brand backs his argument for nuclear by way of contrast with coal. ‘By contrast, a 1-gigawatt coal plant burns 3 million tons of fuel a year and produces 7 million tons of CO2, all of which immediately goes into everyone's atmosphere, where no one can control it, and no one knows what it's really up to…. The air pollution from coal burning is estimated to cause 30,000 deaths a year from lung disease in the United States, and 350,000 a year in China.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). 

But who is claiming that coal is clean? This is only a surprise to those who never worked in the coal industry. To argue that coal is dirty reveals absolutely nothing about the safety or cleanliness of nuclear. A red hot poker up the arse is less lethal than decapitation, but it still bloody well hurts and is likely to bring death in the long run. Scientists should stop fobbing us off with selected evidence and false antitheses in order to pretend that radioactive waste is safe.

Brand dismisses the case for renewables in the most off-hand and cavalier fashion.

By all means, let us use the small input from renewables sensibly, but only one immediately available source does not cause global warming and that is nuclear energy. . . . Opposition to nuclear energy is based on irrational fear fed by Hollywood-style fiction, the Green lobbies and the media. These fears are unjustified, and nuclear energy from its start in 1952 has proved to be the safest of all energy sources. ... I am a Green and I entreat my friends in the movement to drop their wrong-headed objection to nuclear energy. Even if they were right about its dangers, and they are not, its worldwide use as our main source of energy would pose an insignificant threat compared with the dangers of intolerable and lethal heat waves and sea levels rising to drown every coastal city of the world. We have no time to experiment with visionary energy sources; civilisation is in imminent danger and has to use nuclear—the one safe, available, energy source—now or suffer the pain soon to be inflicted by our outraged planet. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Since some of the biggest critics of nuclear read like a who’s who’s of the intellect – Rotblat, Einstein, Russell - the patronising attitude doesn’t wash. Who the hell do these scientists think they are talking to? They address citizens as though they were children. How many scientists were behind Hitler’s Final Solution? Too many for comfort. Scientists should show a little more humility and a lot more manners when addressing individuals as ‘irrational’. There are more dimensions to reason than scientific rationality. If nuclear is safe, then that is where the case rests. There is no need to justify it as a lesser danger than climate change.

Brand cites the late Anglican Bishop Hugh Montefiore who had been a trustee of UK Friends of the Earth for twenty years. ‘He became convinced by climate dangers that as an environmentalist he had to support nuclear power.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). That’s the blackmail argument again. Assertions of necessity can point to the need for anything, from mass Buddhist conversion to universal fascist dictatorship. It doesn’t prove the veracity and rightness of either.

The real reason why the Government has not taken up the nuclear option is because it lacks public acceptance, due to scare stories in the media and the stonewalling opposition of powerful environmental organisations. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

If these environmental organisations were so ‘powerful’ to stop a perfectly rational, efficient and safe energy source, then why are they not powerful enough to stop the many business practices that demonstrably damage the environment? The science on climate change is clear and has the ‘vehement’ and ‘vocal’ backing  of the bulk of environmental organisations. There has been far more pressure brought to bear on the issue of global warming, with mass demonstrations surrounding climate talks like a circus. The result has been a series of useless, non-binding agreements ignored routinely by governments around the world. The idea that governments are afraid to act because of powerful environmental organisations is errant nonsense, leading one to suspect the character of the claims being made in favour of nuclear.

The argument applies, if it applies at all, only in odd countries like Germany, where the public do not support nuclear. This highlights another disturbing strain in the arguments of the likes of Lovelock and Brand, how little respect for democracy they have. Public acceptance, legitimacy, the sovereignty of the people, that is what democracy is all about. Here, Brand is sound like those marxists who attribute their lack of support to ‘false consciousness’. Many a failed socialist campaign has bemoaned media bias. The assumption is that individuals are not thinking, acting, choosing beings and are incapable of making up their own minds. Down that road lies elitism. The Green lobbies that Brand condemns are nowhere near as powerful as business lobbies, and ‘the media’ is just a convenient whipping boy. There is precious little reference to nuclear power in the media, little public interest one way or the other in energy sources, let alone evidence of systematic or unconscious media bias. This is a lazy argument which avoids the real reasons for nuclear’s unpopularity – nuclear is dangerous, inefficient, and expensive, insurance companies won’t touch it even with protective gloves, and people do not trust it.

Brand quotes Tim Flannery to make the case for nuclear: ‘Over the next two decades, Australians could use nuclear power to replace all our coal-fired power plants. We would then have a power infrastructure like that of France, and in doing so we would have done something great for the world, for whatever risks go with a domestic nuclear power industry are local, while greenhouse gas pollution is global in its impact.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Sorry, the risks of a domestic nuclear power industry are not local, as we found out with Chernobyl. If all nations go nuclear, the danger will be as global as greenhouse gas pollution.

Much of Brand’s argument is not an argument at all but a selection of favourite authorities. ‘Holdren told a New York Times reporter, "I'm often asked, 'Can you solve the climate problem without nuclear energy?' And I say, 'Yes, you can solve it without nuclear energy.' But it will be easier to solve it with nuclear energy."’
It would have been good if Brand had examined non-nuclear solutions to the climate crisis, but he is too concerned to proselytise for nuclear. Something that Brand fails to address is nuclear weapons proliferation. The governments of the rich and powerful will monitor the governments of the world, dictating who shall be powerful and who shall be dependent. This is the world of Lovelock’s nuclear warlords. Nuclear power will not be confined to civilian uses. The state rests upon force and claims the monopoly of physical violence. Nuclear power must necessarily have military implications. What kind of international authority is going to be sufficient to deal with the geopolitical conflicts and controversies that ensue? Why should Israel be allowed to be a nuclear power but not Iran? Over such controversies nations go to war, get bombed, people get killed. Brand’s treatment of the politics of nuclear is casual to say the least.

Though most of the worry over WMDs [weapons of mass destruction] has focused on nuclear weapons, those aren't the real long-term problem. Not only is the vast manufacturing capability of a nation-state required to produce the basic nuclear materials, but those materials are difficult to manipulate, transport, and turn into weapons. It's also unlikely that a state would give terrorists a nuclear weapon. Sovereignty and national prestige are tightly connected to the production of nukes. Sharing them with terrorists would grant immense power to a group outside the state's control—the equivalent of giving Osama bin Laden the keys to the presidential palace. (Brand ch 4 2009)

Brand might learn a thing or two about the insanities of international politics if he investigated Osama bin Laden’s origins and his links to the US. 
Brand also downplays the problems of rogue states. He completely misses the current controversy concerning Iran. 

If that isn't deterrent enough, the likelihood of retaliation is, since states, unlike terrorist groups, have targets that can be destroyed. The result of a nuclear explosion in Moscow or New York would very probably be the annihilation of the country that manufactured the bomb, once its identity was determined—as it surely would be, since no plot of that size can remain secret for long. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Whoever claimed that politics is rational? The great philosophers like Grotius, Pufendorf, Leibniz and Kant sought the perpetual peace of the rule of reason in politics. The great philosopher poet Dante sought the politics of tranquillity and global peace. We are very far from Dante’s ‘divine comedy’, an end state of universal felicity. The US has armed any number of rogue states and movements. Where do you think Al Quaida came from? Off the Christmas tree? So long as politics remains within a state of international rivalry, each state will feel the need for constant, aggressive intervention, provoking reaction and therefore generating constant and escalating international turmoil. 

And Brand thinks it sensible to throw nuclear power into this explosive mix.

‘Even in the very unlikely case that a nuclear weapon did end up in terrorist hands, it would be a single horrible incident, rather than an ongoing threat.’ (Brand ch 4 2009).

Talk about blasé. The whole of world geopolitics looks like an awful lot of single horrible incidents coming together to form one large and ongoing threat. I don’t know whether to laugh or cry at this reasoning. Far from being bold new thinking we need, this reads more like the senility that comes before death.

All this debate over the relative merits of energy sources strikes me as irrelevant to the main point – why the assumption that energy demands must be high and ever increasing? It is the accumulative imperative of the capital system which must have economic growth and hence must have high and ever increasing energy inputs. The obvious conclusion is that the system itself demands all and every form of energy. Brand quotes biologist Jared Diamond in his support: ‘To deal with our energy problems we need everything available to us, including nuclear power.’
Which begs the obvious question ‘what energy problem?’ The USA used more energy in the last half of the twentieth century than all the civilisations in history put together. One can examine every civilisation in history in terms of energy usage. When it comes to the twentieth century, the chart has to be broken because it won’t fit the page. The energy problem is not one of supply as such but of demand threatening to outstrip supply. Is it not possible to scale back energy requirements? Why is it assumed that energy demands have to keep on increasing? Notice how the large and increasing demands for energy are never related to the economic system and its endless expansionary thirst for accumulation. Of course given that kind of energy demand, the system will require ‘everything available’. That statement of the bleeding obvious impresses only those who turn a political and social problem into a technical problem. The ends – determined by the economic system – are simply assumed, the technicians set to work in their own area of expertise, the means. The problem with these kinds of technical analyses is that they so spectacularly and deliberately misdiagnose the problem that they end up with the same thing writ large as the solution. 

Brand pulls rank here. The scientists are the ones who know the most, he claims. He cites twelve Green nuclear proponents. ‘All but one are obsessed with climate (Patrick Moore is not), and all but four are scientists (Montefiore, Kunstler, Gore, and McKibben are not).’ (Brand ch 4 2009). Here we go. Here is the claim for the scientists as constituting the new priesthood, using their expertise to face down ‘ignorant’ critics. Except the argument here is based less on the science than on the necessity, and it is a false necessity at that, in that energy inputs of this increasing level are a function of the capital system, not some objective law of nature.
‘With everyone I've encountered who is really immersed in climate issues, the common view of nuclear is "the lesser of two evils" and "take nothing off the table."’

The lesser of two evils is still an evil. There are two very different things being argued here by Brand. 
1 That nuclear energy is safe, renewable and efficient, i.e. a good rather an evil;
2. That nuclear energy is dangerous but less dangerous than other options, i.e. a ‘necessary evil’.

That is a blatant logical flaw and violates the law of non-contradiction. What leaves a sour taste in the mouth is the way that Brand indulges in such contradictory reasoning, labels critics as ‘nutty’ and uses the appeal to science as an authority that trumps all others. This is a crude and obvious attempt to erect a division between an expert scientific elite and an ignorant mass. The public, after all, is led astray by green lobbies and the media and is unable to understand genuine science. It is a clear attempt to disenfranchise the common body of citizens. That has always led to irresponsible power in the past and rarely has the public good at heart. Who guards the guardians? More to the point, who pays the scientists?


We can do better than this. There is a move towards what is called ‘citizen science’ in which experts from various fields are involved in popular campaigns and grassroots activism to give people more control over their own lives (Irwin 1995). And we can also examine the words of Bronowski who argued against scientists distancing themselves from the public as certain to doom us all.

Brand will have none of this and makes a crude appeal to the authority of science: 
As for scientists, Gwyneth Cravens reported in her book that they invariably poll high in support of nuclear, ranging from 89 percent among scientists in general up to 95 percent for energy scientists and 100 permit for nuclear and radiation scientists. (those  who know the most are the least frightened.)

So what? Most of those at the Conference of Wannsee, the architects of Hitler’s ‘final solution’, were doctors of one kind or another. There was 100% support for the extermination of the Jews there. They may have been highly educated and supremely clever men and women, experts in their field. But they were as far wrong as it is possible to be.
Those who ‘know the most’. Underline those words from Brand. Those who ‘know the most’. Who are the rest of us, then? Are we citizens or subjects? The ignorant mass have nothing to say and nothing to do, except turn up at the coal face and drone their lives away for their new lords and masters. 
Not so long ago, the priesthood in the west and the Brahmins in the east claimed a monopoly of power on account of their knowledge of the spiritual world. They insisted on using Latin or Sanskrit rather than the vernacular tongue to make themselves incomprehensible to the masses. This monopoly of interpretation gave the priestly elite the monopoly of control. The use of common languages and the spread of the holy word through the printing revolution gave people greater and more direct access to the understanding of the spiritual realm. Scientists are now the new priesthood, asserting that without mathematics or specialised language the people cannot understand the material world. They, of course, claim that world as their own province. Not so. Science does not rule the world. The people are sovereign and they set the rules and the framework for all aspects of civilised life, of which science is one part alongside the other parts. Science is one side of the fact/value divide and should be pressed into service as the means to ends determined by others. Science does not deliver meaning and can never deliver meaning for so long as the fact/value, object/subject, means/ends divide holds. It is on the wrong side of the divide for that. The attempt to assert the connection between knowledge and power is crude and obvious and we know too much to fall for those kind of assertions. (Brand ch 4 2009). To derive an ‘ought to be’ from an ‘is’ is to affirm a value, not to assert a necessity in the service of power.
Apart from anything else, there is enough loose reasoning and contradictory assertions in the case made for nuclear to destroy any claims on the part of scientists to ‘know the most’. Anyone well versed in history see such claims to knowledge and power as intrinsic to politics. It is the old dictatorship of the clever, the government ‘overflowing with brains’ that Bakunin saw in embryo in Marx’s ‘scientific socialism’. Stalin’s governments were staffed with experts. Those who ‘know the most’ assert the least. As Bertrand Russell said, the more he came to know, the less he came to assert. I shall stick with the Socratic tradition, ‘only this I know, that I know nothing.’ Socrates was wise because he knew that he didn’t know. Those who claimed knowledge were unwise because they didn’t know how ignorant they were. The reason that ‘those who know the most’ are the ‘least frightened’ is because their knowledge is self-validating – that’s all they know and that’s all they want to know, no other knowledge exists to contradict their claims.
Brand resorts to some dubious tactics in bolstering his case for expanding nuclear power generation. He gives the example of Grist.org, who asked readers, "In the light of the mounting threat of climate change, does nuclear power deserve another look?" 54 percent of respondents voted "Yes." (Brand ch 4 2009). 
Talk about loading a question. “Given that you are going to die a horrible death tomorrow and there’s little doctors can do, do you think it’s worth looking at a course of leeches?” The biggest surprise that only 54 percent voted ‘Yes’, since this did not entail going nuclear, merely giving it ‘another look’. In training, researchers are taught to avoid building assumptions into their research. Loading a question taints the research and renders the results worthless. Garbage in, garbage out. Brand has gone from asserting the claims of ‘those in the know’, the scientists, to picking and choosing from the myriad public polls. Sorry, I thought the public were ignorant. Or is he arguing for the Platonic Noble Lie here? A little drip-drip propaganda from pro-nuclear scientists, shape opinion, and then manacle the people by their own consent?

‘During one online discussion, a visitor to a blog hosted by Earthjustice Legal Defense wrote: "I have been an ardent foe of nuclear power generation for over three decades. . . . However, in the last two years I have reversed my position, and now support the building of a new generation of nuclear plants in the USA. The reason is that global warming is such a huge and imminent issue, that I think we must accept the lesser evil of nuclear power generation."(Brand ch 4 2009). 
A visitor to a blog says we must accept nuclear as the ‘lesser evil’. Well, that’s me convinced. This kind of opinion has no place in an argument. ‘I was blind but now I see.’ Brand is quoting a blogger to an online discussion in support of his position. There is a film on You Tube, Flash Gordon Conquers the Universe (1940). A visitor to the page comments ‘Ming the Merciless would love geoengineering’. Indeed he would, he was a pioneer. I have come across individuals on these online forums claiming to be Elvis Presley. I don’t think any of them are Elvis at all. But talking of Elvis, there is a line in his song Let’s Be Friends that reasons along the same lines: ‘someone I know says life is good, and he can’t be wrong’. He can, he most certainly can. 
Throughout his book, Brand backs his arguments with quotes from people who agree with him. A visitor to a blog for crying out loud!! A million quotes and more do not make a proposition correct. What counts is not numbers but evidence. The opinion of one thousand people does not make a groundless proposition more correct than the view of one person whose view is backed by evidence. Whether, how and to what extent human beings are affecting the climate is a purely a scientific question and, as such, is only decidable by appeal to Nature, not by counting opinions. To quote this person or that who happens to agree with your view does not count as evidence in favour of that view at all. The only thing that counts is evidence, and the quality of the reasoning in drawing conclusions from the facts. It’s all about maintaining empirical and rational controls so as to ensure we remain in the realm of knowledge and out of the quagmire of opinion. If someone lacks evidence and reason, then they cannot offer much by way of a valuable contribution.

And note again Brand’s argument from necessity. ‘We must accept the lesser evil of nuclear power’. Why, if nuclear energy is safe and efficient, is Brand still referring to it as an ‘evil’? A lesser evil it may or may not be, but it is an evil all the same. And the reason it is an evil is because it is deadly.

A generation gap has emerged. For younger Greens, cold-war nuclear fears are ancient history, and Chernobyl is not part of their personal experience. The threat of climate change is what dominates their world, along with accelerating technology, with which they are comfortable. 

Poor reasoning. Would people choose nuclear without the threat of climate change? If nuclear is safe and efficient, they would. So why the need to cite climate change? It seems that nuclear would not be chosen on its merits. It’s like asking a prisoner which way he wants to die, horribly or really horribly with a red hot poker up his backside. I’d choose horribly, but it doesn’t mean that I want to die horribly of course. It’s called Hobson’s Choice. If these are the only options in this game, it’s time to change the game.

Brand cites those scientists who left Greenpeace as soon as it started to get political, i.e. as soon as environmentalism started to get serious about the way that vested interests, class, exploitation, power impact upon the planet’s ecology. Against this difficult political terrain where issues of power and control are contested and resolved, Brand opts for the safe neutral ground of technology and proposes more of the same enlarged by nuclear. And worst of all he takes his stand on the know all authority of science. Frankly, this kind of reasoning reveals an appalling naivety and ignorance with respect to the real world of political economy. Or feigns naivety. Scientists like this are eaten alive by big business and big government and, indeed, that is just what is happening year in year out.

Brand explains his change of mind as a result of the threat of climate change: ‘the key moment … was when it was reported that the permafrost in Siberia was melting massively, giving up methane, which is a very serious problem for the world. It was kind of like a religious conversion. Being anti-nuclear was an essential part of being an environmentalist for a long time but now that I'm talking to a number of environmentalists about this, it's actually quite widespread—this view that nuclear power is not ideal but it's better than climate change. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

To say that ‘nuclear power is not ideal’ is very different from claiming it is safe, efficient and renewable. Note that the reason for Brand’s conversion is not that nuclear has become any less deadly, only that climate change has become more pressing. That’s the choice, death in the short or the long term. These are not the only options. A good rule from history is never ever ever succumb to appeals driven by assertions of necessity. Behind such appeals there are nearly always what the philosopher Stuart Hampshire calls ‘false fixities’, things claimed to be natural and inevitable but which turn out to be historical creations and social practices which are subject to human intervention and alteration. The large and ever increasing demand for energy is one such false fixity. The demand is directly connected to the capital system and capital’s need for the endless self-expansion of value. This calls for politics, a domain of human intervention, argumentation, choice and decision. This involves judgements. The scientists do not recognise this as being knowledge. However, far from being clever, these scientists who reduce questions of politics to technology are remarkably stupid. They reduce options and narrow the scope for change. There is a price to be paid for such stupidity. That accumulative logic lies behind the destruction of the environment and depletion of natural resources and will continue in all the more powerful form when supported by dangerous, deadly nuclear energy. 

Older environmentalists talk about nuclear power exclusively in terms of what they see as the four great problems that condemn the technology-safety, cost, waste storage, and proliferation. Those four have no form of positive, only degrees of badness, and they are treated as absolutes. If a reactor accident is possible, then nuclear power is impossible; if the capital costs are high, then nuclear power is impossible, and so on. Absolutes are potent. Once something is seen as a capitalized Absolute Evil, it functions as a premise; everything has to exist in relation to your opposition to it. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Here’s another potent Absolute. Either you are dead or you are not. Of course, by degree, you could be one of the half dead, those who spend years living with the consequences of radiation sickness. Bland is remarkably blasé here.

Reactor safety is a problem already solved. In 2008 the world had 443 civilian nuclear reactors boiling up 16 percent of all electricity and keeping a yearly 3 gigatons of carbon dioxide that would have been generated by coal plants out of the atmosphere. Year after year, the industry has had no significant accidents, having learned hard lessons from the three that got away—England's Windscale fire in 1957, the Three Mile Island meltdown in 1979, and the Chernobyl steam explosion in 1986. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Give ‘em enough rope….. Brand’s claims are big and bold. With huge technological hubris he turns the problem into simple engineering. He then declares that ‘reactor safety is a problem already solved’, with ‘no significant accidents, having learned hard lessons’. This was in 2009. It had to happen, and it did. Talk about tempting fate - Fukushima 2010. So much for those who ‘know the most’. The really depressing thing is that these scientists and technicians just never ever learn, the same big claims, the same claims of omnipotence, the same patronising condescension to the ignorant masses and ‘nutty’ activists – and the same spectacular fall following overweening pride. It has ever been thus. But, no matter how many Titanics sink, the worship of power carries on unabated. Indeed, even when an accident that is no longer supposed to happen, like Fukushima, happens, the scientists, like true believers, assure us that there is nothing to worry about. No deaths, no adverse consequences, all safe and under control – and, like the crooked spiv Max Bialstock says at the end of The Producers, ‘we’ve learned our lessons and we’ll never do it again’. 

Writing in 2009, Brand cites the Japanese nuclear programme as one for the world to follow.

Japan, the largest user of nuclear power after the United States and France, with fifty-five reactors in operation, is planning eleven new reactors by 2017. The government wants to transform its electricity mix from 30 percent nuclear now to 60 percent nuclear by 2050. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Well, they are in trouble now after Fukushima. The argument for continuing with nuclear is not that it’s safe but that energy bills will go up and the economy will be damaged without nuclear. So cut the scientific b/s and start being honest about the economic necessity driving energy policy. At least then we can get political economy back into the picture and pack the engineers off to where they can do least damage, looking after the means and leaving the rest of us to determine ends.

But Brand engages in one last bout of arm twisting:

For our fellow environmentalists still queasy about nuclear, we might quote Al Gore's mentor Roger Revelle, who sponsored the atmospheric carbon dioxide studies that first exposed the inconvenient truth about climate change. Revelle regarded nuclear as "much more benign" than other energy sources. He said, "What we ought to do is imitate the French and Japanese. They haven't got any phobias about it." (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Well they have now. Brand asserts ‘They were right.’ They were wrong. And Brand is wrong. The Japanese government is currently having to spend billions to support Japan’s moribund nuclear industry.
Brand seems to realise that he has laboured the point to absurdity and takes another tack. He now comes to attack fear. This is the ‘unreasoning fear’ that James Lovelock also refers to with respect to critics of nuclear. Rather than engage with the arguments of critics, it is easier to dismiss them as fears with no basis in reason. And, by a real feat of prestidigitation, Brand makes the fear of nuclear power the real problem, as against any danger possessed by nuclear power itself. ‘We should fear fear itself. Though the odds of dying in a terror attack like 9/11 or contracting Ebola are infinitesimal, the effects of chronic stress caused by constant fear are significant.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). 
Priceless. Having cited the threat of climate change as the necessity forcing us to choose the nuclear option, Brand now claims we need to reassess fear in light of risk society. Well, that argument is also used by those who would deny the science on climate change. Brand uses precisely this fear to justify the nuclear option, only now to accuse those critics of nuclear of succumbing to fear. The case starts to read like Tony Blair’s case for the military attack on Iraq. Here is one reason to justify nuclear power, if you don’t like it, I have others. There isn’t a coherent case being made here, it’s an any old argument will do approach.

Because Hiroshima and the cold war threw everything atomic into the Absolute Evil category, our feelings about nuclear energy are tainted by our revulsion about nuclear weapons. Thus the chemical release of the Bhopal incident in 1984 is treated as far less consequential than the radiation release from Chernobyl, even though over six thousand died from Bhopal versus fifty-six from Chernobyl (forty-seven workers, nine children). Through fear of radiation and expected birth defects, the World Health Organization reported, couples in the Chernobyl area had 250,000 abortions. But no human birth defects have been found to result from Chernobyl—nor, by the way, from Hiroshima. As for disease, the low-dose-radiation expert John Goffman declared that "the number of fatal cancers to come over the years and decades ahead as a direct result of this accident will not be lower than 500,000." In fact it was less than 1 percent of that figure. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

The same old false antitheses and juxtapositions which populate cases like this. We can see the same reasoning in Lovelock and in Mark Lynas’ The God Species, playing up the Bhopal disaster in order to play down the Chernobyl disaster. I would be more than keen to discuss the depredations of transnational capital with regard to the health and welfare of communities across the world. There are also questions of sovereignty and democratic control to be addressed here. The problem is that these technological fixers are keen to rule out politics and political economy, it saves them asking the controversial questions of who gets what, how and why they get it, and how we change the terms on which the global product is distributed. And now their hearts bleed for the dead, sick and poor of Bhopal!!!! If Brand et al were involved in political campaigns against the global corporate capitalism behind such industrial disasters I would be more impressed. But they are not and never have been. And even if they were, to compare Bhopal with Chernobyl would still be a false antithesis. 

To stick to a clear philosophical point, to point to more deaths in the short run from one kind of industrial accident does not alter the damaging and destructive and indeed deadly effects of another accident in another time and place. A scientist would know well that the impacts of a nuclear accident are more diffuse, more indirect and more long term than an industrial accident like Bhopal. And what Brand also ignores are the massive steps taken by governments to minimise the damaging effects of radioactivity in the aftermath of Chernobyl, all the health programmes, the prohibitions on land and livestock, the drugs, all of it designed to reduced harm. What would the figures have shown had nothing been done? Interesting that this fact, which is common knowledge, is left out by Lovelock, Lynas and Brand. That’s quite some oversight. It implies a very selective approach to the argument and to the evidence.

In the tones of Dr Strangelove, Brand opines ‘statistically it is a nonevent— epidemiology can't detect it.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). I don’t know what all the fuss is about.
‘The real damage to people in the region, according to the Chernobyl Forum report, is from poverty and mental stress.’ (Brand ch 4 2009).

This argument is repeated in Lynas’ book. The real accusation is not that these writers are guilty of plagiarism but that they are not looking into the truth of these questions, not addressing contrary arguments and evidence, not properly researching the case. They are recycling their words at second hand, that is, claiming knowledge and making some very big assertions, they are taking their views on authority. The arguments are right because the authors have selectively read the material with a view to finding arguments which confirm a predetermined position. As Freud lamented, people will believe what they want to believe. But the resort to second hand argument weakens any case being made. This is shallow stuff, really. It’s a sales pitch.

Brand quotes Robert Baker: ‘The world's worst nuclear power plant disaster is not as destructive to wildlife populations as are normal human activities.’
The same assertions crop up in Lovelock and Lynas. Who is copying who? More to the point, such mutual borrowing reveals not merely plagiarism but unthinking fitting of arguments and evidence to a predetermined position.

Radiation from nuclear energy has killed not a single American, but of all these energy by-products it is the only one we dread. Nuclear radiation as used in medicine for diagnosis and treatment has saved countless lives, while exposing all the patients to levels of radiation that are many times what is illegal in the nuclear power industry. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Sometimes, words just fail. Apart from pointing out that that is just a bare faced lie. I suppose it will depend upon what Brand means by ‘killed’. The US government has indeed been hiding behind the law on this one. You cannot prove which particular cigarette is responsible for giving you cancer. Any scientist who is happy with this kind of reasoning is well on the way to a career in politics. Of course, being in the ‘know’, they are above ideology. So that’ll be politics with a small p, like nazi with a small n. But I’ll stick my neck out and play a hunch here, that big John Wayne himself died of a cancer brought about by exposure to radiation from nuclear energy. And that’s some exception.

We should pay attention to these claims by scientists that there’s nothing to worry about with respect to radiation. It implies that safety will not be uppermost in their thoughts when it comes to nuclear energy. Why put the accent on safety when there’s nothing to be afraid of? Persuaded? Me neither.

It appears to me that the main public safety issue around nuclear power is what Luisa Vinton and the United Nations agencies found at Chernobyl: "Fear of radiation is a far more important health threat than radiation itself." The lesson of Chernobyl is double: one, be careful; two, be careful what you fear. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

In fine, the fear of radiation is more damaging to health than radiation itself. I don’t like the vagueness in the words ‘it appears to me’. Appearances can be deceptive and never moreso when a scientist is engaging in wishful thinking. Why ‘be careful’ if nuclear is safe? If nuclear is safe, there is no need to be careful.

Brand is back to selecting quotes, this time from Green Ted Turner: ‘I would rather have a nuclear plant than a coal-burning plant.’ And I’d rather have rickets than cholera. I’d prefer not to have either, though. I’d rather stick pins in my eyes than listen to Kylie Minogue, but I’d prefer not to. Arguments packed with false antitheses are not arguments at all. You shouldn’t waste your vote. You have to vote. People fought and died for the right to vote. OK. You have two candidates. Who would you vote for, Stalin or Hitler? Pol Pot or Timur the Lame? Vote for the lesser evil. So which one is nuclear, Stalin or Hitler? Vote for a lesser evil and you get evil. I’m with Camus on this, to say ‘no’ is really to say ‘yes’, by affirming values beyond the boundary. Rather than support an expansionary economic system that is continually outstripping planetary boundaries, we would do better to transgress the boundaries of an unsustainable economic system, challenge and subvert the mechanisms of accumulation and replace the capital system with an economic system that respects nature’s life support systems.
There is a vast literature on this subject. Brand cites one piece of research to claim that nuclear has been deprived of resources whereas other energy sources have benefited from government subsidy. ‘The perception that renewable energy has been short-changed at the expense of other energy sources is not correct. . . . Coal and nuclear technologies have been underfunded, while solar technologies such as photovoltaics, solar thermal, and wind have been well funded.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). (Details, with ‘illuminating graphs’, may be found in Roger H. Bezdek and Robert M. Wendling, "A Half Century of United States Federal Government Energy Incentives: Value, Distribution, and Policy Implications," International Journal of Global Energy Issues, vol. 27 [2007], no. 1.) 
Brand claims that this study ‘leaves out the copious subsidies at the state level for renewable energy.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). He doesn’t supply the evidence for that claim.
The objection that nuclear is only viable through gross oversubsidization – supported by countless peer reviewed papers - is countered by reference to one tendentious piece of research from 2007 which supplies ‘illuminating graphs’ to show that nuclear has been ‘underfunded’ whereas all other energy sources (except coal) have been well funded. The evidence against? There is a wealth of this evidence against. It isn’t even mentioned. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

‘You may have heard this one: "It's no good building new reactors because we're running out of uranium." In fact we're not, and it wouldn't matter if we did.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). 
I have heard it all right – the same denial that uranium is running out crops up in Lovelock, too. If you didn’t know any better you could say that Lovelock, Lynas and Brand are the same person, like the cranks on radio phone-in’s or Internet forums who say the same thing under different names.
The nuclear scientists of the postwar era exhibited an anguish and care which contrasted markedly with the Panglossian mentality prevails in military, industrial and political circles, a mentality which assures us that there is nothing to worry about and that any problems there may be are accidental and transient and that everything works out for the best in the end. It’s not an argument that has much appeal to anyone with a modicum of historical awareness. Time and again, governments have systematically lied to their peoples, particularly with respect to the dangers of nuclear power. In complete contrast to the Panglossians of science, working in tandem with business, state and military, the veterans of the Manhattan Project, the likes of Leo Szilard, explained the truth with a clarity and a cogency that thoroughly contradicts the sneer of ‘unreasoning fear’ put around by the likes of Lovelock and Brand. The demand for civilian control of atomic energy and for restrictions on nuclear tests began with nuclear scientists (Jungk 1956 (1958); Kimball Smith 1965). These scientists kept the Faustian awareness alive as against the Mephistophelean claim that great things can be achieved only if human beings suppress their concern and care. When the likes of Lovelock, Brand and Lynas argue against sentimentality, against theories and principles, and make ethics conditional upon what works, they have plainly abandoned the Faustian part and have instead come to play the role of Mephistopheles, the diabolic character who offers Faust the bargain – mind and magic in return for power. Mephistopheles is "the spirit that negates all"!
For all of the claims that the scientists are the experts who ‘know the most’, it is not the scientists at all who alone play the Faustian part, not when the bargain affects all. We are in the age of citizen science, whether the experts like this or not. The Faustian protagonist charged with the responsibility to make the bargain or reject it is society as a whole, all of us, not just some of us. The Faustian bargains that drive development affect all individuals, who must take responsibility for the choices made. And nuclear scientists appreciated this from the start. "The society must make the choice, and this is a choice that we nuclear people have no right to dictate." (Weinberg 1972: 27-34.) The acceptance or rejection of Faustian bargains is not a matter of expert knowledge, still less of mind and magic in the service of the state, the military and the corporations, but a question of moral responsibility that all must address as a condition of citizenship. This is integral to the principle of self-assumed obligation, the idea that individual citizens are obligated only by those laws that they have themselves had a hand in making. Citizens not only have the right to play the Faustian part but also an obligation the making of Faustian bargains. This is a condition of ensuring that the power of mind and magic, of science and technology and industry, retains a sense of moral awareness and hence does not degenerate into Mephistophelian diabolism. This awareness requires the moral responsibility of society as a whole, not the scientific knowledge of an elite. This responsibility cannot be transferred to any select group of experts for the simple reason that when it comes to the Faustian predicament we are all experts. The moral question is one that all need to address. Science and technology are not abstract forces which have expanded in a social and cultural vacuum, but are set within a moral and social matrix. The power of science and technology enhances or inhibits life to the extent that their visions and values mirror, magnify and realize those of the society around them. Science and technology generates powerful means to realize ends embodied and expressed by the people organised as a public. When science and technology set those ends, scientists and technologists join the diabolic party in the Faustian bargain. As social beings, individuals are always responsible for the directions taken or not taken the goals pursued, the way that powers are applied, the human costs as well as the achievements. Stewart Brand states that we have become as gods and therefore must get used to being as gods. But he singularly fails to recognise the distinction between Faust and Mephistopheles, between assuming moral responsibility for the powers of mind and magic, and selling science and technological knowledge to the devil. For that reason, time and again, Brand, in pursuing his claim that human beings are to be as gods, abandons the world of theories, principles, ethics, values, sentiment – everything that defines human beings as moral beings with a Faustian awareness – for the diabolism of Mephistopheles. This is hopeless, in that it delivers mind and magic to the emperors of the world. The central fact of modernity is that we are all Faustians now, which means that society as a whole needs to assume conscious common control of its collective powers, rather than hide behind the fiction that scientists are the only ones in control, or avoid responsibility by claiming that scientists are the only ones out of control. 

We can sum up Brand’s case for nuclear power in a few words - unproved hype. Brand blames green lobbies, the media and public fear for the lack of progress on nuclear. This is just plain wrong. The real reason why the world has not yet gone nuclear is because nuclear reactors are prohibitively expensive to build, require vast subsidies, might not work and cost fortunes to decommission. Oh, and no-one, from governments, to insurers, to the people believe that nuclear is safe. No government is prepared to fund them and no private company will undertake the risk. Even with the threat of climate change, few are prepared to take the risk. Which leaves a big problem unresolved. How about renewables alongside scaling back energy inputs? 

An economy altered in its fundamentals is crucial. Brand, however, is full of false modesty here.

We Greens are not economists. When someone needs fiscal advice, they don't usually hire an environmentalist, because they know we don't really know about money and we don't really care about money. Our agenda is to protect the natural environment, not taxpayers or ratepayers. We're perfectly happy requiring such impediments as environmental impact reports, which add horrendous costs and delays to projects, and our arguments for protecting one endangered species or another do not include cost analysis. How much is a condor worth? Don't even ask. (Brand ch 4 2009). 

Brand is being disingenuous here, confessing the sins of the Greens far too much. We Greens know nothing about economics and cost those who do so much money with our silly environmental campaigns. Brand is wrong. There are many Greens who are economists. And there are very many more socialists who are economists. I am sceptical of this ‘we know nothing of economics’ claim. It reads like a capitulation to the status quo, to the very economic system driving environmental crisis. The Greens don’t know, so it’s best trust those who do. Guess who they will be? I’ll give you a clue. It won’t be the ecosocialists. This is a clear case of intellectual disarmament.

Occasionally we'll invent useful economic instruments like debt-for-nature swaps, and many of our organizations are well run financially, but money issues are customarily employed by Greens strictly as a weapon. "If you want to kill a power project," advises one activist in Orion magazine, "focus on economics." I recall the futurist Herman Kahn talking about the fight over the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in the 1970s: "The Greens began by complaining about the design of the pipeline, and they were right, it did have flaws. But once those were fixed, the Greens put all their effort into forcing delays and extravagances that raised the cost of the system. Their final argument was that the pipeline should not be built because it was too expensive. That's like a kid murdering his parents and then asking for mercy from the court because he's an orphan."





Brand, it should come as no surprise, is a strong advocate of biotechnology. ‘Asking around over the years, I've found that professional biologists are universally unalarmed about genetic engineering. Most are adopting it in their own work because it is transforming every one of the biological disciplines.’ (Brand ch 5 2009). 
Yes, of course they think biotechnology is important, they’re biologists. They would, wouldn’t they? But the best practitioners in any field are always a little more thoughtful than this. Wise and intelligent people are always cautious, if not necessarily alarmed as such. Straight away, this denial of any kind of moral implication around genetic engineering is grounds alone for suspicion.

Activists who oppose genetic engineering in crops give detailed biological arguments about the damage they're sure it will cause, but it's oddly context-free biology. (Brand ch 5 2009). 

Oh no, no, no,  it’s those who promote genetic engineering who are most context free, free of politics and of economics most of all. Secret tests, highly controlled to generate the right results, selective release of findings that support pre-determined agendas, hiding of contrary results. There isn’t a trick in the book that hasn’t been resorted to. This is an area where science does not cover itself in glory.
The simple and undeniable fact is this, the food problem is one of distribution and not production. GM crops will give all power to those already in control of global food and they will continue to distribute on their own terms – for a big profit. No wonder that Brand pleaded economic ignorance in a previous chapter. He gives one extremely ignorant argument with respect to GM food. Not that that stops Brand from arguing from the authority of science to delegitimize the voice of critics: ‘As with nuclear, those who know the most are the least frightened.’ (Brand ch 5 2009). 

Given the fact that he has asserted his case rather than argued it, given that he has not engaged the reasoned arguments of critics, this is lazy as well as patronising. Brand has a case to make, but I’m not going to deal with it because I know more than him. So there. That’s Brand’s approach. It’s not fear that motivates the critics of nuclear. Brand hasn’t engaged the arguments of the critics at all, he has simply ignored them. That’s real fear. And now he does the same with respect to GM crops. Brand isn’t one of those who know the most at all. He is ignorant. He doesn’t know – he doesn’t want to know – that the global food problem is one of distribution and not one of production. The capacity to supply the world’s population with more than enough food already exists. The problems in distribution are entirely to do with the need to keep profit margins up through an artificial scarcity. It is a form of economic rationing that ensures who own and control the productive means get a return, regardless of human needs. As with nuclear, so with GM crops: those who assert the most, know the least.
Brand quotes James Watson, the codiscoverer of the structure of DNA, in his defence. Watson resists the need for government to regulate science. ‘Evolution is constantly trying to seek out the best set of genes for a given organism to occupy a niche. I do not worry about "monsters."’ 
No, James Watson probably never worried about monsters. No more than did Dr Frankenstein before he created one. That moral deafness and blindness is precisely why science spawns monsters. Here, in a nutshell, is the madness of a scientific rationality detached from moral purpose – whatever can be done, must be done. And the scientists involved have no ethical awareness or scruple. That’s how things go wrong.

It's silly to control where there's no evidence of danger. I am totally agreed that the public should participate in any process where they can be given facts to think about. But the tradition is, you don't call fire until you see it. (Brand ch 5 2009). 

You don’t shout ‘monster’ until you have created it. You have to create a monster in order to show evidence of danger. The problem is that by this stage it has broken free of its chains and is on the rampage in the town. Some scientists wear blinkers. They can push so far in their own work that they lose their grip on reality. There is always a need for control, for caution, for anticipation of problems. 
Scientists have become so accustomed at having the charge of ‘Frankenstein’ thrown at them, that they now throw it back dismissively.
Brand writes of ‘the moment when environmentalists turned away from reason in regard to genetic engineering’, lamenting the fact that ‘Friends of the Earth and all the other environmental organizations I know of still oppose genetic engineering. Most of all they oppose transgenic food crops; thus the great coinage "Frankenfood."’ (Brand ch 5 2009).
On these terms, embracing reason means arguing in favour of genetic engineering and GM crops. By definition, criticism of GE is contrary to reason. Again, there is no attempt to engage with contrary arguments, just the assumption that reason, like God, is on one side whilst the other side is irredeemably stupid and prejudiced. The merits or demerits of GM crops is not my concern here. To argue against such overstated positions cannot avoid stumbling over the pitfalls of overstatement. I am more concerned with the mode of argumentation. Note well the constant claim to reason on one’s part and the abandonment of reason on the part of one’s opponents. That is a crude and rather obvious attempt to deny opponents a legitimate platform. ‘We’ know, but ‘they’ do not; ‘we’ are reasonable, but ‘they’ are not; ‘we’ should be listened to, but ‘they’ should not. ‘We’ know what we know and that’s all there is to it as far as we are concerned. The worse part of these arguments for genetic engineering, regardless of the pros and cons, is that they are beside the point. It’s the tendency of these kind of arguments to turn political and socio-economic arguments into technological questions that reveals them to be ideological, concealing the power interests and relations that lie behind the controversies. Claiming ignorance of economics, Brand makes several strong statements in support of Monsanto. At this point, it is difficult to keep reading without feeling like you are being had for a fool, wasting time when there are much better things to read. Again, much of this could read like an attempt to spread dissension and conflict within a political movement that is beginning to encroach of power and initiate change. Brand needn’t worry about his advocacy of GM crops. He has some very powerful allies in business and politics here, so he can dispense with the ‘minority’ of environmentalists he disparages as ‘activists.’ He’s changed sides. We’ll see you on the other side of the barricades. But if Brand thinks his business chums have the environmental good at heart, then he is sadly deluded. He has fooled himself, but that’s no reason why the rest of us should be fooled.

At least GE allows us to see what Brand has in mind when he writes that human beings must get good at being as gods.

The precision of GE, writes Jonathan Gressel, lets you control "in which tissue, under what circumstances, and how much a gene will be expressed. This is done without introducing all the extraneous genetic baggage brought by crossing with the related species. Genetic engineering is like getting a spouse without in-laws, whereas breeding is like getting a spouse with a whole village." The traditional method for removing the extraneous genes is with many generations of backcrossing—a blind, random, painstaking process. (Brand ch 5 2009). 


Which means that we are as gods presiding over nature, we can control evolution on our terms. It’s a wager. Look at the complexity and diversity of nature and biological systems and ask yourself the question – do you really think scientists are that clever that they can design in and design out everything they like and leave us with a perfect result? Do you really think they know what they are doing? For the likes of Dawkins natural selection works so well because it operates by chance, without conscious intelligence and design. The process is natural and inheres within the overall system. Now we have scientists who think they can do better. It’s ironic to think that biologists are putting the choice into human evolution when Richard Dawkins has built a career on denying vitalism, purpose and conscious choice. On balance, I would prefer to take my chances with evolution by natural selection. But the case for human beings being the God Species widens the scope for human action and design.
So let’s give Brand the benefit of the doubt and look at what is at stake with GE crops. 
There is no avoiding the view that transgenic genetically modified (GM) crops are risky and anyone who says otherwise is untrustworthy. In the very least, they are a work in progress. We simply do not know the health effects of eating, for instance, a banana into which genetic material from a lamb has been introduced. What the impact on the human body may be is a matter of speculation no better than guesswork. The environmental risks of farming GM crops are significant since genetic engineering introduces self-reproducing species into the environment before we have had time to study them in any depth.
One of the supposed advantages offered for GM crops is that they reduce the need for pesticides. Indeed they do, on the outside. But this doesn’t address the question of what happens when humans and animals consume GE plants that have been designed so that every cell in them produce pesticides. Unlike pesticides sprayed on the crops, cannot be washed away when consumed. Brand ignores all of this. It would be interesting to hear his case against, or at least read his denial. The lack of discussion may reveal volumes. Plenty of research has been done on this issue, issuing in numerous studies which show the connection between GM and increased disease, mortality and reduced fertility. The conclusions are that this is most likely caused by poisoning from the very pesticides that these plants are designed to produce. Until this question is cleared up, it is perfectly rational, sane and sober to exercise caution. Brand will have no criticism. He merely impugns the motives of those who dare criticise GM crops. He doesn’t deal with the specific criticisms, he doesn’t even deny them.
Brand’s tendency to breeze past the connection of GM crops with the corporations sets the alarm bells ringing. One doesn’t need to be George Orwell to think that Brand’s rosy view of the economics of GM crops is suspect. 
The words of Paul Foot are pertinent here: ‘Rich and powerful people are always explaining how they wish to expand their wealth and power not for themselves but for everyone else. Their basic claim for the 'free-market' system which has made them rich is that it is the only known system which fits what is produced to what people want and need. Yet the plainest fact of all about a world dominated by the free market system demonstrates exactly the opposite. From every corner of the world comes the suffocated howl of millions of people whose desperate needs and wants are being systematically ignored.’
There is a wealth of evidence to show the connection between GM crops and the corporations and it is an insult to the intelligence to have this connection denied. It begs the question of whom Brand is really addressing his argument, because few greens and environmentalists will fall for his benevolent view of GM crops as the solution to global hunger. Brand must know that greens and environmentalists have heard these claims many times before and have rejected them time and again, supporting their case against with reason and evidence. By making an ‘appeal to reason’, Brand’s argument seems designed to portray greens and environmentalists as contrary to reason. Of course, claiming that GM crops will feed the world’s starving millions makes it easier to portray environmentalists as political extremists unconcerned with the real problems that people face. So Brand’s approach makes sense as an anti-green politics rather than as a genuine appeal to persuade environmentalists. 

Does Brand seriously think that the massive corporate research into GM crops is part of a big hearted crusade on the part of big business to feed the starving? Or, does he really think that enough of us will be so stupid or so desperate as to fall for such a big lie? 
No one can be so naïve, so it begs the question of what Brand is really up to. It also begs the question of why it has taken so long, since the starving, like the poor, have always been with us. It doesn’t wash. Research into GM crops has been pushed by the corporations so as to generate design-patented products that reinforce the existing system of agribusiness and the way it generates wealth for a powerful few. To argue that the race to develop GM crops is an attempt on the part of scientists to feed the starving millions, with the economic implications merely an indirect concern, requires a credulity that one simply cannot credit in anyone over the age of six. The corporations, of course, are not financing research so as to redesign crops for free distribution to the world's poorer farmers or the starving, but to ensure that they monopolize factory farming, control the global food supply and continue to rake in profits. There are huge political, social and economic questions here which Brand ignores. Instead, he tries to remain on the ground of the science of genetic modification, with the result that those who raise implications beyond the science are easily dismissed as irrational and political. It also allows him to make many uncontentious scientific statements, which are not at issue, so as to leave the heavy impression that critics are against the science.
For the record, my view is that genetic modification as such is not inherently evil and does not necessarily produce monsters. Whether GM, like any science, has positive results depends upon whether it guided by wisdom. GM could improve health, restore agricultural sustainability, benefit the economics of food importation. There are many possibilities. But this depends upon the social relations within which the technology is set. It depends upon whether means are set within an appropriate set of ends. Hence the importance of Brand’s citing of James Watson’s argument against regulation. This is a defence of the freedom of science. However, science is never free from control. Like all means, it serves someone or something. Which is why there are grounds for suspicion in Brand’s keenness to deny the centrality of the corporations and his concern to free science from control. This is designed to emancipate science from governmental, democratic and ethical control so as to be better serve money and power. There will always be control of some kind in place. If science doesn’t serve the people, who or what will it serve?

We now understand the lengths to which Brand went in denigrating agriculture and the countryside in favour of the city. It seems that the ‘city planet’ he advocates dispenses with the land altogether. He states explicitly that: ‘To an ecologist, or to a Gaian for that matter, agriculture is one vast catastrophe. The less of it, the better.’ (Brand ch 5 2009). Brand quotes James Lovelock: "The fact that at least 40 percent of the land surface is used for food crops is hardly ever taken into account in our current approach to climate change. A self-regulating planet needs its ecosystems to stay in homeostasis. We cannot have both our crops and a steady comfortable climate." 

Down with agriculture, down with the land. We understand now the motivation behind Brand’s constant denigration of village communities as ‘cesspools’, his celebration of the virtues of urban living. The lack of balance in Brand’s argument on town and country is thus motivated by his advocacy of GM crops. So this is the environmental vision, synthetic food from laboratories is superior to working the land. This is the dehumanisation that Tolstoy predicted in the nineteenth century. 
Tolstoy’s words cannot be bettered and cannot be paraphrased, so I shall quote at length. Every sentence cuts to the heart of this question and exposes the phoney rationality at the core of scientific hubris.

The deviation of the science of our time from its true purpose can be seen with striking clarity in the ideals that some men of science set up for themselves and which are not rejected but are acknowledged by the majority of scientists.
These ideals are voiced not only in stupid, fashionable books describing the world 1,000 or 3,000 years from now, but also by sociologists who regard themselves as serious scientists. These ideals are that food, instead of being obtained from the earth by agriculture and the raising of livestock, will be prepared in laboratories by chemical means, and that human labour will be replaced almost entirely by the utilization of natural forces.
Man will not, as he does now, eat an egg laid by a hen he has raised, or bread grown in his own field, or an apple from a tree he has been tending for years, which blossomed and ripened before his eyes, but will eat tasty, nourishing food prepared in laboratories by the combined labours of many people, in which he will take no part.
There will be almost no need for man to labour, and thus all people will be able to give themselves to that same idleness to which the ruling upper classes now give themselves.
Nothing shows more obviously than these ideals how far the science of our time has deviated from the true path.
People in our time, the vast majority of people, lack wholesome and sufficient nourishment (the same holds for housing, clothing, and all primary necessities). Moreover, this same vast majority of people are forced to work constantly, beyond their strength and to the detriment of their well-being. Both misfortunes can very easily be removed by abolishing mutual struggle, luxury, the improper distribution of wealth, and generally by abolishing the false, harmful order of things and arranging human life in a reasonable way. Yet according to science, the existing order of things is immutable, like the movement of the heavenly bodies, and therefore the task of science lies not in elucidating the falseness of this order and establishing a new, reasonable system of life, but in feeding all the people while maintaining the existing order, and giving them all the opportunity to be as idle as the ruling classes are now, living their depraved life.
With all that, it is forgotten that nourishment on bread, vegetables, fruits grown from the earth by one's own labour is the most pleasant, healthful, light and natural nourishment, and that the work of exercising one's muscles is as necessary a condition of life as the oxygenating of the blood by means of breathing.
To invent ways for people to be well nourished by means of chemically prepared food and to make the forces of nature work for them, while the distribution of property and labour remains wrong, is the same as inventing a means of pumping oxygen into the lungs of a man who is locked up in a room with bad air, when all that need be done is to stop keeping the man in the locked room.
No professors will ever set up a laboratory for the production of food that is better than the one that has been set up in the vegetable and animal world, and to use the fruits of this laboratory and participate in it, man has only to give himself to the ever-joyful need for labour, without which man's life is a torment. And here the scientists of our age, instead of applying all their forces to removing what hinders man from using these blessings prepared for him, recognize the situation in which man is deprived of these blessings as immutable, and, instead of arranging the life of men so that they could work joyfully and be nourished by the earth, they devise ways of turning them into artificial freaks. It is the same as if, instead of taking a man from a locked room out into the fresh air, one invented ways of pumping the necessary oxygen into him, enabling him to live not in a house but in a stuffy basement.
Such wrong ideals could not exist if science were not on the wrong path.
(Tolstoy 1995 ch 20).

False systems, false food, false people. That, to me, is the biggest objection of all to GE crops. A machine world and a machine economy served by people as machines consuming machine food. Brand’s ‘city planet’ will be populated not by citizens but by shiny, plastic people. This is EM Forster’s world of ‘the Machine’.
Brand dismisses criticism in a lazy manner. 
‘Environmentalists keep insisting that GE crops are bad for farmers, especially small-scale farmers. That position is tough to maintain as the reality emerges that even in the face of opposition, GE crops are tremendously popular.’ (Brand ch 5 2009).

Well, they are popular with the people who want them. This is not reasoned argument but opinion and assertion. Brand’s ridiculing of family farming as a ‘bucolic fantasy’ is not serious argument either, merely an attempt to delegitimize alternative positions. Brand takes his stand on science, but his mode of argumentation is opinion and assertion, beginning with a predetermined position and selecting the evidence to back it up. Given that the research literature is vast, Brand’s argument is remarkably thin on evidence and documentation. The positions he criticises are vague in the extreme, statements like ‘many environmentalists argue’ and ‘environmentalists keep insisting’ that nuclear, biotechnology, GE, geoengineering are bad. Who? Where are these claims made? Which environmentalists? And what exactly do they argue? And what is the evidence for as well as against these arguments? Brand doesn’t engage the arguments. Even worse, he peppers his books with unreasoned assertions backed by opinions. When he does cite evidence, it is along the lines of ‘a 2008 study found that’ or ‘reported that’, as though the matter ends there. Basic level research does not allow an argument to rest on an authority selectively quoted in this manner. As I was told very early on in research, ‘you are only citing this author because he agrees with you, it doesn’t make your argument right’. (Brand ch 5 2009). 

Throughout the book, Brand systematically avoids the real issues at stake and the real arguments against his very strongly asserted opinions. He refuses to set the science within the bigger political, social and economic picture. And no, the substantial case against GE crops is not the ‘bucolic fantasy’ of the family farm. (Although, in passing, one might ask what is so bad about the family farm, or local farming more generally?)
Those who only see what they want to believe are forever in danger of picking certain trends and turning them into the whole. The future nearly always turns out to be something entirely different. 
Going by the trends, it would indeed seem to be the case that rural life is facing eclipse in face of an irreversible drift to the towns and cities. But trends change and, from the early 1990s, we have seen small but significant reversals within the general pattern. In Europe, there is the phenomenon of ‘downsizing’, families taking a cut in their material standards of living to getter a better quality of life in the country. In the USA, rural areas have grown four times faster between 1990 and 2000 than they did from 1980 to 1990 (Johnson and Beale 2004). Nearly all of that growth is the result of an influx of people from urban areas. So significant has been the trend that researchers have given it the name of the ‘rural rebound’. This is not a ‘back to the land’ movement as such, and it doesn’t involve people becoming farmers. Instead, it points to a new type of life, with advances in infrastructure and transportation generating new jobs in information technology, service, manufacturing, and distribution. Alongside the new workers are the retirees, increasing the population of rural destinations that combine new opportunities with beautiful scenery and low-cost living. It beats the rubbish tips of Mumbai that Brand is so enamoured of.
It is always best to be cautious. Brand makes a typical engineers error – he forgets that the real creative agents of history are human beings, not the machines that they make and use. Which way trends and tendencies go always depends upon the creativity of the human factor. First and foremost, human beings are change agents and, as such, it is human creativity and choice that determines the direction and purpose of trends and tendencies. The pathways of history are ones that are opened up in the process of being walked. This is to affirm the radical indeterminacy of the future, a view which leaves something for human beings to do. One should not make excessive claims for social theory, but leave something over for social practice, highlighting the role for technology but leaving the major creative part to the human agents themselves.
It is clear that Brand’s antipathy to the country and his paean to the city is born of his engineers love of the simplicity of the machine. It’s as though Brand, in his notion of the city planet, has taken Le Corbusier's motto — ‘a house is a machine for living in’ — and extended it over the entire planet. This machine is not populated by citizens but by robots, fed from laboratories and never knowing real nature, neither the nature outside the machine nor their own human nature. A city planet conceived on mechanistic lines may no doubt be technically feasible as some kind of external landscape, but the human beings confined within such a machine will die in their inner landscape.
So this thinning and destruction of rural life and culture matters and should be seen for what it is: a serious loss of natural virtue and capacity. In its current manifestation, the trend from the country to the city signifies precisely what Tolstoy thundered against, a general misplacing, a misplacing of traditional means of food production, a misplacing of the human character from a productive orientation to the world to a passive, consumptive approach, and a misplacing of the sense of our belonging within nature. The result is that more and more people are becoming increasingly dependent on abstract, machine-like systems for the sustenance of mind, body and soul. Human beings, like the steel hard world within which they are confined, become machines for pumping out value, feeding the monster, living, but losing the reasons to live.

This loss of nature virtue and natural capacity represents a steady homogenization of the species, of life and of cultures, a narrowing of evolution to serve a narrow purpose. Skills and knowledge built up over generations are being lost in a matter of a few years, leaving people and their communities — as well as the global means of sustenance — less open to human comprehension and control, less resilient to shock and to change, abstract, inhumane, prone to crisis and collapse. 

By ‘sustenance’ I mean those things which sustain and nourish the whole person in mind, body and soul. This is more than food. Man does not live by bread alone, said Jesus Christ, and there is a tendency for the profound meaning of that moral to be crudely dismissed. Brand employs a cheap dodge past difficult questions by pointing to the starving millions who need food. He quotes Florence Wambugu: ‘You people in the developed world are certainly free to debate the merits of genetically modified foods, but can we please eat first?’ In parenthesis, Brand points out her credentials: ‘(A Kenyan plant pathologist educated on three continents, Dr. Wambugu did a three-year postdoc in genetic engineering with Monsanto, developing a virus-resistant GE sweet potato. She heads the Africa Harvest Biotech Foundation, based in Nairobi. In 2008 she won the Yara Prize for a Green Revolution in Africa.)’

That tendentious passage reveals the real ideological purpose of the pro-GM argument. To take the simplest point first, to claim that the debate on GM crops depends upon feeding the starving first rather renders the debate pointless. The claim is that GM crops are the solution to global famine, so feed the starving millions first and then have the debate afterwards. That would be a debate about what? There is no point in debating after the fact. Brand’s argument is simply an attempt to silence argument. Adopt that approach as a general principle. Are all debates in world politics to wait upon feeding the starving millions? If the reasons why there is poverty and famine in a world of plenty are not debated in the first place, how can we trust any ‘solution’ that is on the table? And to exploit the desperate circumstances of people to impose an untried and uncertain technology is plainly immoral. Desperate people tend to grasp at straws. But for the record, there is ample evidence of grassroots resistance to the corporations and GE crops – it is being systematically crushed and ignored. There is not one word of this in Lovelock, Lynas and Brand. It takes no more than a little research to find the truth of the matter out. They must know or they must have chosen not to know. Suppressing contrary evidence is a familiar political and ideological tactic. But these people keep claiming to be scientists above the fray.


Note how Brand, in parenthesis, introduces Monsanto and links them with the good works of the good Dr. Wambugu. Worth noting. Because Dr Wambugu crops up again. Important? Well, Brand speaks for the people of the developing and underdeveloped world, saying that GM crops are popular. He doesn’t let them speak for themselves. The only critics he cites are those from the rich and affluent west. See what he has done? He has polarised the debate between the poor, starving millions who are for GM crops and the well-fed environmentalists in the west who are against. Then there is the good scientist Dr. Wambugu, with her links to Monsanto and her calling to feed the world. Without even looking at the facts, ask yourself this question – is this a plausible explanation of the controversy over GE?


Brand asks why environmentalists want to deny the advantages of GE crops to the developing world? Another loaded question. When environmentalists were – and still are – demanding an alteration in the terms of trade, a rescheduling or cancelling of debts, economic development via managed markets and trade to benefit local producers, where was Brand? Where does he stand on these issues now? We can all ask questions which presumes the very things at issue – the merits or otherwise of GE crops. Worse than that, however, Brand answers his own loaded question not by discussing critics of GE but by having a pro-GE enthusiast put words in their mouths. Apparently environmentalists deny the poor and the starving GE crops because they themselves are neither poor nor starving. The vicious b******s!
One of the good things about a philosophical training is that you learn how to frame an argument and how to identify flawed and faulty reasoning. Brand asks why environmentalists oppose the ‘advantages’ of GE crops, thus presuming the very thing at issue, and then he has opponents of the environmental position on GE crops answer at length.
In The Idea of History the philosopher Collingwood states clearly that ‘in order to interpret such things correctly we must remember that no competent thinker or writer wastes his time attacking a man of straw. An intense polemic against a certain doctrine is an infallible sign that the doctrine in question figures largely in the writer's environment and even has a strong attraction for himself.’ Brand, Lynas and Lovelock conduct an incredibly ‘intense polemic’ against ‘nutty’, ‘extremist’, ‘anarchist’ Greens who are so far wrong on every issue one wonders why they are worth the time – or why no-one else has seen through them. To repeat, the question of GE seeds and poor farmers and starving people is a question of the global political economy under the control of transnational monopoly capital. Some 500 or so TNCs, what used to be called the ‘Fortune 500’ decide what is produced, where it is produced, who produces it and on what terms – and that is why there are people poor and starving on this planet, that is why there are millions unemployed all over the world. The food problem is a political problem, a problem of distribution connected to social relations and not a technical problem of production. This problem requires a transformation of social and economic arrangements rather than a technological fix. GE crops with simply add new technologies on top of iniquitous and exploitative economic relations. In other words, no solution for the poor and starving, bigger and more controllable returns for the rich and powerful. And another step in the direction of the global slave state.

Brand’s argument wholly contradicts this view. He notes that, ‘with public support’, GE projects for local crops are proliferating in the developing world. Again, his evidence is thin. He cites Joel Cohen and Jennifer Thomson, who give a list of a positive abundance of GM crops being developed in countries around the world. I won’t give the list, since everything seems to be on there, and every country too. It is Brand’s conclusion that is worth examining:

So much for the leftist dread of centralized corporate control of global food production through genetic engineering. GE instead is proving to be a tool of regional empowerment, enhanced cultural variety in foods, and the ability of farmers to sell to global markets without being controlled by them. (Brand ch 5 2009). 

Brand’s point might have some force if he had actually engaged with some ‘leftist’ political economy. He rebuts no specific argument from ‘leftist’ critics because he simply opts for broad brush generalisation. He is wise to avoid such engagement. ‘Leftist’ political economy would make hay with Brand’s reasoning. The political economy of food is the last thing Brand wants to publicise. This passage from Brand contains some very big claims, purporting to refute the key criticisms of the left. The only thing is, Brand has refuted nothing because he has not engaged with any of the arguments. He has asserted what has to be proven. Brand daren’t present these arguments, precisely because they would show that the problem of famine is not one of production, it is one of distribution. The political economy of food raises questions of who is in control of the food trade, how markets are organised, how prices are fixed. Does Brand want to address any of those questions? No, for obvious reasons.


Sooner or later, the ‘apolitical’ mask that these scientists, technicians and engineers hide behind slips. They claim to be above politics and ideology but what they are really doing is concealing a highly political standpoint behind benign and neutral technology. Selected evidence to deny what masses of evidence supports – GE is a tool of corporate control destroying local agriculture. Brand earlier condemned Barry Commoner as an ‘ecosocialist’. Now he claims to have rebutted the ‘leftist dread of centralized corporate control’. Note well that at no point does he present that ‘leftist’ critique of transnational monopoly capitalism, let alone engage with it. There is a wealth of literature for him to draw upon here, but he plainly isn’t interested in addressing it. He ignores the evidence against his position, selectively presents the details that fit his ideological position that GE crops empowers regional farming, lists the GM crops that are being developed in the world, and then says ‘so much for the leftist dread of centralized corporate control’. He hasn’t even bothered to set up the straw man before knocking him down. ‘So much’ for the importance of reason and evidence.

Brand pours scorn on organic farming and sneers at the ‘family farm’ as a bucolic myth. He also repeats that farmers in the Third World have decided to embrace GE crops. He gives no contrary argument and acknowledges no contradictory evidence. It’s not that the contrary view is difficult to find. Brand just isn’t interested. Instead he sets the debate within a narrative of his own making, rich European farming interests protecting themselves against poor impoverished Third World farmers. Repeatedly Brand claims that Third World farmers are falling over themselves to embrace GE crops and explicitly denies any corporate interest and influence. 

There is, of course, another view, one which challenges Brand’s rather Pollyannaish assertions on pretty much every point. Of course, Brand, as does Lynas, has already covered his back when making these controversial arguments, he claims to be challenging received Green nostrums. Indeed yes. Take well-documented truth and turn it on its head. 

Brand makes no connection between GM crops and land usage. In particular, he pays no attention to the way that people are being cleared from the land. Expanding cropland in countries like Indonesia, Brazil, and the DRC involves clearing tropical rainforests that sequester carbon. The result of such land policies risks raising global carbon emissions significantly, thus further increasing climate change's disruptive effect on food security.
Brand talks as though feeding the world is the main purpose of GE. His neglect of the politics of food production speaks volumes. The investments made by agribusiness firms are designed to acquire land in low-income countries in order to produce food exclusively for export. There is nothing of this in Brand. It’s all about feeding the starving for him. Yet there is little doubt that such land investments are going to leave people in these countries worse off. At local level, many people are going to be left landless. At national level, there will be less land to produce food for local use. 

There are many questions that need to be asked with respect to bilateral land acquisitions. The fact that these agreements are almost always negotiated in secret indicates the anti-democratic character of land policy. Even though land is a public resource, only a few high-ranking officials tend to be involved, and the terms often remain confidential. Local farmers are not present at the negotiating table and often learn about the agreements only after the papers have been signed. Such agreements mean that in the main local farmers and herders are simply displaced, their land confiscated or bought from them at a price they have to accept. Brand paints a rosy picture of land policy, claiming popularity time and again for such policies. Actually, it isn’t difficult to find the public hostility that has exploded in these host countries. You just need to look.

The African land grab was exposed by John Vidal in The Observer. Vidal quotes an Ethiopian, Nyikaw Ochalla, from the Gambella region: ‘The foreign companies are arriving in large numbers, depriving people of land they have used for centuries. There is no consultation with the indigenous population. The deals are done secretly. The only thing the local people see is people coming with lots of tractors to invade their lands.’ His own village has been taken over by an Indian corporation. Ochalla says, ‘Their land has been compulsorily taken and they have been given no compensation. People cannot believe what is happening.’

Such hostility to land grabs on the part of local people is the rule rather than the exception. In 2007, for example, China signed an agreement in secret with the Philippine government to lease 2.5 million acres of land on which to produce crops that would be shipped home. Once the agreement was discovered there was a massive public outcry, with the Filipino farmers leading the protest, causing the government to suspend the agreement. Similarly, in Madagascar, a South Korean firm, Daewoo Logistics, sought the rights to more than 3 million acres of land. The public outcry brought down the government and led to the cancellation of the agreement. 
The point is that the technology of GE is all part of the politics of food and food security. In this bigger picture, land investments and acquisitions by powerful corporations seeking to extend the system of agribusiness are being confronted by local people all the world over. There is nothing of this in Brand. He wants to give the impression of popularity rather than protest. Such a misreading of the politics of food can only be wilful. A coalition of more than 100 NGOs, some national and others international, are contesting land acquisitions and showing the corporate interests behind them. These groups make it clear that what the world needs is international support for community-based local farming, centred around labour-intensive family farms geared to producing for local and regional markets, ensuring food security and creating desperately needed jobs and generating income in the process. Instead, agribusiness as usual is being forced upon land, with large corporations extending large-scale, highly mechanized, capital-intensive agriculture throughout the land. This approach has been instrumental in creating famine in the first place. A dangerous and unsustainable geopolitics of food scarcity is emerging, with people having even less power than before and the corporations more than ever. As the climate changes and the temperature rises, land and water are becoming increasingly scarce. World food security continues to deteriorate. Far from being a positive and coherent response to food insecurity, GE is an integral part of the process by which land is removed from popular control and made to serve the interests of business. GE crops are thus an integral part of a global power struggle for food security. Not only is it designed to benefit the corporations, it will do so at the expense of the poor. Most offensive is the way that Brand claims that it is environmentalists who are behind famine since they oppose GM crops. As a sleight of hand, it is crude rather than clever, in that it is easily spotted. Brand ignores environmentalists’ criticisms of the politics of food production and security – the fact that the rich will remain in control of food supply and will continue to hit the till and the poor will, if they are lucky enough to survive, will remain poor.

Brand makes some very cheap and even nastier points here. ‘Starvation was treated as a measure of commitment to the cause. In the service of what was thought to be a higher good, the environmental movement went sociopathic in Africa.’ Social movements and environmental groups have been contesting the politics of food for decades, so Brand would be hard pressed to back this claim in any general sense. What he has to justify his claim is a quote from Vandana Shiva about the situation in Zambia. She said:

When the same situation happened in India, with the cyclone— 30,000 people dead and many hungry— when we tested the food and found it to be GM, and we just gave the information to the people who were victims, who were hungry, they led a protest to the aid agencies and they said just because we are poor, just because we are in emergency, doesn't mean you can force us to eat what we don't want to eat. Emergency cannot be used as a market opportunity. (Brand ch 5 2009). 

Which amounts to an awareness of the extent to which interested parties would exploit a desperate situation to their own ends. They always have done and always will do given the chance. Hence the attempt to exploit global famine in order to promote GM crops. Brand sneers here: ‘I propose that anyone who encourages other people to starve on principle should do some of the starving themselves. I can attest that starving just a little bit, just for a week, concentrates the mind wonderfully. Bertolt Brecht stated the operative rule: "Grub first, then ethics."’ 

This is very weak. As though there can be no morality in conditions of natural necessity. Many starving people practise ethics, they have to as a condition of survival. The starving are much more ethical than those living lives of material excess. 

In extreme conditions, it may be thought that the need to survive becomes so dominant that ethics ceases to matter. We have accounts from the Soviet labour camps and the Nazi death camps, where, it was said that "the doomed devoured each other," that "all trace of human solidarity vanished." It would seem, then, that all values are abandoned as each fights for his own survival alone. One would expect this, given the way that these camps deliberately and systematically dehumanized their inmates, removing their clothes, shaving their hair, turning them into numbers, and letting them know in every way possible that their lives were of no account. The remarkable thing is that reports from the camps show that prisoners helped each other. Even at extremes, Brand’s case for demoting ethics is crude rubbish. Terrence Des Pres’ The Survivor is based on reports by those who survived the death camps. He nails the thesis that ethics is a mere appendage to survival flat in no uncertain terms: "The assumption that there was no moral or social order in the camps is wrong. .. . Through innumerable small acts of humanness, most of them covert but everywhere in evidence, survivors were able to maintain societal structures workable enough to keep themselves alive and morally sane." 
Prisoners risked their lives to pick up strangers who had fallen; they built radios and disseminated news to keep up morale; and even though they were starving, they shared food with those still more needy. There was no ‘grub first, then ethics’ – the prisoners retained a high moral sense throughout. There were also ethical rules in the camps. Stealing from fellow prisoners was strongly condemned and the prisoners punished anyone caught stealing. There was no ‘then ethics’ in the camps, in the most extreme circumstances when human beings had been deliberately dehumanised. The one thing left to prisoners was this moral responsibility and freedom, the core of human dignity. 

Yet, Stewart Brand would strip human beings of this, the very thing that the oppressors running the death camps couldn’t strip from the inmates – moral autonomy. With this approach to ethics, the distinguishing features of the human species, we are left questioning the premises of planetary engineering. We should certainly be suspicious of any conclusions drawn on the basis of ethical disempowerment.

Man does not live by bread alone. It is possible to starve spiritually as well as materially and this is just as deadly to the human being. Aristotle drew a distinction between existence and life. The point of life is not just to live but to live well, to flourish as a human being.

The best hope for humanity is ethics. Brand dismisses ethics as a mere frill which we add on to hard biological necessity. This is biologically ignorant. There is a clear genetic basis for individuals to act together in a selfless manner to ensure a social good.

To say that human beings need to eat is not a statement of the obvious, it is a dodge, a moral evasion. And here is why: to eat well is part and parcel of living well. And that is a moral question. Gandhi’s statement that there is no economic problem, only a moral problem is apposite here. Gandhi made the wise statement that the world produces enough for man’s need, but not for man’s greed. 
There is a Chinese proverb which tells of two groups of people who were given 4 feet long chopsticks. One group starved because the individuals acted as individuals and were therefore unable to feed themselves; the other group lived because they acted as social beings and learned to feed each other. 

Where there is morality, people cooperate with each other, help each other and eat and flourish. Where there is no morality, people starve. And in the modern world, people are starving amidst abundance. The problem is not a lack in productive power but a lack of morality. First ethics, then food for all. It is the failure to take ethics seriously that lands us time and again in difficulties. It was in this vein that Einstein pointed out that the modern world has a perfection of means and a confusion of ends. Einstein also argued that science without conscience will doom us all. We are rich in means and poor in ends, which is why our technical powers keep misfiring.

Ethics should be elevated from the banal realm of the technological and the necessitous realm of the biological into something altogether more life-changing and enriching. Ethics is both clouds of glory and feeding the hungry. The momentous and the everyday go together, since creating a world in which all the hungry could be fed requires a substantial social transformation. Against Brand’s crude and whole false distinction between survival and morality, we can quote Theodor Adorno: 'There is tenderness only in the coarsest demand: that no-one should go hungry any more.' (Adorno 1974: 156.) That is as true now as it was in 1974. The reason the hungry are still with us is the lack of morality in politics and economics, meaning that whilst it is technically possible to produce sufficient food to feed the hungry, its rationing to support the price and profit system ensures uneven distribution. Brand’s phrase can be rewritten as ‘grub first, then profits’. Brand attacks theory, morality, ideology, principles throughout as secondary and ephemeral concerns to getting things done. There is barely a word of criticism of capitalism. What if it can be demonstrated that it is the profit system and the way it rations the distribution of food according to ability to pay that lies behind world hunger? Lacking a political and ethical position, it is not a question that Brand even asks, let alone addresses. Like a good engineer who gets things done, he doesn’t ask questions of power.





Brand began by arguing that since we have become as gods, we must get good at being as gods. It is obvious that Brand doesn’t have the first idea as to what that imperative implies. He simply means that we should use our technical capacities to the full in order to master nature. That’s only the beginning, that’s the divine-like power we have already acquired. Getting good at divinity means setting our technological power within a system of ends. Brand rules this out in the crudest of terms, making ethics a consequence of the application of technology rather than the cause of the wise use of technical power within a broader technics. In this, Brand is simply of a piece with the process of modern rationalisation and the instrumentalisation of the world. This conception of technical power as prior to morality, morality as a consequence of the exercise of instrumental power, has had a depraving effect on civilisation: it spreads the illusion that there is a technical answer to every question with the result that we get the same problems on a scale magnified by technical ‘progress’.
The failure to comprehend the immorality at the heart of an instrumental realism renders all technical solutions unrealistic, issuing in the worst form of utopianism, a world completely controlled by technical rationality. A genuine realism must correspond to nature and to human nature. 
‘Grub first, then ethics’ encapsulates the illusion of totally rationalised modernity perfectly. Brand italicises ‘then’ to emphasise the status of ends as conditional upon means. This, of course, inverts the true relation. That inversion is not an intellectual error but is inherent within modernity itself as an inverted society. In modern society, the extension of instrumental rationality to all spheres has enlarged the realm of means and displaced ends. Brand is merely the spokesperson of that inversion. The belief that the end of scarcity will make human beings good is a commonplace in the social and economic thought of the modern era. Even to argue that we must become good at being gods is not novel, but is integral to the myth of Faust. Through our technological powers we will overcome original sin and restore Paradise as a modern machine of mathematical order and precision. Eternal life is beyond the decaying flesh and the body and is located in our shiny, clean, impersonal technology. We’ve heard it all before. Brand raises the most profound question of power, but it seems he does so not out of any profundity but through a veneration of technology.

The depressing thing is that these questions are long standing. They were raised by Christopher Marlowe, by William Blake and by Goethe. Which makes the point that the human race is taking an awful long time at getting good at being gods. In the 1930’s, John Maynard Keynes speculated on the 'economic possibilities for our grandchildren'. Keynes made the distinction between needs and wants. Needs are natural and can be fulfilled whereas wants can be endlessly inflated. Those who fail to make a distinction between a natural scarcity, something to be resolved by technique, and a false scarcity, caused by maldistribution within specific social relations, will continue to misread moral and social problems as technical problems. Hence the paradox of poverty amidst abundance and the anomaly of idle workers and idle machines despite a wealth of human needs. As a technical problem, there is nothing to prevent resolution of the paradox between a desperate need for goods and the insufficiency of supply. But, as economist Robert Heilbroner writes with respect to the Depression, ‘the contradiction was purely a moral one. For the economy did not operate to satisfy human wants - wants are always as large as dreams. It turned out goods to satisfy demand - and demand is as small as a person's pocketbook. Hence the unemployed were little more than economic zeros; they might as well have been on the moon for all the economic influence they exerted on the market-place.’ (Heilbroner 1980 ch 9). 
Precisely. So when Keynes sought to persuade the managers of industry to share more of their profits with their staffs, his concern was moral as well as economic. Good economics is a good ethics, an ethos or practice rather than a causal relationship in which one precedes the other. However, the principle behind the capital system is not moral. That principle, which ensures some are rich and some are poor, some are fed and some are not, is grounded in impersonal mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation – profit in the popular idiom. No profit, no investment, no growth. It seems like a law of nature but it isn’t; it is a product of specific social relations of production.
Not even Keynes, with a brain that could boil water, could negotiate his way safely through this problem at the heart of the capital system. Capital has a systemic imperative to expand values – that is not a moral principle at all, it is an impersonal necessity. Keynes persuaded himself that capitalism could produce and spread wealth so widely that human beings could 'one day afford to be moral'. To make ethics a consequence of material riches and power is to propose that the means not only justify the ends, but determine the character of those ends. This is to express the essence of the immorality at the heart of the modern world. It states our moral predicament rather than solves it.

Gandhi bemoaned those who dream of 'systems so perfect that no one will need to be good'. Who but the most credulous and utopian optimist could believe that technology and material advance alone could deliver ethics or are the necessary conditions of ethics? Such a notion deprives life of its meaning by reducing ethics to necessity. That such immorality is credible is the effect of displacing ends by means, making it look as though it is possible to dispense with morality and replace it with technology. It’s nonsense, and errant nonsense at all. Technology needs to be set within the conception of technics, comprising a balance of art, skill, ideas, morals and culture.

The error of this kind of thinking can be seen in Keynes. Keynes was right to distinguish between needs and wants and right to see the former as capable of fulfilment and the latter as capable of infinite inflation. Focusing on needs, Keynes looked at the progress of technique and organisation and concluded that the time is coming when everybody would be so rich that 'we shall then once more value ends above means and prefer the good to the useful.’ So far so good, but Keynes warns: ‘But beware!, the time for all that is not yet. For at least another 100 years we must pretend to ourselves and to everyone else that fair is foul and foul is fair : for foul is useful and fair is not'.

Highly intelligent man though he was, Keynes failed to spring the trap. With wants displacing needs, the time for valuing ends will never come. It will always be ‘grub first’ in such an economy of endless expansion, as wants are continually converted into needs. Keynes allows the nihilism of the capital economy to blind his conscience and silence his reason. 'If moral considerations stand in the way of progress, we must turn a blind eye to them in order that men in the future may have the morality lacking in us.' On those grounds, men in the future will never have morality. By setting up an opposition between progress and moral considerations, there will never come a time for morality in a system of endless expansion. It will always be ‘grub first’ since capital must continually expand its values or collapse. There will never be a ‘then’ for ethics. The system is nihilistic in the sense of proceeding not according to ends but according to instrumental imperatives, accumulation for the sake of further accumulation. The process of accumulation lacks an ending point at which we proceed to ethics. The west has had centuries of material progress. The same period of material progress has witnessed the collapse of traditional morality. This reveals a clear error in Keynes’ thinking. By arguing that with material expansion 'we shall then once more value ends above means', Keynes tacitly acknowledges that humankind must once have valued ends above means. The capital system has inverted means and ends and, surviving by the manipulation of wants in the service of endless accumulation, will ensure that the time will never come for ‘then ethics’. ‘Accumulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and all the Prophets!’ (Marx). That’s the principle upon which the capital system rests and that’s the principle that thrives by the stimulation of false needs, protecting profit margins by false scarcity. But if we once were able to value ends over means, why do we need to wait for some unspecified level of material wealth in order to do so again?

Since we are some 80 years into Keynes' 100 years, we are in a position to evaluate the assertion that material advance is the only way to salvation. The idea that the means justify, even determine, the ends is an immoral principle and the consequences are all around us in the poverty amidst abundance. The conditions of nature provide us with everything we need in order to become moral but not enough to serve the infinite demands of an expansionary economy. The collision between natural limits and unlimited economic expansion has brought us back to the eternal principles. And this is what lies at the heart of the critique of the new technologies being lined up to serve capital.

Of course, no-one is encouraging anyone to starve on principle at all. Brand misrepresents the position deliberately in order to portray critics of GM crops in the worst possible light and advocates of GM as the knights in shining armour. GM crops within unaltered relations of food production do nothing to resolve the false scarcity at the heart of famine and everything to reinforce it in order to make profits. Brand’s comment is easily turned against those for whom profit is the only principle and who have therefore rationed food according to ability to pay. The principle for which people have been starving is profit. Perhaps the rich who work for the corporations as well as their lickspittles in media, politics and academia could themselves do a little bit of starving to concentrate their minds. Starvation or GM crops are not the only two options on the table and those who claim they are are engaged in a plainly political and ideological argument.

It would be easy to get angry at this kind of tripe, were it not for the fact that it is plain what it is – tripe. And badly written tripe at that. For the best part of a century, socialists have been at the forefront of arguing against the way the capitalism of the developed world has deliberately impoverished and underdeveloped the Third World. Very many have fought directly against exploitation at the heart of these communities, many being imprisoned, tortured and murdered in the process. Brand is an engineer who claims to be above politics, but his views have a very political slant. He has the temerity to claim that environmentalists put their principles above the starving. His only support for this claim is that environmentalists oppose GM crops. Environmentalists are alive to the way that wealthy and powerful interests exploit desperate situations, when people’s options are narrowed, to impose highly contentious practices and technologies. To expose this is not to call for people to starve on principle. There is no reason whatsoever for people to be starving on this planet. It is those who insist that it GM crops or starvation who are proclaiming a sociopathic principle. To repeat a point I have made throughout, the problem of global famine is not one of production but of distribution. This means that more attention should be paid to the way that food production is undertaken in accordance with the principle of profit making, food being rationed according to the prospect of monetary returns. None of that changes with GM crops. GE is a technology which will reinforce the iniquities of food production and ensure a continuation of a genocidal maldistribution. But I doubt that Brand would like being called ‘sociopathic’.

Edward Said wrote well of the kind of politics that divides into the good and the bad, where one sees the other side as irredeemably evil. That’s what Brand has done here. But such a Manichean politics works both ways. Brand’s use of a poverty and a famine that is a direct and inevitable consequence of an iniquitous and exploitative global capital system to browbeat the critics of that system is beneath contempt. Brand is now in his seventies. I would like to ask what he has been doing over the decades. Poverty and famine are nothing new at all. There have been plenty of economists and social activists who have established the links between underdevelopment and capitalism. That is, famine is not a technical question at all but is connected to a particular set of social and economic relations. Yet there are our politically ‘innocent’ scientists who argue that poverty and famine is in some way a product of nature. And that makes it a technical question. In which case it would have been solved years ago. The problem is not one of production – the world produces and is able to produce more than enough food – it is one of distribution and the way that food is rationed according to price and profitability. The title of a book on the Depression in the US in the 1930s makes the point clearly – The Poverty of Abundance. 
Here is the point. Those scientists who eschew ‘leftist’ critiques of capitalism will happily parent poverty and famine upon ‘nature’. And now they have a technological fix that has the merit of keeping existing power relations unobserved, unchallenged, unaltered and entrenched. GE will keep the very relations that have driven poverty and famine from the first firmly in place. That’s why it is important to establish this point that the problem is not one of production but of distribution. That problem will continue after GE crops have been imposed on farmers the world over. And control will be more centralised than ever. Brand claimed earlier that Greens don’t know anything about economics. He plainly doesn’t. Or, more likely, he pretends that, as a ‘Green’, he doesn’t know about economics. It is, of course, a deliberate disarmament designed to keep corporate capital firmly in the box seat. Brand can speak for himself. I know about economics and studied economics to masters level. I have covered these arguments in the fourth volume of my Industry and Europe (1995). Brand is really trying to portray Greens in general as being economic illiterates. He can speak for himself here, not for me.

Brand comes back to his favourite expert, Dr Wambugu, this time omitting her connections to Monsanto. He quotes her testimony to the U.S. Congress in 2003: ‘The primary accomplishment of the mainly European antibiotech lobby, through gross misinformation and political maneuvering, was only to keep safe and nutritious food out of the hands of starving people. . . . The antibiotech lobby asserts that the continent needs to be protected from big multinational biotech companies. This often Eurocentric view is founded on two premises: that Africa has no expertise to make an informed decision and that the continent should focus on organic farming.’







Science, reason and politics
Brand cites some other interesting characters in support of his ‘argument’ (note the inverted commas? We can all play the game of delegitimising voices we don’t like). He cites Dick Taverne and his book The March of Unreason (2006). Here, Taverne castigates ‘extreme [GE] opponents’ for connecting genetic modification to eugenics and hence to Nazism. Well, there is no necessary connection, this is true. The technology only goes this way in a moral vacuum, when ethics is made conditional upon material progress. That was the road to Nazism in the past. Brand, like Taverne, is proposing some such moral vacuum with respect to new technologies.
But Taverne is interesting company for any environmentalist to be in. Who he? Dick Taverne is a man who regularly pronounces on science, even though he lacks a scientific background. He clearly knows nothing of real science. By citing Taverne, Brand has revealed something about his own position. Dick Taverne is Lord Taverne, a Liberal Democrat peer and chairman of Sense About Science. By ‘reason’ and ‘sense’, he means those positions with which he agrees. Critics of those positions are, by definition, spouting nonsense and are purveyors of unreason. That rather prejudices the debate from the first but no mind, Lord Taverne argues strongly that science should be freed from the claims of democracy. The scientists ‘know’ whereas the ignorant masses do not. From his shelter in the House of Lords, Taverne condemns the criticism of science as the 'cowardice of a pampered society'. This is worth looking into more closely. 

Sense About Science is not a politically innocent forum for the promotion of science. Actually it is an outgrowth of the Revolutionary Communist Party whose ultra left politics moved very easily to an extreme corporate libertarianism propagated under the guise of the Living Marxism magazine. Alongside libertarian demands for the lifting of restrictions on child pornography, the magazine was noted for a systematic denigration of Green politics. Successfully sued in 2000 for claiming that ITN had falsified evidence of Serb atrocities against Bosnian Muslims, the magazine closed but soon reappeared as the Institute of Ideas, the online magazine Spiked and assorted other toadstools. Throughout the nineties, Living Marxism aggressively promoted GM food. 

Before returning to Taverne and Sense About Science, it is worth spending some time looking at the anti-environmentalist positions of Living Marxism and Spiked. 

In the 1990s, the Revolutionary Communist Party through their magazine Living Marxism kept up an extreme and virulent assault upon environmental politics, publishing articles with titles like 'Red and green won't go', 'Animals have no rights' and 'Environmental imperialism'. The articles were so tendentious in their reasoning as to make them intellectually worthless, meriting no further comment. Much more interesting is to examine the politics at work in this vehement and systematic anti-environmentalism. (A prize should be offered to anyone who can identify the connection between Living Marxism and any kind of marxism that is on nodding terms with the thought of Karl Marx. At the risk of sounding pedantic, Marx did not advocate corporate anarchy, hubristic science detached from social relations, or ultra-libertarianism, quite the contrary.)

I don’t want to waste much time on this kind of rubbish, the bought and biased nature of the politics should be immediately apparent. But it’s worth noting that Living Marxism survived its miserable demise and lingers on in cyberspace as Spiked. I still can’t identify much that is marxist about it. The only consistent thread is its anti-environmentalism, what its editor caricatures as 'the ugly elitism and end-of-days mania of the environmentalist movement'. (Brendan O'Neill,  'Stupid,  feckless,  greedy:  that's you,  that is', Spiked, 16 March 2009.) Let us make short work of this drivel – it barely merits even passing comment. This crude libertarianism is morally, biologically and anthropologically illiterate. The great religions did indeed call upon us to control our desires, the great philosophers, like Plato, Spinoza, Kant, many more, did show how through reason and restraint we gain a greater freedom and how responding to impulse alone chains us to empirical necessity, psychologists like Freud did call for the regulation of the Id. The libertarianism of these clowns associated with Spiked is simply a form of regression, a plain infantilism, ‘stupid, feckless, greedy’. The editor Brendan O'Neill describes environmentalism as 'a largely elitist project, beloved of politicians, priests and prudes keen to control people's behaviour and curb our excessive lifestyles' (Spiked, 4 March 2009). Except that it is those who think the people incapable of acting out of more than impulse and desire are the true elitists. Politicians, priests and prudes of a rational persuasion affirm the impeccably democratic view that the individuals composing the demos are capable of much, much more than responding to impulse and inclination. That such a trite, commonplace point should be the cause of such controversy and consternation indicates how idiotic the Spiked position is. It is also worth pointing out that whilst the RCP claims to be Trotskyist, other Trotskyist groups and parties, such as the Socialist Workers Party, accept the findings of climate science and are concerned only that the campaign against global warming is connected with the abolition of capitalism, on which the RCP and Spiked are silent. The conclusions are obvious – there has been an attempt to inject a strain of virulent anti-environmentalism into left-wing politics. 

The academic Frank Furedi, a professor of sociology at the University of Kent, makes frequent contributions to Spiked. He describes global warming as a 'moral crusade' against humanity. Well, let us see the hard science. This week (January 17 2013) we saw NASA no less issue another warning concerning global warming, stating that 2012 was one of the hottest ten years since records began. They further stated that there is no doubt that carbon emissions through human activity have been responsible for the temperature increases of the last fifty years. When the research of real scientists mounts up in this manner, we need waste no time on red-nosed clowns like Furedi, a man who passed and reviewed a sociology article written by two natural scientists in the language of gibberish.
Furedi takes his stand on a clapped out modernism, the old fantasy of the empire of man instituted over nature: 'Instead of bowing to the divine authority of the planet, we ought to uphold the age-long project of humanising the planet.' (Frank Furedi, 'Climate change and the return of original sin', Spiked, 25 February 2009.) 
Except that respecting planetary boundaries is more a case of bowing to biological and ecological authority. Acknowledging our place within nature must surely be a humanisation, so that, as Marx argued, the naturalisation of man and the humanisation of nature go hand in hand. It is not the planet that needs humanising but our technology. That’s Marx’s view. And it is a view which respects science. Furedi’s hubris completely disregards science’s sober sense of realities, truths and uncertainties. Furedi sets up religion as a straw man to knock down, only to reduce science to a caricature. It’s best to keep out of these polemics, based as they are on unreasoned nihilisms, crude antitheses and caricatures. Which side are you on? None of these.

These characters have form when it comes to truth, falsehood, lies and propaganda. In 2007, individuals associated with the Revolutionary Communist Party produced the documentary The Great Global Warming Swindle. The working title Apocalypse My Arse gives a good indication of the programme’s intellectual quality. The film proceeds to state what we have heard many times before on radio phone-ins, that man-made climate change is 'a lie ... the biggest scam of modern times'. (Anon.,  'Global warming labeled a "scam"',   Washington  Times, 6 March 2007. The director, Martin Durkin, described global warming as 'a multibillion-dollar worldwide industry, created by fanatically anti-industrial environmentalists, supported by scientists peddling scare stories to chase funding, and propped up by compliant politicians and the media'. There has never been a shortage of people who could be described as ‘anti-industrial environmentalists’ – Blake, Wordsworth, Emerson, Whitman etc etc. In point of fact, the notion of global warming is based upon solid, sound science. As James Lovelock argues, science is remarkably self-cleansing; bad theories don’t last long. So, if global warming is no more than a multi-billion dollar created by anti-industrial environmentalists and supported by scientists after funding (never heard of the military, nuclear, industry, great rewards in all those areas for compliant scientists), then real scientists would have little trouble making short work of the science. Which begs the question of why this hasn’t happened and why the science of global warming firms up with every passing year. And it begs the question of just who these characters denigrating climate scientists and environmentalists are and who they are working for.

In an earlier documentary Against Nature, Durkin characterised 'environmentalist ideology as unscientific, irrational and anti-humanist'. The documentary made the claim that the roots of modern environmentalism are to be found in Nazi Germany and that self-interest, politically motivated environmentalists are responsible for famine and poverty in the Third World. As images of suffering and dying Third World children were shown, environmentalists were called callous fundamentalists for their opposition to the dams that would bring clean water and electricity. 

Sound familiar? It should. Stewart Brand notes that ‘there is a troubling Green thread in the Nazi movement.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). Brand also claims that environmentalists are responsible for famine since they oppose GM crops. (Brand ch 5 2009). Brand claims that environmentalists compel ‘other people to starve on principle’. It all fits the RCP/Spiked diatribe. That doesn’t mean that Brand is linked to these characters, only that there is an anti-environmentalist current that shares similar themes and prejudices. 

Durkin describes 'environmentalist ideology as unscientific, irrational and anti-humanist'. The Royal Society criticised Swindle for its crude distortion of scientific facts. I know who I believe.

I’d rather not waste any more time on this. More fool anyone who cannot identify and see through crude distortions and caricatures like these. Most interesting is the attempt to unite capitalists and workers against environmentalism (in defence of capitalism, of course). It’s the simplistic promise of economic growth leading to investment, jobs, wages and consumption. Well, it has usually worked to keep the workers at the coalface. But the level of argumentation at work here can be seen in Swindle’s claim that the science of global warming originated in the attack of the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher upon the organised working class, specifically her desire to destroy the miners trade union. Swindle claims that Thatcher invested public funds in the science of global warming, the scientists produced the evidence she needed, and the government proceeded to attack the miners!!!!!! Even now, with abundant evidence that global warming is a worsening reality, large swathes of the public refuse to accept the science and change their lifestyles accordingly. The idea that a science of global warming was invented for political reasons to aid the struggle of a Conservative government against the organised working class only has to be stated for its manifest absurdity to become apparent. Why, on Earth, would an explicitly pro-capitalist party like Thatcher’s Conservatives invent a science that identified capitalism as a threat to planetary health? 

The RCP and Spiked are unimportant in themselves, small fish with big connections. One should locate these characters in a much wider stream of climate denial. The deniers, in their multifarious forms, have organised to cast doubt in the public mind with respect to climate science and delay attempts to reduce the carbon emissions of the fossil fuel companies it represents. The whole sorry tale has been well documented in books that read like the epitaph for a stupid, feckless and greedy species (Gelbspan 2004; Pearse 2007.) If those terms offend, there is no other way of explaining why these planetary polluters and despoilers have been able to get away with their destruction of the environment. It’s not just the industrialists and the capitalists, but governments, voters, workers and consumers, all who drone away their lives inside the political and economic machine in pursuit of ‘progress’ via endless economic growth. The veneration of money, capital and commodities – what Marx aptly called ‘fetishism’ is not only embedded in modern social and political institutions but in the modern psyche, in the way we experience and perceive the world. Which is why the failure of economic growth amounts to an existential crisis for most people. ‘Progress’ is one god that simply cannot fail. Through industrial expansion, human beings thought that they had conquered natural necessity. Marx was thoroughly modern in sharing this belief. The climate crisis is the return of nature with a vengeance, contradicting modernity’s most celebrated belief that the environment can be rationally controlled by technique and organisation. From this angle, planetary engineering sounds like an extreme attempt at the re-assertion of human power and control against recalcitrant nature, a fight to the death. No wonder the deniers deride the climate models of the science, since they cannot offer certainty. This derision is specifically targeted against the scientists who try to model the irreducible uncertainty of climate systems. 

Sense About Science is another incarnation of this oddball movement which equates marxism with corporate anarchy and ultra-libertarianism, and Lord Taverne is its chairman. Taverne continually blasts non-scientists for having the nerve to debate scientific issues, in a clear attempt to silence critics, yet he himself has no scientific background. As the head of science at Demos, James Wilsden, wryly comments, Taverne is 'about as useful to science as Robert Kilroy-Silk is to race relations'. That is a very good point. The kinds of arguments that Taverne uses to promote science easily rebound against science. Far from promoting science, the result is to further deepen public suspicion. People might not be experts on science but scientists make a crass error if they treat people as fools. People are not foolish and they spot attempts to promote vested interests and private business under the cover of science. The conclusion is then drawn that science is in the pay of business and government. The scepticism that follows becomes enormously damaging when it comes to trying to get people to appreciate the dangers of climate change. Public distrust in science is damaging and will cost lives. That is less the fault of the public than of characters who use the authority of science to promote particular interests.
Some of the comments coming from Sense About Science beggar belief. This organization has claimed that 'most [chemicals] leave quickly but some stay: asbestos and silica in our lungs, dioxins in our blood. Do they matter? No!' No? Asbestos etc doesn’t matter? Doesn’t matter to whom? Here are ‘experts’ with no connection with working people. The organisation put forward another 'expert' who claimed that if cancer is increasing, 'it's because people are living longer'. It’s hard to know where to start with a claim of such illogic like that. This kind of rubbish seems designed to distract and waste valuable time and resources wading in nonsense. 

But here is the crux of the matter. When the public backlash against GM food was at its height, with a clear danger that the political and scientific elites were not going to get their way, 114 scientists wrote to Tony Blair, prime minister, complaining that 'genetic engineering of plants has been reduced to a matter of consumer preference.' Shock, horror, to think that the views of citizens and consumers actually matter! Bear in mind James Lovelock’s call for the suspension of democratic government, bear in mind Brand’s claim that scientists are the ones who ‘know the most’. It seems that individuals as consumers in the market and as citizens in the political process do not have the right to make their own independent choices. ‘Science proposes, society disposes’ Brand asserts (Brand ch 7 2009). Scientists propose, subjects dispose. That is a technocracy, not a democracy. The principle of self-assumed obligation holds that citizens obey only those laws they have had a hand in making. There is no legal obligation in a technocracy. This is a recipe for tyranny or anarchy, the anarchy of the rich and the power as a tyranny over the people.

Even if citizens and consumers fully understand the science, they are perfectly entitled to exercise their own judgement and decide accordingly. To assert that science must have its way reveals scientists at their most arrogant. There is a nasty, anti-democratic streak running through the whole argument and this derives from the assumption that scientists have a monopoly over knowledge. This is exactly what we see with respect to nuclear energy, biotechnology, GE crops and geoengineering

The kind of political company that ‘apolitical’ scientists keep matters. Brand’s citation of Taverne’s The March of Unreason is of a piece with the cringing eulogy that James Lovelock delivered with respect to Nigel Lawson's ‘thoughtful’ An Appeal to Reason. Lovelock calls Lawson’s book a ‘breath of fresh air coming from an open window’. Personally, I smell a cess pit of bullying scientists in collusion with business interests. Where was Lovelock when Lawson orchestrated the global attack on the climate scientists? It was time to stand up and be counted. I didn’t count him in the ranks. I didn’t hear him. I didn’t see him. The same goes for Dawkins and Harris. When it was time for scientists to stand up and be counted in defence of science, they turned tail and ran. The much derided Greens and environmentalists stepped up to the plate and fronted up well. They are still in the field, now being hectored by the likes of Brand to see the error of their ways.

Brand wants to clear the way for science to be able to proceed free from moral, political and most of all democratic constraint. It’s all of a piece in the build up to the global slave state as the anarchy of the rich and powerful. Brand targets the precautionary principle as ‘a barrier to progress. There have been various attempts to come up with a replacement for the precautionary principle — the proactive principle (Max More and Kevin Kelly), the precautionary approach (Nuffield Council on Bioethics), the reversibility principle (Jamais Cascio), and the anti-catastrophe principle. 
None of these approaches have worked, so Brand tries something more subtle – keep the name but get rid of the principle. Brand turns the principle on its head, shifting the bias away from inaction and toward action with a supplement—the vigilance principle. 

The precautionary principle by itself seeks strictly to stop or slow new things, even in the face of urgent need. Precaution plus vigilance would seek to move quickly on new things. The emphasis of the vigilance principle is on liberty, the freedom to try things. (Brand ch 5 2009).

We need to ask: this ‘freedom to try things’ is freedom for whom? Who is being unfettered? Brand’s attack on the precautionary principle is not about liberating science at all but about creating the moral and political vacuum that permits the anarchy of the rich and the powerful within the global economy. We are in the middle of a vast process of enclosure of the global commons, with not only land and water, the atmosphere and the oceans but genes, technology, scientific knowledge, everything, being brought under corporate control. This is what Aristotle in his Politics identified as licence in contradistinction to liberty.
The precautionary principle enjoins us to exercise caution and act humbly in light of human ignorance. Of course it restrains the licence to ‘try new things’. There is a human temptation to thinking because we know a little bit, we know it all. Brand wants us to be able to ‘move quickly on new things’. It is a view that is more impressed with limited human knowledge than the scale of our ignorance. The real challenge is to find wise ways to evaluate human knowledge in light of human ignorance. Brand is overimpressed with technology, that much is clear. He recognises no limit and wants us to venture into the unknown at haste. His vigilance is exercised after the fact, that is, after the deleterious consequences have followed.

Against this, we need to draw upon the wisdom inherent in nature, tailoring human activities and practices to nature's cycles and rhythms, whether the task is growing food, managing seas and rivers, or dealing with wastes. It is because knowledge is incomplete that decision-making processes need to deal wisely with human ignorance. Decision-making is inevitably flawed and often downright disastrous in its consequences when it proceeds purely from what is known. To argue for a principle of vigilance which monitors consequences is to promote a gamblers charter. The known needs to be blended with the unknown, and this can be done only by setting action within an ethical framework whilst mimicking nature's ways.

Both technological fixers and free marketeers proceed as though knowledge-based decision making is un-problematic. Indeed, they turn the precautionary principle on its head so that decision-making processes are slanted so people are free to act as they please, unless hard, proven, verifiable facts show unmistakably that harm is occurring. The level of scientific proof often demanded stands at the 95 percent confidence level. Given the scale of human ignorance, this sets an impossibly high level, effectively clearing the path for scientists – business in possession of scientific knowledge – to be free to ‘try things’.

The implicit assumption with respect to ignorance is that science is capable of uncovering all that we need to know if given the freedom to try new things, proceeding to put that missing information to use. This is slightly different to the idea that current knowledge is sufficient for sound decision making, with market forces serving to incentivize the acquisition of more knowledge. 

The idea of out-of-control machines consuming and destroying everything in their path has been repeated so often as to become a cliché. That doesn’t make it any less of a threat, though. If that scenario has been avoided, that is because people and governments learned the lesson and took precautions. The idea of human powers escaping the control of and turning against their human creators has been contained but not refuted. This is because the vigilance principle has been exercised before the fact, not after. It is still a very plausible scenario that science and technology could produce powers with unforeseen and detrimental consequences. This is why the precautionary principle should be sacrosanct and treated as science’s own Hippocratic oath. The precautionary principle is the idea that actions whose outcomes are unknown or potentially negative should be avoided. This principle serves to keep the machines in check, preventing them from becoming monstrous. The argument that the Frankenstein prediction has been rebutted and that therefore it is a myth ignores the effectiveness of the precautionary principle in working to ensure that refutation. To argue for the reinterpretation or replacement of that principle in consequence is like arguing that since the car hasn’t crashed, we can dispense with the brakes. Take off the brakes and the car will soon be in the ditch. 
It is possible to interpret Brand’s case charitably as meaning that the precautionary principle should be reinterpreted to continue to guard against damaging consequences whilst at the same time allowing scientists the flexibility to investigate possibilities for innovating a technology that could have positive implications for planetary health. This entails choosing less risky alternatives over most risky alternatives whilst exercising vigilance with respect to potential risks. Except that isn’t quite what Brand says. The vigilance he writes of does not evaluate potential at all so much as potential well into the process of becoming actual. Given institutional inertia, temptation to conceal errors and cover up bad practice, as well as vested interests, it would be the height of folly to think that any process could be as reflexive and self-correcting as is required.
This shows again the need to close the gap between elite and mass and democratise our institutions. Only when it is open to broad participation can the precautionary principle both protect against harmful consequences and encourage beneficial innovation and experimentation. There is a switch here from asking how much harm is acceptable to how much harm is avoidable. Dale Carrico, specialist in the history and philosophy of technological development, puts the accent on the last part of the principle. ‘Even expert knowledge is most useful when it is answerable to multiple and contending stakeholders ... rather than imposed unilaterally by an organized authority ... When the Principle places a burden of justification on those who propose we undertake a risky development, this is not the creation of a new and arbitrary burden, but the fairer distribution of the burden of development onto all its stakeholders.’ (Carrico BetterHumans.com).




Just as the red of Communists no longer means anything politically, Brand asks ‘how long will Green mean something?’ (Brand ch 7 2009).
Brand’s reasoning is worth examining, because it reveals his flawed approach to morality. Brand starts from the premises that the environmental movement is driven by two powerful forces—romanticism and science.

The romantics arc moralistic, rebellions against the perceived dominant power, and dismissive of any who appear to stray from the true path. They hate to admit mistakes or change direction. The scientists are ethical rather than moralistic, rebellious against any perceived dominant paradigm, and combative against one another. For them, identifying mistakes is what science is, and direction change is the goal. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

There are a couple of glaring errors here. Science cannot pronounce on morals. Science cannot deliver meaning. An ought-to-be cannot be derived from an is. Scientists cannot be ethical as scientists. This is clear and commonplace stuff. As Bertrand Russell put it: ‘Science, by itself, cannot supply us with an ethic. It can show us how to achieve a given end, and it may show us that some ends cannot be achieved. But among ends that can be achieved our choice must be decided by other than purely scientific considerations.’ (Russell 1950 (1984), 406-7.)

And to what extent are scientists rebellious against any perceived dominant paradigm? As Kuhn argued, scientists stick with a dominant paradigm even in light of errors so long as it broadly does the job and no obvious alternative exists. Scientists test theories. But there are limitations in this conception of scientists being open minded. Try criticising the dominant paradigm of mechanistic materialism and see the backlash. Try arguing for vitalism in biology and see the backlash. Try arguing for intelligent design and see the backlash. Try criticising nuclear energy, biotechnology and geoengineering for that matter. This may mean that the theories within the paradigm are sound or seem so. It may not. The point is that scientists are strong defenders of their own status quo. The greatest opposition to Galileo came not from the Church but from scientists like Brahe, who refused to accept the Copernican theory that the earth went around the sun. Brahe was wrong and Galileo was right, the point is that scientific clashes are rarely sweet and reasonable. Many scientists are true believers, and woe betide anyone who lacks faith. Brand has done nothing but ridicule contrary positions throughout this book. Like many a scientist, he can give it, but he can’t take it. Scientists can launch assaults and bring about change, but they have to face an awful lot of entrenched positions along the way.

‘Romantics love problems; scientists discover and analyze problems; engineers solve problems.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). This would seem to imply that human knowledge is many faceted. Some such notion is needed to get to grips with the problems facing human civilisation. For Brand, this is a wake up call to Greens. 

The long-evolved Green agenda is suddenly outdated—too negative, too tradition-bound, too specialized, too politically one-sided for the scale of the climate problem. Far from taking a new dominant role, environmentalists risk being marginalized more than ever, with many of their deep goals and well-honed strategies irrelevant to the new tasks. Accustomed to saving natural systems from civilization, Greens now have the unfamiliar task of saving civilization from a natural system—climate dynamics. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

That sounds OK until one realises that what Brand considers to be ‘outdated’ about the Greens is just about everything that identifies a politics as Green in the first place. And it begs the question, if Greens are so marginalized, why are their views are of any importance one way or the other? Such a marginal group cannot hope to save civilisation and cannot bring it down, so why is Brand making such a big deal of Green ‘ideology’? Could it be that Greens are more important than Brand is letting on, and have become such a threat to existing power that they need to be marginalised? Looked at from this perspective, there seems to be a deliberate attempt to sow dissension within the ranks of the global environment movement.

The switch from saving nature from civilisation to saving civilisation from nature’s backlash is the most significant aspect of Brand’s argument. This is a demand that human beings assume moral responsibility for their powers and live up to those powers creatively. This means replacing the project of mastering nature by means of technique and organisation with an infusion of those technological and institutional capacities with moral ends which respect planetary boundaries. This recognises the creative praxis of human beings as a moral praxis but also as an ecological praxis. This is more than saving civilisation but entails building civilisation. This is a matter of politics, culture and ethics. Science and technology along with economics are the mere means; they are not the whole, just the mechanics.
Brand’s attitude to warnings coming from ecologists is remarkably sanguine, not to say dismissive. He describes Edward Goldsmith as an ‘eco-pessimist’ who ‘could announce almost triumphantly in 1992’:

Modern humanity is rapidly destroying the natural world on which it depends for its survival. Everywhere on our planet, the picture is the same. Forests are being cut down, wetlands drained, coral reefs grubbed up, agricultural lands eroded, salinized, desertified, or simply paved over. Pollution is now generalized—our groundwater, streams, rivers, estuaries, seas and oceans, the air we breathe, the food we eat, are all affected. Just about every living creature on earth now contains in its body traces of agricultural and industrial chemicals many of which are known or suspected carcinogens or mutagens. 
As a result of our activities, it is probable that thousands of species are being made extinct every day. Only a fraction of these are known to science. ... By destroying the natural world in this way we are making our planet progressively less habitable. If current trends persist, in no more than a few decades it will cease to be capable of supporting complex forms of life. 

Edward Goldsmith The Way: An Ecological World-view. 

I read these words from Goldsmith trying to find an error, an exaggeration, an overstatement. Every word was justified, I thought. Brand’s contention, it turns out, is not at the level of fact. Goldsmith’s view is correct. ‘His worries are accurate individually, but they are selective, one-sided, and overaggregated into a paralyzing spasm of angst.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). Which begs the question of what Goldsmith is supposed to do in the introduction to a book claiming that there is an ecological crisis that we need to overcome. There is precious little point in proposing a solution when the problem hasn’t even been stated.
I read Goldsmith’s words again and again to see what Brand was complaining about. I couldn’t spot any inaccuracy. And neither can Brand. To take the extinction of species, this is something EO Wilson warns about. The last time there was a comparable rate of extinction was 65 million years ago. Brand admits that the points here are accurate but claims that they are selective. Well, we have mobile phones and plasma screen TVs. But read that last line again. ‘If current trends persist, in no more than a few decades it will cease to be capable of supporting complex forms of life.’ Brand does not contest that line. Brand calls Goldsmith an ‘eco-pessimist’ who ‘triumphantly’ announces eco-catastrophe. Actually, Goldsmith has been raising the alarm for decades. A pessimist is one who claims we are doomed and that nothing can be done. This has never been Goldsmith’s point. He has consistently called on us to take action. But maybe Brand dislikes Goldsmith for another reason. Goldsmith has continually warned of the deleterious consequences of the way that the technosphere has become detached from the ecosphere and is destroying our natural life-support systems in the process. This is how the point is expressed in the Blueprint:

Firstly, the introduction of technological devices, i.e. the growth of the technosphere, can only occur to the detriment of the ecosphere, which means that it leads to the destruction of natural controls which must then be replaced by further technological ones. It is in this way that pesticides and artificial fertilizers create the need for yet more pesticides and artificial fertilizers. 

Brand, you see, is a man of the technosphere. His solutions all come from within the technosphere. To the likes of Brand, the above passage is blasphemous. To Brand, it is our technological devices which are our gods, our salvation. Brand is a true believer who wants to convert the world. Well, I am sorry, but I am not a believer, and neither was Goldsmith. Brand sees no hope in morals and culture, in the possibility of human beings changing their ways and coming to live lightly on the land. Now that is what I call pessimism. I see hope in ethics and culture, in the possibility that human beings can create a new way of life, and so too did Edward Goldsmith. That’s optimism.

Brand is a poor historian and an even worse philosopher. Poor old Rousseau, the aunt sally of reactionaries, is dug up again. 

Arthur Herman traces the origin of romanticism and its decay narrative to one man and one event—Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the French Revolution of 1789. Rousseau embraced an imaginary primitivism and declared, "Everything degenerates in the hands of men." His vision of a return to innocence and freedom seemed to be at hand with the overthrow of the French monarchy. The intelligentsia of Europe thrilled to the coming of a new dawn in 1789, and then watched it turn into blood and terror by 1793. With that trauma, the romantic stance became one of despair and defiance, and it has remained so ever since. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

Which makes it clear that if either Herman or Brand have even bothered to read Rousseau, they either haven’t understood him or have deliberately misunderstood him. This is second hand, second rate criticism, the stock in trade of hacks and reactionaries. There are so many errors packed into the above sentence that it is a waste of time to challenge them in full. From More to Swift, it was something of a commonplace to criticise the emerging modern civilisation by reference to the new lands being discovered by the navigators in the eighteenth century. Try Gabriel de Foigny's Les Aventures de Jacques Sadeur dans la decouverte de Ta Terre Australe (1676). Or Diderot’s Le Neveu de Rameau (1762) and Supplement au voyage de Bougainville (1796). The purpose of these utopias was to criticise Western civilization with its repressive religion and warring states by means of a contrast with a more healthy and natural alternative. Rousseau is always singled out for assault as a ‘back to nature’ reactionary, a viewpoint which a) misses how widespread the device of natural utopia was between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries; b) ignores the point of the utopia (to criticise aspects of current society rather than propose a return to some lost paradise; c) completely fails to understand Rousseau’s position.

The general question was why, without law and religion, these so-called savages could be more free and more happy than the civilised world with its church and state, trade and money? It doesn’t mean that any of these writers were actually proposing a return to the state of nature. Moving to the idea that the French Revolution was about a return to innocence, how about the interpretation that it was a bourgeois revolution of new money against an ancient regime that was collapsing under the weight of its own corruption? The modernisation, indeed the centralisation of power as against the old feudal autonomy and communal self-government would seem to suggest some such thing. To argue that the degeneration of the French Revolution into blood and terror is due to Romanticism is too crass to even worry about. The other side of the reactionary critique of the French Revolution refers to its worship of Reason with a capital ‘R’. The guillotine was a fine feat of engineering rationality. A clean and efficient way of death. As Brand himself says: ‘Romantics love problems; scientists discover and analyze problems; engineers solve problems.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). The engineers certainly solved the problem of how to execute so many people with the greatest speed and the least mess. They were still at it under the Nazis – Adolf Eichmann, the man who got things done and never asked questions.

But whenever I read sweeping generalisations from Anglo-American critics with respect to the Terror in revolutionary France, I challenge them with this little nugget. At this same time, the British killed more people in Ireland putting down Wolfe Tone’s rebellion than were executed in the whole of the Terror. The British state also stationed more troops in the working class towns in Britain than they committed to the war against Napoleon on the continent. So if its blood and terror that Brand is concerned about, there was a whole lot more of it coming from the British state than from the French Revolution. And it had nothing to do with Romanticism. On the contrary, the likes of William Blake were under surveillance and lucky to escape imprisonment. Others were not so fortunate. The repression of the British state in this period has been swept under the carpet. Rather than proper history dealing with facts, we get broad brush prejudice to fit a predetermined position.

As for the criticism of Rousseau, it is just plain wrong. As I have argued at length in Rousseau: Autonomy, Authority and Authenticity, Rousseau’s entire argument is predicated on human beings exchanging the licence of their individual life in a natural state for the richer range of possibilities of living together in a civil state. Rousseau could not have been clearer. There is nothing of the noble savage in the Social Contact. The confusion comes from the inability of certain minds to differentiate the argument for going forwards to the fuller and differentiated realisation of human nature in a civil state from a primitive yearning to return to the undifferentiated unity of the natural state. Kant understood the argument easily enough and put Rousseau alongside Newton as one of the key architects of the modern era, the one the master of the moral world – ‘the moral law within’ - and the other the master of the physical world – ‘the starry heavens above’. Still, it is discomforting when reason gets in the way of a good prejudice. Rousseau is an easy target, but to keep rebutting the same charges gets boring after a while. As for the connection of Rousseau with the French Revolution, Rousseau’s Social Contract was hardly even read before the Revolution. Further, it is crystal clear that Rousseau envisaged a city republic in the manner of his home town of Geneva, not the large modern centralised state. What is true is that Rousseau was critical of the emerging modernity for its iniquity and inauthenticity, hence his demand to move forwards to the future civil state. And that is perfectly reasonable. That is why Rousseau remains a live philosopher.
At this point, Brand’s argument turns plain ugly. He claims that there is a deep seam of romanticism that leads through Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West (1918) directly to Nazi Germany. Brand remarks here: ‘There is a troubling Green thread in the Nazi movement.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). Well, whatever Green thread there may have been in the Nazi movement, it was thoroughly subordinate to the forces of science, technology and big business which positively defined Nazism in power. If Brand wants to hurl abuse like that around, I suggest that he checks the central role that engineers played as architects of Nazi barbarism. The concentration camps were the pinnacle of ruthless, rational efficiency. The engineers solved problems there alright.

Brand’s reasoning here is not innocent. The attempts to undermine Greens has continually attempted to connect Green ideology with extremist politics, either Communism or Nazism. The fact that Brand is a party to this political labelling makes it abundantly clear that his book comes with a certain slant. 
So we get references to young back-to-the-land romantic strivers of the late nineteenth century who were all too easily co-opted into the Hitler Youth. Well, they would be wouldn’t they. That doesn’t make them Nazis, no more than it makes the same kind of people who could be found in every industrialised nation of the time doing the same thing Nazis. Brand informs us how he ‘learned’ that biologist Ernst Haeckel, coiner of the word ecology (oekologie, 1866), championed eugenics and selective euthanasia. Indeed he did. Much as many other scientists did at the same time, as well as people of all political persuasions influenced by Darwinian notions of survival of the fittest. If Brand doesn’t know this then he is just ignorant. If he does know this and is being selective, then he is being disingenuous. Either way, his attempt to smear Greens as supporters of eugenics and euthanasia backfires to the detriment of his constant claims that scientists are the ones who ‘know the most’. You don’t need to take my word for it. Check the history. Scientists of all political persuasions and none championed eugenics and euthanasia. It was only when Hitler gave this social Darwinism a bad name that scientists had second thoughts.
This taste for social Darwinism had nothing to do with Romanticism at all and nothing to do with Greens – this is what happens when science is free from moral, political and democratic constraint. Brand’s charge can be thrown back in his face. He wants to associate ecology with euthanasia. Actually, it is ecology and biology as science detached from morality and from religion that brings about monstrosities like euthanasia, eugenics, racialism, murder, genocide. Or does Brand think it was Greens who ran the concentration camps? He should take a look into science’s own black heart here; he may learn something.
Brand refers to ‘the ongoing debate’ about ‘the Green face of Nazism.’ Which debate is this? Greens have nothing to fear about such a debate about Nazism. Indeed, such a debate would make the points clear about what happens when science and technology become means to the ends of capitalist power. 

In his defence, Brand quotes Nils Gilman at Global Business Network, who says that the Nazis used their green credentials to win and widen their popular support. Gilman writes ‘while there's obviously no necessary connection between eco-friendliness and fascism/nativism, there are lots of ways in which the two movements can and have connected historically, and may again in the future.’ 
It is interesting that quotes a friend from ‘Global Business Network’. It is hardly news that Nazism in Germany was backed by business elites as a bulwark against Bolshevism. The Nazis also used the name of ‘socialism’ to broaden their popular support, but it doesn’t make them socialists. Brand portrays Nazism as Green but makes not one single solitary reference to its anti-Bolshevik character, its suppression of trade unions and other working class institutions, its persecution, imprisonment and murder of socialists, communists, workers, its links to big business. A very funny kind of socialism that, a very odd way to practise Green politics. 

Brand’s argument is disingenuous and politically underhand. It is evidence of a very smelly politics at work. The implication is that Greens are Nazis and that the leftist character of the dominant German Greens is a mere ‘flip’. ‘How times change’, he comments. ‘Germany is once again the Greenest country in Europe, but this time the political framework is so leftist that the powerful Green party members, Die Grunen, are commonly called watermelons: green on the outside, red on the inside. That flip is common in the world.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). Get it, the extremes of left and right are just two sides of the same Green German coin. The Greens are Communists and Nazis.

This is politically ugly and an insult to reason. One feels soiled even reading it. But it is worth exposing because it is here that one understands what is going on behind all the advocacy of new technology and the appeal to reason. It confirms the impression of scientists trying to blind us with science but really pushing for some hard line politics. But if Brand wants to talk about the strains which contributed to Nazism, I think we can start with Thysen and Krupps, capital and big business, property owners and the bourgeoisie who loathed socialism and saw Hitler and Nazism as a bulwark against the Bolsheviks. These are the kind of vested economic interests who preside over the global economy and are controlling the new technologies.

Of course the Nazis exploited the popularity of the back to the land romantics. That movement was apparent in America, Britain, everywhere where the new factories and ugly towns and cities gave people a yearning for a more natural lifestyle. Baden Powell in Britain exploited this yearning for the country for his own militaristic and imperialistic ends. It doesn’t make Greens Nazis. Not in Britain and not in Germany. What makes people Nazis is the violent suppression of democracy and trade unions, the murder of political opponents, racism, the financial support of ruling elites and the capitalist classes, the virulent anti-socialism, the hatred of the working classes, anti-marxism, overweening science, eugenics, euthanasia, animal and human experiments, the Final Solution.

Brand openly states that the scientists are those ‘who know the most’. He takes his stand on this elitist claim to knowledge. He raises the spectre of Nazism with respect to Green politics, so it is most appropriate to call him out here. Brand takes his stand on elite expertise. Fine. He should ponder this fact long and hard - more than half of those who attended the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 carried the title of ‘doctor’. These were the individuals who planned the 'final solution to the Jewish question', the systematic and ever so rational murder of all of Europe's Jews. They either had doctorates or were medical practitioners. This is a fact worth thinking about before any assumption of knowing more than others.
How anyone can have such unthinking, uncritical faith in the authority of science and knowledge after Auschwitz, Dachau, Buchenwald, Stutthof, Majdanek, Treblinka, Flossenberg defies belief. And I am certainly not going to have the likes of Stewart Brand, who engages in a most facile apologetics with respect to corporate capitalism, associating ‘leftist’ Greens with this naked right wing politics. If he wants to go hunting for Nazis he can start by looking closer to home. The Nazis were very keen on engineering solutions to political problems. The concentration camps were impeccably rational systems of extermination. There is nothing Romantic about them whatsoever. Cold, cool, clinical, impeccably scientific and no room for sentiment. In summing up his three essential points, Brand states: ‘Ecological balance is too important for sentiment. It requires science.’ No room for sentiment, insists Brand. ‘Harden the heart’ Hitler said. Mein Kampf is full of Darwinism. No, not the romantics, not the Greens and not the left, but the scientists, the engineers, the bourgeoisie and the capitalists were the key agents in the service of Nazism. It is obvious which company Stewart Brand is in, and he can put that in his pipe and smoke it. 

Brand is much better when focusing on the positive side of his message. His point is that a romantic stance can motivate effort but falls short when solving problems. In eco-pragmatism (2000), Daniel Farber writes: ‘One of the points of pragmatism is that there is no escape from the need to wrestle seriously with the particulars of a given problem.’ I have written at length on the concept of eco-praxis, an attempt to generate an ecological sensibility through popular worldchanging projects that can show tangible benefits (Peter Critchley, The Coming Ecological Revolution (2011). 

Paul Hawken writes:
I have given nearly one thousand talks about the environment in the past fifteen years, and after every speech a smaller crowd gathered to talk, ask questions, and exchange business cards. The people offering their cards were working on the most salient issues of our day: climate change, poverty, deforestation, peace, water, hunger, conservation, human rights, and more. They were from the nonprofit and nongovernmental world, also known as civil society. They looked after rivers and bays, educated consumers about sustainable agriculture, retrofitted houses with solar panels, lobbied state legislatures about pollution, fought against corporate-weighted trade policies, worked to green inner cities, or taught children about the environment. Quite simply, they were trying to safeguard nature and ensure justice. 


That’s a large constituency for the kind of eco-pragmatism that changes the world for the better. Well done is better than well said and, with respect to Brand, the less said the better. Brand should focus on what is to be done rather than social and political critique because, frankly, he isn’t up to it and his politics is likely to offend and deter. Unfortunately, confronted with an eco-pragmatism that is centred upon social movement in the civil sphere, Brand still cannot see the full potential of human beings as change agents. ‘Science proposes, society disposes’ he asserts (Brand ch 7 2009). That is to invert means and ends. Actually, society proposes and science and technology disposes. The means should serve the ends. Unfortunately, what Brand is proposing is a crude scientific determinism. ‘Science is the only news’ he claims. ‘Human nature doesn't change much; science does, and the change accrues, altering the world irreversibly.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). The point is not that human nature changes much but that human beings create their own history, expressing and realising aspects of their nature through specific social relationships. Brand here denies human beings a history and so therefore abolishes the future. Human beings are not the creative agents of the historical process. Human beings it seems do nothing. It is ‘science’ that is the change agent. It seems too simple a point to be worth making, but ‘science’ does nothing without scientists. ‘History’ does nothing in itself, it is human actors who make history. Unfortunately, human agency disappears in Brand’s analysis. Science does it all. It has taken a century for us to escape those grand philosophical narratives which held human beings to be passive products of vast impersonal forces. Brand is still referring to ‘science’ as possessing an existential significance in itself. He argues that ‘science is imbued with a double optimism’ and ‘science makes science go faster and better’ as though science were a real flesh and blood person with conscious will and capacity to choose. No, that is what human beings are. Brand’s scientistic arrogance comes with a dangerous ignorance.
Because the findings of science are not just matters of opinion, they sweep past systems of thought based only on opinion. The swarming edges of science pose ever more and better questions, better put. They're phrased to elicit hard answers, the answers get found, and the questioners move on. (Brand ch 7 2009). 
That’s fine for the fact side of the divide, but science has nothing to say on the value side. This other side is ignored at our peril. Science without values is blind and, instead of delivering the possible qualitative change, can simply end up producing the same old quantity writ large. Science without conscience will doom us all, argued Einstein. Einstein also argued that ‘"The significant problems we face cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them." More of the same is not a solution, it is merely a bigger problem. Non-rational systems of thought – I am deducing that Brand is referring to religion here – are not by definition irrational. The options are not only rational and irrational but also the sphere of the arational, dealing with questions which are non-factual, but no less important for that. If Brand is putting the case for science, as science, and as one part of human understanding, his argument is fine. If he is asserting the primacy of scientific knowledge over all other parts then he has crossed the line that separates science from scientism. It is a common enough error, but an error nonetheless.
And Brand’s claim that science rests on knowledge over against ‘systems of thought based only on opinion’ is crude and overdrawn and fails to recognise the need for trust and authority in every human endeavour, science no less than any other field. The philosopher Mikael Stenmark speaks with good sober sense here:

Scientists rely on authority for good reasons. This is so because scientists are not Cartesian egos or lone ideal observers. Rather, scientists (like the rest of us) are finite beings with limited cognitive resources who find themselves in a particular social environment with a particular task at hand. As a consequence, every application of their cognitive resources has a certain cost. Scientists, therefore, have neither the time nor the resources to check every scientific theory and method in their field or even all those which form the basis of their own research. If they were to try to do such a thing they would never get anywhere in their research. So without trust in others, individual scientists would neither be able to pursue their projects as rapidly nor be capable of developing projects that are impossible for a single individual to accomplish. (Stenmark 2004).

Scientific rationality, for all the knowledge it yields, cannot deliver meaning and value of itself and to argue as though it can is an invitation to hubris. That hubris is a permanent danger. The inversion of means and ends at the heart of modernity reappears unconsciously in the perspectives of scientists, with the result that the continual encroachment of instrumental rationality into all domains of human life appears normal rather than immoral. Science deals with means and means cannot determine ends. Science is silent on values. Science can show us the best means to certain ends, but, having supplied knowledge, has no role to play in determining and choosing between ends. Science is on the wrong side of the how/why, objective/subjective, fact/value divide for it to be able to play an active role in the determination of ends. This is why Brand’s assertion of the superiority of science, as based knowledge, over thought based ‘only’ or ‘just’ on opinion needs to be challenged. There is a danger that Brand has just dismissed just about every domain of human thought and action other than science. And that is scientism and can be vigorously rejected. For reasons given above, there are many ways that human beings access and understand their reality, from religion to aesthetics. If Brand wants to dismiss these as mere opinion he is free to do so. And we are free to note his blindness and deafness to the human condition. Any science predicated on those terms will likely be inhumane and dehumanising.
The various domains of human insight and knowledge need to be located in their appropriate place and true relation, revealing different aspects of the human condition, their validity and legitimacy recognised and respected. The Faustian bargains which the modern world has been all too willing to strike with the idols of industry and state is the real source of the hubristic temptation, not science. But science degenerates into scientism when this hubris develops into a complete faith in the methods and results of science above and against all other human fields for determining truths. 
Making science the principal agent of history does not give human beings a future but generates a pervasive unease and disquiet. If science treats meaning and value as ‘mere opinion’, then the world loses its human character. It becomes accessible by intellect alone, a cold impersonal place of causal mechanisms and processes. The world ceases to be the house of being. The only part of being which is satisfied is the intellect. It is the world of fact devoid of meaning and purpose. As I have written elsewhere: 

We accumulate quantity to the neglect of quality. Thus we are well fed but less happy; we have much but are less; we have more possessions but have less time; we live with more knowledge but less wisdom. (Philosophising through the Eye of the Mind Peter Critchley 2010).

Which is to say that we do not live at all. Reduced to the world of fact, we exist as machines, sinews, bone, gristle, but we do not flourish as human beings.

Brand returns to his assault on Greens and environmentalists. 

Scientists freely criticize each other and lambaste anti-Darwinians, but they are weirdly polite with environmentalists. It smells of condescension. Every biologist I know is dismayed by the Green campaign against genetic engineering, but the only one who speaks out is Peter Raven. Climatologists see the need for nuclear power, but the only ones who publicly criticize environmentalists for their opposition are Jim Lovelock and James Hansen. It's time to stop coddling environmentalists. Their motivation is not fragile. Their effectiveness will increase to the degree that they are armed with scientific sophistication and discipline. If they are treated as peers by scientists—which means harshly—they might become peers. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

This cuts both ways of course. The scientists are not in the political firing line. Environmentalists are. When the fast bullets were flying over the so-called ‘Climate-Gate’, the environmentalists stood up to the political bullying and defended the integrity of climate science. The scientists, sad to say, caved in and didn’t stick their head above the parapet. Frankly, the scientists in the main were gutless.

Brand calls on scientists to get tough with environmentalists, to treat them as peers and hence harshly. And then he says, with breathtaking condescension, that they ‘might’ then become peers. Frankly, having witnessed scientists cave in time and again before the power of government, business and media, I wouldn’t worry. These scientists couldn’t persecute a pudding.

Brand’s call for scientists to turn on environmentalists raises an obvious question – where have the scientists been amidst all the controversies over climate talks? When climate change deniers in politics, in business, in the media, in the think tanks have openly denigrated the science and accused scientists of making it all up to get on the gravy train, environmentalists have fronted up and stood tall. Actual scientists were thin on the ground. James Hansen stands out because he is alone.

The findings of Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway in their book Merchants of Doubt are highly revealing. The authors investigate the greatest scientific controversies of the last hundred years. Time and again, the scientists are found wanting. Oreskes and Conway set out to tell 'heroic stories of how scientists set the record straight' on acid rain, climate change, tobacco marketing and the ozone crisis. Instead, with very few exceptions, the scientists were conspicuous by their absence. It is clear that if the human race does have a future on this planet, it will be because of the environmental activists that Brand, Lynas and Lovelock denigrate. The scientists, it is plain, lack the guts for a cavalry charge at the 11th hour. 'Clearly, scientists knew that many contrarian claims were false,' Oreskes and Conway declare. Which begs the question 'why didn't they do more to refute them?'


Why indeed. Before turning on the environmentalists, the scientists should pick on someone their own size in business and politics. It is clear that political guts in the scientific community is rare. Brand calls for scientists to speak truths to Greens and environmentalists; it is about time that scientists starting speaking truths to power, because their record here is strangely disappointing and calls for an explanation. Far from speaking truths to power, Brand’s argument is all in favour of putting scientific knowledge and technology in the service of power, government and business. His ire is reserved for Greens and environmentalists. His main concern seems to deny the scientific credentials of political activists. Big government, big business, big science – quite a troika. Brand makes big claims about the robustness of science and scientists but in practice there are few rebels to be found in science. When it comes to the time to take a stand and shout ‘I’m Spartacus’, the scientists are busy advising the Romans how best to organise a mass crucifixion, building sturdy crosses that can stand up to the strain. As Brand defends his approach: ‘I've learned to disbelieve much of what I've been told by my fellow environmentalists, and I now think of problems the way an engineer does, as design problems. Define them, frame them in a way that is solvable, solve the damn things, and once you've got a solution, act on it.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). 
Confronted with real power and the scientists are strangely timorous. One reason for this is simple human cowardice. As Bulgakov argued, cowardice is a survival strategy, how the less weak survive alongside the more powerful. Allegations of scientific fraud have been the staple of the press in recent years, with many patently false claims made about climate science. Scientists have been reluctant to rebut these charges for fear of becoming the target of contrarians. Scientists would prefer not to suffer the criticism that has been directed towards a figure like Al Gore, for instance. Oreskes recalls how an oceanographer told her that she would prefer to err on the side of caution since it made her feel more 'secure'. So the many erroneous outpourings of climate change deniers go unchecked. The fight has been left to Greens and environmentalists. Indeed, the abuse that Brand has hurled at Greens and environmentalists in this book – implying a connection with Nazism – forms part of the abuse and denigration of activists which causes scientists to shy away. Is this Brand’s purpose?

If scientists are not prepared to show more backbone, I’m not sure why environmentalists need to accept a subordinate position at all. The scientists were badly needed in the controversy over the leaked emails at East Anglia University. Their silence and their absence made climate science look all the more suspicious to the general public and left environmental campaigners doing all the hard work in the media. Far from scientists coddling environmentalists, it is the environmentalists who should be demanding more from the scientists. The Greens and the environmentalists stand up to be counted when the fast bullets start to fly. The scientists are remarkably silent. It’s time for them to do more and to say more, adopting a more public profile. It’s time for environmentalists to stop coddling scientists. Their motivation is not fragile. Their effectiveness will increase to the degree that they are armed with political sophistication and discipline – and some backbone. 





Contrast this definition of politics with the frankly technocratic approach of Stewart Brand. Brand advocates engineering solutions for environmental problems, praising China as a nation run by engineers rather than lawyers. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

Brand’s fevered praise of China’s engineering approach to Green politics savours more than a little of HG Wells and the Fabian Webbs’ celebration of Stalin’s modernisation as a ‘new civilisation’. There is the same tendency to get over-excited by the shiny and clean new toys of technology. Hitler liked his gadgets and machines too. Always, we should be careful to ask about the politics. Engineers get things done, asserts Brand. They do, indeed they do. They did under Stalin, they did under Mussolini. And they did under Hitler. The concentration camps worked perfectly, a testimony to the ruthless efficiency of the engineers. The guillotines of the French Revolutionary Terror also worked efficiently. They got the job done. Is that a good thing in itself? Engineering is part of any solution as one of the means, but not the final solution. Brand’s ‘vision’ is blinkered and dangerously so. When it becomes the solution as such, technology, like Saturn, soon starts to eat its children.

Meanwhile, in North America and Europe, environmental problems are treated as commercial opportunities, and Green entrepreneurs lead the way. Engineers are being hired in droves. They don't know or care much about environmental traditions, causes, or romantic attitudes. Because they are interested in solving problems, not in changing behavior, technology is the first thing they reach for when looking for a solution. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

Brand makes this claim time and again. This doesn’t make engineers people to celebrate, it makes them the blinkered tools of power. Engineers might well get things done, but that doesn’t mean that they are the ones giving the orders. But notice how Brand associates the engineering approach to environmental problems with commerce and entrepreneurialism. There is no need to know or care about environmental traditions, causes or attitudes, it’s all problems and opportunities. There is no need at all to refer to human behaviour, just reach for the technology the same way a gunslinger reaches for the gun. Shoot first, ask questions later. The engineering approach is Faustian on account of its the exchange of mind and magic for power, but what is so often missed is the extent to which the approach completely misfires, fails to achieve its goals, and doesn’t work. Example after example can be presented, of dams in China, agriculture in Russia, Robert Moses’ road system in New York, of vast development projects that destroyed livelihoods and communities, wasted fortunes, polluted resources. It’s all titanic building, as destructive as it is gargantuan. Virulently anti-communist, Robert Moses was fond of quoting Stalin, "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs." Moses threw down the gauntlet to his many critics: “I'm just going to keep right on building. You do the best you can to stop it.” It’s not just the inversion of means and ends that is objectionable, it’s the fact that it just doesn’t work, let alone deliver on its grandiose claims. Moses' network of public roads epitomises the fantasy of modern science, actualising its dream of creating a machine system that is in perpetual motion. However, in realising the ideal, Moses' system reveals the central flaw at the heart of the technocratic utopia. Although a system of public works, Moses’ road building involved a "public" without the people. With respect to the problems his works in the Bronx faced, Moses blithely stated "more people in the way—that's all". Ultimately, not even Moses himself, let alone the people of New York, had the power to control the system or stop its ever-expanding dynamic. The irony is that Moses was motivated by a genuine love of New York and a desire to add to the city. He would have baulked at the idea that his plans would spell the ruination of the city. But that is what happens when pragmatism, the urge to get things done, blinds the vision we need to see where we are going.

Brand borrows the hedgehog-fox distinction from Isaiah Berlin, who gave as examples of single-minded hedgehogs Plato, Dante, Hegel, and Proust; as open-minded foxes, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Voltaire, and Joyce. He values the foxes over hedgehogs for their ‘aggregate prediction success rate’. So what? I find myself asking. If human beings are makers of their own history – they are – then all human action has the quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy. As makers of our own history, there is little value in prediction. Respecting creative human agency and moral choice means to proclaim the radical indeterminacy of the future. Predictions are of no importance.

But to dismiss hedgehogs for being ‘apparently blinded by their extensive expertise and beautiful theory’ seems bizarre. Plato and Hegel have never been more relevant, with respect to the mathematical universe and the interconnectedness of all things within an organic world. Aristotle, excellent, Shakespeare, too, but Voltaire? Is Voltaire all that? He is the typical superficial intellectual lacking in depth. His ridicule of Leibniz indicated his inability to make or follow any argument of substance. He got Leibniz wrong and he got Rousseau wrong too. Still, he had some entertaining one liners and a superficial cleverness. And while we are on the subject, Aristotle would read this book with disdain.
Brand dispenses advice he should actually think about taking himself.

"Whenever I start to feel certain I am right... a little voice inside tells me to start worrying," one of Phil Tetlock's respondents told him—a statement he considers "a defining marker of the fox temperament." Another comes from the French fox Voltaire: "Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd."

Well put, except that Brand is nothing less than completely certain about nuclear energy, biotechnology, GE and geoengineering. My case is not simply against the technologies that Brand advocates but most of all against the way he promotes them. My foxy instincts tell me that the hounds are closing fast. There is little doubt in the way that Brand has presented his argument. He is entitled to back each of these but the point is that at no point has he presented opponents’ arguments at their strongest. That is he never challenges the case he makes for all these things, he never doubts, he is always certain. The views that Brand expresses on all these things are decided. And it involves him in some patronising comments on misguided environmentalists. When it comes to technological solutions, I’ll run with the foxes and keep well ahead of the hounds.

Fessing up aids learning. From these mistakes and others, I have learned to suspect my excesses of optimism and pessimism. Apparently I often think that societies catch on faster than they do, and that large complex systems are more brittle than they are. Bear in mind I might be wrong that way about climate. And many of my faulty opinions turn out to be based on ignorance; dismissing nuclear was one of those. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

Or, to continue in this vein of self-criticism, Brand may well be wrong about nuclear, just as he was in the past, and he may be wrong about biotechnology and GM crops and about geoengineering. He’s got form, he’s been wrong so many times before. Here, Brand is attempting to prove the rightness of his current opinions on the basis of a feigned humility with respect to his past faulty opinions. All of which justifies a cautious, incremental and evidence-based approach. This certainly undermines an approach which is based on the idea that scientists are the ones ‘who know the most’. Knowledge is always conditional and should always be subject to popular control. Despite this confession of his past ignorance and his celebration of doubt over certainty, Brand is very certain in his support for nuclear energy, biotechnology, GE crops and geoengineering. Read his arguments closely. At no point does he waver in his certainty that he is correct, that the science is unchallengeable and that opponents and critics are acting from a variety of political, romantic and ignorant positions. That is certainty.
As far as pessimism and optimism goes, some of the greatest minds who have changed the world for the better with their ideas have been pessimists, some of the biggest cretins who have plunged the world into disaster have been optimists. 

In his book Financial Reckoning Day, W Bonner writes well on the financial meltdown that was to come. His book is an incisive critique of cock-eyed loony optimism on the part of human beings who think themselves more smart than they are.

Readers used to economics texts or financial books may find our discus​sion of military history out of place. Not at all. It is in war that we see most plainly what mischief humans can do. Even the most "rational" men go mad from time to time—in love and war, markets and economics. With luck, they are beaten back before they have an opportunity to do much damage. A real genius, on the other hand, with a mob at his back, can succeed to the point of disaster.
We humans flatter ourselves. Endowed with the power to reason, we believe ourselves superior to the rest of the animal kingdom. But, along the road to Moscow, every dog, horse, rat, and cow that saw Napoleon's grande armee or Hitler's Wehrmacht pass must have had better sense. Even a field mouse might be said to have been better programmed than a field marshal. Scurrying to safety as the troops passed, did these lowly, furry rodents foresee that they would later gnaw at the bones of fallen soldiers, or at the frostbitten fingers of sleeping ones?
Bonner 2003 ch 2

Just as human beings think themselves smarter than the rest of the animal kingdom, so scientists think themselves smarter than the rest of humanity. Brand keeps condemning Greens and environmentalists for being anti-science. Perhaps, trusting to nature, we know something every dog, horse, rat and cow knew with respect to the overweening ambitions of Napoleon and Hitler.

There is a need for hope, mind, and there is a need to emphasise that our problems are solvable and that we have the tools for the job. Brand is right about that. Some times call for an optimistic pessimism, other times a pessimistic optimism.

One source of confusion for people is that the views of hedgehogs are strongly stated and strongly held, while the views of foxes are modestly stated and loosely held. Guess who gets audience share. What we need is more brazen foxes who don't mind strongly stating their loosely held views (this book tries to be an example), and audiences that honor honest opinion change. When some pontificator begins, "As I've always said,. . ." the right response is "Uh oh."

Uh-oh. Oh no, no, no. That statement is completely contradicted by the way that Brand states the case for nuclear, GE crops, biotechnology with complete certainty. He states his case very strongly, so strongly that the views cannot be loosely held. It is difficult to imagine what could persuade him to change his views on nuclear. He dismisses Chernobyl as a ‘non-event’ and, out of the mass of research done on the exorbitant expense of nuclear energy, he cites the one paper that claims nuclear has been underfunded. It must have taken Brand eons to find that piece of research. It’s like finding a needle in a haystack. But what gives the game away is Brand’s refusal to engage with contrary arguments. 
Let’s look at that line ‘when some pontificator begins…’ To pontificate means to express dogmatic opinions in a pompous or dogmatic way. How about the justification of nuclear energy by reference to the claim that scientists are the ones ‘who know the most’. Critics and opponents simply don’t know enough to criticise and oppose. Brand pontificates throughout this book and makes it clear that he thinks non-scientists are lesser beings than scientists. Pompous, dogmatic and just plain wrong.

Brand calls for an approach in which opposing opinions can be stated ‘out loud, without sarcasm.’ ‘Better still, the shared probe for depth of understanding of the issue replaces the usual win-lose mutual deafness of public debates. As a result, audience members find that the hard edges of their own opinions start to soften.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). 
Personally, I think well done is better than well said and that debates do little more than reinforce existing prejudices among the committed and turn everyone else off. It takes an eco-praxis with worldchanging results to change minds. 
That said, at no point does Brand adopt the approach he recommends here in this book. The argument is tendentious from first to last and fails to present contrary arguments at their strongest and clearest. He feigns even-handedness but his approach lacks balance. He is right on nuclear et al and his opponents are just ignorant; proponents of nuclear are acting from knowledge since they are scientists, opponents are acting from opinion since they are non-scientists. Fine, but why not engage with the many arguments from scientists which are against nuclear, GE crops and biotechnology? Perhaps because that would make it clear that these issues are scientifically contentious. It is easier to split the debate between scientists and political activists and claim victory for those who ‘know the most’.
If Greens don't embrace science and technology and jump ahead to a leading role in both, they may follow the Reds into oblivion. They need to become early adopters of new tools and adventurous explorers of new situations. Instead of always saying "No" and "Stop," their strategy can be to affirm and redirect. They could give a new technology the benefit of the doubt—but never throw away their doubt—using it to shape the technology in gentler ways to better ends. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

Which amounts to saying don’t fight the power, join it. It’s a strategy of cowardice. This is how Bulgakov explained why so many went along with Stalinism. That cowardice makes sound evolutionary sense in that it allows survival in face of stronger powers. The Reds may have gone into oblivion – for now – but at least they went down fighting. But for the record, it wasn’t the failure to embrace science and technology that led the Reds into oblivion. On the contrary, it was the all too eager adoption of science and technology – Harold Wilson’s white heat of technological modernisation – over and against political issues on power, control, distribution of resources, social relations that led socialism into political irrelevance. Capitalism is good at sniffing out political threats and extinguishing them. Same with Communism, all those production figures and machinery were no substitute for real politics.
This is where Brand’s lack of a political economy is really shown in its sharpest relief. Under the capital system, no group or movement will be able to take a ‘leading role’ in something as strategically important as science and technology without meeting the resistance of capital. Marx was no fool and theorists who talk generally about building or saving civilisation should pay the old bearded gentleman a little more respect. Marx, of course, was big on big changes and transformations. At a certain point, he argued, the productive forces become so powerful as to supersede the relations of production. That is, the new productive forces, including science and technology, contradict the narrow purpose to which they are organised within prevailing social arrangements. To argue that the Greens should ‘embrace science and technology and jump ahead to a leading role in both’ really does point to something like revolution in Marx’s terms. Couldn’t agree more, but if Brand thinks capital and the capitalist class will sit passively as Greens seize control of the productive forces he is living in cloud cuckoo land.

Rather than cherishing the role of romantic rebels and avoiding government, Green activists should leap into government, seeking to emulate the all-embracing government-run Green plans of New Zealand and the Netherlands. (Brand ch 7 2009).

Frankly, I don’t understand this point at all. It’s as though Brand hasn’t looked at Green politics for two decades. The conflict between the fundamentalists and the realists ended eons ago in favour of the realists. The Greens have been in government at every level, from local to state. Romantic rebels are thin on the ground these days. In fact, I may put my own name forward in the absence of a better alternative. Unfortunately, my past may count against me. I have made the case for Greens to be involved in government and for institution building many times and am developing a concept of an eco-Sittlichkeit based on Hegel.

It's All Gardening
We need an Hegelian ethical system that integrates human society from the lowest level to the highest via rich, affective ties, relations of practice, communities of interest, corporations and the state. It’s essential to our nature as social beings and constitutes civilisation. Brand writes of the ‘harsh truths’ of human prehistory. He quotes Edward O. Wilson: ‘Humanity has so far played the role of planetary killer, concerned only with its own short-term survival. We have cut much of the heart out of biodiversity.’
Yes, but this would not be news to anyone who appreciates the achievement of the axial religions in civilising human beings and getting them to develop moral codes that sought the common good of each and all in the long run. It’s been a long, hard road. The problem we have now is that the traditional morality is being eroded through political and economic systems that induce people to act as individual voters and consumers concerned with their own short term selfish interest. That is pertinent to another ‘harsh truth’.

This is stated by Steven LeBlanc in Constant Battles:

If any group can get itself into ecological balance and stabilize its population even in the face of environmental change, it will be tremendously disadvantaged against societies that do not behave that way. The long-term successful society, in a world with many societies, will be the one that grows when it can and fights when it runs out of resources. It is useless to live an ecologically sustainable existence in the Garden of Eden unless the neighbors do so as well.

That is the case for universal communication and cooperation, the goal of long term strategic thinking and of the global planetary ethic. Except that the phrase ‘constant battles’ suggests that that end point of balance will never be achieved. Brand seems to agree with that and James Lovelock is quite explicit that we should increase the arms budget and prepare for war. Bear this politics of war and warlords in mind when Lovelock and Brand blithely advocate nuclear energy.






Brand argues that human beings are ‘stuck’ with a planet stewardship role with respect to managing the commons, maintaining natural-infrastructure, tending the wild, niche construction, ecosystem engineering, mega-gardening. If we really are serious about being gods, we should assume the role of planet stewardship, with consciousness, with wisdom. When Brand makes a reference to ‘intentional Gaia’ it seems that at long last, in the final chapter of the book, Brand is finally going to deliver on the promise of addressing the implications of human beings living well as gods. The idea of ‘intentional Gaia’ would imply human beings as self-conscious creators of their own history, assuming moral control of their aggregate powers and fitting this creative power within planetary boundaries. Sounds good, so long as human beings see themselves not only as rational beings in themselves but also as moral beings in relation to each other and as natural beings in relation to the planet. This entails a global planetary ethic that concerns relations between human beings in society and between human society and nature.

Brand employs a term coined by Paul Crutzen, the atmospheric chemist who won the Nobel Prize in 1995 for his work on ozone depletion. ‘It seems appropriate,’ Crutzen wrote, ‘to assign the term Anthropocene to the present, in many ways human-dominated, geological epoch.’ The point is that human activity has shaped the Earth so profoundly that it is now written in the geological record. The atmospheric and ecological changes we have made are expected to reverberate for tens of thousands of years.

This is true, which makes it all the more necessary to adopt the right relation and approach to science and technology. It is not a case of simply saying yes rather than no to science and technology but of embracing the right kind of science and technology with respect to an overall framework of ethics, social relations, political institutions and economic practices. This is the point that Brand has missed throughout, all of which makes it more than likely that all the opportunity for real transformation will be wasted and instead there will be the continued adaptation of new productive forces to the outmoded social relations.

Brand laments the way that politics trumps science. It does. Which underscores the need for a robust political ecology. Failure to develop such a position leaves science and technology easy prey to existing relations. It’s amazing how difficult it is to get scientists and engineers to accept this point. They might not be interested in politics, but politics is always interested in them. Politics is an integral part of the human condition and, I would argue, much more central than science. In origin, politics goes back to the ancient Greek definition polites, meaning those interesting in public affairs. This is politics in its original meaning as creative human self-realisation. As Aristotle argues, the human being is a zoon politikon, a social animal, who requires a politikon bion or public life in order to realise himself/herself and flourishing as a truly human being. Isn’t that the point? Reading some of these scientists and the distinction between existence and life seems lost on them. Life is about more than survival, it is about living well to some purpose. Politics is crucial to the human enterprise. Brand and many other scientists see it as a world of prejudice, opinion and stupidity. Is that what they think of the human race? Science will never trump politics and the day we allow science to put politics on ice is the day we become less than human.

Brand goes through the options available to us in our attempt to deal with climate change. He rejects the commitment to building a low-carbon energy infrastructure — Renewistan — on account of its ‘stupendous cost’, disruption, and our lack of time. This can be challenged immediately. The financial resources already exist. It would take some 12% of the current global arms budget. If the human race cannot divert a portion of the money it spends on death and destruction to serve the purposes of life, then the time has come to pull the curtain down and leave the stage. 


Brand also rules out incremental changes via renewables. ‘It will become painfully apparent that mitigation is not going to succeed. The whirlwind is coming anyway. Currently imaginable efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions do not level off at the desired 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 in the atmosphere, nor at 550 ppm, and probably not even at 650 ppm. Increasingly vivid knowledge of how lethal a 650-ppm world would be will motivate a frantic search for alternative paths.’ (Brand ch 9 2009).

As people start to die as a result of climate change, as societies start to implode from within, ‘there will be demand for action on climate that shows immediate results.’ Once we are in the world of positive feedback, then the climate crisis becomes a self-accelerating phenomenon which demands a proportionally immediate response. Brand brings us to his favoured solution:

Some forms of geoengineering, expensive as they are, may be a hundred to a thousand times cheaper than building Renewistan, and some of them would have an instantaneous effect on climate rather than one delayed by decades. As soon as climatic conditions become frightening and urgent, geoengineering schemes will suddenly jump from "plausible but dangerous" to "dangerous but we have no choice." The cost is low enough that a single nation or even a wealthy individual could set in motion a geoengineering project that would affect everyone on Earth. (A growing number of workshops are addressing the specter of unilateral geoengineering.)

If that is bound to happen, as Brand says it is, why does he need to argue his case. Desperate times will call for desperate measures and at this point governments will throw whatever technology they have at the crisis. This sounds like an argument preparing the psychological ground for technological gambling. It also has all the hallmarks of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Brand rules out other solutions which are possible and for which we have sufficient resources – financial, institutional, technological – if only we could generate the political will. These solutions are our best long term options but Brand rules them out. That leaves the technological gamble.

So we are brought here finally. I feel like asking ‘is that all there is?’ Why all the talk about what environmentalists should and shouldn’t do, why all the proselytising for nuclear and biotechnology and GM crops? Brand’s argument is that sheer necessity will force us into it anyway. All the debating and politicking is over and now we must face the music. It sounds like H.G. Wells’ War of the Worlds. The governments throw all their military hardware against the alien invaders, but to no avail. People gather in churches and on hillsides and pray, but to no avail. The Martians are brought down by germs. This time, however, when our science, technology and religion fail us, nature will not come to our rescue. Nature has us at bay. It is probably better to face the music, own up and finally, at long last, fit our powers within biospheric boundaries. It is the height of follow to turn round and attack.

It seems that Brand’s only solution is to throw all our technological might against nature as she closes in. He has no faith in politics, that is clear. But his faith in science and technology is surprising. He is the real pessimist, it is clear. He is gambling. In other words, rather than embrace science and technology in the long range project of civilisation building, he rules out all possibilities of real change. It’s too late, too expensive and too difficult – so all we have is the technological gamble, a throw of the dice. Let’s go out punching. It’s dangerous but we have no choice. That, of course, is not a reasoned position at all. For all of Brand’s justification for human beings becoming planetary stewards through the rational employment of science and technology, ultimately he offers nothing more than Butch and Sundance going out with guns blazing. The future is the low-carbon energy infrastructure allied to strong governmental institutions. Of course it requires a long term effort, but that is what the practical application of intelligence implies. Brand seems to make this case, yet continually, through a lack of politics, is left resorting to wild gambles based on necessity. For all of his bluster about being a scientific optimist taking on the cultural pessimists, there is a very deep strain of pessimism in his views. He starts his book by repudiating politics and ideology for science and technology, only to rest his case on the ‘constant battles’ view of history. That does not augur well for attempts to develop a long term planetary balance. He argues that Greens embrace science and technology and take a leading role in building a planetary stewardship. Yet time and again his arguments for nuclear, GE crops, biotechnology and geoengineering reduce to necessity, compelling not so much technological fixes as technological gambles. That’s a position based not on optimism with respect to the pull of likely outcomes as a pessimism born of the push of probable eco-disasters looming on the horizon. If things are so drastic – and James Lovelock argues that they are – then reconcile yourselves, make your peace with the world and establish some right principles so that the survivors rebuild civilisation on the right lines, less scientistic hubris and more ethics.

Brand is full of gimmicks. Iron fertilization anyone? What about an array of floating vertical pipes would provide nutrients to organisms near the ocean's surface by drawing cold, nutrient-rich water up from the depths? These futile attempts to cheat nature’s payback for millennia of technological misuse seem hardly worthy of comment in themselves. Just think of how puny human technology was in Wells’ War of the World. 

But a closer look at this notion of planetary engineering is required.

When it comes to policy and practice, it used to be clear that resolving a problem at its source is a good indication of environmental wisdom whereas 'end-of-pipe' solutions which aim to moderate ecological harm after it has been done is the plainest environmental folly. Those proposing technological fixes turn this sound environmental logic on its head. What is most striking about the position is the extent to which its technical optimism is grounded in a moral, political and anthropological pessimism. The things that need to be changed – human behaviour and lifestyles, cultures, social relations etc – can’t be changed, hence the recourse to the only thing left – technology. Geoengineering has been defined as 'the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change'. (Royal Society 2009: 1)


And that, indeed, is what is being proposed to deal with the very real and growing problems of climate. The urgency of the climate challenge before us is not in doubt. Whether geoengineering is a solution most certainly is in doubt. 
We can look at two kinds of geoengineering here: removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and managing solar radiation so as to reduce the solar radiation coming in or to reflect more of it out. 
There are many schemes for removing carbon from the atmosphere. It is claimed that fertilising the oceans with iron filings could promote the growth of tiny marine plants called phytoplankton, absorbing carbon dioxide as they grow and taking carbon to the ocean depths when they die. The trials have not justified the top talk. Moreover, as usual with technological fixes, the unintended consequences generate further problems – the creation of 'dead zones' in the ocean. 
Another scheme for the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere involves the installation of a vast number of floating funnels in the ocean. These funnels attempt to draw nutrient-rich cold water from the deep so as to encourage the algal blooms that suck carbon dioxide from the air and proceed to take more carbon back down. There seems to be little support for such ideas. (Lovelock 2009: 98.) Another idea is to build thousands of what are called sodium trees, devices that are designed to carbon dioxide directly from the air and turn it into sodium bicarbonate from which carbon dioxide could be separated and safely disposed. (Kunzig and Broecker 2008: 234-45.) It all seems highly speculative. Indeed, the method for separating carbon dioxide from the sodium bicarbonate is a secret in the hands of the inventors. It sounds like one of those Internet scams in which the characters who infect your computer with a virus pop up and offer you the solution at a price. There is no denying that the emission of greenhouse gases is a problem. There is no denying that something should be done. But speculative gambles not only do not solve the problem, they make it worse and get in the way of the real changes we need to make. It is not clear that extracting carbon dioxide from the air is even cost-effective. There is little enthusiasm for the schemes, which is why ultimately they will fail. People seem to have the sound instinctive sense to distrust these myriad complicated schemes. Right or wrong, any resolution of current climate problems requires the heart and soul of the public. Geoengineering seems likely to raise hopes to impossibly high levels, bringing about massive disappointment and anger. The schemes aiming at removing surplus carbon dioxide from the atmosphere seem too complex to even generate support, let alone work. 

The second type of geoengineering schemes aim to cool the planet by increasing the Earth's albedo, thus extending the extent to which incoming solar radiation is reflected back. Whitening city buildings, rooftops and roads is reasonable enough, and reflects good practice in the hotter parts of the world. It seems, however, that such whitening has only a minimal effect. (Royal Society 2009: 25; Adam 2009.) Other ideas blur the lines between science fact and fiction, for instance, the proposal to send ten trillion 60-centimetre reflective discs, at the rate of one million a minute for thirty years, to a point in space, LI, which is 1.5 million kilometres from Earth towards the Sun. (Royal Society 2009: 32.) That sounds like an awaful lot of effort over an awful long term for a very uncertain result. Even more fanciful is the idea of launching unmanned ships to plough the oceans and shoot up plumes of water vapour so to increase cloud cover. Some 1500 vessels specially designed for the task would be needed. One can only see the problem of ocean acidification increasing as a result. Other ideas include converting dark-coloured forests into light-coloured grasslands. Crackpots painting over the cracks.

The scheme which attracts the most serious interest and support envisages the transformation of the chemical composition of the Earth's atmosphere so that it is possible to regulate the temperature of the planet as required. In this scheme, sulphur dioxide gas is injected into the stratosphere, some 10—50 kilometres above the Earth's surface, thus creating sulphate aerosols, particles that reflect solar radiation. At present, about 23 per cent of solar radiation is reflected back into space by the atmosphere. The injection of enough sulphate aerosols to reflect an additional 2 per cent would, it is claimed, serve to offset the warming effect of a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide. (Royal Society 2009: 2, 24.)

The scientific reasoning is thus, whereas aerosols in the lower atmosphere may last merely a week, sulphate particles in the stratosphere remain in place for a year or two. (Crutzen,   'Albedo   enhancement   by  stratospheric   sulphur injections: A contribution to resolve a policy dilemma?', Climatic Change, vol. 77, nos 3-4, pp. 211-20). The analogy is drawn with a volcanic eruption, with analysts using the example of the 1991 explosion of Mount Pinatubo, the sulphur and silicate ash from which cooled the Earth by around half a degree in the first year and continued this cooling to a lesser extent for a couple more years (Barrett 2008: 45-54.) 
Analysts have also drawn an analogy with the brown haze which is produced, largely, by the burning of fossil fuels and which envelops the lower stratosphere. The haze cuts the amount of incoming solar radiation and thus, through a process of ‘global dimming’, keeps the Earth cooler than it would otherwise be. Of course, such dimming masks the effect of global warming rather than deals with the causes of the problem. It is also worth pointing out that soot particles can also increase warming. In reducing smog, air pollution laws have had the effect of allowing more solar radiation to reach the Earth's surface. (Crutzen, 'Albedo enhancement by stratospheric sulfur injections'.) Any gains are wiped out by pollution as a result of the expansion of global aviation. There is evidence that as a result of aircraft being grounded for three days after the 9/11 attack in the US, daytime temperatures in the country rose as a result of the clearing skies. (Travis, Carleton and Lauritsen 2002: 601).

The attempt to mask the effects of global warming by enhancing global dimming is another example of the environmental folly of techno fixing. Environmental wisdom would demand that the problem be tackled at source. Instead, here is another ‘end-of-pipe’ solution that solves nothing, that keeps the fundamentals in place. 
Further, as with all techno-fixing, there are the unintended consequences which always follow. Any attempt to regulate the Earth's climate by technological tinkering is fraught with dangers. Probably the biggest flaw in all these schemes is the piecemeal way in which they tackle the ecological problem. Global warming is a holistic problem requiring a holistic solution. Instead, the various schemes do not see the whole ecosystem, only specific parts of it. To take an example, the absorption of carbon dioxide by the oceans is an essential component of the carbon cycle. It is estimated that the oceans absorb around a third of the extra carbon dioxide in the atmosphere resulting from the burning of fossil fuels. The increasing acidification of the oceans is bleaching corals and inhibiting shell formation by marine organisms. And the point is that schemes aiming to inject sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere and enhancing the Earth's albedo do nothing to prevent the acidification of the oceans. (Matthews, Cao and Caldeira 2009). In fine, piecemeal, one-off, isolated schemes to deal with the global problem of climate change fail to recognise the complexity of the ecosystem and the interconnected nature of the cycles that govern life on Earth. 
Failure to recognise that interconnection means that any one solution proposed risks generating two or more further problems down the line. Disregarding the complexity of the ecosystem as a whole could be fatal. In 1954, the geoscientist Harrison Brown proposed to solve world hunger by means of increasing the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere so as to stimulate plant growth. (Kunzig and Broecker 2008: 262.) The proposal entailed the construction of 'huge carbon-dioxide generators pouring gas into the atmosphere', with the burning of some 500 billion tonnes of coal required to double the amount of gas in the atmosphere. Brown's book received the endorsement of Albert Einstein, no less. Well, we have had Brown’s ‘huge carbon-dioxide generators’ pouring gas into the atmosphere, it’s just that we call them coal-fired power stations. Ironically, it was a student of Brown's, Charles David Keeling, who first sounded the alarm that the world is warming as a result of the rising concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Where Harrison Brown sought to pump carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in order to improve the human condition, now there is a growing concern to pump sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere as an attempt to control the effects of having pumped too much carbon dioxide into it. 

And on and on we go, technological solutions to problems caused by the application of technologies, so that things keep getting much worse as they get better. That’s the familiar case against technological fixing and needs no reprise here. Much more interesting is to note, with respect to Harrison Brown in 1954, just how long plans for geoengineering have been around. Contrary to the impression often given, geoengineering is not new thinking at all. This begs the question why business, government, environmentalists, the general public have all ignored these schemes for so long. They are massive gambles which involve an awful lot of effort for seemingly little certain gain and maybe plenty of further trouble.

Apart from the complexity, apart from the unintended and possibly very damaging consequences, geoengineering is, above all, a political and moral evasion. In claiming to deal with the deleterious environmental consequences of carbon emissions, geoengineering could easily become a substitute for reducing emissions. That is, even if geoengineering succeeds in its own terms, that very success encourages the continuation and expansion of carbon pollution. Geoengineering is therefore part of the process of global warming, not a coherent response to it. In economic terms, it fits the logic of the polluting system rather than challenges it. It changes nothing and costs little when compared to actually cutting carbon emissions. The geoengineering option is cheap enough for a single country to offset the emissions of the whole world. (Barrett 2008) The temptation for geoengineering to substitute for the necessary cutting of carbon emissions is great. It may or may not be fair to call geoengineering proposals science fiction solutions to real world problems. Certainly, we need radical new thinking. But such thinking proceeds alongside commitments to changing the way we organise our interchange with the planet. Without those changes, geoengineering may even entrench and extend current polluting practices. 

So why the sudden enthusiasm for geoengineering? Fear and panic and desperation. These are not arguments. The psychological and political inertia of government and people in face of a growing climate crisis has induced some environmentalists and scientists to abandon the realm of politics and ethics as irredeemably backward and embrace technological solutions. Technology doesn’t let us down in the way that politicians and people do. There is no doubting the gravity of the situation, with emissions escalating even in the middle of the biggest economic recession for eighty years. 
In 2006, atmospheric chemist and 1995 Nobel Prize winner for his work on the hole in the ozone layer, Paul Crutzen, argued that whilst cutting emissions is 'by far the preferred way' to respond to global warming, the necessary action to that effect is not being taken. In that case, he continued, it is time to explore 'the usefulness of artificially enhancing earth's albedo and thereby cooling climate by adding sunlight reflecting aerosol in the stratosphere'. (Crutzen 2006)

In other words, this debate revolves around whether or nor we can recover the sense of politics as creative human self-realisation and moral responsibility for the common good. The slow political response to the alarms sounded in the world of science does not augur well for the future. And so we get the abandonment of politics for techno-fixing. This is hasty, if understandable. For Crutzen, plans to change the chemical composition of the atmosphere are an escape route should global warming get out of control. Crutzen is clear that the ideal solution is to take measures to avoid having to enhance the Earth's albedo. Agreed. But for Crutzen, this 'looks like a pious wish'. And so we have an increasing number of environmentalists and scientists despairing of Plan A and placing all their bets on Plan B. The most august scientific institutions in the world, the US National Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society amongst them, are thinking along these lines. I think this is a vain hope. It’s Plan A or eco-catastrophe. No amount of science and technology can avoid the deleterious consequences of bad ecological practices. The irony seems to be lost on scientists and technologists. From its formation in the seventeenth century, the Royal Society played a crucial part in the expansion of industrial power. In the title of his book, the economic historian David Landes calls the industrial revolution the ‘Unbound Prometheus’. How ironic that the Royal Society is now attempting to lead the campaign to counter the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution in industry by advocating further science and technology. It’s a bitter irony. This is the progress promised. Now we are seeking ways of avoiding having to pay the bill now that it has started to come in.

Whilst advocates of geoengineering have adopted a cautious approach, as we have seen, many are gung-ho, riding roughshod over moral restraints and political constraints. Many are now re-writing the precautionary principle out of existence or even turning it against those whose objections stand in the way. The techno-fixers cannot guarantee gain, so they shift the burden upon critics to demonstrate harm. When critics point to the potentially deleterious effects of geoengineering, the advocates of geoengineering assert that any such unintended consequences can be managed with the application of other techniques, so the problem of acidification in the oceans can be countered by spreading lime. More problems, more solutions. One may wonder why we ever swallowed the spider in the first place. Instead, there is an idea to install a network of undersea pipes to inject alkalis around sites such as the Great Barrier Reef, thus offsetting acidification. (House, House, Schrag and Aziz, 2007:  846/7). 
In assessing all these geoengineering proposals one is struck by the extent to which some people are prepared to push technology in order to avoid instituting the reductions in carbon emissions which the overwhelming number of scientists urge as the sine qua non of environmental health and sanity. The world is to be turned into a playground of technological gadgets whilst nature goes to the wall. Well, such a maniacal vision might well succeed in realising Robert Boyle's dream of the 'empire of man' ruling over nature, and it may well satisfy those neo-liberal economists and utilitarian philosophers who think it possible to price those parts of the ecosystems valuable enough monetarily to preserve. It’s madness. It’s the nature of madness that only those on the outside can see it for what it is. And it’s up to such people to call it for what it is – madness. I call it for what it is, the senility that comes before death.

If the world stands in need of a new mythology, then the ecological folly of recent centuries provides ample material for the tales of heroes and villains, lessons and legends for people in the centuries to come, if they do indeed come for the survivors of the coming eco-catastrophe.

The ancient Greeks had a word for what the world is witnessing, Hubris, overweening power, power which transgresses limits and boundaries and which invites divine retribution in the form of Nemesis, the god whose 'blade of vengeance ... yields a ripe harvest of repentant wo' (Aeschylus, The Persians.) In ancient Greek form, retribution was visited upon all those who thought themselves so powerful as to be beyond the reach of the gods and above the laws of men. In the modern techno-industrial age, hubris takes the form of the wilful disregard of planetary boundaries, so that human beings can do whatever they have the power to do, regardless of environmental and social and moral consequences. Gambling with Gaia will provide more than enough material for the new mythology for the new age of ecology which, surely, must follow this age of idiocracy.

The individuals of the modern world, who think themselves to be free, choosing beings, have been spoon-fed an idea of progress that bears no relation to ecological realities. They seem hell-bent on learning the hard way, if they learn at all. They have a blind faith, touching in its naivety, that technology can solve any problem. Since the world is understood to be a machine and since ‘progress’ seems to be delivered through technology and the market mechanism, these old modalities seem to be the obvious way to resolve environmental problems. In other words, the very modes of thought and action that got us into the mess are the ones that are supposed to get us out of it. It’s a genuinely touching faith. The god of progress fails time and again and yet, everyday, in every part of the world, the worshippers get up in the morning and drone another day of their lives away. Stewart Brand gives the game away when he boldly asserts: ‘Human nature doesn't change much; science does. (Brand ch 7 2009). Well, it is certainly true that changing technologies is much easier than changing people. But changing technologies can also be a way of avoiding the social and political changes which are a condition of a genuine resolution of environmental and social problems. The emphasis on technology is certainly a way of avoiding confronting power. It’s engineering masquerading as politics, the way of the coward, practical men like Adolf Eichmann, who asks no questions, just gets the job done.

The philosopher Karl Jaspers captured the paradox at the heart of the technocratic case when, pondering the threat the atom bomb posed to human existence, he declared: 'We want to find salvation in a technological conquest of technology—as if the human use of technology might itself be subject to technological direction.' (Jaspers 1961: viii.)

The comedian Al Murray gets a good laugh when he suggests that the problem of global warming will be solved by turning up the air-conditioning. Many a true word is spoken in jest. It’s the absurdity of the real world that gets the biggest laughs. There are affluent Texans who, even in a hot climate, enjoy sitting in front of a log fire, turning up the air conditioning in order to indulge their fancy (Hamilton 2007.) As laughable as it sounds, it seems that those Texans are a microcosm of the human population, who are acting as though global warming will bring warm weather all the year round, modulated by the air conditioning, our never failing, ever reliable technology. Even in the middle of the worst recession in eighty years, carbon emissions have continued in their relentless upward movement. We continue to throw more logs on the fire, in the belief that if things do get too hot we can just turn up the air conditioning.

Human beings act as though they really can live forever in a surrogate world removed from nature’s life support systems. The ecological illiteracy demonstrated points to a species that lacks environmental fitness. Over a period of millions of years, the Earth’s temperature and the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have moved together, through both cold and warm epochs. The relationship between the two is governed by primary factors (‘forcings’ ), solar radiation, volcanic events, methane release and, recently, carbon emissions as a result of human activity; and by secondary feedbacks, particularly the way that melting ice alters the Earth's albedo and the extent to which carbon dioxide is released from the land and oceans. Life forms that benefit from keeping the Earth’s temperature in a habitable state moderate this interaction (Lenton and von Bloh 2001; Lovelock 2007: 40). 

From this perspective, the resort to geoengineering in order to counter human-induced global warming is an unconscious attempt by the human species to decouple the process that connects the atmosphere to the Earth’s temperature and the biotic systems of the land and oceans. How complicit various parties to this decoupling are in the protection of an environmentally destructive capitalist system is a subject for conjecture. Many scientists may be politically naïve, many may see the world of nature as a machine, to be administered mechanically. Many are in the pay of state and capital. Either way, the effect is the same. The geoengineers seek to decouple the problem of global warming from the economy which lies behind the escalation of carbon emissions. The solution, of course, is to decouple ‘the economy’ from the growth of carbon emissions, to end the capital economy and the way that its accumulative logic systemically transgresses planetary boundaries and to create the green economy that respects those boundaries. But it is easier to change technologies than it is to change people and restructure relations of power and domination.

There is a question of just what constitutes knowledge here. The points which leave scientists and engineers non-plussed have been easily understood by the poets and artists. It’s called insight. In August 1883, the Symbolist painter Edvard Munch was disturbed by an unusual blood-red sunset he witnessed over Oslo. He wrote that he 'felt a great, unending scream piercing through nature'. The event was the inspiration behind The Scream.


The Scream 1893 Munch

That disturbing blood-red sunset indicating something badly wrong at the heart of nature is a theme which crops up in other Munch paintings.

 





Anxiety, fear and melancholy, the modern neurotics hat-trick. Over one hundred years later, Munch’s worries have not eased one bit. 
The blood-red sunset that Munch witnessed followed the eruption of Krakatoa off the coast of Java, which sent a massive plume of ash into the stratosphere, causing the Earth to cool by more than one degree. That’s the reasoning that, by way of analogy, impresses geoengineers. Why not engineer such explosions, thus cooling the Earth by global dimming? The artist Munch noticed the tear at the heart of nature. Such blood-red sunsets would follow the use of sulphate aerosols to engineer the climate. Even worse, the whitening of the daytime skies would become a permanent feature. (Crutzen 2006)

The recourse to geoengineering in order to counter global warming is utterly self-defeating, insofar as it diverts attention away from the need to reduce carbon emissions. As the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere continues to rise, so too would the warming that geoengineering is designed to suppress. As Clive Hamilton argues, once we start manipulating the atmosphere, we become forever dependent on a program of sulphur injections into the stratosphere. (Hamilton 2010 ch 6). Once started, we become trapped in an escalating cycle. We cannot stop the sulphur injections into the stratosphere without suffering an immediate jump in temperature. Indeed, it has been estimated that if we did stop sulphur injections, warming could rebound at a rate 10-20 times faster than in the recent past as a result of the backup of greenhouse gases (Damon Matthews and Caldeira 2007). This phenomenon is aptly called the 'termination problem'. (Royal Society 2009: 24.) 

Although the planetary engineers like to present their views as new thinking, their proposals are in many respects a late and increasingly desperate attempt to make good the old Wellsian claim of ‘men as gods’. This thinking has nothing in common with the new ecology, with Gaian holism, with the new physics. The extent to which GM food, geoengineering, nuclear power etc chime with existing political and business elites – with the old industrial political model that has brought the planet to this impasse – gives the lie to any claims to being new at all. Been there, done it, these ‘men as gods’ have long since failed, and it is time to move on.

Clive Hamilton describes the planetary engineers as throwbacks from another era. Well, that era is still with us, as the old that is dying and which is standing in the way of the new. Hamilton refers to Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories in The Lost World, with it fictional character Professor George Edward Challenger — ‘a mad and pugnacious scientist blessed with a supreme faith in his own intellectual capabilities.’ But Challenger is much more than that. Doyle has Challenger espouse a view that could have come from James Lovelock — that 'the world upon which we live is itself a living organism, endowed ... with a circulation, a respiration, and a nervous system of its own'. (Arthur Conan Doyle 1995.) However, rather than respect this Gaian insight and find a way for human beings to be at home on Earth, Challenger resents the suggestion that the living, sentient Earth could be oblivious to the presence of human creatures crawling over its surface, and so determines to 'let the earth know that there is at least one person, George Edward Challenger, who calls for attention—who, indeed, insists upon attention'. So he orders a pit be dug through the crust in the Sussex countryside. Eight miles down, Challenger orders a sharp, hundred-foot drill to be positioned just above the soft, organic body of the Earth, which is then 'shot into the nerve ganglion of old Mother Earth'. At which point, the Earth screamed. 'It was a howl in which pain, anger, menace, and the outraged majesty of Nature all blended into one hideous shriek.' Doyle writes of 'the mighty achievement, the huge sweep of the conception, the genius and wonder of the execution, broke upon their minds'. Professor Challenger thus takes his bow. 'Challenger the super scientist, Challenger the arch pioneer, Challenger the first man whom Mother Earth had been compelled to recognize.' 

The artist Edvard Munch knew better.

Suffice to say that the sound of flapping white coats is deafening, but I don’t know who they coming to take away. This is the world of howling insanity. Reason has long since departed and I, like the fox who wants to hold onto his brush, am on the run too. This kind of mad tinkering would make sense if nature really was a machine. The centuries old conjecture that nature is mechanical rather than organic is about to receive a massive rebuttal, so it is probably fitting that the engineers who have manned the guns throughout history should be on the receiving end. It would be fitting that the scientists and engineers should be made to look stupid. They have had it coming.






Much of the appeal of planetary engineering stems from the perceived and often very clear failure of governments, nationally and internationally, to tackle the problem of global warming and agree on effective measures to cut carbon emissions. The world of politics revolves around the clash of interests and the cacophony of opinions. In comparison, planetary engineering is clear and simple, cheap, with immediate and tangible results, and most importantly, involves projects that can be undertaken by a single nation. Rather than the interminable round of international conferences, planetary engineering can proceed by unilateral intervention (Victor, 'On the regulation of geoengineering', p. 331, n. 14.) It is at this point that the attempt to evade politics by having recourse to engineering solutions is revealed to be thoroughly self-destructive. Compare the planet to a house with central heating. Each room has its own thermostat and each has a different ideal temperature. Some rooms want a warmer world, some want a colder world, some will be adversely affected by heating, others want more heat. In other words, there is no way of avoiding politics. There is a need for an international agreement between nations. Climate change is a global problem that requires a global solution. The problem with unilateral action is that, on the international stage, it may easily be self-cancelling, with nations working at cross purposes. With each nation embarking on its own climate-control project, no consistent overarching policy emerges, so that the problem of climate change does not get addressed.

For all of the apolitical claims, planetary engineering has always been associated with a certain kind of politics. It is significant that Edward Teller and Lowell Wood were two of the earliest and most aggressive advocates of planetary engineering were. Teller was the co-founder and director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in San Francisco. Described as the 'father of the hydrogen bomb', Teller was the inspiration for Stanley Kubrick’s mad scientist, Dr Strangelove. Whilst Teller had a prosthetic foot, Dr Strangelove had a prosthetic hand.
Teller recruited Lowell Wood to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he became his protege. Christened 'Dr Evil', Wood was one of the foremost 'weaponeers' in the Pentagon, leading the group developing the technology for Ronald Reagan's Star Wars missile shield, coming up with plans for an array of orbiting X-ray lasers powered by nuclear reactors. 
Mad? Since 1998, Wood and Teller have been promoting aerosol spraying into the stratosphere as sufficient to deal with the problem of global warming. This would require a fleet of 747s. They also argue that a 15-mile Kevlar tube not much wider than a garden hose could link to Earth’s surface to the stratosphere. (Teller, Wood and Hyde 1997; Goodell, 'Can Dr. Evil Save The World?'.) Sulphur pollution on the ground would be pumped to the top of the pipe. ‘Can Dr. Evil Save the World?’ No. 
The example of Teller and Wood make it clear that this sudden advocacy of planetary engineering is nothing new, just the latest assertion of the empire of man over nature. It’s the politics of the planetary engineers that need highlighting. Planetary engineering is currently being offered as the most effective and cheapest way to counter global warming. The likes of Teller and Wood either deny global warming or dismiss its dangers. Both Teller and Wood have links with the Hoover Institution, known for its right-wing political agenda and its denial of climate change. Wood is a visiting fellow whilst Teller was affiliated with the Institution. The Institution has received funding from ExxonMobil and has given a platform to Thomas Gale Moore, the author of Climate of Fear: Why We Shouldn't Worry About Global Warming. That begs the question that if we needn’t worry about global warming, why do we need the extreme technologies advocated by the planetary engineers? (Steffen 2009) Here we see an example of the military-industrial complex at work. The Marshall Institute and Hoover Institution share personnel and in 2003 jointly released a book titled Politicizing Science: The Alchemy of Policy-making, a book which made the familiar claim that climate science is a pseudo-science, politics masquerading as science, whereas they, the ‘climate sceptics’ represent 'sound science'. It’s a trick that is used continually against any attempt to explore the political and practical implications of science. Science deals with uncertainty, any attempt to draw conclusions and derive practical lessons from the science ceases to be science and becomes politics. Those who stick to the uncertainties and call for more research are the true representatives of ‘sound science’. Such people also stick to the status quo, itself a highly political position. It’s an attempt to disable science and render it pointless at the level of social and political practice. This neat little tactic has been used umpteen times. It has been identified and can now be safely ignored. Too much time has been wasted on this nonsense.
The uncritical identification of geoengineering as a new environmentalism is alarming given its long standing connection with right wing politics and think tanks, forces active in denying human made climate change. The Marshall Institute, the Hoover Institution, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the American Enterprise Institute and the Heartland Institute all deny AGW and all promote geo-engineering. The connection of environmentalism with positions supported by these bodies is curious enough. Even more curious is that these bodies promote the development of technologies aimed at countering a global warming that they deny is occurring in the first place. Of course, such bodies are active in their opposition to all measures to reduce carbon emissions, and geoengineering is a way of avoiding the source of the warming, protecting their backers in the fossil fuel industries, and offering a substitute for carbon reductions and a justification for delay, (Steffen 2009) 

This is the political economy that lies at the heart of the climate crisis. But there is also a deeper question of perceptions and paradigms. Planetary engineers see the world not as a living organism but as a machine. Such a conception entails a particular view of how human beings manage their relation to the natural world. Pursuing a strategy of reduction is tantamount to admitting that ‘progress’ is an illusion and that the forces of science, technology and industry has damaged the foundations of life. We see here the extent of the existential crisis that global warming induces. From this perspective, geoengineering is an attempt to redeem the false promises of the industrial revolution by turning current failure into final triumph. And the final proof of the human mastery of nature is the capacity to engineer the Earth's climate. Technology always triumphs. The more it fails, the greater is the urgency that it must succeed. 

In evaluating the various proposals put forward, the crucial question is whether geoengineering is seen as a substitute for the necessary reductions in carbon emissions or as a complement to a low or non-carbon strategy. In Geoengineering the Climate, the Royal Society claims that there is insufficient evidence to state one way or another that geoengineering is a 'moral hazard', that is, would undermine efforts to reduce carbon emissions. (This goes to the question of whether it is seen or would be seen as a substitute for mitigation or a complement to it. Royal Society 2009) Such equivocation is music to the ears of those who advocate climate manipulation. The likes of Teller and Wood are men of decided views. They do not call for further research. They are clear that geoengineering should be promoted as against attempts to reduce emissions. They also argue that geoengineering plus rising carbon dioxide concentrations would produce an outcome that is superior to a situation in which there was no global warming to deal with. (Teller, Hyde and Wood 2002.) 

We can speculate on the motives of environmentalists like Brand and Lynas in their sudden, vehement, advocacy of geoengineering. The increasingly desperate position with respect to climate change no doubt leads to calls for desperate measures. But I think it is much more than this. I think such environmentalists have tired of politics and people and want to see tangible, immediate results, now. So rather than engage in the hard work of creating a new game, they reconcile themselves to the only game in town at the moment – the very system that is crashing around our ears.
Either way, such environmentalist have some very strange bed-fellows. The effects of this ‘new environmentalism’ can only be damaging. At the moment, governments and fossil fuel corporations are reluctant to give public support to geoengineering in case they are accused of attempting to evade their responsibilities with respect to cutting emissions. However, if environmental voices start to be heard calling for planetary engineering, such an approach will quickly become part of the political mainstream. The commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions will weaken, fade and dissolve. The inflated claims made for geoengineering are all that is needed for yet more delay in dealing with climate change. ‘If, as the Stern report says, climate change is the biggest market failure we have ever faced, geoengineering is the most serious moral hazard we have ever faced.’ (Hamilton 2010 ch 6). 

Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline comes with a very peculiar political odour, which is unmistakeable, however much Brand avoids explicit political argument. Brand’s views savour a great deal of Lowell Wood, for whom it's merely a matter of time before the 'political elites' discover the cheapness and effectiveness of climate engineering. Changing technologies does not entail something so difficult as changing people and challenging power and vested interests. 'We've engineered every other environment we live in—why not the planet?' (Goodell, 'Can Dr. Evil Save The World?'.) Someone should explain why this cannot be done before the attempt to engineer the planet proceeds further.

In a paper they wrote together, Wood and Teller argued that the costs of sulphur injections to offset global warming would amount to a mere 1 per cent of the cost of reducing carbon emissions. One could call this economic. Cheap is a better word, and to many is sufficient argument. Wood and Teller also claim that the technique could be reversed so as to prevent a new ice age. (Teller et al., 1997) In this paper, global warming is divorced from the biosphere and made a problem of pure physics, in complete disregard of the complexities of the carbon cycle or feedback effects. That makes the argument worthless and irrelevant.

More interesting is Wood’s contempt for politics and the world of politics. I think this is the real source of the sudden interest in planetary engineering on the part of some environmentalists. As the climate crisis has worsened, the psychic and political inertia on the part of governments and voters has become increasingly evident. There is most certainly a need for a new politics, one that shifts the focus from individual voters and consumers – the idiocracy of market economics and parliamentary elections – to a genuine democracy concerned with popular control and participation. Some hope, say the planetary engineers. Wood has no faith in the capacity of the world’s governments to cut carbon emissions, calling this the 'the bureaucratic suppression of CO2' (Quoted in Fleming, 'The Climate Engineers: Playing god to save the planet', Wilson Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 2007, p. 48.)

People will not change, governments cannot change, the climate crisis worsens and something needs to be done. All that is left is technology. But the idea that we must play god to save the planet is based on an obvious fault. It is the engineers who are playing god, on the basis of a recognition of flawed, corrupt human nature. As Jeff Goodell states, Wood predicts popular resistance to the idea of 'toying with the integrity of the Earth's climate just so Americans don't have to give up their SUVs'. (Goodell, 'Can Dr. Evil Save The World?'). So just what, exactly, does change when engineers play god?

But note that all of this comes with a certain politics. There is no way of avoiding politics. Wood speculates about the possibility of obtaining private funding from a billionaire for an experiment. 'As far as I can determine, there is no law that prohibits doing something like this.' (Goodell, 'Can Dr. Evil Save The World?'.) The only law that would prohibit this experiment would be if it is undertaken with hostile intent. That such a thing has been attempted should give us cause to be even more cautious with respect to climate engineering.

Both sides in the Cold War made exerted efforts to control the weather for both aggressive and benign purposes. The military manipulation of the weather was outlawed by the nations of the world in 1976 through the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). However, the Convention does not cover unilateral climate engineering for the 'peaceful' purpose of protecting us from climate chaos. All the time there lurk commercial pressures. The Moon Treaty was an international accord attempting to govern human use of the moon by assigning jurisdiction to the world community. The treaty was defeated after vigorous lobbying by US groups determined to keep alive the future possibility of private ownership and commercial exploitation. This suggests that the future possibility of the unilateral deployment of all geoengineering techniques in the interests of private annexation and development. 
The planetary engineers and the climate sceptics who stand behind them favour a grand technological intervention as an alternative to a genuine political intervention that would challenge power and alter social relations. Rather than respond to climate crisis through changes in human behaviour, economic purpose and social organisation, the planetary engineers advocate the total technological control of the Earth’s climate system. Mention was made of the defeat of the Moon Treaty as a result of the lobbying of groups seeking ownership and development. Whereas once we could praise the imagination of HG Wells’ men on the moon, now this colonizing and expropriating arrogance seems merely vulgar, mean and small. One can discern no magnificence of mind here, no ‘men as gods’. Just hucksters turning a buck the same old way. This is not a new beginning at all but the end of an era. And not before time.

Planetary Engineering and Politics
I will state my social and political view clearly. I argue in favour of a democratisation of Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit, the ethical life which draws individuals together via their everyday roles, social practices and associations. This is to reject the atomistic conception of the demos as an electorate, a passive, undifferentiated, amorphous mass. Instead, democracy is reconfigured through a richly layered fabric of institutions and as exercised through a welter of intermediary powers (Dallmayr 1993:253; Meister 1990:120  177;  Kedourie  1995:142/3). The idea of the universality of the state being composed by the internal communities of civil society envisages democracy as a popular mobilisation from below, as against a direction from above. The new Sittlichkeit extends the rights of individual liberty in civil society to rights of public participation, creating a social identity that ensures that the individual and the common good are two sides of the same coin. The conception of the 'democratic Sittlichkeit' comprises churches, municipal and regional governments, and other civil institutions and is based on a mediation the individual citizen and the state. It forms a citizen body out of disparate individuals and groups. Universality is not imposed from the outside but is internally related to and constituted by civil society. Communitas, the common good central to a global planetary ethic of social and environmental justice, grows organically from within the soil of civil society itself. The intermediate institutions of  civil society are integrated within  a comprehensive  legal  framework which embodies a genuine universal interest. Rather than confining the public sphere to a single level, as in the classical view, a differentiated eco-public is multi-layered, with a series of levels having key roles to play, including the civil rights of private individuals, the publicity of legal processes, the public life of the corporations and communities of which individuals are a part, and also the interaction between public deliberation, decision-making and opinion. Generating communitas out of a thick welter civil associations produces a conception of an open ended public space  forged  by a democratic social bond which embraces the full range of social movements. 
Such a conception draws on the first principle of ecology - the law of ‘integrated systems.’ This entails a principle of interactive cooperation and models human society on the way that nature actually functions. It is a holistic notion which puts the accent on the interdependence of the parts within the whole, canalising energies and efforts in a positive direction to ensure the common good. This is plainly the antithesis of individualism and isolationist behaviour.
The conception of the eco-Sittlichkeit is worth mentioning here to make sense of Brand’s view of what ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Greens’ should and shouldn’t be doing. Another law of ecology is unity in diversity. Rather than impose a single view on a movement, it is healthier to allow for diversity and hence the possibility of mutual learning. ‘Greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ come in many shapes and sizes and that has been a strength to the extent it allows each individual to play a role. It all helps to build the ecological consciousness and sensibility which is crucial to building a new way of life. Change is a process first and foremost and an event only in a secondary sense. The key events receive the publicity as the most obvious manifestations of change, but they are the culmination of processes over time. To attempt to impose a single vision or an artificial unity on a diverse movement risks short-circuiting the whole process. 

After taking a very strident line on what Greens and environmentalists should do, Brand suddenly turns agnostic on who does the work.

There is so much work to do that it doesn't matter who does it. Large corporations making money doing the right thing is just fine. The United Nations sending black helicopters to do the right thing is just fine. Property-defending conservatives doing the right thing is just fine. Placard-waving leftists stopping the wrong thing is just fine. Paul Hawken's myriad micro-organizations doing the right thing locally is the health of a system curing itself. (Brand ch 9 2009).


Dogmatic on ends, Brand is flexible on means. So long as we all do what he wants, he doesn’t care who does it. Respecting the law on integrated systems and following the principle of interactive cooperation, I would agree that there is a positive role for all sections of the community to play. That is the nature of public life and it acknowledges the interests that all people have in a healthy and flourishing natural environment. I would just caution that Brand has spent an entire book singling out ‘Greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ for criticism and strongly implying that the corporations are ecologically benign.

I would love to see the environmental movement as a whole (along with everyone else) embrace the kind of ideas posed here, and maybe it will happen. (Brand ch 9 2009).

That statement violates the law of integrated systems. Brand does not want interactive cooperation at all, he wants ‘everyone’ to embrace his ideas. That would be unwise. Brand argues at length in favour of nuclear, GE, biotechnology and geoengineering only to argue that the problem of climate change is now so urgent that nothing less than a gigantic technological gamble could work. We can gamble now or we can gamble then. Either way, that has nothing to do with building an eco-civilisation. So we are free to carry on. Brand argues that ‘the papered-over unity’ of the environmental movement is ‘more of a problem than a help.’ It depends on what he means. The usual charge is that there is no environmental movement as such, just a myriad of groups and campaigns with no coherent political identity. There is a need for intellectual and political coherence, but not so much as to suppress diversity. Brand makes a strange prediction here: ‘I would not be surprised if the movement now divides like a bacterium into two or more lively offspring.’ (Brand ch 9 2009). He must have missed the controversies over whether Greens should remain a social movement composed of grassroots organisations or form a political party, he must have missed the resulting splits between realos and fundis. If there is a ‘movement’ then it is one composed of a range of activities and campaigns and identities. 
It seems that Brand is most concerned with the way that Greens, as they have developed a political edge, they have come to appreciate the connections of the environmental crisis with economic interests and processes. This has resulted in a political ecology that promises fundamental change at the level of social relations. This theme crops up in Lovelock too. The target is not ‘Greens’ as such but political activists and ‘leftists’. It begs the question of whether Lovelock and Brand are serious about real change. To be radical is to go to the roots of a problem and that means examining the social relations which shape the way power is applied and exercised. Lovelock and Brand evade the political question and look instead to technology. And business.
Brand seeks to split the Greens between ‘traditional Greens’, whom he earlier condemned as ‘outdated’, and ‘another set of Greenish players more interested in innovation and risky endeavors.’ 

The new crowd will eventually be labeled—Post-Greens, Greens-plus, Greens 2.0, Off-Greens—who knows? I need to call them something for rhetorical purposes here, so I'll improvise. Combine the color green with the color of the blue sky, the blue planet, the blue ocean—all that atmospheric blue an artifact of life, back when it converted to oxygen—and what do you get? The science- and technology-loving Blue-Greens: the Turquoise movement, made up of Turqs (to their friends) or Turqueys (to their critics).

Is this satire? How many people would like to be known as Turqs or Turqueys? Blue is the conservative colour, of course. This sounds suspiciously like what New Labour did to socialism. Post-socialism, post-labour, post-green – the same old pro-business. It’s business as usual. Brand should not be allowed to get away with this kind of phoney polarisation. To criticise particular forms of technology and to criticise certain aspects of science is not to be anti-science and anti-technology. By characterising his Blue-Greens as ‘science- and technology-loving’ Brand implies that ‘traditional Greens’ are against science and technology. This completely ignores the efforts of those with backgrounds in science and technology who are arguing for the ethical use and ecological design of science and technology. There are alternatives to Brand’s proposals which are more congenial to the spirit of science than Brand’s scientism. 

Here we the problems caused by Brand’s refusal to treat politics and philosophy seriously. It is a classic failing of those who place all their faith – and it is faith – in science. It is called scientism and it always backfires against science.

Brand’s comment that ‘there is so much work to do that it doesn't matter who does it’ sounds open-mined but, in truth, the flexibility with respect to means is contradicted by the dogmatism with respect to ends. Brand wants ‘everyone’ to agree with his ideas, he doesn’t care who. That is not an active civil public sphere that respects people as creative agents at all. 

There is a need to address the fragmentation that characterizes the environmental ‘movement’ in the contemporary world. Greens and environmentalists are many, but, far from their being a unity, paper or otherwise, they are often working in different directions. If the law of integrated system applies, then environmental action would evince an interactive cooperation that strengthens the whole. If, however, environmentalism is a house divided, then disparate efforts become self-cancelling rather than mutually reinforcing. The ‘environmental movement’ as such doesn’t exist at the level of a coherent philosophy and politics. Without this coherence, environmentalism will get so far but no further. It is possible to protest power and contest power but to assume power and use power it is necessary to have a politics and a philosophy. Power needs to be institutionally embodied and expressed. Without that coherence, Greens and environmentalists will work at cross-purposes, some working as environmentalists as such — promoting productive forests, soil conservation, the efficient use of waterways, the protection of wildlife habitat and so on — others campaigning on single issues, issues of local concern, politics. The arguments and the tools and the approaches can fail to mesh and groups can be at cross-purposes. There is a need to develop a coherent political identity so that fragmentation becomes a genuinely interactive diversity that feeds and strengthens unity. Brand and Lovelock attempt to steer environmentalism back to the science. That is to deny environmentalism a politics of its own – that would entail the corporate capture of science and technology, something that meshes perfectly with the corporate capture of the democratic state and forms part of the enclosure of the global commons. So long as environmentalists continue to promote competing agendas, public action could stall. This points to the need to take politics seriously, embrace the state and policy making and seek to ground power politically and institutionally. This is why I rejected Brand’s notion of Greens as ‘Romantic rebels’ in favour of an Hegelian eco-Sittlichkeit. The need to assume responsibility for our powers, which is what Brand is asking for, involves politics. Those who develop a political identity soon become aware of the connection of the environmental crisis to political economy. It is here that Lovelock and Brand decry left wing politics. If ‘romantic rebels’ have to get serious about politics, then so to do scientists and engineers. To avoid a political position is to revert to the default of the status quo and the powers that be. It is wise to distrust ‘apolitical’ stances. Not to choose is also to choose.

To coordinate efforts and concentrate forces, environmentalism requires an overall goal, an eco-philosophy that establishes an end towards which environmentalists could work towards. Given that nature functions as an integrated system, the logical aim derives from the ability of the system as such to function over time. Leopold argued that there was ‘only one conservation problem’ since there was ‘only one soil, one flora, one fauna, and one people’. A common goal and a common good requiring a coherent strategy, however diverse the means towards unity. 

Which is to say that we need both foxes and hedgehogs. Foxes are OK on the ground, but hedgehogs are the most important of all. Heads down, foxes can find the individual pieces of the jigsaw, looking up to the blue skies, hedgehogs see the bigger picture. This is the difference between tactical thinking and strategic thinking. Lots of piecemeal victories never amount to the one game-changer that is needed. Berlin’s distinction between hedgehogs and foxes is not deep. It is intellectually disabling. Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive liberty was also unsustainable, and yet it remained in use to justify individualism in thought and politics as against the more collective projects that sought to enhance the liberty of each individual alongside all individuals. That individualism is the cultural problem of modernity. Brand is pointing in the right direction when he points to the need to go beyond ‘individual power’ to develop ‘aggregate power.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). If Brand had understood Rousseau aright, instead of condemning him as a back to nature Romantic, he would have found in him much that he was seeking, including a political basis for so institutionalising ‘aggregate power’ as to avoid scientistic denials and repressions of creative human agency.

An eco-philosophy which develops a common goal to aim for fosters the sense that nature is good when it sustains the health and promotes the well-being of the community conceived as nature’s web, human members included. Health and well-being is the absolute good sustaining the whole web of life. The environment is one great subject given the interconnections between soil, plant, air, water, animal and humanity. A common home implies a common good composed of the smallest units interconnected within the whole. Given this interdependence within the whole, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of the health and well-being of an isolated individual.

The lack of discussion about politics is linked to the reluctance of many scientists to frame their arguments in moral terms. Moral language requires careful use, but more than rewards the effort in insight and clarity. ‘Grub first, then ethics’ quotes Brand. That is not being silent on ethics, that is to denigrate ethics as a mere epiphenomenon of natural necessity. This amounts to a moral and a political disarmament. Opponents of environmentalism do not hesitate to frame liberties and property rights as moral claims, protecting them against scientific claims. So long as human beings remain human, facts will never be powerful enough to trump values. For environmentalists to eschew morality is to concede the high ground to others. Further, it is to render environmentalism without vision, purpose and foresight. Moral argument advances ideas and evaluates practices. It can accentuate the moral good of humanity and nature without resorting to force, power, political assertion. 

Brand’s argument is hobbled from the first by his refusal to take politics and morality seriously. Morality matters and so does politics. Brand evacuates this terrain of human choice and action and thus concedes the strategic ground to opponents. Brand defines his approach as ‘pragmatism’ —‘a practical way of thinking concerned with results rather than with theories and principles.’ ‘The shift is deeper than moving from one ideology to another; the shift is to discard ideology entirely.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). If ideology is understood in Marx’s critical sense of beliefs and distortions which conceal and preserve existing power relations, then I would agree, discard ideology. But what Brand has in mind are theories and principles, ideas and ethics, politics and morality. That leaves his argument impotent. Environmentalism as science dispenses with all talk of an overall goal. Environmentalism needs this common goal to bring coherence, inspire hope and motivate effort. An overall goal coordinates efforts and ensure that disparate forces are concentrated. It also serves to inculcate an ecological sensibility. The attempts to portray Green measures as being against jobs and growth would be much less persuasive if the environmental cause conveyed a clear and well-conceived goal concerning the commonality of life. 

Brand was on the right lines by rejecting individual thinking in favour of ‘aggregate power’, but he fails to follow that insight up, either in terms of a politics of the common good or an ecology that perceives human beings as members of biotic communities. Nothing in nature thrives in isolation, and that includes human beings. This is the danger of Brand’s reliance on technology and engineering as solutions to the environmental problems. It turns out that for Brand living as gods means using technological power to the full. Brand still believes the old delusion that that human beings can master nature. The Promethean myth is that human beings are free to throw off all shackles of nature and pursue self-selected goals through technology. If they are unwise enough to do so, they would assuredly harm the life-support systems they live off and hence themselves in the process.

I have written extensively on the conception of ‘rational freedom’ that one can trace through the works of Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Maimonides, Spinoza and Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. The conception of ‘rational freedom’ holds that the freedom of each individual and the freedom of all individuals are one and the same thing. To call for a shift from individual power to aggregate power is to situate the argument within a philosophical context which conceptualises freedom as something relational and communal, emerging through the interactions between individuals. The best expression of this principle in the modern world can be found in the work of Jurgen Habermas. Freedom, even personal freedom, is conceivable only in 'internal connection with a network of interpersonal relationships', in the context of the communicative structures of a community, so that 'the freedom of some is not achieved at the cost of the freedom of others'. There is a need, then, to ‘analyse the conditions of collective freedom' so as to remove the 'potential for Social-Darwinist menace' inherent in individualist conceptions of freedom. 'The individual cannot be free unless all are free, and all cannot be free unless all are free in community. It is this last proposition which one misses in the empiricist and individualist traditions' (Habermas 1992:146). This conception freedom is achieved through the unity of individuals as against their separation goes back to Plato and Aristotle. Clark thus summarises Aristotle's in this way: 'Man's being lies in community, in the unity of man with man’ (Clark 1975:107/8). 

The ‘rational’ conception of freedom values individuals and their capacity for free will and moral choice; it also affirms that individuals could lead flourishing, ethical lives. The individual does count in the rational tradition, but it is to the individual as a social and relational being that the rational ethic is addressed. In this sense, aggregate power recognises that the forces which govern the world are supra-individual and that the realisation of individual power requires the assertion of common power. The pooling of individual power both preserves and enhances power of each through the power of all. In contrast, narrow pursuits of self-interest are a bogus individualism, quite distinct from a genuine individuality. As social and as natural beings, human beings are integrated into larger systems, whether they knew it or not. There is a need for human beings to develop an awareness of this fact so that, ethically and practically, human action blends the communal fabric, in a social and an ecological sense. 

Despite this communitarian ethic at the heart of human ecology, environmentalism is showing more and more signs of being absorbed into alienating dualisms and separations of capitalist modernity. As we move more and more towards the post-liberal society organised around the corporate form, environmentalism is assuming the character of an outdated liberalism. Communities are being addressed as individual. Liberty as doing what one wants and morality as subjective views of the individual’s own choosing are the order of the day. This is liberalism in its most idiotic form, idiotes in the ancient Greek sense as an exclusive concern with private affairs. Ecology needs a public life and requires a belief in intrinsic moral values, both with respect to human nature and nature itself. There is a need for an ecologically informed morality that identifies a common good and identifies a common goal. For environmentalism to embrace moral relativism and individualism would be an abandonment of its own core values.

If the environmental movement is going to chart a successful path in the coming years, it needs to develop a coherent and cogent ethics and politics. The notion of the common good is at the heart of things. There is also a need for an awareness of political economy. There is a need to understand that the force encroaching on natural and social communities is not globalisation as such but the globalisation of specific capitalist relations. It is not the globalisation of economic relations that is the problem but the neo-liberal ideology that undergirds it. This involves an aggressive individualism that induces human beings to see themselves as individuals, independent of social ties and free from restraint moral, political and indeed natural restraints. Social decay and environmental degradation are symptoms of a flawed morality and culture. Materialism is a false philosophy and needs to be contested as such. To halt decay and degradation, environmentalist need to confront the ideological flaws underlying modernity and its claim that the possibilities for progress are unlimited. 

Environmentalism needs to be more than a science and a technology but must punch its weight morally and politically if it is to deliver on its promise. Environmentalism poses a serious challenge to the practices and imperatives of the prevailing social system, but it will succeed only if it brings about substantial change. There is little point the likes of Lovelock and Brand lamenting the left wing politics of Greens and arguing for the adoption of some politically neutral identity. Change is political, change is radical, change does go to the root of the problem. Minor adjustments are simply not enough. Applying technology within unchanged social relations simply reproduces the same problems on a greater scale. To achieve significant change, environmentalism requires a solid grounding in political economy and needs to acquire a coherent political identity. Devoid of critical understanding of political economy and fighting shy of political action, environmentalism is at best futile and at worst dangerous. Environmentalism requires an internal change in our modes of thought, action and organisation, in our concerns, goals, loyalties, affections, and convictions. Human beings need to change their modalities and mentalities as a condition of real change. It makes no sense to rule out changes in culture and changes in behaviour as either impossible or as taking too long. Such change is the point. To argue otherwise is simply to reduce environmentalism to an attempt to save the existing civilisation from collapse. The big questions concern what is technology for, what is the land for, what is life about, what is the meaning of anything. To keep asking these questions is what it is to be human.

The failure to acknowledge this, indeed, the fact that Brand explicitly repudiates politics and philosophy – only to sneak both in behind supposedly value-neutral science and technology – makes this book not merely useless but a possible menace. There will be people tempted by the simplistic notions peddled by this book, overlooking the need for a coherent politics and philosophy. Engineers get things done in the way that Mussolini got the trains running on time. That’s the problem with futurism throughout the ages, overlooking the true complexities of a problem and reducing everything to a shiny and clean technical form. That is not the world that human beings inhabit.


Brand summarises his views in conclusion:
‘Ecological balance is too important for sentiment. It requires science.
The health of natural infrastructure is too compromised for passivity. It requires engineering.
What we call natural and what we call human are inseparable. We live one life.’ (Brand ch 9 2009).

These claims are one-sided and so will misfire, dangerously. We require morality every bit as much as science and probably more so. James Lovelock too repudiated what he called sentiment and sentimentality in no uncertain terms. This denigration of morality is simply chilling. It is a recipe for social breakdown. As Adam Smith or David Hume could have told us, it is sympathy or sentiment that matters above all. Human beings are social animals. Without what Smith called the moral sentiments, there is no empathy and civilisations decline and fall as rapidly as a house of cards when human beings are reduced to inanimate objects. 
Fact and value, science and religion complement each other, it is not the either/or it is for Brand. Brand’s approach is the approach of Eichmann. Ecological and social balance is far too important to be left to engineers. Engineers can make the trains run on time, but to where and why is a moral choice. Those questions, engineers are ill-equipped to answer.
Against Brand and Lovelock we can insist that morality is not sentiment. The need for ethics is plain realism. It is impossible for any observer with a modicum of intelligence to survey planetary condition and conclude that survival, let alone something as momentous as human well-being, requires a thorough-going social and cultural transformation. Lovelock knows the precarious state of the planet well, and issues a ‘final warning’. Yet it is the supposedly hard-nosed pragmatists who are the cloudy dreamers, not the environmentalists portrayed as ‘extremists’ and ‘anarchists’. There is a remarkable gap between the vast scale of the environmental problem revealed by Lovelock, Lynas and Brand and just how little is changed by the technological fixes they propose. For all of their hard-headed, hard-hearted pragmatism, the technological fixers are merely the sentimentalists of the status quo. 

To recognise that the infrastructure we live within is in part a human creation does indeed eschew passivity. But creative human agency refers to a whole lot more than engineering. The human and the natural are two aspects of the same seamless web of life. We do indeed live one life. Brand’s best sentence is his last. The tragedy is that much of what he writes does not recognise ecological balance but asserts the power of technology over nature. In this last sentence we see the book that Brand could have written. It’s the book that the Greens and environmentalists that Brand derides have been writing for years.

Further, when push comes to the shove of looming climate necessity, Brand doesn’t actually offer science devoting to ecological balance and engineering designed to promote the health of the natural infrastructure, just a series of technological gambles based not on likely success but simple lack of options. It is not reason at all being offered here. Reason would amount to a programme of institution building, embracing science and technology certainly, but arranging social and economic life within a common ethical and political framework. The commitment to the low carbon infrastructure requires this rational superstructure. Instead Brand offers nothing less than a gigantic gamble that pays off only if a series of myriad minor gambles also pay off. The odds against any of these are great, the odds against the gamble as a whole are simply astronomical. The problem with Brand’s analysis is that he has painted the picture of dire ecological necessity only too well. So large and looming is the coming environmental crisis that attempts at social transformation and institution building seem so puny in comparison. For all of the rational argument concerning science and technology, Brand is really gambling wildly on astronomical odds. Einstein famously said that God does not play dice with the universe. Human beings as the God species most certainly are playing dice in the analyses of Brand, Lynas and Lovelock. In football there is a term the ‘Hollywood ball’ which refers to a long pass that looks good but rarely comes off because it asks too much. Brand’s argument reduces to throwing all our technology against nature and hoping that something turns up. Gambles like this only pay off in Hollywood.

5 MARK LYNAS AND THE GOD SPECIES




Beginning on a positive note, Mark Lynas’ book is of real value if it popularises the concept of planetary boundaries. Lynas’ argument is structured around the idea of planetary boundaries. The idea of planetary boundaries is not Lynas’. In 2009 in Sweden, Lynas met with the Planetary Boundaries Group, a body of experts that is campaigning for the recognition that there are nine critical planetary boundaries. 
The nine boundaries are: climate change, biodiversity loss, biogeochemical cycles (such as nitrogen and phosphorous), ocean acidification, water consumption, land use, ozone depletion, atmospheric particulate pollution, and chemical pollution. Of these, the Planetary Boundaries Group believes that we have already transgressed the planet's limit on the first three.

So credit where credit is due, Lynas seeks to explain and popularise this concept of planetary boundaries in his book. I now use the concept in my own writing and have used it in various writing in the press.

But it is how we organise our behaviour in relation to the concept of planetary boundaries that matters most. Whilst a recognition of natural limits would seem to imply the curtailment of an economic system that pursues endless growth, production and consumption, Lynas takes another direction entirely, keeping the accumulative dynamic in place whilst engaging in planetary engineering and management. Well, sound global resource management is better than unsound global resource management. But it has nothing to do with being gods.

The Gap between Technical and Moral Capacities

“In this groundbreaking new book, Mark Lynas shows us how we must use our technological mastery over nature to protect the planet from ourselves.” (amazon.co.uk). Given its contents, the title of the book should be The Icarus Species or The Prometheus Species, and not The God Species. Despite his depiction of human beings as ‘the God species’, Lynas notes how ‘blissfully unaware’ we are of the environmental crisis we face. ‘As if God were blind, deaf and dumb, we blunder on without any apparent understanding of either our power or our potential.’ That lack of moral intelligence should have told Lynas something about the human species.

Even most Greens - ever hopeful that vanished wild nature can one day be restored - still recoil from the real truth about our role. Climate-change deniers are successful not just because of the moneyed vested interests they serve, but because they tap into a powerful cultural undercurrent that insists we are small and the planet is big, ergo nothing we do - not even in our collective billions - can have a planet-scale impact…. Our culture and politics languishes decades behind our science. (Lynas 2011 Intro).
Or, put another way, our science has raced far ahead of our intellect and morality. This disparity in moral and technical capacities will produce catastrophe. It’s a familiar warning. Can we catch up? Is it simply a case of catching up? The problem with stating the problem in terms of catch-up is that it misdiagnoses the problem. The problem is one of balance. Lynas presumes that our science is more advanced and therefore it is for our other capacities to catch up. The implication is that our politics and culture should adapt themselves to our science. Stating the problem as one of balance allows us to say that science ought to change as much as our politics and culture. Lynas sets his argument up on a false premise and fails to see that the problem with our power is less our unawareness of it than our inability to subordinate it to ends we have chosen. Lynas has set the argument up around the veneration of scientific knowledge and technical power, as though this is something new. This is the central theme of rational modernity. 
Lynas is one the right lines when he focuses on power, the identity of human beings as a creative agency. ‘I suggest that since nature can no longer tame us, then we must tame ourselves.’ (Lynas 2011). The idea savours a great deal of Karl Marx. ‘The labouring classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man. To succeed in this attempt they do not want strength, but the organization of their common strength, organization of the labouring classes on a national scale’. (Marx AB SE 1973). 
But Lynas’ idea is of a different stripe. At the heart of Marx’s argument is an awareness that human beings have, through their transformative power, abolished natural necessity only to subject themselves to a new social necessity. The critique of alienation is absent in Lynas. Instead, rather than critique power, Lynas proposes that we venerate it. In other words, Lynas keeps us within the scope of alienated social conditions.

Recognising that we are now in charge - whether for good or ill - we need to take conscious and collective decisions about how far we interfere with the planet's natural cycles and how we manage our global-scale impacts. This is not for aesthetic reasons, or because I mourn the loss of the natural age. It is too late for that now, and - as my uncle always says - one must move with the times. 

The argument that we must move with the times can be resisted. Surely, the point of Lynas’ argument is that human beings now have the power to move the times to our consciously chosen ends. Simply moving with the times implies a societal determinism that is the antithesis of human creative agency. What times? Do we all become Nazis in Hitler’s Germany? This is what Popper called moral futurism, mistakenly accusing Marx of assigning a moral value to whatever will be. What mattered for Marx was movement in the direction towards freedom as human self-determination. The times are neither good nor bad in themselves – we supply the values. I thought this was the point of the God species, a species able to supply morals to itself, not read them from God, Nature or the times. Freedom as a self-determination does seem implied in the recognition of our power and in the assumption of conscious and collective control.

Marx’s relating of human power to notions of freedom and determination within a socio-historical context repays close attention here.

There is one great fact, characteristic of this our nineteenth century, a fact which no party dares deny. On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces which no epoch of former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors recorded of the latter times of the Roman empire. In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving-and overworking it. The new​fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted.
(Marx delivered this speech at a dinner commemorating the fourth anniversary of Ernest Jones's People's Paper, in London on 14 April 1856. It was published in the People's Paper on 19 April 1856. (Marx AB SE 1973). 

In other words, where the likes of Mark Lynas blandly refer to human power and the need to recognise its transformative capacities, Marx frames the issue within the conflict between the forces of production on the one hand and the relations of production on the other. It’s an old and familiar idea by now, but its explanatory power remains unsurpassed. Failure to understand the exploitative and alienative social relations at the core of the problem of human power and its use can lead to a continued misfiring of power. An exclusive focus upon the new productive forces neglects the way that these are organised and used within prevailing social relations. To realise the full potentiality of those forces requires a transformation of production relations.

Lynas ignores this issues of the forces and relations of production and instead concentrates on the need for human beings to recognise their power and to employ it in the resolution of the environmental crisis. That is only the beginning of awareness. It’s a start in the right direction, but too broad to get very far.

the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence suggests that we are fast approaching the point where our interference in the planet's great bib-geochemical cycles is threatening to endanger the Earth system itself, and hence our own survival as a species. To avert this increasing danger, we must begin to take responsibility for our actions at a planetary scale. Nature no longer runs the Earth. We do. It is our choice what happens from here. (Lynas 2011). 

Choice. A good word. It is a word that implies morality, freedom as the moral dignity of the species. Moral choice refers to the Divinity within the species. We are not gods but God’s partners. As individuals, through the exercise of moral choice, we recognise the universality of the moral law within ourselves and within others. That brings us in relation to others and in relation to the greater whole. Move along these lines, and the human race may well constitute itself as the God species.





Lynas states his thesis clearly: 

playing God (in the sense of being intelligent designers) at a planetary level is essential if creation is not to be irreparably damaged or even destroyed by humans unwittingly deploying our new-found powers in disastrous ways. At this late stage, false humility is a more urgent danger than hubris. The truth of the Anthropocene is that the Earth is far out of balance, and we must help it regain the stability it needs to function as a self-regulating, highly dynamic and complex system. It cannot do so alone. (Lynas 2011). 

Lynas looks at the problem from entirely the wrong end. The Earth is not out of balance, it is our current technics which are ill-balanced, with technical means displacing conscious ends. It is this inversion of means and ends at the heart of civilisation that lies behind the damage we are inflicting on the planet as well as upon ourselves. The destruction of the planet is mirrored in the destruction the ill-balance in our technics has wrought upon society. Human society is characterised by the poverty of abundance. We are rich in means but poor in ends. The poverty, famine, disease etc that stalk the world are the product of an iniquitous and exploitation arrangement of our productive powers and it is that ill-balance that drives the destruction of our natural life support systems. A failure to grasp that basic point will undermine any argument from the start.
Again, the way Lynas phrases his argument sounds like he has appropriated the form of Marx’s but stripped his argument of moral and political content. Marx stated the problem succinctly: ‘The new​fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want.’ Now they are destroying the planet. The obvious conclusion is that human beings should assume responsibility for their transformative powers. That’s Lynas’ conclusion, but he frames it so generally with respect to technology for it to mean anything. It is politically vacuous, which is always worrying in an argument. Society, no less than nature, abhors a vacuum. The vacuum is soon filled by powerful social and political forces, bureaucracy and technology in the service of existing asymmetrical power relations. Not the least of adverse consequences of the defeat of socialism is the tendency to eschew political economy and social critique, and hence to avoid issues of power, control, class, exploitation, authority, distribution of resources. This is quite an omission. It invites a backdoor politics. Social and economic questions are turned into technical questions and are given technological and engineering solutions. The crucial problems of human society are thus removed from there sphere of political controversy and are therefore insulated from political intervention, dispute and alteration. 

Lynas boldly opines that ‘this means jettisoning some fairly sacred cows.’ It transpires that it means jettisoning politics for technocratic solutions, making problems and their solutions the domain of experts rather than of the demos. So what does Lynas want? The usual suspects are on the list – nuclear power (which is ‘environmentally benign’), genetic engineering, (‘a powerful technology that can help humanity limit its environmental impact and feed itself better in the process), synthetic biology. 
I am not going to waste time debating the pros and cons of any of these technologies. There is a wealth of research material out there. It is easy to spot when you are being sold a pup and my advice to anyone is to read against your prejudices and see why the alternate view might be right. I don’t buy double glazing from door to door salesmen and I don’t buy insurance in the street. I don’t like seeing a sales pitch in a book. Scepticism is in order, particularly when the sales pitch paints the alternative view as ignorant, prejudiced and irremediably wrong. ‘Anyone who still marches against nuclear today, as many thousands of people did in Germany following the Fukushima accident, is in my view just as bad for the climate as textbook eco-villains like the big oil companies.’ (Lynas 2011). In my view …. It is opinion, editorial. What are we supposed to do with abuse like this, hurl it back? And what then becomes of reason? Refusing nuclear power is not the cause of the climate crisis, it is the ever increasing energy demands of an industrial capitalist economy that Lynas refuses to examine.

And this is my real concern. The problems of human society are political, social and economic not technological. This calls for a social solution, not a technological one. The application of new technologies whilst leaving existing social institutions and structures unchanged amounts to a more effective equipment and powering of the very system that is destroying the planet. So it is fairly easy to hurl Lynas’ abuse back in his face – those who proselytise for the application of new technologies within existing social relations of production is not only just as bad for the climate as textbook eco-villains like the big oil companies, they are on the same side.

Lynas’ conclusion on the need to embrace nuclear, GM crops and biotechnology confirms this interpretation:

But the lesson is clear: we cannot afford to foreclose powerful technological options like nuclear, synthetic biology and GE because of Luddite prejudice and ideological inertia. (Lynas 2011). 

It’s never long before the Luddites are wheeled on for some ignorant abuse. I am always suspicious whenever I hear the ‘Luddite’ jibe being thrown. It should by now be well known that the Luddites were not against machinery, they wanted it to be the means to human ends, not the end in itself. That humanisation of technological power remains the challenge that the human species has yet to meet. The historian EP Thompson’s brilliant work in this area makes any repetition of the Luddite myth unforgivable as ignorance but explainable as politics. It makes us question just how much the perpetrator of this myth actually does know. It was not prejudice that caused the Luddites to attack machinery, but politics. The absence of politics will always leave an argument dangerously open. Here we see the problems caused by Lynas’ inadequacy with respect to political economy and social critique. The Luddites represented a political movement aiming to alter the social relations of production in order to apply the new forces of production for social benefit. This remains the challenge is our technological powers are to be used for ecological benefit too. Lynas doesn’t grasp that point. He refers to our ‘new-found powers’. The words sound like Marx writing about our ‘new-fangled powers’, but the argument falls woefully short of Marx’s call for ‘new-fangled men’.

We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men - and such are the working men. They are as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself. In the signs that bewilder the middle class, the aristocracy and the poor prophets of regression, we do recognize our brave friend, Robin Good-fellow, the old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer - the Revolution. The English working men are the first-born sons of modern industry. They will then, certainly, not be the last in aiding the social revolution produced by that industry, a revolution which means the emancipation of their own class all over the world, which is as universal as capital-rule and wages-slavery. (Marx AB SE 1973). 

Marx goes on to note that ‘the heroic struggles the English working class’ have been ‘shrouded in obscurity’ and ‘burked by the middle-class historian’. This class struggle is still off the agenda. Those who promote the power of new technologies to resolve social problems sound radical but they are really shallow and superficial. They talk past the real problem. In the famous 1859 Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx argues that ‘at a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production…. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.’ 
But it is not social revolution at all which Mark Lynas is proposing. He cannot see these new technologies as the new productive forces which are breaking the fetters of the old social relations. Indeed, Lynas expresses some very reactionary views. He declares that many of the campaigns being run by the big environmental groups are ‘irrelevant or even counterproductive.’ He then mentions carbon offsetting as a palliative that the Green movement has discredited without good reason, ‘harming both the climate and the interests of poor people in the process.’ That is assertion. ‘Some Green groups have also made it very difficult to use the climate-change negotiations as a way to save the world's forests by insisting that rainforest protection should not be eligible for carbon credits.’ And so on. That’s the nature of politics, that the nature of the issues. There are pros and there are cons, they are debated in the political arena. To cite specific examples and then generalise to form sweeping conclusions is just vacuous. The idea that carbon offsetting is a palliative that wastes time and resources whilst reinforcing ecologically damaging practices is perfectly arguable. For Lynas to just pronounce is not reasoned debate which cites the evidence either way, it is just assertion, opinion and abuse. His book is so full of such loaded argument that it would be tedious to keep making the point. ‘Blaming the rich countries alone for climate change may tick all the right ideological boxes, but it is far from being the full story.’ (Lynas 2011). A straw man. Name names, Lynas. Who blames rich countries alone for climate change amongst the environmental movement? This is an argument used by those favouring development in places like India and China. Further, just because the rich countries alone are not responsible for climate change doesn’t mean that the rich countries do not bear the heaviest responsibility. It becomes clear from the first that Lynas is pitching his claims at the extreme in order to stir controversy and make a name.

Lynas adopts the same combination of assertion, opinion, abuse and caricature when he states the case for geoengineering.

Most Greens also emphatically object to geoengineering - the idea that we could consciously alter the atmosphere to counteract climate change, for example by spraying sulphates high in the stratosphere lo act as a sunscreen. But the objectors seem to forget that we are already carrying out massive geoengineering every day, as a hundred million people step into their cars, a billion farmers dig their ploughs into the soil, and 10 million fishermen cast their nets. (Lynas 2011).

What rot. No Green has forgotten any of this at all. Talk about setting up straw men. Lynas has forgotten what Greens do say on this issue, if he ever knew at all (remember his words on how little he researched the issues he campaigned on). ‘They’ say something outrageous whereas I am the voice of reason. The rest of the book proceeds along these lines, making for a kind of journalistic pseudo-science concealing some very dubious politics. Oohh look at all our big toys, what big things we can do with them if we all agree I’m right. What could possibly go wrong! Technology and its application is not all of the same character. To justify specific technologies which are contentious by pointing to the application of technology in general is a deliberate obfuscation. It’s like saying that we cannot criticise GM crops because we already have agriculture. We can’t criticise this particular application of this specific technology because we are already applying technology in the manipulation of nature. We can criticise, we need to retain a critical attitude to anything we do.
Lynas’ approach here is to state generally that ‘many Greens talk rubbish ….’ Well, the rubbish is not worth wasting breath on. The argument must be engaged on its strongest points. It’s OK to provoke debate and cause controversy, but there is no value in generating so much hot air as to cloud enlightenment.

The God Species does indeed provoke controversy, but more by its failings than by its merits. There is certainly a need to examine the evidence with respect to new technologies. The call for a debate is disingenuous because the issues have been debated from the first. What Lynas was after was to bully the green movement to abandon its well researched, principled and highly effective repudiation of nuclear, biotechnology, GM crops and geoengineering. Lynas talks of prejudice, yet his book is very thinly researched in comparison to those produced by serious green and environmentalist authors. That assertion, opinion and caricature should be taken so seriously reinforces the need for high-quality debate in these areas. I have no trouble in taking a stand on science, reason, evidence and argument to counter the wild generalisations, crude caricatures, unwarranted assumptions, prejudicial stereotypes and blatant misrepresentations now being aggressively peddled by advocates of contentious new technologies against green critics. Lynas is one of these. Lovelock does the same. So does Stewart Brand. The same assertions, the same thin, highly selective approach to evidence, the same resort to caricature, the same pat solutions. They call greens prejudiced, ignorant, fearful, militant, extreme, yet their arguments are scarcely reasoned, full of contradictions and are very short on evidence. Friends of the Earth, for one, have called Lynas’ bluff and have stated their willingness to debate with him. Greens have been debating these issues since ever and have nothing to fear from the same old assertions dressed up as new thinking.

Take this from Lynas: ‘The difference seems to come down to one of intent: is unwitting and bad planetary geoengineering really better than witting and good planetary geoengineering? I am not so sure.’ Come off it. He’s very sure. Load the question and then claim not to know the answer! This is poor stuff. This kind of stuff doesn’t make an author controversial, it makes him inadequate, disingenuous or just plain bigoted.

At the very least a reflexive rejectionist position risks repeating the mistakes of the anti-genetic engineering campaign, where opposing a technology a priori meant that lots of potential benefits were stopped or delayed for no good cause. Being against something can have just as big an opportunity cost as being for it. 

Not so. It can avoid the catastrophes of unintended and unforeseen consequences. The precautionary principle is needed here. Apart from anything else, it is always grounds for suspicion when a writer focuses on technology in abstraction from the social relations within which it is applied. The problem is not one of production but of distribution. We can already produce enough food to satisfy global demand. The crucial question is why we don’t. Who do you think will be in control of the production and distribution of GM food? The same people who are in charge now, rationing food production for profits.

More positively, Lynas states his case for human beings as the God species.

Most importantly, environmentalists need to remind themselves that humans are not all bad. We evolved within this living biosphere, and we have as much right to be here as any other species. Through our intelligence, Mother Earth has seen herself whole and entire for the first time from space. 

Even this is not new. Our Judaeo-Christian inheritance places human beings at the top of the hierarchical Chain of Being, precisely on account of our intelligence. How ironic that all our scientific achievement has brought human beings back to the centre of the world. Human being as the intelligence at the heart of the living biosphere.
It is an interesting claim and well worth further examination. Is this a new Teilhardism? How about human intelligibility is the key to planetary self-knowledge. The physicist is the atom’s way of knowing about atoms and being known as an atom; same with geneticists and genes and neuroscientists and neurons. Lynas seems to think the argument is a criticism of greens as such, insofar as they think human beings are an unnatural blight on the planet. But this is an argument that applies deep ecologists rather than all ecologists, and even then only on the basis of a misunderstanding of deep ecology. And there are strong arguments to be made to show how and why the planet could be remotely concerned about just one of its species. Lynas’ case is the same at the claim by all religions that God made this one small planet for ‘Man’. That seems to be where we are, whether or not it is scientifically or morally true. We are the centre of our universe, it’s just that we need to see ourselves also as part of a greater universe. This is to see the human species not so much as gods but as partners involved in a co-evolution with God. In other words, human beings are Gaia’s way of knowing herself and being known. God needs human beings in order to be known as God.

Lovelock, Lynas and Brand have strayed into theological territory, but show no aptitude for the task. To paraphrase Yuri Gagarin, I can’t see God in these pages.

‘Perhaps the environmentalist and futurist Stewart Brand put it best when he wrote these words: 'We are as gods and have to get good at it.' Amen to that. (Lynas ch 1 2011). 
No, no, no. It’s not as easy as that, not so simple at all. The human race has been this way many, many times before and the issue has been subject to deep examination and argumentation. Has Lynas never heard of Prometheus stealing fire from the gods? Being as god is a pretension of all those who equate divinity with the possession of power. Does Faust not ring any bells? Nietzsche wrote that human beings should not have such powers that they cannot creatively live up to. Nietzsche announced the death of God. We have killed him and must now become gods. Are we good enough? That is the question. Fall short, and that god-like power will rebound.

Having set up his straw man – ecologists who value nature over against ‘unnatural’ human beings – Lynas proceeds to knock him down.

Listening to some environmentalists talk, it is easy to get the feeling that humanity is somehow unnatural, a malign external force acting on the natural biosphere from the outside. They have it wrong. 

Never mind this ‘some’ and ‘they’ – Lynas should tell us who? Most of the environmental literature I read makes it plain that environmentalists for the most part well understand that human beings are entirely natural and that human action is natural, whether or not it is ecologically benign or harmful. The target of this attack always turns out to be a handful of deep ecologists and natural scientists. And there are strong reasons for arguing that the criticism misrepresents deep ecology in any case.

Human beings as planetary killer apes
Of course, just because human beings are natural doesn’t make all human action good. A thing isn’t good simply on account of its being natural. What is news here? The natural law tradition does not identify the good with the natural but refers to nature through the eyes of reason. Lynas’ argument proceeds from human origins. ‘We are just apes’ he asserts. No we are not. We share a common ancestor but Lynas’ whole case rests upon our intelligence – as in the natural law tradition. We certainly need to start applying this intelligence.

But with our newfound global power comes a responsibility for proper global stewardship. This is a new task for humans to take on, certainly at a planetary level. But the time for this shift is long overdue, for a brief review of our history to date shows us in a very singular role: that of serial killers. (Lynas ch 2 2011). 

Stewardship? This is the new reading of Genesis, taking the place of dominion. The axial religions have always known of the beast in man and have ever sought to tame it. Darwinian science has targeted this notion of human uniqueness. Now we are having to relearn the old lessons. But what if Darwinian biology is right? What remains of God if we are too hard-wired to change? If human beings are planetary killer apes invested with the power of god, then it’s hard to see how that could turn out well. Lynas cannot criticise some environmentalists for seeing human beings as a blight on nature, only to argue that human beings are ‘just’ killer apes and no more. It is impossible to see how human beings could ever constitute themselves as the God Species on the basis of such a ruthless biological determinism.

Lynas refers to the extinction of the Neanderthals, who clung to life in the remote mountainous parts of France until 38,000 years ago, and in southern Spain until about 30,000 years ago. ‘The very last families died a few thousand years later in Gorham's Cave in what is now Gibraltar, when their final refuge on the extreme southern edge of the continent was overrun. Officially, the direct cause of their ultimate demise is a mystery, but I think we can guess who the culprit was.’ (Lynas ch 2 2011). Could it have been the God species by any chance?

Lynas details the role of human beings in wiping out animals all over the world, leaving nothing but ghost habitats behind. Only in Africa were the animals left relatively unscathed, but no more. African ecosystems have been used as a model for proponents of 'rewilding' parts of North America; if cheetahs, elephants and camels can be imported into places like Montana, perhaps they could assume the ecological niches vacated by their extinct relatives, some have suggested. ‘This is a romantic but vain hope, not least because the ancient homeland of these large surviving animals is seriously endangered by today's generations of human beings. Africa is safe no more.’ (Lynas ch 2 2011). Eden is no more. Our way back to Eden is now blocked. 

Lynas goes on to describe whaling, seal culling, example after example of human beings as planetary killer apes. ‘Species after species was relentlessly pursued.’ The details paint a grim picture of a relentless, rapacious creature. So powerful is the picture that it is well nigh impossible to see how these killer apes who have murdered their way through millennia could ever turn into gods. No wonder that Jonathan Swift made the rational, peace loving horses the heroes of Gulliver’s Travels. Swift also referred to the English as 'the most pernicious race of little odious vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth'. Reading Lynas on human beings as the killer ape, it seems that Swift was being generous with respect to humanity as a whole.

The price on Nature’s head
How does Lynas propose to protect nature? By bringing it within the market and putting a price on it. Yes, that’s what the neo-liberals and utilitarians want to do too, as Lynas must know.

Our chief task today is to design systems that value nature in a direct and marketable sense and deliver hard cash to those who are in a position to protect ecosystems in a reasonably intact state. What is needed is not more moralising, but more money. (Lynas ch 2 2011). 

Without a hint of irony, Lynas comments that ‘this kind of talk makes many environmentalists queasy.’ Of course it does. Environmentalists have seen the damage caused by commercialisation of the environment and the commodification of natural resources. Simply putting a price on nature and natural resources does not mean that that price will be paid. What happens when a place or a species is declared ‘uneconomic’ according to market forces. This is just loose talk, again. Lynas seems to be unaware of the debates over ‘green capitalism’ and green economics. Where has he been? A quick glance at my library yields plenty of books on the green economy. Take The Green Economy by Michael Jacobs (1991). There is a wealth of discussion concerning markets, valuing the environment, sustainable development. Plenty of Greens accept markets. The whole idea of Green taxes is based on market mechanisms, so we can tell Lynas to pull the other one. The real concern is commodification, for the very good reason that it seeks the solution to ecological problems in economic terms – the very cause of the problem. 
The issue is complex. Scientists are still very far from identifying and naming the species on the planet and far from evaluating their qualities, what they contribute to ecosystems and so on. A sweeping statement to the effect we should marketise the environment and make resources subject to the principles of exchange value is vacuous. There are better discussions of the issue elsewhere. Again, Lynas presents an opinion, not a reasoned argument.

‘Money is a measure of value: put a price on wild animals and plants and we will put a value on them too. This is a pragmatic strategy, only to be used in desperation because the others have failed.’ (Lynas ch 2 2011). And if animals and plants do not have an immediate economic value? Then they go to extinction, like the pits once described as ‘uneconomic’, destroyed, along with the coal communities and the whole way of life they sustained. This is poor stuff. This doesn’t make me queasy, it just makes me wonder why I am wasting my time. There are better books to read.
But Lynas is worth pursuing at some length, because his arguments amplify the reductio ad absurdum of environmentalism as technology. Take this:

But how can the value of natural systems be quantified, let alone brought into the market? A possible approach is to try to assign an imputed shadow price to the ecosystem services - fresh water, clean air, recreational benefits and so on - that different habitats deliver. One study suggests a value of $200,700 per square kilometre for 'high-biodiversity wilderness areas', whilst another finds that 'endemic bird areas' might be worth $88,710 per square kilometre. The imputed value of coral reefs - as destinations for tourism, nurseries for commercially valuable fish and shoreline protectors against storms, for example - has ranged from $100,000 to $600,000 per square kilometre. The values of individual species have also been quantified, based on estimates from public surveys of 'willingness to pay' to prevent their elimination. Using this methodology (and in 2005 US dollars) the Eurasian red squirrel is worth $2.87; the California sea otter $36.76; the giant panda $13.81; the Mediterranean monk seal (almost extinct): $17.54; the blue whale: $44.57; the brown hare: $0.00; the Asian elephant: $1.94; the Northern spotted owl: $59.43; and the loggerhead sea turtle: $16.98.

You only have to state the argument in these terms for its inanity to become evident. What is a human being worth? What is Mark Lynas worth? How much is a Claudia Schiffer worth? The equality of all souls before God is replaced by the inequality of a person’s value to the economy. If resources are limited, would you choose to pay for a Gisele Bundchen or a Mark Lynas? If it seems wrong to put a monetary value on a human being, then there is something wrong with the principle as such. Either life is sacred in all its forms or it is not in any. That’s the ecological principle of Nature as an interconnected web of life. The supposedly new environmentalism of Lynas and Brand actually falls far short of the new ecology.
If there is nothing wrong with assigning a monetary value as a principle, then a price can be put on the head of every human being on the planet. Of course, capitalism has been doing this from the start. If the principle is right, we can put a monetary value on a person. How much is an Irishman worth compared to an Englishman, how much is a black person worth compared to a white person, how much is a girl worth compared to a boy? These calculations have taken place in history and are still taking place today in various parts of the world. And they are an affront to human dignity. They are a denial of the moral worth of each and every human being. Or is Lynas exempting the human species? We may exploit and use nature and its resources as we see fit. Except that is nothing new. That is what we are already doing. That is why we have a problem.

Lynas defends himself against the criticism: ‘insisting that natural systems are priceless, as many campaigners do, is in practice akin to setting their effective price at zero. The language and practices of economics may offer the strongest tools today for use in nature conservation.’ (Lynas ch 2 2011). 
But this argument only applies within the language of capitalist economics. The lack of a political economy makes itself felt here. The extent to which economy is conflated with capitalism in these arguments is significant. Surely it is a reconstruction of economics to create the green economy that is required. If you don’t believe in this as a possibility, then you are not a green. That’s fine. Just don’t tell greens not to be greens. You say you can save the planet, we say we can save the planet. It’s called politics. Instead of asking us to join you, you join us. We are not obligated to continue with capitalism – particularly since the whole system is imploding.

Climate Change
Lynas is remarkably blasé about climate change.

solving climate change is actually a lot simpler than most people think. Global warming is not about overconsumption, morality, ideology or capitalism. It is largely the result of human beings generating energy by burning hydrocarbons and coal. It is, in other words, a technical problem, and it is therefore amenable to a largely technical solution, albeit one driven by politics. (Lynas ch 3 2011).

This is a blunt assertion that the problem of global warming is a technical problem requiring a technical solution. ‘Albeit one driven by politics’, he casually adds – including morality and ideology no doubt. This is slack. To reduce this to technology is to massively miss the point. Technology needs to be set within technics so as to emphasise how technology is shaped by politics, culture, morality, ideology, social arrangements and economic imperatives. 

Lynas asserts boldly that: "Global warming is not about overconsumption, morality, ideology or capitalism. It is largely the result of human beings generating energy by burning hydrocarbons and coal." That faulty reasoning typifies Lynas’ argument. The question is what lies behind the energy demands of human beings. In making the distinction he does, Lynas neglects the reason why we burn fossil fuels. That neglect may be innocent. It might not be. In its critical conception, the concept of ideology refers to a body of ideas or perceptions that rationalises and conceals and thereby preserves existing power relations and interests. The extent to which Lynas ignores the key question as to what lies behind our energy demands seems plainly ideological in this sense and begs the question of what is being hidden and protected. Lynas’ attempt to decouple energy consumption from the economic system takes the very thing that needs to be examined out of view – the capital system that demands ever increasing energy demands.

Lynas’ claim amounts to a barefaced denial of the very things that are central to the problem of global heating – overconsumption and overproduction, morality, the displacement of ends chosen by self-conscious human beings by instrumental means concerned with expanding money and power, ideology, the concealing of social relations to protect and serve the powerful, capitalism, the capital system and its dynamic of endless accumulation.

Looking at the wrong end of the problem, Lynas inevitably proposes the wrong solution. 


The burning of fossil fuels is just the vehicle that is hurtling us towards ecological catastrophe and social collapse. To an overwhelming extent these fossil fuels are burnt in pursuit of corporate profits. And to top it all, Lynas would hand corporate capital two other powerful technologies with which to further despoil and destroy the planet: nuclear power and GM food. 

It seems clear, then, that impulse to burn fossil fuels, to cut down rainforests, and engage in an agribusiness that increases emissions of methane gas derives from the pursuit of economic growth, the imperative to accumulate capital and the hedonistic treadmill of consumerism. I do not see how the capital system, organised around the dynamic of accumulation, and driving an endless production and consumption, has no implication at all with respect to global warming. Yet that is what Lynas’ thesis entails. It simply stretches credulity to believe that the crisis in the climate system would be the same regardless of the endless expansion of the capital system. If it is simply a question of replacing dirty energy with clean energy, then why are the solutions so intractable, and why is the political opposition to environmentalism so strong?
As I have argued, we see here the real price of the political defeat of socialism, in that these proposals so utterly lacking in a grasp of political economy that they become subservient to the very forces they are supposed to be challenging.

Lynas thinks that the split between left and right in politics obstructs the promotion of the environmental cause. That seems plausible in only the most general sense. Translating knowledge into public policy implies a change in reality and in the lives of people. That’s when political splits inevitably open up. Lynas is right to work for consensus. Real, enduring change must be grounded in a substantial body of popular thought and practice. However, there is a danger that the pursuit of consensus could become mere political evasion. The split between left and right is a very insignificant explanation of climate change denial and inaction. The principal driver is the corporate capture of government and the way that vested interests have corrupted the debate and effectively obstructed the process by which politicians are able to translate scientific knowledge into public policy. Add to that an electoral system that panders to the electorate as individual voters and which proceeds within the culture of 'more, more, more' that Lynas explicitly justifies, and we seem to be sleepwalking into the technocratic dystopia. That’s presuming that the planetary engineers are sincere in their proposals and are not actually in the pay of capital.

So there is a need to insist, against Lynas, against Brand, against the planetary engineers who are seeking to reboot the capital system, that global heating is an issue with clear political and moral implications. To supply an economic system which is based on endless economic growth with the technologies and the power to carry on growing would certainly appear to be an act of gross irresponsibility. Yet the political economy of capital is not even an issue for Brand and Lynas. A pattern emerges in these writings in which the capital system and its endless imperatives come to be insulated from the challenge of politics, ethics, ecological awareness and climate science. And that’s precisely what I mean by ideology.

Since the environmental worldview is holistic, emphasising the interconnected nature of problems and solutions, any attempt at decoupling amounts to an assault on environmentalism as such. And, sure enough, this fragmentation is apparent in the way that Lynas goes through his list of Green principles, dismissing each in turn, until all is left is his favoured new technologies. As a holistic philosophy, environmentalism entails a cluster of goals integrated around the ecological imperative. However, Lynas’ decoupling renders these goals irrelevant and even inimical to the need to reduce carbon emissions. So he discards them. All we are left with are GM food and nuclear power. Whatever else that it, it isn’t a Green environmentalism. That is an approach to energy and technology that fits the contours of the capital system perfectly, in which case Lynas case isn’t about any radical change at all – it is an explicit assault on political ecology in favour of the status quo. We already have technoscience in the service of capital and Greens, radicals, socialists, democrats etc know this. Lynas has simply joined the other side.

The clearest proof of this can be seen in the article that Lynas wrote for the Daily Mail, entitled: "You mustn't believe the lies of the Green zealots. And I should know - I was one". Read that again. It means that Greens are liars and zealots. It tells deniers of man-made climate change exactly what they want to hear. I would just contest Lynas’ use of the past tense with regard to his character. His proselytizing for the new technologies is as unreasoned and unresearched as his past activism. 

At least the reference to ‘lies’ indicates that we are still in a world where there is such a thing as truth. Ask yourself this, who gains when opinion and ignorance replaces knowledge and reason? The only thing that you can do is stick to the research and the evidence, otherwise you end up being drawn into a sterile bout of name-calling. 

Lynas presents scarcely researched assertions as scientific fact and dismisses critics as being anti-science and anti-technology. That plays right into the hands of those who wish to denigrate Greens of all kinds as anti-science bigots and zealots pursuing a political agenda. The environmental agenda requires the negotiation of consensus amongst broad sections of the public. At a time when environmental ideas have been advancing to such an extent that this consensus was coming within reach, for the likes of Lynas and Brand and Lovelock to start denigrating Greens in the way they have, breathing new life into the deniers abuse of ‘eco-fascists’ and ‘eco-alarmists’, is a dereliction of duty. Either these characters are political naifs who don’t know the damage they are doing or the attempt to fragment the environmental agenda and have environmentalists turning upon themselves from within is deliberate. Either way, it is beneath contempt.

The Greens are ‘zealots’ who have no scientific foundations to their politics. Lovelock, Brand and Lynas make this claim or variants of it. Funny, I can read this same thing every week in the Daily Express and the Daily Mail. Take Leo McKinstry who refers to the ‘green fanatic Al Gore’ in his Daily Express article Now there are lies, damned lies and global warming (Dec 2009). McKinstry claims that ‘the louder the zealots shriek about our imminent doom, the more dubious their claims look. Far from being an indisputable scientific fact, climate change increasingly looks like a conspiracy organised by the political elite.’ Also from the Express was the article Climate Change ‘Lies’ by Britain, (Anil Dawar and Will Stewart Nov 09). The article concerned a Russian claim that the UK Met Office had cherry-picked climate change figures in a bid to increase evidence of global warming in a report submitted to world leaders at Copenhagen climate summit. Yes, it was the week of that summit…
The fact that these claims are made in certain newspapers doesn’t make them wrong, of course. It’s the evidence one way or the other that decides that. But these are the same papers that will tell you how great the capitalist economy is and how climate change is a bogus science made up by scientists who, riding ‘the eco-gravy train’ ‘ignore or suppress data tending to undermine their pet theories’ (Neil Hamilton The great global warming con). Hamilton gets the obligatory reference to ‘CO2 fanatics’ in. 
Strange company for radical environmentalists, I think. Next we will read that all of modern science is plotting and scheming to undermine the future nuke and GM utopia! Actually, it already is …. According to papers like the Mail and the Express, climate change is a global conspiracy organised by scientists hell bent on world government. So I wonder who really is practising real science in this political quagmire.

The failures of political ecology to make further progress points to the political failure of government subject to corporate capture, not the political failure of the ecology movement. Rather than face up the difficulties of politics, Lynas has bailed out and is to be found indulging in the crudest tactics in the book, making large assertions with respect to science and technology and denouncing anyone who disagrees with him as anti-science and anti-technology. This is moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the highest order. It is not evidence of a scientific mind or method at all, quite the opposite. Pushing arguments to extremes, colouring complex issues requiring research and evidence as simple black and white, splitting debate between us and them, has nothing in common with science and reason. It’s pure bigotry, politics masquerading as science. Even a cursory examination of the evidence and the claims that Lynas makes uncovers basic factual errors in Lynas’ argument. His book is very, very light on research, as though Lynas has started from a pre-determined agenda and merely cherry picked his data and evidence from whatever web sites he could find.
Lynas refers to the lies of the Green zealots. Yet Lynas’ book is packed with anti-scientific assertions and facts such as the death toll resulting from Chernobyl "is likely to have been less than 50". The WHO, a conservative organisation leant on by the IAEA, claims up to 9000 dead. 

But to reason at the level of evidence is to miss what is really going on here. This is a politically motivated assault against environmentalism, an attempt to fracture the environmental movement from within, and an attempt to portray Green principles as lacking in scientific foundation and Green politics as the province of bigots and zealots. The mere mention of some of the names who have inspired contemporary environmentalism is sufficient to deal with this little snit – from Jacques Cousteau to David Attenborough. These people have more science in the dirt under their finger nails, dirt earned in the field, than is contained in all the black ink that the likes of Lynas have spewed out, whose misleading claims are blacker than the black death and which may prove to be twice as deadly.

‘I often receive emails telling me that fixing the climate will need a worldwide change in values, a programme of mass education to reduce people's desires to consume, a more equitable distribution of global wealth, 'smashing the power' of transnational corporations or even the abolition of capitalism itself. After having struggled with this for over a decade myself, I am now convinced that these viewpoints - which are subscribed to by perhaps a majority of environmentalists - are wrong. Instead, we can completely deal with climate change within the prevailing economic system. In fact, any other approach is likely doomed to failure. (Lynas ch 3 2011).

What? The solution to economic and environmental crisis could necessitate the abolition of capitalism ‘even’!!! Perish the thought! To Lynas, the global economic crisis seems to be something that has happened to other people. Has he not seen the scale of the public bailouts, the global arms budget, does he not appreciate the symbiotic relation of state and capital, the extent to which a few hundred TNCs control vast processes of investment, trade, and employment? Lynas confidently asserts that we can ‘completely’ deal with climate change within the very mentalities and the modalities which are driving the ecological crisis. God help us, because it is plain that the God species cannot help itself. 

But at least it is an optimistic view, however misguided. Again, however, it is not clear what is new here. Jonathan Porritt and many others have been working to ‘green’ business for many years, something that has been going on for a couple of decades. We can all shout ‘we’re doomed’. Anyone who thinks that the problems of capitalism can be solved within capitalism should be locked within a room full of the collected works of Karl Marx and told to work out what Marx meant by the words ‘contradiction’ and ‘crisis’. There was another good word that Marx used, ‘revolution’.

Lynas gives two options that ‘certainly won't work’. Reducing the global population and restraining economic growth. Well, he’s right. But his reasoning is lamentable.

Greens have for years called into question GDP as a measure of true progress, but the reality is that increasing prosperity - measured in material consumption - is non-negotiable both politically and socially, especially in developing countries. (Lynas ch 3 2011). 

Robert Kennedy called the GNP into question as a measure of progress. Indeed, the economist who originated GNP never intended it to be used as a measure of progress. Nobel prize winning economists are calling GNP as a measure of progress into question. Sarkozy in France and Cameron in the UK are looking at ways of measuring happiness as more than material progress. So Lynas is behind even the political right here. To be fair, he recognises that ‘the fact that GDP does not necessarily equate to happiness is an important point to make.’ But he completely fails to recognise the import of the point when he goes on to state that ‘it won't cut much ice with the billions of people - a majority of humanity - who are poor, insecure or malnourished in today's world. For them economic growth is not a choice but a necessity.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011). 
Of course it won’t cut any ice with those who need material development. The argument questions continued material development where people are wealthy, secure and well-fed, not where material development is needed. Lynas is conflating two very different issues here. Either he is out of his depth on these issues or he is deliberately confusing the argument to win a cheap point. The Easterlin Paradox in economics shows how increased material prosperity increases happiness to a diminishing degree to a certain degree of affluence and then diminishes happiness beyond that point. 
There is a real point here. The living standards in the already economically developed world have risen to unprecedented levels in terms of quantity, but happiness levels are no higher, if at all. All manner of stresses and ailments afflict the modern world. In Dancing in the Streets A History of Collective Joy Barbara Ehrenreich 2008 shows the extent to which material ‘progress’ has been associated with the rise in depression and decline in joy. The constant accumulation of quantity intensifies the stresses and strains of modern civilisation and diminishes health, well-being and happiness. Happiness, eudaimonia, what Aristotle understood as ‘flourishing’, depends less on the quantity of things the individual possesses and more on the quality of the human relationships within which we live. And these relationships can be improved. In an overdeveloped society there is too much emphasis placed on striving for personal success relative to others. These ‘others’ are seen as competitors for scarce resources. This establishes society as a zero-sum game, in which one person’s success implies another person’s failure. That kind of relative game is endless, as individuals struggle to position themselves ahead of each other, with success measured in terms of material quantity, the amount of goods and the kind of good each gets relative to others. In a flourishing society, individuals achieve happiness in relation with each other, not against each other. This pertains to the quality of human relationships.

In other words, economic growth is more of an issue in underdeveloped economies, happiness more of an issue in the overdeveloped. Isn’t such even development precisely what marxist economists always argued for? Isn’t that what ecological balance entails?
Why is Lynas pretending that economic growth is all of a piece and is the same the world over? Does Lynas really think that the main agents of economic growth – the TNCs and global finance – promote economic growth because they want to solve poverty in the underdeveloped world? Why has most trade and expansion been in the developed world? Could it have anything to do with the overriding aim of capital accumulation? Lynas’ argument is lame in the extreme, completely innocent of institutional and structural analysis and implication.
Greens have long since gone past the assertion of ‘no-growth’. The serious argument involves differentiating between different kinds of economic growth – this growth or no-growth is a false antithesis – Lynas must know this, which begs the question why he simplifies things to this extreme. Of course, the reason is clear. Material expansion is ‘non-negotiable’ simply because the capital system is organised around an accumulative logic. Capital requires a continuous self-expansion of values or it collapses. The state must facilitate the process of private accumulation as a condition of its own power. Lynas declares this highly political issue ‘non-negotiable’. Of course, power survives and thrives by being removed from political controversy and being protected from political intervention and alteration. That’s what Lynas does here. 

Lynas optimistically speculates that we could decarbonise the global economy so that economic growth and environmental progress go together. Isn’t that what the likes of Nicholas Stern are arguing, without the indulgent baiting of political groups and movements? This is only controversial insofar as economic growth as such is identified as environmentally destructive. It all depends. Lynas is making a trite observation here. Whether or not economic growth is environmentally destructive depends on how it is achieved. If we are talking about capitalism and its imperative of endless accumulation, then Lynas is presuming that an economics of infinity can go hand in hand with an ecology of finity. On that, he is just plain wrong. The use of natural resources is about more than energy.

The fact is that most of the world needs more growth, not less: China has lifted 300 million people out of poverty in the last couple of decades due to its economic miracle. Hundreds of millions more, in Africa now too as well as Asia and Latin America, are determined to follow, as they have every right to. (Lynas ch 3 2011). 

This is an obvious non sequitur – the need for economic growth in the underdeveloped world does not justify continued economic growth in the developed world at all, it doesn’t follow. Lynas is pointing to the need for growth in the underdeveloped world in order to take attention away from the material excess in the overdeveloped world. Ecologists make the case for even development, an approach which restrains growth and consumption in the overdeveloped world whilst promoting economic development where it is needed. Lynas ignores the finer arguments for crude generalisation. It makes it easier to present his argument.

As for China’s economic miracle, there are serious doubts as to whether it is sustainable. Will Hutton gives good arguments here. There are doubts whether China has the political and institutional infrastructure for sustained growth. There are social and environmental costs to China’s growth which have been well covered. Lynas just gives a broad brush stroke, economic growth as such is good. It says everything and nothing. That’s the claim, now argue it. All that we have is a rationalisation of the accumulative logic of the capital system. Capital must necessarily expand its values or collapse. It doesn’t require a moral or intellectual argument in its support.
Much of what Lynas writes has all the hallmarks of cheap journalistic point scoring. Here is an example:

By mid-century, in other words, we will see a world of many more, much richer people. Most Greens view this prospect with dread, for how can the world possibly reduce carbon emissions under such a scenario? The London-based New Economics Foundation (NEF), for example, writes in a recent report: 'If everyone in the world lived as people do in Europe, we would need three planets to support us.' This is nonsensical, for everyone in the world is going to live like Europeans within this century (and Europeans too will also get richer) whether NEF likes it or not, and we will still only have one planet. (Lynas ch 3 2011).

To refute a point by a statement of inevitability is itself nonsensical – this is like saying that economic growth is depleting the Earth’s finite resources, but since it’s going to happen anyway, it is nonsensical to make the criticism. The criticism may be to no avail in face of a human refusal to change behaviour, but it isn’t nonsensical. A doctor can tell a patient with a heart condition to stop smoking in order to live longer, even though s/he knows the patient will carry on regardless. It doesn’t make the advice nonsense, just the behaviour of the patient. What is nonsensical is Lynas’ attitude that although something is destructive and wrong, since it is going to happen anyway, we should promote it.





‘My own perspective on tackling climate change has shifted since I was appointed adviser to President Nasheed of the Maldives in 2009.’ (Whhooo, get him! I think that the power has gone to his head.)
‘Suddenly, having spent most of my life as a journalist, I was confronted with the challenges of real energy supply in a real developing country.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011). Lynas a journalist! No! The faulty reasoning, wild generalisation, and loaded arguments, I would never have thought.

‘This may be difficult for many Greens to swallow, but …. nuclear power is nothing like the environmental threat it has long been made out to be.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011).
It’s not difficult to swallow at all. I just don’t put it anywhere near my mouth. And neither will governments, private businesses, insurance companies, communities. Nuclear is toxic. Nuclear is so safe that no one will insure it, hence the need for massive government underwrite. No-one will touch it.

Instead, by displacing coal from our energy mix, it can be a net win for the biosphere. China, for instance, has 13 operational nuclear plants and 150 more under construction or on the drawing board. Each 1-gigawatt nuclear plant will displace 6 million tonnes of annual CO2 emissions, making this one of the best pieces of climate-related news anywhere in the world. That should be the end of the matter so far as environmentalists are concerned: nuclear is Green. (Lynas ch 3 2011). 

Oh, it’s as cut and dried as that! One paragraph of assertion by a journalist deals with the whole issue in all its complexity. Lynas says nuclear is cheap and safe and that’s the end of the matter. That’s me convinced. If the human race is to seriously deal with its ecological predicament, it needs, most of all, a clear head, cool analysis, dispassionate reasoning and no, absolutely no, political short cuts, ideological assertions, journalistic bluster and tendentious b/s. Read that line again: ‘That should be the end of the matter so far as environmentalists are concerned: nuclear is Green.’ Meet the criticisms raised by environmentalists point by point – and I mean the scientists and researchers who have examined this and found nuclear dangerous, inefficient and expensive – and I would be impressed. The whole field is obfuscated by agenda pushers – this is the last thing we need, a cacophony of assertion and counter-assertion drowning out the serious argument and information. This is Lynas’ opinion, of no more significance than that. There are far better books than this out there, this is so poorly reasoned, with all the typical cheap-jack stock in trade loading of third rate journalism masquerading as knowledge.

Lynas dismisses the importance of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, stating that ‘the actual dangers from increased radiation were minimal: those leaving Tokyo on aircraft will have soaked up more radiation from cosmic rays on their flights than if they had stayed put in the Japanese capital.’ Such claims were made immediately by scientists as part of an agenda of news management. We now know it to be tommyrot. So long as the pro-nuclear argument is larded with such misinformation and wishful thinking and populated by people who play fast and loose with the truth, it will rightly be treated with suspicion. Powerful people have lied to the people throughout history and they still do.

Lynas makes the claim that ‘the fear of radiation is vastly more potent than the real thing’. Radiation is used in many walks of life and is always handled to the highest of safety standards. There is a reason for that. It’s dangerous.

Lynas doesn’t think that the Fukushima disaster – a disaster, we should not forget, we were constantly told was not possible in a developed and democratic nation, given engineering advances -  will be enough to stall the nuclear renaissance. Why? Because refusal to go nuclear forces a greater dependence on coal – ‘which by every measure is vastly more toxic and dangerous than nuclear.’ ‘Japan too has little option but to stick with nuclear’. 

That’s not an argument, that’s a choice between necessary and unavoidable evils. The options are not coal or nuclear. If nuclear is the answer, we seriously need to ask another question. The assumption of ever increasing energy inputs needs to be examined thoroughly and traced to the expansionary dynamic of capital accumulation. Of course, if this is ‘non-negotiable’ then the situation is hopeless. The USA used more energy in the last half of the twentieth century than every civilisation in history put together. That way lies suicide. You can choose life or you can choose death. There are many ways to die. Nuclear is one, coal is another.

Lynas makes a positive assertion here. ‘Any reasonable science-based assessment, such as Greens insist should guide us when considering climate change, refutes most of what the anti-nuclear lobby dishes out as 'fact'.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011). We would be in a better position to judge the veracity of Lynas’ claim here if he had bothered to cite any of these assessments. He claims the term ‘reasonable’ for the pro-nuclear argument and puts the research of the anti-nuclear position in inverted commas. The antithesis between the ‘reasonable science-based assessment’ on the one hand and the ‘anti-nuclear lobby’ is crude. With ‘fact’ in inverted commas, we are given the impression that the position against nuclear has no basis in reason and evidence.
‘The British environmental writer George Monbiot has even compared anti-nuclear activists to global warming deniers in terms of their treatment of the science on radiation.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011). Bully for George Monbiot. George Monbiot says nuclear is good and so, therefore, nuclear must be good. The pro-nuclear argument has more substance to it than this, but so too does the anti-nuclear argument. Lynas’ presentation of the case for nuclear is worthless. Note the indulgent criticisms of the critics of nuclear power – but no actual attempt to meet the critics’ arguments. Just a statement that those arguments have been refuted. Lynas hasn’t even given the arguments. The abuse is beneath contempt, since measured criticisms of nuclear based on reason and evidence are out there. This kind of argumentation does neither side in the debate any favours.

The claims for nuclear power are not new. They have been studied to death over the years. And the new claims for nuclear have also been examined and found wanting. Paul Brown, environment correspondent, has little trouble rebutting these claims in Voodoo Economics and the Doomed Nuclear Renaissance. Brown sums up the response to Lynas, but the points apply equally to Lovelock and Brand:

‘There are no grounds for saying that a fourth generation of nuclear power would prevent proliferation. There are three generations at present; the third generation is the one being constructed in Finland and another in France. It is the type the government wants to build in England. Many 'new' designs for new nuclear power stations exist, all of them called fourth generation reactors. What this means is they could be the new form of reactors adopted after this present third generation. For all of them it is claimed they will be cheaper, safer, and better in every way than the present generation. All this is unproved hype. The reason they have not been built is essentially because the first one (of every design) would be very expensive to build and might not work. No government is prepared to fund them so far. 
The fourth generation that Lynas is talking about is a design that will burn existing stocks of plutonium and uranium thereby reducing stocks of these bomb-making materials, therefore reducing proliferation dangers. The UK government was asked by British Nuclear Fuels to sanction research and development into building one of these at Sellafield but was refused on the grounds of cost. 
No one knows whether an 'integral fast reactor breeder plant' would really work. Fast breeders only worked on small-scale dustbin-size projects and broke every time France, Japan, and Russia tried to scale them up. Note the 'close to' fail-[argument]. [He] could have said in theory the design is fail-safe. In other words it has not been tried, so how can you know? Nuclear fission is a controlled nuclear explosion. It is virtually impossible to make it fail-safe. (Brown, P. The Environmentalist's Nuclear Debate:(2) Mark Lynas. 19 August 2008. http://thelazyenvironmentalist.blogspot.com/searc (​http:​/​​/​thelazyenvironmentalist.blogspot.com​/​searc​) h?q=nuclear).

In fine, the case for fourth generation nuclear reactors is purely theoretical. The models currently being built around the world are third generation reactors. It costs millions of dollars in just to get a reactor design to market, with additional expense accruing from the likelihood that reactors will be modified from plant to plant in light of required improvements. Theoretically, the case can be made for the next generation nuclear technologies being safer, but the many drawbacks make proposals for the mass deployment of nuclear ludicrous. 


Compared to renewable energy, the case for nuclear pales. Not only is renewable energy safer, cleaner, more efficient, it a democratic form of energy. Nuclear abstracts power from local hands and centralises control. Nuclear power proceeds hand in hand with the state and with the militarization of politics and economics. Renewable energy is empowering and engaging with respect to its users, fostering community control and cohesion and making self-reliance possible. It seems that a large part of the attraction of nuclear is that it makes energy safe for governing and business elites. Energy is power and power is the last thing ruling elites want the people to have.

Of course, a range of small generators involves complexity, and this is something governments dislike. Big government and big business are in symbiotic relation and are characterised by the same modes of thought, action and organisation - large, centralized, top-down and bureaucratic. Such modes work well in controlling power. They fit Weber’s rationalised world in that they proceed according to calculable, quantifiable rationality. In contrast, the demos, individually and collectively, can be chaotic, wilful, contrary and unpredictable. This is not a case for an authoritarian technics at all. In an increasingly complex world, when humanity is becoming not just more numerous but more diverse in expressing needs and interests, having a more differentiated impact on the natural environment, there is a need for a democratic technics which actively engages people as a creative resource. Renewables generate institutional and social options which nuclear must necessarily deny. 
The question of nuclear energy often reads like a dialogue of the deaf. It is not purely a scientific question, no matter the attempts to reduce it to statistics, diagrams, arguments or evidence. Those facts and figures tend to be selected and slanted to prove one case or another. Conclusions are fundamentally contestable and nearly always are contested, often immediately and absolutely. So the debate soon degenerates into a nullifying cycle of claim and counter-claim. To get anywhere on this question, one should be careful of selective evidence, quotations which fit an agenda rather than support an argument, tendency to abuse and caricature. 
The arguments concerning nuclear power tends to polarise not around the scientific for and against at all, but around a division between authoritarian politics and a democratic politics, with dominant interests seeking to protect and advance their power, and subaltern classes seeking to diffuse power in the social body. 

The links between government and the nuclear industry are very close the world over. Lynas, Brand and Lovelock are very good at implying that environmentalists are playing politics and basing their case on fear and prejudice. This is part of the claim and counter-claim cycle. There is plenty more evidence of legerdemain with respect to those in favour of nuclear. Former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s brother, Craig Brown, is Communications Director at EDF, the French 85%-state-owned nuclear giant. With a view to building a number of nuclear reactors in Britain, EDF have taken over British Energy, the sole UK nuclear company. Of course, the usual promise of public consultation on the UK’s nuclear future was made. The first one ended up in the Royal Courts of Justice in London in 2007. Mr Justice Sullivan called the consultation process ‘seriously flawed’, ‘misleading’ and ‘manifestly inadequate and unfair’. (NuclearConsult.com. Homepage: Energy Review.  www.nuclearconsult.com/ (​http:​/​​/​www.nuclearconsult.com​/​​)).
There are therefore a number of very disturbing aspects to the way that nuclear energy is advanced as the solution to climate crisis. Facts and figures are manipulated or avoided to make nuclear look safe, efficient and cheap, when it is none of these things. There are the links between government and the nuclear industry. And there is the way that this 'friends in high places' strategy employed by the nuclear industry subverts democracy. The hyperbole employed by Lovelock, Lynas and Brand combined with the evidence of behind the scenes influence on the part of those advancing nuclear serves only to strengthen public distrust of the industry. This makes it clear that the question is not just one of the relative merits of energy sources with respect to investment in and planning for the future, but also a political question concerning the power to influence and determine government policy. Is the sovereignty of the people more than a fiction? When answering that question bear in mind the way that scientists lament the scientific ignorance of the public. And remember the case for prudential wisdom and judgement, something that goes beyond science.

In the past few years, it seemed as though a nuclear renaissance was under way. Powerful interests had been pushing hard for it and government’s were certainly being persuaded. But projects are being shelved or postponed after the hoped-for deals have stalled. From South Africa to the UK, companies are pulling out of new nuclear programmes, citing cost. The elephant in the room is safety. The reason why nuclear programmes are financially prohibitive is that no-one trusts nuclear, meaning that it requires massive government underwrite.

The tendentious reasoning employed by the likes of Lovelock, Brand and Lynas is probably counter-productive. People might not understand the scientific evidence one way or another but they can spot a sales pitch when they see it. No-one likes buying a pig in a poke, and much that is said in favour of nuclear obscures its true nature. People can spot it and abuse only further entrenches positions. Lovelock refers to the ‘unreasoning fear’ of those against nuclear. It’s not fear, it’s anger at being treated as a fool. The future for nuclear energy has never looked rosy, but a looming climate crisis brought on by fossil fuels combined with ever increasing energy needs offered an opportunity that the nuclear industry couldn’t miss. But there really is no way of concealing the danger, the inefficiency and the expense. The Fukushima disaster combined with financial and economic crises has checked the renaissance of nuclear. Nuclear is an expensive option and there is less and less of the taxpayer's money to go round. Private capital? Forget it. No private company will touch nuclear without government backing, no insurer will go near it. Instead of trying to persuade ‘greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ to go nuclear, Brand and Lynas should be taking their crusade to private insurers. I doubt that they will get far.

The simple truth that advocates of nuclear avoid is that nuclear is prohibitively expensive and, given its dangers, not worth the risk. It is pointless denying this, it is so well known. Abuse and bullying simply entrenches positions. Who likes to be called unreasoning, fearful, prejudiced, ignorant, extremist? All those terms are used against greens and environmentalists in the books by Lovelock, Lynas and Brand. Those are not terms designed to persuade anyone. Not least because they do not even begin to meet the criticisms of nuclear. 
If full-cost pricing is used, the question of whether we should go nuclear wouldn’t even be debated. It is simply too expensive. The cost of paying for disposing of nuclear waste, decommissioning worn-out plants, and insuring reactors against possible accidents and terrorist attacks render the building of nuclear plants prohibitive in financial terms. In terms of both the nuclear industry and its insurance, it is clear that, above and beyond the debatable science, the risk cannot be born.

Nuclear energy fits the contours of capitalism perfectly in that it is a centralised, controllable form of energy under the thumb of an elite. Against it is only a ‘minority’ of environmentalists. This begs the obvious question why governments drag their heels. Get this straight, business interests come first with governments who have never hesitated to override mass movements when necessary. So the idea that only a minority of environmentalists is stopping the US from going nuclear is laughable. Only a scientist innocent of politics could make the claim. Have a look at how the US government operates in climate change talks, they play hardball for business. It’s pillochs to environmentalists at that level. Could it be that governments know fine well that nuclear is too hot to handle?

And we shouldn’t waste too much time on this caricature of critics of nuclear energy as being a minority of environmentalists with political axes to grind. There are countless studies by experts which show nuclear to be expensive, deadly and dangerous. Without exorbitant government backing, no nuclear plants would be built. No-one but government is daft enough to insure them. That’s taxpayers money, by the way. That’s scientists hoodwinking the public on the one hand and filching their purses on the other.
Why Brand and Lynas and Lovelock would choose to target environmentalists as the main critics of nuclear rather than the scientific experts is easy to explain – it makes it seem as though the division is between the scientists who know about these matters and the non-scientists who are working to a political agenda. That they do this, rather than engage with expert analyses and meet their well researched and detailed criticisms, is quite deliberate. It has nothing to do with science and everything to do with loading the argument. 

There isn’t time to waste on nuclear. It is now time to look at cleaner, safer, more democratic renewable energy. Renewable energy is substantially cheaper than nuclear power, and becomes even cheaper in the long term. Whereas nuclear energy centralises power in the hands of the state and generates geopolitical instability, even conflict and war, the renewable energy solution enables individual users and empowers communities. Renewables ensure clean energy security for the people in stark contrast to the environmental and geopolitical insecurity spread by nuclear. Whereas nuclear centralises power and control in a few hands and therefore reinforces the gap between active elites and passive masses, renewable energy expands the range of economic, environmental and social opportunities enabling individuals to exercise power, as individuals or as citizens in their communities. Renewable energy is therefore integral to a democratic technics building the ecological society from below. Nuclear power works in precisely the opposite direction, reinforcing monological modes of technocratic power.
A build-up of nuclear power is not required to create and sustain the renewable energy economy. 
My argument can be stated clearly, renewable solutions are clean, safe, affordable, and available. They are a democratic imperative in that they are less complex than the centralised systems of nuclear power and can be managed by local workforces within a decentralized system. And, as a democratic technics, they are a moral imperative, enabling human beings to become conscious, choosing agents in control of their powers, changing their world and actualising their potentialities in the process. If the phrase ‘the God Species’ has any meaning, then this is how it is constituted.
Here, we can realise ‘citizen science’ (Irwin 1995) as an eco-praxis, people as change agents, changing themselves as they change their world. In realising the eco-society, individuals become eco-citizens. Planetary citizens practising a global planetary ethic in their everyday relation. This is to address the environmental crisis as part of a wider strategy of public engagement. This is more than policy making by government responding to the science – elitist even if government finds the courage to ignore business interests – but generates an ecological consciousness on the part of citizens and communities through practical experience with biospheric and environment-protecting activities. This approach expands opportunities for popular participation in an eco-praxis, raising awareness of ecological issues, extending an ecological sensibility and generating popular support for green policies. People learn by doing, and well done is better than well said. A public educated by their own practice and experience will make it harder for vested interests and deniers to misinform and mislead and will build up the pressure upon governments to finally govern.

Claims made for or against energy forms should be examined to see who really benefits from them and at whose expense. The question is not just one of science. Here we see the ideological character of those who remove politics and economics from the discussion. Renewables are clean, affordable, available but also serve to extend citizen and community participation in the energy market. The potential of nuclear to become a self-interested regime monopolising power is too obvious to even argue. It would be interesting to see how Lovelock, Lynas and Brand could deny the point, however.

Energy and economic imperatives
Lynas adopts the same bullying approach when it comes to wind farms. ‘From a climate-change perspective opposing wind is just as reprehensible as opposing nuclear’ (Lynas ch 3 2011). This is not scientific reasoning at all. ‘Reprehensible’ is a pejorative term, not a scientific term. This is just emotive, politically charged and loaded language – us and them, good and bad, right and wrong. Lynas has not actually met the arguments of the people he refers to in the most vague and general sense as ‘Greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ and he has certainly not established the rightness of his case. Cherry picking the evidence to prove an assertion is not argument.
Many years ago, when I first became a general supporter of the green cause, I was met with horrified glances and furrowed brows and open mouthed incomprehension. Green politics is a middle class politics, a lifestyle or post-materialist issue for the well off or for environmentalists who are either misanthropes studying inanimate matter or geeks obsessed with technology. It’s a political irrelevance, a political ‘cop-out’, I was told. This tennis match of claim and counter-claim concerning energy makes those old warning seem true. Why do we need so much energy anyway is the real question. What is it about the economic system that combines social injustice and inequality with environmental degradation? The paucity of political economy in the works of Lovelock, Brand and Lynas is lamentable. They want an energy efficient way of facilitating the process of private accumulation. Why should anyone who is aware of capitalism as an exploitative and alienative system of asymmetrical class power be concerned how efficiently powered it is? Renewables or non-renewables, nuclear or wind farms, a plague on all your houses. Long before ecological collapse, even before economic collapse, the system will have morally imploded from within as a result of its inherent bloated excess. We’re well on the way already. Only public intervention and expenditure is keeping the global capital economy afloat. This is not sustainable economics, let alone ecologically sustainable.

Lynas’ case can be stated simply. Capitalism requires ever increasing energy inputs to fuel endless and exponential economic growth. Fossil fuels will result in runaway climate change so we had better take our chances with nuclear, because it is really safe and efficient and cheap. ‘Energy is very different from other commodities, for without energy nothing can happen anywhere in the economy.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011).
Of course, Lynas here contradicts the assertions he made earlier about economic growth as being an overriding goal that is simply ‘non-negotiable’, a view which acknowledges no ecological limits. Now, growth is predicated on energy, that is, is constrained by the available of energy. Energy, as anyone with any scientific awareness knows, cannot be produced. So there are limits. Infinite economic growth clashes with finite natural resources. Simple. Lynas’ book is so poorly reasoned, riddled with massive inconsistencies, that its value lies not in Lynas’ case but in highlighting the fallacies, inanities and stupidities of the technological fix.
Example? Lynas rejects the idea that the environmental crisis concerns culture, ideology, morals, way of life and states that it is ‘a technical problem’, ‘amenable to a largely technical solution’ and one that ‘we can completely deal with’ ‘within the prevailing economic system.’ Yet he also makes this statement: ‘Despite frequent claims to the contrary, current technology will not suffice on its own to do the job. We will need dramatic improvements in the efficiency of renewable power sources and breakthroughs also in technological options for removing the additional burden of carbon dioxide that has already accumulated in the atmosphere.’ Lynas continually asserts that the technology is available to do the job –  only to call for further ‘big investments in research, development and demonstration (RD&D) in energy.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011). 
So, as things stand, Lynas is calling for a technological solution which lacks just one thing – the technology. That’ll do the job then.

‘I know many environmentalists will read all this with a sense of growing horror. A technofix!’ (Lynas ch 3 2011).

Horror, no, disappointment, yes. Stuff like this gets tedious at the thousandth time of reading. It’s the disappointment that is hard to stomach. Lynas’ book is entitled The God Species. I expected to see a penetrating discourse concerning how human beings need to relate means and ends, how we can finally derive values from facts so as to take conscious responsibility for and collective control of our powers; I expected to read how human beings can finally live up to Nietzsche’s challenge that, having killed God, human beings can take on the onerous responsibility of living as gods and so come to creatively live up to their powers. Now that would have been quite a book. Instead, we get a sales pitch. I can get this every other day at the top of Church Street in my local town centre. I keep my hands in my pocket and that’s where they are staying with this book. Lynas flatters himself. He is not proposing anything we have not heard many times before. As one of the girls in Rita, Sue and Bob Too put it, ‘tell us another one’. Heard it, Mark, many times before, so many times that it’s tedious now. I’m more interested in getting behind the reasoning to what is really going on, politically, psychologically, in the techno-gambles.

Take the way that Lynas – like Lovelock and Brand – use ‘green’ as a boo word.

‘There seems to be a perverse pleasure taken by Greens in reminding us all just how difficult dealing with climate change is going to be, and how impossibly enormous the required behavioural change in the way we use energy.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011). 
Pleasure? I’m sick to the back teeth of the whole issue. Given the choice, I would much prefer to be listening to Bach and Beethoven, working my way through my Werner Herzog collection, tracking down missing episodes of Soap, trying to make a word of sense of Jacques Lacan, finishing my book on Elvis Presley or getting back on track with a view to fulfilling my lifelong ambition to marry a pretty French lady and retiring to a chateau in the French countryside, taking my ease amidst all those rolling hills and vineyards. (Actually, I tell a lie. I have given up on Lacan).
The constant slog in the cause of environmentalism might very well be perverse, but pleasure it ain’t. There are much better ways to enjoy yourself in this life. Of course, what Lynas is getting at is the old snit that greens are really misanthropes. I find that my view of people depends on the company I keep. But it should be pointed out that it is Lynas who is ruling out the potentiality of human beings as creative agents of their own historical process in favour of a reliance on technology. That pessimism with respect to human capacities is the real misanthropic position. Lynas commits a typical engineering error in identifying agency with the technology rather than with the human beings who make it, use it, apply, who create and sustain the moral and socio-institutional matrix within which technology is set.

No-one denies that technology has a critical role to play. It always has played this role and always will. Human beings manage their exchange with nature through the tools they invent, always have and always will do. So far, so obvious. The problem is that as soon as we go beyond the trite, Lynas turns on those who adopt a critical approach to technology and accuses them of being anti-technology. No, the debate concerns this or that specific technology, not technology as such. To identify a specific technology one favours with technology in general is a crude tactic designed to insulate one’s views from legitimate criticism.
Further, if Lynas thinks that technology on its own is sufficient to solve all our environmental problems then he is plainly deluded. Mike Childs of Friends of the Earth hits the nail right on the head here: ‘If planetary boundaries are to be respected we can't all eat super-size food portions, drive hummers, and frequent jet about the planet. Behavioural change is an important part of the equation to live within our planetary means. The challenge we have is how to sell behavioural change without creating dangerous and negative backlashes. There is no easy answer to this.’ (Posted by Mike Childs 03 Aug 2011).

Away with Lynas’ techno-nonsense. A behavioural change is required on the part of human beings. This is not a difficult point to grasp. You are what you repeatedly do, argued Aristotle. We need to practise what we preach. We need to be the change we want to see. To this perennial wisdom Lynas seems to want to add a phrase of his own. It’s been claimed, you can have your cake and eat it – so long as it is genetically modified.
Lynas spent a whole chapter on the human species as the killer ape of the planet. He didn’t follow that up but, surely, for Lynas to be able to call the human race the God Species must, surely, imply a behavioural change. Seems not. Lynas is going to put the power of gods in the hands of killer apes. How very reassuring. Frankly, this sounds like manifest technocratic madness. It makes Dr Strangelove sound sane. It’s as if a chapter or two has been excised from his book, a sort of missing link which would explain how the killer apes become gods through an anthropological transformation. But Lynas’ central assertion doesn’t require that anthropological transformation in any case, since he is assigning divinity to the technology, not to human beings. In which case this is just another instalment in the history of modern idolatry.

‘It is almost as if there is something shameful about proposing a solution that is too easy and that lacks the stark moral challenge of the conventional Green narrative.’ (Lynas ch 2011). Easy! Lynas has just admitted that the technology doesn’t yet exist and requires massive investment. Now he claims that the solution is ‘too easy.’ This sounds like thick Lord Percy in Blackadder thinking he can discover the secret of turning base metals into gold overnight. The fact that this has eluded the greatest minds over the centuries doesn’t deter him. ‘I like a challenge.’

Lynas presses his attack even further.

Similarly, if it is to succeed in helping us to meet the climate change planetary boundary, the environmental movement needs to become comfortable with centralised technologies and big corporations. (Lynas ch 3 2011).


Sound familiar? It should. It sounds like what’s happening already and has been happening for the best part of a century. Does Lynas know nothing of history? From the earliest stages of primitive accumulation up to and including forced collectivisation and state modernisation programmes to the present age and the new global enclosure of the commons, political and business elites have forced people into compliance with their external imperatives. At a time when protest against a manifestly failing global capitalism is gaining pace, Mark Lynas is insisting that the environment movement becomes comfortable with its principal features.

Lynas’ call for a new environmentalism can be resisted. Even a cursory glance at what he argues and proposes makes clear the extent to which he has abandoned an environmentalism concerned with protecting the planet and it’s life support system from harm. Instead, Lynas’ views mirror what we already have – technoscience in the service of state power and capitalist economics. There is no need for any change at all, only for Lynas to go and join his new friends. Maybe he already has, and his role is as a virus weakening the environmental movement from within. What else? The technologies he calls for are already in the pipeline; they don’t need the Greens to sanction  and support them. 
It seems that the position of Lynas and Brand et al is merely a rationalisation of political defeat and failure. The denial industry has achieved its aim and prevented effective political action on climate change. But caving in to the pressure exerted by the deniers doesn't mean you are right and ‘the Greens’ are wrong, it just means you are appeasing people who refuse to face the uncomfortable truth that the capital system is destroying the life support systems of the planet. Planetary engineering is designed to keep our current wasteful and destructive lifestyle going. It’s business as usual, a few dollars more for a few decades more.
Lynas’ crude economic and technological determinism can be easily and firmly rebutted. Marx wrote well about the concentration and centralisation of capital and so it has come to pass. We don’t have to get comfortable at all with the global slave state being prepared here at all. There is an alternative, one which conceives the objective socialisation of the capital system as creating the structural conditions for a genuine socialisation of humanity.
This is to distinguish the unsocial socialisation under capitalism from conscious human control. Marx described the ‘joint stock company’ as the ‘abolition of the capitalist mode of production within capitalist production itself’ (Capital III). The economist Joseph Schumpeter was also impressed with how, since ‘the economic process tends to socialise itself’, the system would evolve beyond capitalism (Schumpeter 1942:219). These views were mistaken. All that evolves on the basis of capitalist relations is capitalism. In this untransformed state, these socialisation processes, along with state intervention, lead to an ‘organised capitalism’ with a ‘planned and consciously directed economy’ (Hilferding 1980). Socialism is not simply an economy that is consciously planned under state direction.
To point to the emergence of the new productive forces alongside the continued concentration and centralisation of capital is to understand that the socialisation of production and of labour on a global scale has reached the stage which makes qualitative change feasible. The objective socialisation and contradictory dynamics of the capital system which generates crisis and puts the concentration of power and resources in the hands on a minority on the political agenda. This requires social transformation as a result of conscious intervention on the part of ‘the workers of all lands’. This is an act of freedom on the part of the human subject (Ferraro 1992:41). 
There is a tendency to refer to broad trends like ‘globalisation’ as though these were anonymous processes written into history. Not so. History does nothing, it is individual human beings, acting in concert, with some, against others, who are the real agents of the historical process. Human beings do not have to ‘become comfortable’ with abstract, impersonal forces driving the historical process but understand them as their own powers in alien form. 
In this respect, globalisation may be understood as a continuation of the process of objective socialisation under capitalism, a process creating the material basis for socialism. Marx always insisted that socialism could only be established on global basis (Wallerstein 1974; 1979:30 ff 58 61/5 239/40 280; 283:69 86ff 91/2 108/11). The global development of the capital system entails a global proletarianisation, something which fosters the international unity and solidarity of the proletariat. To argue that human beings have to become comfortable with the centralisation of power is to point to an objective trend and insist that the human subject adapts to it. Actually, the condition of human subjectivity is to see these objective powers as their own and adapt them to human purposes. This is the definition of human freedom as self-determination as against human enslavement as an external determinism.
Lynas is impressed with the objective forces of the capital system, human agents are merely passive adjuncts to these forces. He describes the human species as the God Species, only to assert the crudest of economic and technological determinisms. But if Lynas wants to make a great deal of capital’s objective socialisation, then there are other political options that adaptation and acceptance.
Capitalism has now become the universal mode of production that Marx argued that it would become (Avineri 1968:165ff), and with that universalisation comes a universal proletariat capable of assuming control of globally integrated means of production. It is for creative human agency to ensure that this material base of socialism is realisation as socialism. If human beings remain passive, then capital’s socialisation will continue in its unsocial form, with all the consequences that this entails in terms of social and environmental injustice and crisis.
The idea of a globally integrated economy with a global social structure recovers Marx’s idea of a universal proletariat, technically integrated and in control of a global developed means of production (Harris 1987:19 24ff 30/64 92ff 119 130; Warren 1980:45ff 143ff 176 184 253). When Marx urged ‘workers of all lands unite’ he was making an appeal to the common class interest that united workers all over the world. The socialisation of economic relations on a global basis now gives that appeal to class unity real political and moral force.
Who and what does Mark Lynas turn to? Centralised technology and the ‘big corporations’. Lynas can disappear into the void of the mixed economy, following the same road to nowhere walked by Burnham, Merle and Means, up to Crosland in the 1950s. Does anybody remember Crosland and his Future for Socialism in 1956? He argued strongly that capitalism no longer existed, that we had a mixed economy and that therefore the old class politics were irrelevant. As a Minister in the Callaghan government mired in economic crisis, Crosland, faced with any number of intractable problems, was heard shouting down the phone ‘I know what it is. It’s bloody capitalism!’.
Strange how there is not one word of the economic crisis in Lynas’ book, as though the environmental crisis has no connection with the kind of economy we have. 
One may conclude, therefore, that with global socialisation, ‘the world is catching up with Marx’s outline of the tendencies of capitalism rather than superseding it… In the long term, the hundred years since his death will be seen as a very short period; few will remember all the deviations and false starts along the way’ (Harris 1991:123). 

Democracy means the rule of the people. Lynas is going in the other direction. The principle of self-assumed obligation states that we are only obligated by laws that we have had a hand in making. Lynas is proposing a lawless state of systemic and technological imperatives, a totalitarianism which we will have to be comfortable with. This is Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World.

Focusing on small-scale solutions may feel good for individuals, but it is not going to solve a planet-scale problem. Small may be beautiful, but big is better when you have the entire Earth's future at risk and many billions of people to provide sustainable energy for. (Lynas ch 3 2011).

To set big against small is a false antithesis. The question is one of appropriate scale. Power should reside and decision should be taken at the appropriate level of competence. It’s the old Catholic principle of subsidiarity. Lynas is dressing up wild assertions stated at extremes as radical new thinking. For the record, EF Schumacher himself did not oppose small to big in any crude antithesis but recognised the need for scale. If Lynas has read Small is Beautiful he has not understood it. Lynas is here simply stating something which is generally accepted.

Lynas carries on mixing trite generalisation with wild assertions: ‘Instead, much of the climate-change activist movement has grown more and more extremist in its rejection of corporations and markets.’ (Lynas ch 3 2011).
Lynas should actually names some names here so that we can be clear as to whom and what his attacks are directed. We are well used to seeing radicals portrayed as extremists and characters such as Hitler, Mussolini and Saddam Hussein portrayed as ‘moderates’. Noam Chomsky has produced volumes revealing how language is slanted in politics. The critique of corporate capital is certainly well developed in political economy. Is Lynas out to delegitimize such a critique? Note how the critique of transnational monopoly capitalism is not even addressed, simply associated with the word ‘extremist’. Is the critique of the corporations by definition ‘extremist?’ It seems so. Now that’s a political slant on Lynas’ part. And what kind of markets is Lynas referring to here. Markets function very differently according to social institutions, social relations, culture and the law. Again, Lynas is silent. Just blanket condemnation. To criticise the way that specific markets function is not the same thing as criticising markets as such. I have long criticised TNCs whilst advocating markets. I have also shown how a market economy is perfectly compatible with marxist economics (Marx, Market Socialism and Participatory Planning.) Lynas is clearly unaware of the extent to which the corporations manage, manipulate and undercut markets. I’ll simply mention transfer pricing and let him do his own research. Suffice to say, it is well-known that in many markets, businesses are price makers and not price takers, something which undermines the market principle. But it’s hard to respond to Lynas’ charges because they are so general as to be vacuous. To be radical is to go to the root of the matter, to go to the root of the matter is most certainly dangerous for those with a vested interest to defend. The identification of the extremist often depends on where one is standing. Lynas needn’t worry about converting environmentalists to the new technologies, a marginalised minority as they are. Lynas will have many rich and powerful friends in his advocacy of new technologies and ‘big corporations’. Which begs the question of what he is really up to. It is interesting that the book has made few if any converts. Most of the comment on the book has come from those already in favour of the new technologies claiming that environmentalists are motivated by politics rather than science, unreason rather than reason, as their reaction to Lynas’ appeal to reason proves…. And there’s the trap. Make an appeal to reason and those who reject your specific points stand revealed as being against reason. Lynas’ book makes sense as an attempt to marginalise environmentalists, but no sense at all as an attempt to persuade environmentalists. All that can be said is that these tactics have been applied time and again throughout history. The issues do not go away, they keep coming back. People are not fools and the social problems that those who seek to skew the debate want to deny will be seen, felt and experienced in the everyday life of human beings.

Lynas is offering a distinctive politics and ideology here, not simply technology. It is significant how quickly the argument from technology and engineering was reduced to a narrowed political environment. Totalitarian regimes have always reserved a special place for engineers and for engineering solutions to political and social problems. It saves having to engage in radical solutions that go to the heart of the matter. The political philosopher David Held refers to crises with transformative potential, denoting those crises which require a fundamental change in core elements of the social structure. The environmental crisis is a crisis with transformative potential. Those with a vested interest in the status quo, the descending class, seeks to deny such crisis as a condition of preserving its power. The ascending class seeks to resolve the crisis by fundamental social transformation. It stands to reason that those with a vested interest in preserving existing power relations would see this rising class as extremist.

Lynas’ book is riddled with assertions and generalisations, yet he is not averse to alleging greens are guilty of the very thing that is second nature to him. 
Instead, 'real solutions', the activists maintained, should be 'based on safe, clean, renewable, and sustainable use of natural resources, as well as transitions to food, energy, land, and water sovereignty' (whatever that might mean). (Lynas ch 3 2011).

Lynas makes food, energy, land and water sovereignty sound like some hermetically sealed postmodernist irony – or an impossibility. ‘Whatever that might mean’, Lynas sneers. If he doesn’t know, he should have found out before going to print. It is a clear enough concept and concerns the popular control of resources. Does Lynas simply assume that the global enclosure of the commons is a law of history? The poor, the marginalised, the oppressed and the uneducated the world over not only grasp the concept, they are fighting for it every day. But Lynas pretends not to know what it means. It makes one wonder how much Lynas does actually know, or even how much he wants to know. The notion of sovereignty with respect to the commons is pretty basic stuff. Imagine Lynas writing a book on physics, and stating ‘relativity (whatever that might mean)’.

He comes now to his real target – the political left, the radicals, the socialists, anybody who is against capitalism and is therefore an extremist.

'System Change - not Climate Change' was the mantra, the system in question being, of course, the market and capitalism. (Lynas ch 3 2011). 

Note how frequently Lynas associates capitalism with the market as though the two are joined at the hip and rise and fall together. The market is managed and manipulated every day of the week by financial and corporate interests. This has nothing to do with freedom and everything to do with an anarchy of the rich. Lynas doesn’t want any examination of capitalism. He rules out any attempt to trace the origins of the environmental crisis in the capital system. His reasoning is no more than crass political cowardice. In the very least, it is entirely politically legitimate to locate the origins of the environmental crisis in the operation of the capital economy. If the connection can be shown between capital’s accumulative dynamic and climate crisis based on increasing energy use, then a political campaign to abolish capitalism is entirely legitimate. Lynas puts capitalism off limits, insulates it from criticism and political assault. At no point does he examine the claims that the environmental crisis is grounded in the capitalist economy. Instead, he is more concerned to label any politics which is against capitalism as extremist. The extremists have been ruling us for some time, hollowing out the centre and sending us all to extremes.
The last passage of Kenneth Clark’s Civilisation sums this up perfectly. Clarke quotes Yeats’ prophetic poem.

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

‘The trouble is that there is still no centre. The moral and intellectual failure of Marxism has left us with no alternative to heroic materialism, and that isn't enough. One may be optimistic, but one can't exactly be joyful at the prospect before us.’ Clarke was an eminently conservative gentleman, describing himself as a ‘stick in the mud’. He is clear that capitalism, what he calls ‘heroic materialism’, is not enough. Lynas’ passionate intensity for the new technologies, along with his tendency to caricature and label critics, identifies him with ‘the worst’ amongst. It is a time for cool heads, a scepticism that seeks out feasible alternatives rather than induces cynicism, and most of all the courage to face realities, however unpalatable or dangerous the political implications. Lynas asks us to surrender to existing power.

Moreover, hardcore ideological campaigning can spark a backlash against climate mitigation in general amongst those not amenable to this kind of politics. (Lynas ch 3 2011). 

Well, what chance does that give anybody? If there are systemic and institutional causes of crisis – and there are – then the closer one comes to those roots, the more likely that there will be a backlash by those with a vested interest in preserving existing power relations. Unless Lynas seriously thinks that sweet reason is enough and that all we have to do if persuade the masters of the universe to see the error of their ways. Back in 1946 Keynes warned that the ‘dragons of finance’ could one day return to destroy the global economy. I’d like to see Lynas persuade them to see the error of their ways. There’s as much chance of persuading Ming the Merciless to become a pacifist. What Lynas wants is a climate politics that is amenable to business. It’s cowardice, plain and simple. Don’t offend the people causing the problem, try a little gentle persuasion. 'Be unselfish', 'give generously', these are the age old slogans of an impotent moralism. (Berki 1976: 97) The Labour Party’s Roy Jenkins called for 'idealism' on the part of the people. 'We have to persuade men and women who are themselves reasonably well off that they have a duty to forgo some of the advantages they would otherwise enjoy for the sake of others who are much poorer than they are.' And: '. . . the gulf between majority and minority now cuts across class lines. Our only hope is to appeal to the latent idealism of all men and women of goodwill . . .' (Roy Jenkins, What Matters Now, London, 1972, pp. 21—2.)

‘Go on, be unselfish!’ It didn’t work then, it isn’t working now and it won’t work in the future. This is the politics of cowards. The morality is even worse. Don’t defend the Jews, it might annoy the Nazis. In time, the Nazis might respond to rational persuasion. Persecution and extermination are not good. But don’t fight them, it’ll only entrench positions and make things worse. Don’t engage in environmental politics, it might prevent the capitalists making a few changes as they proceed to wreck.




‘Those of us who celebrate human technological ingenuity, as I do, must admit that human inventions can have dramatic and unpredictable impacts on the biosphere.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011).
I don’t know whether to laugh or cry. The grammar is as bad as the politics and the ethics. Lynas adds a redundant ‘as I do’ to the line, as though there was ever any doubt that he celebrates technology. But read the sentence again, ‘those of us’ …Identifying himself as one of ‘us’, Lynas didn’t need to add the ‘I’. He is already included in the ‘us’. This stuff isn’t well written even as journalism. Lynas has got carried away in his fevered concern to cheer new technology. ‘Those of us who think that Elvis Presley is the greatest singer who ever lived in the history of all things ever, as I do … Calm down, Mark, calm down, we know you are a true believer in technology.

But at least, albeit a long four chapters in, Lynas starts to acknowledge the problem. Technology can have dramatic and unpredictable effects on the biosphere. Well I never! But hopes are quickly dashed and we return to the pantomime. The villains of the piece, of course, are the greens.
‘None of these potential benefits of genetic engineering cut any ice with Greens, however.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011). Greens!! Boo! Boo! Talk about boo words. We are ever so sane and rational; ‘they’ on the other hand …boo!! boo!! They’re behind you. They’re under the beds. Flush ‘em out. This is CJ talking to Reggie Perrin in the industrial relations role play.
At least Lynas offers an identifiable target for once, even if he doesn’t present the argument: 'The introduction of genetically engineered organisms into the complex ecosystems of our environment is a dangerous global experiment with nature and evolution,' argues Greenpeace. Greenpeace’s argument, of course, is a lot more cutting than this general observation. There are scientific reasons why GE is an experiment with nature and evolution, the research has been done, but Lynas doesn’t go there. Why? Because he assures us: ‘I am personally very familiar with all the arguments against genetic engineering, because I used to make them myself.’ And they are? Actually Lynas’ arguments against genetic engineering are not arguments at all. In an article Lynas wrote for the Guardian in 2008 Lynas wrote that 'the technology moves entirely in the wrong direction, intensifying human technological manipulation of nature when we should be aiming at a more holistic ecological approach' and that GE 'raises a whole new category of risk'. These are big claims and assertions, they are not arguments, they do not offer reasons, facts, details. It is clear that Lynas has as little grasp of the arguments against as he does of the arguments for. He takes things on authority and then sets off on the campaign trail. ‘Looking back, I now realise that I was caught up in more of an outbreak of mass hysteria than anything resembling a rational response to a new technology.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011). Yes, we’ve been here before too –  here is another God that failed moment. Once I was young and naïve but now I am all knowing and wise. Actually, nothing has changed at all. Lynas’ mode of reasoning is the same. That is the point. The way the case for or against is argued is more important than the case for or against as such. Lynas is someone with a superstitious, ideological approach. Note well that he is not really arguing, neither for nor against, merely asserting. The best argument I have heard against this ‘God that failed’ type of proselytising came from Edward Said, who simply stated that if you are that clever, what were you doing believing in a god in the first place. There is only the one God and you won’t find Him or Her in politics, science, technology or even journalism. 

So what changed Lynas’ mind about GE crops? Lynas’ explanation is revealing. ‘Several people also posted comments pointing out that none of my arguments - such as my concern about how biotech corporations were using the new GE crops to boost their profits - logically led to an outright rejection of the technology.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011). That is indeed true. One does not reject particular products or technologies on account of corporate misdeeds. But remember that earlier Lynas rejected criticism of the corporations as extremist. Statements like this make it crystal clear that Lynas is well aware of how corporations can misbehave in the pursuit of profit. And that being the case, it is perfectly legitimate to criticise corporations without being accused of being extremist.

If there is a familiar tone to Lynas’ arguments there should be. You can read all of this in Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline. Lynas describes Brand’s argument as a ‘eureka moment’. Brand writes: '1 daresay the environmental movement has done more harm with its opposition to genetic engineering than any other thing we've been wrong about. We've starved people, hindered science, hurt the natural environment, and denied our own practitioners a crucial tool.' 
Note the emotive language, ‘we’ve starved people’. The environmental movement has ‘starved people.’ This is an outrageous calumny and the people who perpetrate it should be exposed. It is not the environmental movement who set the terms of trade, it is not the environmental movement that is behind the maldistribution of global resources, that determines land use, that determines technology policy, that organises loans and schedules debt payments, that forces commercial practices which induce soil erosion and desertification, that does underhand deals with corrupt political regimes, that ties aid to trade, that is involved in selling and buying arms ….. There are any number of reasons behind global famine, none of them attributable to the environmental movement, all of them traceable to global capitalism and its nefarious practices and institutions. If the powers that be wanted to ‘feed the world’ they could have done so many years ago many times over. Whoever has been starving millions of people, it hasn’t been environmentalists. There are reasons why nations are not self-sufficient in food and they have everything to do with corporate control and terms of trade and the international division of labour. So Brand and Lynas can take back this calumny that environmentalists have starved people. Such demonising of political groups and movements for simply having alternate viewpoints is inadmissible.

We should note in passing Mark Lynas’ self-image as the most Damascian person on the planet. I was wrong but now I am right. Lynas dishes out plenty of playground abuse to those who hold contrary positions, and then shouts bigotry and persecution when criticised. He evidently likes to play the martyr and jump up on the cross. Well, for anyone involved in real transformatory politics, it doesn’t wash.
But notice how arguing from technology so quickly and so easily loses sight of the social relations of production. Inequality and poverty have something to do with the way that the economy is organised. This is why I premised the argument on the way that the forces of production are organised and used within social relations of production. The observation that it is not technology as such but the ends and interests which it serves that is important is completely missed by Lynas. It is a political blindspot, which is always worrying. The blindness in this book is so wilful as to be deliberate evasion of difficult political questions concerning control, authority, asymmetries in power and resources. There is a wealth of literature to demonstrate the links between capitalism and uneven development. Failure to acknowledge that is plainly ideological in Marx’s critical sense of  ideas and beliefs which conceal and protect existing power relations. 

Listen to what Lynas considered research: ‘I hunted through the scientific literature, but I could not find any convincing evidence that genetically engineered crops or foods had ever harmed a single human being or animal. Nor was there any substantiated evidence of environmental damage, even after thousands of separate tests and wide-scale commercial deployment across the world.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011). 


Lynas surely knows all about the controversies surrounding these tests. They are manipulated to get the results wanted and they are very selectively released into the public domain. This sounds like David Miliband claiming he had no evidence of extraordinary rendition. Such evidence is never offered, never sought and therefore never find. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist. And apart from anything else, what evidence there is never convinces those who have made up there mind. Some people do not believe what they see, they only see what they want to believe. There is evidence, but I don’t think reason and science matter when politics and business are involved.

Whether he is arguing for or against, Lynas’ approach is the same. Lynas condemns himself out of his own mouth. ‘I had been just as guilty of misusing biological science in the service of ideological ends as global-warming 'sceptics' have been in misusing climate science. I was repeating assertions made by campaigning groups without checking the primary evidence.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011). That doesn’t encourage us to have faith in much that Mark Lynas says on anything. What Lynas argues seems to depend on what he has just been reading. If his critical powers are as weak as that, then he lacks the authority to speak on complex and controversial matters. He isn’t trustworthy. As Edward Said said about the people who contributed to The God that Failed, if you are so intelligent in your politics, what were you doing believing in a God in the first place? For or against, left or right, up or down, black or white, the only consistent thread throughout is poor reasoning powers. Lynas is as inadequate in putting the case against environmentalism as was in putting the case for it. He confesses his sins. ‘I was citing as fact one or two studies showing apparent harm from GE products without putting these in the context of an overwhelming expert literature showing that GE was safe. (When sceptics do this on climate, I condemn it as 'cherry-picking'.) (Lynas ch 4 2011). But this is precisely what Lynas is doing in this book, citing studies that purportedly prove his case and reducing the massive literature to the contrary to a couple of generalisations. Once he said black, now he says white. He just says it the same way. Compared to that literature, Lynas’ assertions are superficial, shallow.
‘Most damning of all, I realised that throughout the entire time I had been an anti-GE activist, donning biohazard suits and mounting night-time raids against test sites, I had never read a single scientific paper on the subject.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011). So why on earth should anyone listen to him now, with such a record of shoddy intellectual practices. Lynas is clearly out of his depth. He lacks the training to deal with these complex issues and is too set in the ‘up with this’ and ‘down with that’ school to be anything more than a menace. 
‘Although none of the major environmental groups will admit it still, the first generation of GE crops has almost certainly been beneficial both to the environment and to farmers.’ Well, that’s what the corporations and their publicists and political allies claim, and no doubt Lynas has read their sales pitch and taken it at face value. And there is no doubt whose side Lynas is on. ‘There can be no more important task than feeding people whilst protecting the planet. We must use the best of science and technology to help us to achieve this vital aim.’ (Lynas ch 4 2011). 
Which begs the question of where Lynas – and the corporations – have been. This could have been achieved decades ago given our levels of science and technology. The solution to global famine has never been attendant upon GE crops. The problem of famine this past century is not and has never been one of production, but one of distribution. Lynas is playing into the hands of those who wish to control the global food supply for their own financial and political reasons, the very same people who have presided over starvation in the midst of abundance. He needn’t worry. The people in control now are working every day to still be in control in the future. I can sum up this book in a line: real change is so difficult as to be well-nigh impossible, so let’s just give in to state power, capital and technology. The words political and moral cowardice also spring to mind.

‘The world is going your way Webb’, said William Morris to the Fabian Sydney Webb, ‘but it isn’t the right way in the end’. 






It's an ill wind that blows nobody any good — and the increasing urgency of climate crisis is bringing the industrial lobbies for various technologies out into the open, offering solutions for a climate crisis that big business has for years denied is happening. 
It is in this context that the ‘debate’ over GM food should be set. Hunger is spreading around the globe for the very reasons that activists have offered for decades. The problem is one of distribution, the world possesses the technical capacity to produce enough food for all. However, the genetically modified food lobby is everywhere turning the problem into one of production and claiming to have the solution.

Food prices are high and rising, food reserves are low and falling, all over the world millions are struggling for their daily bread, and the world’s population is going ever upwards. Bad news is good news for the biotech industry which, still licking its wounds after several high profile public defeats, is back again with another public relations assault. Don’t be surprised if, eventually, public opposition is overridden and the timorous politicians, short of solutions – as usual – give in. To recognise the truth that there is no problem of production, only distribution, entails looking into contentious areas of power and control and organisation. Governments would prefer to keep these highly political issues safe from political scrutiny, intervention and alteration. So one can understand why governments would be inclined to embrace GM technology in order to tackle the current crisis, overriding a long standing public scepticism, even hostility, with regard to GM plants. The arguments of the planetary engineers like Brand need to be seen as part and parcel of the bio-tech industry’s attempt to conceal its commercial purposes behind the moral high ground. In this scenario, GM food is designed with the express purpose of feeling the world, its critics are responsible for starving the world. Only GM food can solve the problem of world hunger, they argue. Anyone who points to the demonstrable, indisputable damage that GM crops do to the environment, anyone who asks for caution in light of the disturbing, if inconclusive, evidence that GM may endanger health, is accused of being politically motivated, of acting out of eco-zealotry, and is blamed for the continuation of famine on Earth. Crude it may be, but it’s a line that both Stewart Brand and Mark Lynas adopt. And that alone is sufficient to render their arguments beneath contempt.

For the record, the ‘leftists’ so derided by the planetary engineers have been concerned with what Fanon called the ‘wretched of the Earth’ since ever. At the same time, our engineers and technicians have been busy selling their expertise and skill to capital, the very force behind uneven development.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to open the newspaper or switch on the TV or radio without hearing some variation of the theme that GM crops will save the world. There are times when it seems we are living in the world of Soylent Green, a film about the artificial foodstuff that feeds the planet in the aftermath of ecological collapse. In the opening scene, a government minister comes on the TV extolling the virtues of this artificial foodstuff, and is cut short one line in by the word ‘bullshit’ uttered by the wise and aged scientist Edward G Robinson. 

And yet this simplistic idea that GM crops will feed the world is passing from punditry into politics and, no doubt, from there into public policy. Influential figures in powerful organisations are now advocating GM crops. Neil Parish, chairman of the European Parliament's agriculture committee, believes that rising food prices will make consumers 'more realistic' about GM. Yes, in the same way that climate change will make people ‘more realistic’ about nuclear energy. Here is an ill wind that is blowing some very powerful commercial interests an awful lot of good. George W. Bush asserted that modified crops 'hold the promise of producing more food for more people' and proceeded to make a proposed £335 million aid package to ease the food crisis conditional upon the promotion of GM crops. Now the World Bank calls for an agricultural revolution based on biotechnology. And forget the mealy mouthed calls for ‘debate’ and for argument to be based upon an open assessment of trials and evidence. We are dealing with people with very decided views. Millions of dollars have been put into research for the cause of commerce, not science and certainly not out of humanitarian concern. The fact that the world could have been fed decades ago but hasn’t reveals all that we need to know about the real priorities of these people. Dissent is not tolerated. Britain's National Beef Association has called for 'all resistance to GM crops to be abandoned immediately'.

Mark Lynas makes a great deal of his own scientific ignorance during the days when he was an anti-GM crops activist. As though the case against GM crops rested only on Mark Lynas’ ignorance. Lynas is giving the impression that the case against GM crops is based on politically motivated ignorance. That may apply to his own activism – which makes it clear how unreliable and untrustworthy he is in this debate, for or against. But Lynas should not be allowed to get away with the implication that the case for GM crops is based on science and the case against is based on political zealotry. There’s little point in criticising activists for being active, that’s what they do. This is about the science. Instead, what we are getting is punditry and politics masquerading as science, all skewing the ‘debate’ in favour of the GM industry. The world's largest ever agricultural study, comprising the painstaking work of 400 scientists and 60 governments concluded that GM was 'not the simple answer to hunger and poverty'. It was demonised by a newspaper columnist as 'a truly shocking betrayal of the world's least-well fed'. Where is the debate here? Where is the careful and critical weighing of argument and evidence? The argument has been decided in favour of GM crops and the large companies and the supposed ‘debate’ is all about massaging and manipulating the public.

In terms of the science, Edward G Robinson’s view of Soylent Green and its political and industrial cheerleaders is apposite – it’s all b/s. And hype. Politically, control of food production remains concentrated in the same hands that have presided over global famine all along, the same forces that said nothing and did nothing as the world organised to raise aid for the starving regions. And these are the people seeking to claim the higher ground. Scientifically, GM crops will do nothing to ease world hunger. On the contrary, the evidence is that GM crops threaten to make a bad problem worse.

The idea that GM crops are more productive has gained the status of self-evident truth by mere repetition. That, of course, is the purpose of repetition. Listen carefully to the language used on TV and radio, in press releases and bulletins. Instead of ‘GM crops’, the reference tends to be to 'high-yielding GM crops'. That positive evaluation shapes public perceptions and renders GM a ‘good thing’ by definition. Dan Price, George Bush's food aid expert, claims that: 'It is established fact that a number of bio-engineered crops have shown themselves to increase yield.'
That hasn’t been established at all. That’s the conclusion that bio-tech companies want to draw from their trials, the idea that they want to produce. Established fact shows quite the opposite to Price’s claim. Not only does genetic modification fail to boost productivity, it often slashes it. Agricultural scientist Dr Charles Benbrook cites 'voluminous and clear evidence' that modified soya crops 'produce five to ten fewer bushels per acre in contrast to otherwise identical varieties grown under comparable field conditions'. 

And that is ‘established fact’, clear and voluminous. To take just a few examples. A 1998 study based on 8,200 trials of GM soya varieties in U.S. universities found they produced 6.7 per cent less than their nearest non-GM relatives. They yielded 10 per cent less than the best conventional soya available at the time.

A 2000 study at the University of Nebraska produced similar results, finding that five different Monsanto GM soyas — though more expensive — produced 6 per cent less food than their closest cousins, and 11 per cent less than the highest-yielding traditional varieties.

Other studies found that the productivity of soya doubled in the 70 years before the introduction of modified varieties in the mid Nineties. At least half of this increase was achieved by the traditional method of improving crops by interbreeding them, with the rest coming as a result of improved farming practices. This growth came to an abrupt halt as soon as GM soya became widespread, with yields remaining at the same level since. Similarly, whereas cotton yields in the US had multiplied five-fold since 1930, they stagnated from the late 1990s as soon as GM varieties took over 80 per cent of the crop.
Whilst the yields of modified corn did continue to grow while GM was introduced, the high increases promised by proponents of GM have been nowhere recorded. Indeed, studies record some GM varieties suffering drops of up to 12 per cent.

This is established, indisputable, irrefutable fact based on extensive research and solid sound science. It is easy for proponents of GM to set this debate up in terms of the science behind GM on the one side and the political activism on the other. That is not a like for like comparison. The bio-tech industry and its proselytizers need to address the solid scientific case against GM food, instead of being allowed to point out the bleeding obvious and irrelevant fact that political activists are, well, active in a political cause. Well I never. 

When challenged by the weight of evidence against GM, the industry starts to dissemble and obfuscate. Having made the claim that GM crops are ‘high yielding’, proponents start to claim that the question of yields is a 'sideshow', and that modified crops were never intended to increase yields. The fact remains that the claims that GM crops are high yielding and will feed the world have been repeatedly made and have been integral to their promotion.

So what were modified crops intended to do? All varieties of GM crops now being grown have been developed for two purposes, tolerating weedkillers so they can be sprayed more abundantly, and resisting pests. The result of drenching crops with chemicals has been all too predictable, the emergence of resistant superweeds, in over 3,250 places in the U.S. alone and GM cotton developed to resist bollworm being attacked by other pests, forcing an increase of spraying with insecticide.

When forced to confront the evidence, the response is an all too typical ‘that was then, but the future will be different’. It’s an attempt to evade the world of ‘established fact’ by another journey into the unknown. There follows the same promises made and falsified in the past. GM crops will be high yielding and feed the world …. In this manner, Monsanto's chief executive, Hugh Grant, announces a 'commitment' to double yields of corn, soybeans and cotton by 2030 and, at the same time, to develop crops that will need 30 per cent less water, land and energy to grow. And, no doubt, to feed the world.

In the view of experts, this is an even more difficult undertaking than developing the present modified varieties and is unlikely to happen. Lester Brown, president of Washington's Earth Policy Institute, points out that the physiology of plants is approaching its practical limit. Despite research into drought-resistant crops these past ten years, experts says that, at best, they are decades away from being grown. And Monsanto has made it clear that the miracle varieties would be used in the U.S. 'well before they become available in other countries'. Far from being concerned to feed the world, the world will have to wait – and that’s even in the unlikely event that research meets with success. The claim that the development of GM crops is concerned with providing a solution to world hunger can be revealed to be the cruel, ugly lie it is. These companies are not sinking millions into research in order to feed the world. Of course they are interested in the commercial aspects of GM food, exploiting the food crisis to their own advantage. How do we know this? The biotech companies are already taking steps to ensure they, and not the world’s hungry, would benefit. Already, these biotech companies have filed for no less than 532 patents around the world on genes that might confer drought resistance. That gives the game away. It’s all about control of resources and control of the means by which needs are satisfied. ‘You take my life when you take the means of my living’ wrote Shakespeare.

If these companies are successful, these patents will enable them to claim a monopoly of the seeds needed to grow crops in a warmer, drier world, charge whatever prices they like and, by ensuring the seeds are 'infertile', force farmers to buy new seeds every year, ending the age-old practice whereby farmers save seeds from one harvest to sow for the next one. These 'terminator' crops would drive farmers to the wall, increasing destitution.
Read what Stewart Brand writes here: ‘Environmentalists keep insisting that GE crops are bad for farmers, especially small-scale farmers. That position is tough to maintain as the reality emerges that even in the face of opposition, GE crops are tremendously popular.’ (Brand ch 5 2009). Being forced to choose the one option available is not evidence of popularity. This is not serious argument, merely spin. It’s the kind of thing we can read in promotional leaflets of all kinds.
The evidence that GM is bad for farmers, especially small-scale farmers, is substantial and irrefutable. Studies of modified soya from Latin America and cotton in India show the extent to which poor farmers and labourers have been hit hard, with larger concerns taking over the land and reducing their workforces. It’s all about reducing costs so as to raise profit margins – making money out of a basic human need. It’s immoral, certainly, but the most important point to establish here is that it is economically inefficient. It’s only rationale is private gain as a  result of exploiting a social need.

Professor Ossama El-Tayeb, of Cairo University, condemns 'big business' for claiming that 'GM crops will alleviate poverty soon, while currently available ones mostly contribute negatively to poverty alleviation and food security, and positively to the stock market'.

The biggest scandal of all is that anyone who understands the problems of agriculture and world hunger knows that the small farmers of the Third World are the key to reducing hunger. The small farmers produce up to 20 times more food per acre than the biggest ones, in part because of the more intensive way in which they work the land. The large, technologically advanced farms produce more per person employed, hence their appeal to those concerned with profit margins. But where land is scarce and labour is plentiful, this is not required. The promise of increasing yields is not one that GM crops can redeem. However, this is precisely what organic agriculture in developing countries can certainly achieve. When forced to abandon facile promises and confront the hard evidence, even the biotech chiefs themselves concede the real truth. Hans Kast, managing director of the plant science branch of the chemical giant BASF, admits: 'Genetically modified agriculture will not solve the world's hunger problem." The GM lobby has proved itself to be incapable of such honesty. (based on It won’t feed the starving and it creates poverty. So why are we told GM food is the answer? By Geoffrey Lean, Environment Editor, the Independent On Sunday.)

What about global famine? This is the question asked by those most vociferous in their promotion of GM crops. This is a question which begs the question. Why has global famine not been addressed long before now? Lynas calls for GM food and condemns environmentalists for starving millions. The basis of this political slight is the notion that the problem of famine is technological rather than social and political, and that therefore those who criticise a particular technology – which takes into account who is in control of it and for what purposes – are guilty of obstructing solutions.

The very great journalist Paul Foot, a journalist worthy of the profession, exposed this kind of tommyrot decades ago. He declared that the ‘astonishing increase in the starving millions, with all the indescribable wretchedness and hopelessness which goes with it, is the chief achievement of the free market’. He noted the tendency of supporters of the free market to blame poverty on the poor themselves. 

it is the triumph of the market system that although the world is full of plenty, the market ensures that it is distributed among them that hath, and withheld from them that hath not. 

A billion and a quarter people cannot, get enough to eat. Yet there is, easily, the capacity to produce enough food to feed the world's population twice over. There is enough food actually produced today to feed everyone on earth. (Foot 1990).

Before Lynas starts to shout ‘socialist’ and therefore ‘extremist’, it needs to be emphasised that Paul Foot backs his claims here by research. Edgar Owens, of the United States Agency for International Development, told a conference in November 1974: ‘If the arable land of our planet was cultivated as efficiently as farms in Holland, the planet would feed 67 billion people, seventeen times as many people as are now alive.’

That might be rather excessive, Foot comments, so, to give a better and more practical picture, he quotes the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, in 1976:

There would be no difficulty whatever with the existing knowledge and resources in doubling food production.

Another United Nations organisation calculated that 0.5 per cent of world spending on weapons of destruction, often mass destruction, would be enough to provide the investment in agriculture in the stricken continent of Africa sufficient to produce enough food easily to feed the entire African population. 0.5 per cent! A tiny fragment of the money devoted to killing could save the lives of millions and millions of people! Yet the 'free market' keeps it firmly locked up in bombs and bullets. At the same time it has ruthlessly cut production in the fertile farmlands of the United States of America. It has even launched a campaign to cut off funds from the United Nations agencies which have the effrontery to reveal the full horror of free-market priorities.

These arguments are as valid now as they were in the 1970s.

GM is a classic example of technology being offered as the solution to something which is a social problem rather than a natural problem. Global famine is not a problem caused by natural deficiency but by economic arrangements within and between countries. The problem of food shortage is not one of production but of distribution. In terms of production, the world already produces more than enough for famine to be alleviated, and could easily produce more. But, of course, output, actual and potential, is stymied by individualism, private property, and the imperative to make money rather than satisfy need. Add disparities in terms of trade, political corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies, and the result is skewed distribution patterns bringing about famine. To apply technologies with a view to improving productive efficiency changes nothing with respect to these problems of distribution. All GM crops do is further centralise power and control over food supply in the hands of the corporations. 

Everywhere, the discrepancy gapes so wide that even the blindest believer in the free market cannot avoid it. The human race now has at its disposal more than enough technology, raw materials, knowledge and imagination to fulfil everyone's basic needs without difficulty. As the man from the FAO said, there would be 'no problem' in doubling food production, no problem for that matter in providing the people of the world with food, clothing, shelter, heat and light, not to mention education, health, and transport.

The figures for potential production are there in all the statistics. All human beings could be progressing in comfort and plenty, cooperating internationally to safeguard future generations from war, and diverting the war-making machines which have been handed down to us by the free market into building a safe and comfortable world. There is no need whatever for the poor to be with us now, let alone always. A flick on the tiller of the industries and farms of the world could wipe out poverty forever.
None of this is idealistic illusion. It is simple common sense, based on the statistics of what is now produced. (Foot 1990).

There is no mystery why there is so starvation in a world of abundance. Why poverty? Why riches? Same question and same answer. It is economics and politics that condemn so many people to poverty and famine, not technological deficiencies. The enrichment of the rich on the back of a global process of accumulation has been without precedent. Globalisation has liberalised markets so that whilst most people have been exposed to a competitive downsizing – cuts in living standards, wealth and security – the elites have been insulated. Ferdinand Mount is now examining this phenomenon, showing the tendency to inequality that is built into the process of globalisation. The fantastic accumulation of riches for the already super-rich wasn’t halted by the crash of 1987 and it hasn’t been halted by the crash of 2007. On this, there is nothing from Lynas. 






Why There Is Famine In The Midst Of Abundance

There's a world called Arsy Versy, whose ways are very queer, 
And the things that happen in that world could never happen here, 
They plant a lot of apple trees and from the laden boughs 
They pluck the bounteous harvest and feed it to the cows. 
And then they take the milk the patient cows deliver 
And give it to disposal firms to pour into the river.

At times they churn the cream, and when the work is done 
They build a butter mountain to shade them from the sun. 
They also press out tons of grapes and from the wine they make, 
For boating and for swimming, an artificial lake; 
And spuds and fruit and vegetables upon the roads they spread 
And mash them very thoroughly beneath a tractor's tread.

In Arsy-Versy world, all sorts of experts by the score 
Plead with those producing goods to turn out more and more. 
And the way the turn-out turns out is somehow always such 
That though there never is enough, there's always far too much.'

A Poem by Hugo Dewar, printed in Socialist Worker, January 3, 1976

The problem of global famine begins with the supply of food. Starting with this seemingly obvious statement has the advantage of revealing the enormity of the problem in all of its plain irrationality.

The problem is not one of the availability of food. There is more than enough food in the world to resolve problems of hunger, malnutrition and consequent disease, and that is before we even look at productive capacity. The availability of food, however, is only one part of the problem. The distribution of food depends on the ability to pay. If people do not have the money to buy food, they may as well live on the moon as far as the market is concerned. 

Certainly, the falling availability of food renders countries vulnerable to famine, but there have been cases of famine where the food supply is actually increasing. Bangladesh in 1974 is a good example. The availability of food was at a record level, yet some 150,000 people starved to death, for the simple reason that they could not afford to buy the grain. Similarly, whilst the average food intake in Ethiopia and Sudan increased between 1974 and 1983, this could not prevent the famines of 1984 and 1985. 
When it comes to the problem of famine, purchasing power counts for more than production. A problem with the availability of food demonstrates the possibility of famine, not its necessity. The shortfall of grain in the Sahel region during the 1984-1985 famine was a mere three or four million tonnes at a time when world grain stocks were 190 million. Grain stocks in the Common Market were 25 million. There was plenty of food around in 1985. There was no problem of production, only distribution. The food economy is rigged to make profits and keep profit margins up, not to get the available food to the people who need it most. If you can’t afford to buy the food, you don’t receive it. Unless as aid. The irony which shows the capitalist system up in all its irrationality is that at the time of 1984-85 famine, the global production of food had never been greater. People starved and died in the midst of abundance. Here is the clash between productive potential and purchasing power that lies at the heart of the capital system, revealing the contradiction between the new productive forces capable of fulfilling the needs of all and the way they are constrained by production relations concerned only with profit.
For all of the talk of GM crops being the solution to global famine, the fact is that there has never been so much food produced in the world than in the past quarter of a century. And that is without taking potential output into consideration. All throughout the 1980s, during the era of famine, food production increasing at the rate of some 2.5 and 3.5 percent, a rate much higher than the increase in the world population. There has never been so much food available in relation to the population. That millions starved had nothing to do with problems in production, nothing. The problem is one of distribution. It was then, and it is now. Those proselytising for GM food should not be allowed to pull the debate away from distribution by inventing a non-problem with respect to production. The problem is not one of production, but distribution. The food is not free, and there’s the rub. The food is not produced to meet the needs of the people who demand it but to make profits for those who control the supply. As every economics student learns, demand is not desire, indicating what people need, but effective demand backed by the ability to pay. If a person cannot pay, he or she may as well be living on the moon as far as the market is concerned. The market neither knows nor cares about needs not backed by money. Food is available but to demand it and to consume it you have to be able to buy it. The problem of famine is a problem of poverty, and poverty is caused by the iniquitous and exploitative relations of global trade.
The endless cycles of the capital economy are bringing about not merely economic crisis and unemployment, but famine. Famine is directly related to the contradictory dynamics and crisis tendencies of the capital economy. The countries most vulnerable to famine are caught up in an economic network that deprives them of autonomy. A fall in export earnings while import costs go up, increasing debts and rising interest payments on those debts, along with other factors such as increasing military spending tied to arms deals all join together to expose countries to the possibility of famine. Without export earnings, countries are unable to buy food. Nor can they afford the fertilisers, pesticides, oil and farm machinery to sustain their own agriculture going. Nor can they purchase the raw materials and machinery required for industry.
At this point, the sinews of the economy start to snap. The problems are exacerbated wherever a country has borrowed heavily and loan service payments come to be jacked up by high interest rates. The debt burden can increase rapidly. In 1984, servicing Africa's debts to Western banks took 25 per cent of the continent's export earnings. Out of the 44 countries of Africa, only 15 were able to meet their debt servicing payments in the period after 1980. This meant that for every £1 given in famine relief to Africa in 1985, the West claimed £2 back in interest and debt payments. President Nyerere of Tanzania declared that Africa cannot go on financing the rest of the world.
With the need to schedule debt payments comes supervision by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The power of these international authorities is exemplified by the fact that the IMF could appoint the head of the central bank of Zaire. There is no national sovereignty within the international economy. 

The conventional economic wisdom held that Africa's food problems were the product of economic mismanagement and a failure to export enough. To export the right things in sufficient quantities, claimed the IMF, prices must be internationally competitive. This meant that subsidies of foodstuffs needed to end and that state sectors in industry and trade must be given over to private competition.

The control of the food supply
The problems attending the global economic crisis are exacerbated by the world market in foodstuffs makes it worse. The combination of these forces ensure that increased vulnerability to famine proceeds inexorably to its outbreak. The developed economies of Europe, North America and Japan are in control of some three-quarters of the world's exports of foodstuffs. All these countries maintain schemes to subsidise and 'protect' their agricultural production. The result is that people in these countries pay inflated prices so that the farm and food processing sectors have their revenues guaranteed.

The claims made for GM food are phoney. GM crops is being advanced as the solution to a non-problem. People starve not on account of a failure of production, but as a result of poverty and diminished purchasing power. Famine is a failure of distribution. In recent years the problem has not been one of production but of overproduction in relation to the available market, i.e. purchasing power. In the United States since the 1980s, the drive has been to cut production. Farmers have been paid to irrigate and drain their land, to clear it, and then leave it idle. In 1985, the US government passed legislation which enabled it to buy and slaughter one million cows in order to reduce milk production and keep prices and profit margins up. The price of sugar in the US domestic market was so high that firms made profits by importing processed foods such as cake mix and extracting the sugar content for sale.

In Europe, so much food was produced that the biggest problem was one of storage. Actually getting the food to where it was most needed formed no part of anyone’s concern. Without the ability to pay, people do not exist on the market. 
In 1986, the European stocks were:
— Butter:    1,400,000   tonnes,   or eleven pounds for every person in the Common Market (270,000 tonnes held in Britain).
*	Skim milk: 1,070,000 tonnes, or seven pounds per head.
*	Beef: 610,000 tonnes (a fall on the 730,000 tonnes held in 1985) or five pounds each. 
*	Wheat: 9,500,000 tonnes, and barley: 4,700,000 tonnes, making total grain stocks of 16,400,000 tonnes (or 113 pounds per head).
*	Olive oil:  260,000 tonnes (an increase of 300 per cent on 1985) or two pounds each.

GM food? We already have more than enough food, and have had more than enough food for so long as to beg the question why it doesn’t reach the mouths of the people who need it the most. When someone insists that we need GM food, we need to present these facts on world overproduction of food and ask why? They need to look at these facts and explain why there is a famine problem at all. The food is being produced and can be produced. Why is it not distributed according to need? Why is it rationed by price and ability to pay? Why do profits come before people? Who is in control of the food supply? Who will be in control of GM technology? If the problem is one of distribution, how will the production of GM food end famine?
The grain reserves of the 1980s were sufficient to feed the whole of Africa five times over. And that doesn’t even take into account the rate at which they were increasing, let alone productive capacity. The beef stocks amounted to some one third of the world total of beef traded annually. In the US, the grain stock was equivalent to two years of all the grain traded internationally.
The value of the stocks of food in Europe was £8,760,000,000 or £32 for every European man, woman and child. But of course, under capitalism, supply and demand are mediated by the market. The stocks could not be sold for this sum and could not be given away. Production needs to be rationed in such a way as to maintain price levels and profit margins. If the stocks were released on the market, they would depress prices, with only a fraction of the value being realised. Profit margins would collapse.
To repeat, there are no food shortages. The problem of famine is one of distribution. The world can produce as much food as it needs. The Financial Times stated the obvious but dangerous truth on 4 September 1986: 'People are not hungry these days because food supplies are not available; they are hungry because they are poor.'

We are asked to believe that this simple truth escapes our brightest scientific minds. If it has, then they are not so bright at all. But it is a dangerous truth in that it exposes the true nature of the problem. To get pertinent answers, argued Jacob Bronowski, it is necessary to ask impertinent questions. Why, if there is no problem in the production of food, are people still starving on this planet? 

The destruction of food
So vast has been the production of food and so great has the problem of storage become that it has been necessary to destroy the food, turn it into something else or dump it abroad. Destroying food has always played an important role in the food trade: ploughing potatoes, cabbages or apples back into the fields. John Steinbeck wrote memorably of these practices in the 1930s, when millions were going hungry in the richest country in the world. The reason for destruction is simple, to keep prices up and preserve profit margins. The formal rationality of market economics is laid bare as a substantive irrationality, a howling insanity.


This is a failure of market economics rather than skill and ingenuity. Indeed, human intelligence is applied to extreme degrees in the service of destruction. The problem set our greatest minds is how to get rid of the food produced without letting anyone eat it, thus undermining the prices of the rest of the supply. The losses are as astronomical as the output. When the European retail price of butter was at £1 per pound for consumers, the EEC was selling it to farmers to feed to calves for less than 3p per pound.

Sometimes the ingenuity of the scientists takes such surreal forms that only Dali at his most warped comes close. When it was considered that Europe’s bees had been 'overproducing' honey, it was first proposed that the surplus honey should be sold back at a low price to the beekeepers, to be fed back to the bees. The real problem, however, was how to prevent the cheap honey re-entering the honey market, thus undercutting retail prices. The brain cells in the world of chemistry hit upon the idea of polluting the honey with garlic in order to make it unfit for human consumption. The problem that the chemists completely overlooked was that it was unfit for the bees too. Not that the chemists were deterred by this little setback. Powdered carbon was injected into the garlicky honey, curing the indigestion of the bees and making the world of food production safe for the capitalists. Prices and profit margins matter, first and last. 

Who gains?
Since there is no problem in food production, the impertinent question to ask is who gains from global famine? Distribution is linked to prices, purchasing power and profits. Who gains from controlling the food supply in such a way as to maximise profitability? Do you need any clues? Try the giant grain traders; fruit, meat and vegetable companies; food processors; storage companies, transport and shipping companies, exporters; the bankers who finance the food trade. Their names are well known. There are very many snouts in the trough, the vast majority of them having no connection whatsoever with farming. The production of the food is the least important aspect of the whole chain of money making. Who gains from GM food? Read the above.

Famine and aid
Left to their own devices, business and government possess an infinite capacity to ignore famine and poverty. Their concern, first and foremost, is to keep up the prices of agricultural products. The fact that people die from hunger is the least of their concerns, if they are concerned at all. Even when it comes to aid, governments are concerned to avoid taking any action that could jeopardise the making of profit and upsetting vested interests. Most of all, government and business wish to discourage the dangerous idea that food surpluses could be distributed and consumed rather than sold at the going price or destroyed.


The millions of people who respond to appeals for aid have little in comparison with the vast resources of governments, with their massive surplus food stocks, but give far more in proportion to their wealth. This means that if governments truly represented the governed then, given food stocks and productive capacity, famine would be abolished. The millions who give in aid, expecting nothing in return, are subverting the monetary imperatives of the market by saying that wherever there is human need exists, it should be satisfied. Cue some more impertinent questions. Is GM food going to be given away? Or is it going to be distributed via market mechanisms, at a price and for a profit? 

Famine is part of the system, not a part of nature
Famine is the product of the way that world economy is arranged, not the result of a failure of agriculture in this or that country. A change in the weather in the US or Europe does not produce famine. There is more than enough surplus food in the world to ensure that no-one in the world suffers from hunger. Famine is the result of economic crisis, high import prices and high debt servicing charges, along with the collapse of export prices and the suspension of new loans by the banks.
The globalisation of economic relations has intensified these factors. Global economic crisis means unemployment in richer parts of the world and famine in the poorer parts. Global famine is not an act of God or of Nature, but are the product of the global economic crisis.

US free marketeer Andrew Mellon, high priest of the roaring twenties, declared that ‘in a depression assets return to their rightful owners.' Famines, like depressions, strengthen the rich and weaken the poor. Famine is only a problem for the starving, just as poverty is only a problem for the poor. The rich gain in famine and in depression: they buy the assets of the bankrupt, they retain control of resources.


What happens within countries happens all over the world. The power of the main food-producing and exporting countries — North America and Europe, in charge of three-quarters of the world's traded grain — is greatly enhanced. Washington has always used food aid as 'a tool in the kit of us diplomacy' (in the words of a US Secretary of Agriculture. Food aid can be used to exert pressure, bully and cajole, to subvert and punish governments, to exercise control. Famine enormously increases the power that rich countries have over poor countries. In 1985, a senior USAID official revealed the political purpose behind US aid programmes in Africa in a statement to the Financial Times: 'In a sense, we're talking about a kind of recolonisation — about sending in smart white boys to tell them how to run their countries.'

The solution
There are no technological solutions to the problem of famine. Technology has long since solved the problem of natural necessity. The world produces all the food it needs, and can produce even more if required. The problem of famine is not a problem of the niggardliness of Nature to be solved by technology. That problem has long since been solved. GM food is not the answer, particularly since such proposals come from the very companies and countries that control the obscene surpluses of world food, making them available only on such terms as are profitable to them. Telling the starving that they could be fed if only the world embraced GM food ignores the fact that rich and poor, the well-fed and starving are locked together into a global economy in which the rich and powerful control production and distribution on their terms.
The criticism of ‘Greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ as political activists is not an aside. The more that environmentalism becomes politically effective, the more there is a backlash from those suddenly exposed to public controversy and questioning. Concern and anger must become political in order to be effective. The systematic abuse of ‘Greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ from Lovelock, Brand and Lynas cannot be politically innocent in this respect. 

The struggle against famine does not start with the countries vulnerable to famine, nor with technology, but here in the struggle against an economic system which produces sufficient food to feed the world but distributes it so unevenly according to ability to pay that millions starve in the midst of abundance.

Famine sums up the substantive irrationality of an economy based upon profits and purchasing power, wants rather than needs. This irrationality feeds into government. World arms expenditure now stands at $1.7 trillion. Arms expenditure always outruns expenditure on food production for need.

Means of production have been turned into means of destruction. In the 1970s, the United Nations calculated that 0.5 per cent of world spending on weapons of destruction would be sufficient to provide the investment required to make Africa self-sufficient in food production. Instead, arms expenditure has continued to grow. A small percentage of the money devoted to killing could go to save the lives of millions, and yet arms expenditure increases. The 'free market' protects its prices and profits and wastes surplus resources on bombs and bullets. As soon as the UN started to point out such simple truths, exposing the full horror of free-market priorities, the US government started to cut off funds.

All over the world, the discrepancy between the abundance that is produced and the uneven way in which it is distributed gapes so wide that only the most fanatical believer in the free market can be blind to it. The world now has sufficient technology, raw materials, know how and ingenuity to meet the basic needs of everyone without difficulty. There is already enough food to feed the world, and there would be no problem in increasing supply. The same goes for clothing, shelter, heat and light, not to mention education, health, and transport.

The figures for actual and potential production are available in all the statistics. The whole of humankind could be advancing in comfort and plenty, cooperating across the world in order to safeguard future generations from war. 
Instead, the capital economy is diverting the potential for peace and plenty into war-making machines. Instead of a safe and comfortable world, the human race faces an insecure, war-ridden, impoverished, hungry reality. And that is before we even mention the looming environmental crisis. There is no need for the poor, the needy or the hungry to be with us anymore. The technological capacity exists to solve all of these problems. The problem is not one of natural necessity and technological failure, but of the way the market mechanism operates within capitalist relations of production.

Whilst there is no shortage of food, scarcity is produced by the way that resources are distributed according to ability to pay. The needs of those lacking the money do not register on the market. Humanity today has an unprecedented productive capacity with which to feed, clothe and shelter everyone. However, this capacity is governed by the narrow, profit-centred purpose of the capital economy. This is the central clash between the power of the productive forces being constrained and contradicted by the narrow ends of the relations of production. This productive potential can be realised for the common good only when the people who make the world's wealth decide to take control of the productive means and employ them for need rather than want, use rather than for profit. The abundance that is now produced will be produced evenly.

Famine is a sure sign that the capital system has long exhausted its historical potential and that the new productive forces demand an alteration in the production relations. As Marx wrote: 'The modern labourer … becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society. (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 79). 

The growing wrath
There is no problem in producing sufficient food to feed the world. There hasn’t been a technical problem for a long time now. The failure is not one of productive forces but of the way that they are constrained, to the point of destruction, within the relations of production.

This contradiction between the forces and relations of production is going on before our own eyes. Back in 1847, Marx noted that modern bourgeois society has ‘conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.’ Economic crisis is nothing less than ‘the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule.’ That revolt is even more apparent today, where immense productive potential is belied by conditions of poverty and famine. We are faced, on an ever increasing scale, with the paradox of poverty in the midst of unprecedented abundance. The contrast between the forces of production and relations of production is before our eyes, and yet too many people cannot see the obvious. 

It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of overproduction. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. (Marx MCP Rev 1848 1973: 73)

For Marx, the explanation of this paradox of famine and poverty despite overproduction is that the productive forces have superseded the conditions of bourgeois property. The productive forces ‘have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them.’
Within capitalist relations, these crises of overproduction are resolved by the ‘enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces’, ‘paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.’ (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973:73). 

In the 1859 Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx wrote: ‘From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.’ (Marx EW CCPE 1975). We are still in this era of social revolution. The existence of famine and poverty in conditions of vast productive potential demonstrate the extent to which capitalist relations of production constrain and contradict the social forces of production, turning means of production into means of destruction. For Marx, ‘mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.’ Famine and poverty are such resolvable tasks, pointing to the need to embed the new productive forces in ‘new superior relations of production.’ 

The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production - antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence - but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation. (Marx EW CCPE 1975). 

At some point, people see what is happening before their eyes and start to ask some impertinent questions. Why is there poverty amidst abundance? People will start to get angry but, to become effective, this anger has to get political. 

'Men have transformed the world with their knowledge. The short lean wheat has been made big and productive. Little sour apples have grown large and sweet, and that old grape that grew among the trees and fed the big birds has mothered a thousand varieties, red and black, green and pale pink, purple and yellow; and each variety with its own flavour.
'The men who work in the experimental farms have made new fruits; nectarines and forty kinds of plums, walnuts with paper shells and always they work, selecting, grafting, changing, driving themselves, driving the earth to produce.
'But men who graft the trees and make the seeds fertile and big can find no way to make the hungry eat their produce.
'A million people hungry, needing the fruit—and kerosene spread over the golden mountains. And the smell of rot fills the country.

'The people come with nets to fish for potatoes in the river, and the guards hold them back. They come in rattling cars to get the dumped oranges but the kerosene is sprayed. And they stand still and watch the potatoes flow by, listen to the screaming pigs being killed in a ditch and covered with quicklime, watch the mountains of oranges slop down to a putrefying ooze.
'And in the eyes of the people there is a failure and in the eyes of the hungry there is a growing wrath.'









On land, Lynas dresses up trite observation as controversial and radical new thinking. ‘With so little of the Earth's land still pristine and unaffected by humans, the idea of the 'wilderness' has less and less meaning in the modern world.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). Never! Some such statement can be found in every book on ecology as a science and environmentalism as politics. To Lynas, the idea that ecology is about returning to or protecting ‘wilderness’ is one of those ‘orthodoxies that are no longer useful in this new era of near-total human planetary dominance.’ Lynas may be surprised to find that conservationists and environmentalists have recognised this and have been dealing with the implications now for decades. I can suggest a few good books for him, seeing as he needs to catch up on his reading. Changing Environments D Morris ed 2003 Wiley OU; Changing the Face of the Earth IG Simmons 1996 Blackwell; Ecology and our Endangered Life Support Systems Eugene Odum 1993 Sinauer Associates; Empowering the Earth Alex Begg 2000 Green Books; Environment and Politics T Doyle and D McEachern 2001 Routledge; Global Environmental Issues Frances Harris ed 2004 John Wiley; Green or Gone D Shearman 1997 Wakefield Press; Greening the Millennium M Jacobs ed 1997 Blackwell Publishers; Human Ecology  Gerald Marten 2001 Earthscan; Interpreting Nature I Simmons 1993 Routledge; Political Ecology P Robbins 2004 Blackwell; Private Planet David Cromwell 2001 Carpenter; Reinventing Eden - the past, the present and the future of our fragile earth Barbara Griggs 2001 Quadrille Publishing; Remaking Reality B Braun and N Castree ed 1998 Routledge; Society and Nature Peter Dickens 1992 Harvester; The Ecology of Learning Sustainability, Lifelong Learning and Everyday Life John Blewitt 2006 Earthscan; The Human Impact On the Natural Environment Andrew Goudie 2000 Blackwell; What is Nature K Soper 1995 Blackwell; What will it take A Deeper Approach to Nature Conservation Iain Scott 1999 HPT Books; Who Cares for Planet Earth The Con in Conservation Bill Jordan 2001 The Alpha Press; Why Conservation is Failing and How it Can Regain Ground Eric Freyfogle 2006 Yale University). 

That took a couple of minutes of checking my own personal library. There are many, many more books on the humanity-nature interaction out there. My beef with Lynas and his ilk is not so much the arguments themselves, as thin as they may be, but that the way of presenting them is designed to entrench positions and deter people from investigating further. Books like these are often justified in terms of provoking debate. The problem is that they provoke the kinds of debates we do not need, debates between decided opinions. We need to encourage a depth in reading, not a superficial cycle of assertion and counter-assertion. Lynas admits that in the past he was ill-informed. I suggest that he still is.

'Getting close to nature' or going 'back to the land' will generally not be good for the environment, however psychologically fulfilling these objectives may be to individuals seeking escape from industrial living. (Lynas ch 5 2011). Oh, no, here we go again. This book comes with the strong whiff of burning straw. Every time I hear this ‘back to nature’ routine I cringe, waiting for poor old Rousseau to be led out to be burned one more time.

Instead, we need to intensify agriculture and other human land uses in existing areas as much as possible, and encourage as an environmental boon the growth of the world's major cities that already successfully concentrate today's enormous human population onto only a tiny proportion of the world's land. The most positive trend of all in allowing us to minimise our impact on the planet's surface is one more often bemoaned than celebrated: urbanisation. (Lynas ch 5 2011). 

I love how the big assertions follow each other, supported by next to nothing by way of argument. I can agree about urbanisation, but where is the supporting argument or, indeed, the argument to be made? The argument that cities are big users of energy and require a large carrying capacity are not rejections of the city as such. Ecologists going back to Barbara Ward’s works have been concerned to make the city healthy, liveable, human and efficient in the use of resources. Lynas is doing what Brand did here, asserting that greens are against cities and urbanisation, going on to praise the virtues of cities and urbanisation. This, frankly, is an irrelevance. If greens were all sky-clad hippies wanting to get naked in nature it would have a point. But they are not, so Lynas doesn’t have a point. Many ecologists are already looking at greening the city and the urban environment. I have an interest in eco-Architecture. I can suggest some more good books for Lynas here. Earth to Spirit In Search of Natural Architecture David Pearson 1994 Gaia Books; Ecological Planning A Historical and Comparative Synthesis Forster Ndubisi 2002 John Hopkins UP; Green Architecture James Wines 2000 Taschen; The New Eco-Architecture Colin Porteous 2002 Spon Press. There are many more. Lynas thinks that his assertions will fill environmentalists with ‘horror’. To me, it’s just a fuss over nothing. Better work can be found elsewhere. It’s the publicity that Lynas received that is horrifying, because it was a clear attempt to skew the political debate against green positions. 

‘Often I find thinkers on the political right put this truth best. As the self-styled 'rational optimist' Matt Ridley - with whom I disagree about a great deal - writes: 'The vast majority of people are much better fed, much better sheltered, much better entertained, much better protected against disease and much more likely to live to old age than their ancestors have ever been.'’
That, of course, is not denied by thinkers on the political left. This isn’t the issue at all. Is it sustainable and what alternate possibilities are we falling short of? Who is arguing for a return to nature? Straw man argument again. The likes of Ridley are happy singing the praises of the capital system and the free market and writes as though it is through the benevolence of capital that food, shelter, health etc are all delivered. Yes, these things are delivered for some, and at a price. Actually, there are two sources of wealth, labour and nature. Those who produce the wealth ought to have a bigger say in how it is produced and distributed. ‘Nor is the global inequality frequently bemoaned by leftists much of a fly in the ointment’ continues Lynas: 'The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951.' And so on and so on as Lynas cherry picks his way through the data!
‘Where I disagree with Ridley and many of his colleagues on the right is their tendency to then go on to downplay or deny the environmental consequences of this human great leap forward, as later chapters will show.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). Which means that Lynas has no problem with the way in which Ridley downplays the social consequences of capitalism. Earlier, Lynas was defending the market, the corporations and capitalism against the ‘extremists’ on the left. Now he is admitting that there is a connection between capitalism and the environmental crisis: ‘For land in particular, our impacts on the planet's terrestrial surface are now so extensive and transformative that they threaten the capacity of varied ecosystems to self-regulate and maintain the living biosphere overall.’
This book is just plain schizophrenic – not reliable. It soon becomes clear that beyond the general advocacy of nuclear, GE crops, biotechnology, Lynas’ book doesn’t offer much. Nothing by way of politics. ‘Questioning organic agriculture because of its land-use implications does not mean rejecting ecological principles in general. Instead, it means that farmers need to take the best of modern science and ecology to deliver maximum yields with minimum environmental damage.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). Well, yes, but how. This is just assertion at the level of generalities, again and again. We need science and technology, repeated ad nauseum. There isn’t much science in this book, the scientific case isn’t made, it is asserted. 
It soon becomes clear that what Lynas is doing is finding what is popularly understood to be the typical green position and simply inverting it to cause maximum controversy and publicity. ‘Campaigners are on to a loser if they try to convince people either to convert en masse to vegetarianism or to have fewer children for the good of the planet.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). Yes, I think we saw that one coming. Vegetarianism is on the rise for ethical reasons, there are also scientists calling for a vegetarian diet in order to reduce planetary harm. So Lynas indulges in a cheap attack on vegetarianism. Mark Lynas has simply drawn up a list of Green nostrums and pieties and inverted them, claiming that God, in the shape of Science and technology, is on his side. The way that Lynas uses the  word ‘orthodoxies’ suggests that this is a deliberate strategy on his part, giving Lynas some ill-deserved publicity and maybe winning him some well-deserved new friends.
‘People's desire to eat more meat as they get more wealthy is so deeply embedded in most cultures (and getting lots of protein may even be a biological impulse inherent in all of us) that it is not something that is amenable to outside influence.’ It’s profound stuff. I have a book The Hunting Ape Meat Eating and the Origins of Human Behaviour by Craig Stanford (1999). The book traces our social origins to hunting, killing, meat eating, and sharing. Meat eating isn’t an end state, Stanford makes clear, it’s where we began. The author explains meat eating rather than justifies it. His argument is that to evolve beyond the predatory and killing instinct, we need to know about our origins. He comments ‘While women may collect most hunter-gatherer protein, we should not ignore the fact that men are able to use meat for their own selfish and manipulative political ends.’ (Stanford 1999 ch 7). Meat is about power and control. And it is about how we live and what values we choose to live by. ‘We receive conflicting messages in our society about the value of sharing. While a deep cultural value is given to altruistic sharing, we are also socialized to be individualistic. We learn that there are both powerful incentives and disincentives to share and to be selfish. Either can be advantageous depending on the context; altruists can be strategically self-serving in myriad ways, and individuals who are otherwise selfish may seem utterly altruistic at times. If these are qualities that served us in our distant ancestry, then perhaps that is why there is so much ambivalence about altruism and selfishness in society today.’ (Stanford 1999 ch 7). 

There are strong environmental grounds for human beings to exchange meat eating for a vegetarian diet. But there are also strong moral and social grounds to do with a change in social relationships and human behaviour. Lynas cannot be allowed to get away with a casual assertion that with increasing wealth comes increased consumption of meat, as though this is some unalterable law of history. Stanford is a biologist, he knows something about this subject, and is able to indicate what is at stake.

‘Humans are not demons by nature; in spite of the attention that we focus on human violence, there are thousands of acts of compassion for every act of physical aggression. 
The hunting, scavenging, and sharing of meat were fundamental features of the lives of our ancestors. This does not mean that we are biologically driven to do any of these. The way that we deal with one another in society is rooted in social strate​gies that were molded during a time in our history when getting and using meat was vital. If meat were a currency with a 10,000-generation history in the human family, then the traditions that have developed related to the use of meat are likely to have some evolved basis. By sharing meat we are both altruistic and selfish, as we are in most other arenas of our endeavors. We are not simply compassionate by training and Machiavellian by nature. Nor are we constrained by our past to repeat Machiavellian patterns in the future. A fuller understanding of our ancestral nature is, however, the first step to liberation. (Stanford 1999 ch 7). 

Lynas asserts that the desire to eat more meat as they get more wealthy is ‘deeply embedded in most cultures’ and is ‘not something that is amenable to outside influence.’ Human behaviour has brought us to the brink of ecological catastrophe. Lynas knows this. His case for planetary engineering is premised on the need to deal with the climate crisis. Yet he makes a statement that effectively claims that the human behaviour that has brought us to the brink cannot be changed. The human desire to consume more as wealth increases is embedded in the culture and can’t be changed. Ecologists argue that human beings need to alter their behaviour and their consumption patterns in order to stave off. Lynas says it can’t be done. Frankly, that means that he has nothing to contribute to the debate.

At the start of The God Species Lynas wrote a chapter on human origins, identifying human beings as a planetary killer ape. He never picked up the argument of that chapter again, leaving us to guess whether and how the killer ape could attain the god-like status claimed by the book’s title. Reading further, it becomes clear that Lynas locates divinity not in human beings but in technology. He never followed up on our ape origins, hence he merely asserts the inevitability of meat eating and pretty much everything else about our ‘animal instincts’. Human nature, for Lynas, is unchanged and unchangeable. We are killer apes. But the implication of this position seems to have escaped Lynas. When he argues that increasing wealth brings increasing consumption of meat, the implication is that new technologies do not change the nature of the killer apes, only magnifies their murderous, cannibalistic capacities. If this does not necessarily follow, then Lynas is not entitled to assert meat eating over vegetarianism. Human nature is malleable and ethics have a central role to play. That is implicit in human beings ceasing to be killer apes and realising its rational potential as the God Species. Actually, the evidence is that with increasing wealth and a more ecologically sophisticated culture, vegetarianism, as part of a post-materialist ethics, increases.

‘As with climate change, the only pragmatic option is to concentrate efforts to fulfil people's desires and demands in a way that protects natural ecosystems as far as possible - not to try to challenge patterns of consumption per se by insisting that they are unsustainable, even if this appears to be the case in the short term.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011).

Hilarious – the solution is to fulfil people’s desires and demands whilst protecting ecosystems…! Maximum production and consumption with minimal ecological harm. This isn’t technology, this is magic. Can you turn me into the Queen of Sheba while you’re at it? Technology will fulfil all our wants and fantasies at no cost at all. Nothing, not a single thing, has been learned. At the very time that nature’s reality is knocking loud on the door of the machine, the likes of Lynas write as though economics is wholly distinct from nature, in a world of its own. And this is a man who knows all about natural limits and planetary boundaries. He thinks technology can cheat nature. The idea of planetary boundaries isn’t Lynas’. It originates with the Planetary Boundaries Group, experts campaigning for recognition of nine planetary boundaries. Lynas organises his book around those boundaries, but it is plain that the deeper philosophical message evades him.

Lynas continues his relentless assaults upon environmental campaigns and groups. ‘One cannot help but get the impression that Friends of the Earth's opposition has more to do with a general aversion to trading and international markets than any specific objections’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). Such criticism would be fine if Lynas actually engages the arguments of the critics of the capital system and actually shows some awareness of political economy. I can’t say if Lynas is write or wrong here, since he doesn’t identify his targets in any specific sense. Instead, the same lazy assertions of the beneficience of markets and capitalism. In this form, Lynas’ words have no more relevance than an editorial in a right wing newspaper. Fine if you want to read that kind of thing to have your prejudices confirmed, but of relevance when it comes to the issues concerned.

There is now a long list of books from outside the marxist and Green tradition which are critical of neo-liberal economics, but Lynas avoids them all so as to justify pro-market and pro-business policies and paint environmentalists as politically motivated zealots, probably marxists, who all hate capitalism. I’m sure I read some such thing in the Daily Mail. Lynas seems desperately short of good material, so I’ll help him out again with some good books by non-marxist economists on the subject. Animal Spirits G Akerlof and R Shiller Princeton UP; Capitalism 4.0 Anatole Kaletsky 2010 Bloomsbury; Capitalism against Capitalism Michel Albert 1993 Whurr Publishers; Common Wealth For a free, equal, mutual and sustainable society Martin Lange 2010 Hawthorn Press; Economics of Good and Evil Tomas Sedlacek 2011 Oxford; Enough is Enough F O Toole 2010 faber; False Dawn The Delusions of Global Capitalism J Gray 1999 Granta; Fantasy Island Larry Elliott and Dan Atkinson 2007 Constable; Financial Reckoning Day W Bonner 2003 Wiley; No Way to Run an Economy Graham Turner 2009 Pluto; On the Edge Living with Global Capitalism Will Hutton and A Giddens ed 2000 Jonathan Cape; Freefall R Stiglitz 2010 Penguin; Stuff Matters The Secret of Capitalism Harry Bingham 2010 Fourth Estate; The Bubble of American Supremacy George Soros 2004 Weidenfeld and Nicolson; The Crisis of Vision in Modern Economic Thought Robert Heilbroner and William Milberg 1995 Cambridge University Press; The Return of the Master R Skidelsky 2010 Allen; The Road From Ruin M Bishop and M Green 2011; The Truth about Markets J Kay 2004 Penguin; The Under Cover Economist Tim Harford 2007 Abacus; The Value of Nothing Raj Patal 2009 Portobello; The World We're In Will Hutton 2002 Little Brown).

And that’s just off the top of my head. Reading Lynas on economics and it sounds like he’s mugged up on a few Pollyanna-ish articles in The Economist and recycled them in ill-digested form. It is worth emphasising this point because the kind of lazy generalisation that Lynas employs attempts to give the impression that Greens and environmentalists don’t know anything about economics and that the case against free markets and capitalism is motivated purely by communist fundamentalism. It’s the same trick that Stewart Brand tries to pull when he claims that environmentalists don’t know anything about economics. ‘We Greens are not economists’ he says. ‘When someone needs fiscal advice, they don't usually hire an environmentalist, because they know we don't really know about money and we don't really care about money.’ (Brand ch 4 2009). Well, there most certainly are ecologists who know about economics. And there most certainly are economists who expose neo-liberalism as a bad economics that has brought the global economy to its knees, but as a good class politics that redistributes wealth and power from the poor to the rich. The claim that economics is somehow a difficult science to be left to the experts is laughable. Karl Marx referred to economists as experts by way of bourgeois stupidity, ‘sycophants’ of the bourgeoisie. And things haven’t changed much. These economists have been rationalising the naked class politics of the rich and powerful for decades now and have bankrupted the global economy in the process. Back in 1994, Paul Ormerod, professor of economics, wrote the book The Death of Economics. The idea of expertise in economics is risible. Brand and Lynas must have been living in a cave these past few years. The current crisis in the global economy is proof positive that these experts in economics are utterly clueless. We are moving towards a new economics.

Brand claims that ‘we Greens’ don’t know anything about economics and should leave the economy to business – the capitalists, the rich and powerful. Brand can speak for himself here. I know about economics. I did economics in my first degree and received A’s at masters level. I left economics for philosophy because I found it easy, uninteresting and unchallenging. I also realised that behind the so-called science of economics was politics, social relations, interests, classes and conflicts. Back in the 1930s and 1940s, the Polish economist Michal Kalecki showed us the way out of economic crisis, through government intervention, borrowing and spending on infrastructures, increased social benefits and reduced taxes, boosting demand and generating employment. There are economists now who use such thinking to promote the Green New Deal. Kalecki was a great economist, but he knew that such proposals are unlikely to be translated into public policy. Although a growing economy and healthy profits would benefit all, business and workers together, the ‘leaders of industry’ would actively oppose government intervention on principle. For it amounts to a practical demonstration that an alternative, socialised economy is possible. Kalecki goes on to identify one of the principal obstacles standing in the way of the resolution of economic crisis, ‘so-called “economic experts” closely connected with banking and finance’ and ‘big business’.

It’s politics. It has nothing to do with expertise. Economics is not that difficult a subject. It’s a bogus science, a rationalisation of class politics. The coalition of business, banking and finance is united by three concerns:

They want to minimise government intervention in the economy;
They want to prevent the state expanding into new areas, thus making it clear that social and public regulation is feasible;
They want to keep workers insecure, preventing the emergence of a healthy jobs market in which workers have the confidence to demand better pay and conditions, more security and the power of control.

That’s the point of economic growth, you might say. No, that’s the promise that keeps workers at the coal face. It’s not meant to be delivered. Whilst a healthy and prosperous economy supported by the government generates greater corporate profits than a crisis ridden economy, that’s not what keeps an economy based on class division and exploitation going. ‘But “discipline in the factories” and “political stability” are more appreciated by business leaders than profits’. Better an insecure and pliable workforce than a confident and powerful one.
And it’s this politics, not economics, that lies behind the rejection of the Green New Deal. And it’s politics, not economics, that lies behind the advocacy of planetary engineering.

The claims of economic illiteracy and worse that Brand and Lynas direct against environmentalists are interesting, given that many right wing, pro-business groups portray Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace as marxists rather than genuine ecologists. Interesting how Lynas seems to agree. A leopard that changes its spots this much wasn’t much of a leopard in the first place. But since when did criticisms of the way that the global political economy is rigged up become beyond the pale? I think, in light of the last three decades of a neo-liberal agenda we are entitled to develop an alternative political platform. Friends of the Earth have offered to debate with Lynas on these issues. They have nothing to fear, having debated these issues for decades. FoE have a wealth of evidence as well as a coherent position. Lynas has nothing but assertion and an appeal to powerful allies.

Lynas produces arguments which fit the neo-liberal carve up of the planet like a glove fits a fist. 

To my mind, that powerful interests are beginning to see forest protection as a winning opportunity should be welcomed by anyone who wants to see the survival of tropical forests in the long term. This is simply practical politics: no amount of glossy pamphlets published by Green groups will have a chance of protecting forests if moneyed interests stand to make a bigger profit from their destruction than their protection, as the accelerated rate of deforestation over recent decades has shown. Bringing forests into properly designed markets as living entities is essential for their survival. (Lynas ch 5 2011).

Practical politics indeed. We well know what kind of politics are practical, we see it at work every day. Pack the whole world up for the market. This argument is so crude it could work as satire.

‘I suggest each country adds half a per cent to Value Added Tax (VAT) with the proceeds raised specifically safeguarded for ecosystem and habitat restoration ('rewilding') and preservation.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). And when it is rejected as a burden on business, as it will be? ‘This would be fair because a tax on consumption would mean that people pay in proportion to the environmental impact of their lifestyle patterns - with those who consume more bearing more of the cost - and as the economy grows so the yield from the tax would grow too.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). But taxes on consumption are not fair, they are known as regressive because they hit the poorer income groups the hardest. Those with least money spend a greater proportion of their money. Hardly fair. But no doubt Matt Ridley would agree. Again, Lynas shows himself to be out of his depth.

‘Village life, particularly in extremely poor developing countries, should not be romanticised by outsiders.’ They aren’t. They aren’t vilified for simply being villages either. Stop erecting your straw men. ‘Whenever they are given the chance, younger generations tend to flee to the cities, where they have many more livelihood options and can escape the cultural oppression that is often a hallmark of traditional societies.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). No, they are seduced by the promises of wealth in the cities. They soon find out the reality. I have read this same argument in Brand, where he justifies the urban poor as the shoe-shine boys and prostitutes of the urban rich. I commented on this with respect to Brand and see no point wasting any further time on the issue.
‘City living is seldom lauded by environmentalists, but it may be our most environmentally friendly trait as a species, because urban dwelling is vastly more efficient than living in the countryside.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). Environmentalists have been at the forefront of humanising and greening the city since long before Lynas was born. This is like Bertrand Russell being lectured on mathematics by a child who is halfway through mastering the abacus. Of course, it depends on what Lynas means by a city and who he means by environmentalists. Like Humpty Dumpty, the terms can mean whatever Lynas wants them to mean, particularly since he doesn’t define them in the first place. For the record, I lauded the city to the extent of seven volumes in a study entitled The City of Reason. The book proceeds from Plato and Aristotle to develop a social and ecological conception of the liveable city. Guess what? Things are not as simple as Lynas makes out. It takes more than identifying an obvious trend to make an argument. Lynas asserts that people leave the countryside in search of a better life in the city. How much research did it take for him to draw this conclusion?
Lynas gives us a piece of good news: ‘the rate of population growth is declining, having fallen from 2.2 per cent at its highest in the early 1960s to 1.2 per cent today.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011). Lynas is remarkably blasé, not to say casual, on this question of population. There is an assumption that with development, population will stabilise. Well, let us presume that our technological fixes buys a continuation of current lifestyles for another half a century. Does anybody really think that the seven billion people on the planet taking such conditions for granted will not try to make it to ten billion? And why stop there, if technological fixing can keep expanding carrying capacity? Sooner or later, the price of the avoidance of planetary boundaries by artificial means will be exacted. Hopeful assertions that technology will save us simply another form of denial. It’s time for this question concerning the demands we make on the planet to be addressed. 

I’m not even sure that Lynas, having written this book, got round to copy editing it in order to ensure internal logical consistency. In an earlier chapter, Lynas identified reducing the global population as an option that ‘certainly won't work’, there is no prospect of halting population growth. Well, there clearly is, if the rate of population growth is declining. And, guess what, economic development is instrumental in this process. Environmentalists do not deny economic development where development is needed. To criticise over-development in the rich countries, particularly the excess use and waste of resources, does not entail the denial of the need for development in poorer countries. A little differentiation here deprives the likes of Lynas and Brand of a few cheap points.

Lynas states that ‘environmentalists need to take land use more seriously.’ Thanks for the advice. As though ‘environmentalists’ had missed questions surrounding land use!!!! Refer to the books on ecology I listed above, they are full of arguments and policies concerning land use. I can just picture some poor ecologist, with years of field work under his or her belt, reading this from a journalist of variable opinions, and getting very bad tempered indeed.
Right at the end of the chapter, Lynas finally gets to the serious issue with respect to cities. I love the line: ‘As always, one should not oversimplify.’ (!!!!) ‘Cities themselves consume resources, including food, timber, water and energy, harvested over vastly wider areas than the land that they physically occupy, and this greater footprint needs to be considered in any overall assessment to get a true picture.’ (Lynas ch 5 2011).

Having presented the bleeding obvious as blinding insight, Lynas introduces the fundamental questions on the last page of the chapter. Unfortunately, he doesn’t get round to addressing them. Instead, we get some more gratuitous caricaturing and abuse of greens.

 Given the choice, most people around the world already find city life more attractive and varied than that in the countryside. Forget the 'back to the land' self-indulgence of some disgruntled people in rich countries. Billions of people want to move to urban areas to achieve increasing prosperity and improve their standard of living. Let us be glad of that. They are unwitting 'Greens', whose efforts at self-improvement should be celebrated. (Lynas ch 5 2011). 

Given the choice, Lynas states. There is an argument that if you really want to understand what individuals want out of life, look at what rich people choose to do with their money. With money comes freedom. What the rich choose is what other people would choose ‘given the choice’. It is a principle that works well in architecture and in building. Poor people are indeed attracted by the promise of wealth in the cities. Of course, they often find that the promise is illusory. This isn’t choice. Lynas should pay more regard to the rich in developed countries who are now downsizing. There are psychological reasons for that. As the Easterlin Paradox shows, material wealth increases happiness only to a certain level of development. Beyond that, human beings have other needs to satisfy. I thought everybody knew Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. To deride this as a ‘back to nature’ self-indulgence is simply newspaper polemic. It isn’t argument – it is caricature. This is the worst kind of journalism. Regardless of the argument being made, the mode of argument is one we can do without and safely ignore. 


The Economics of Water

It would be foolish to neglect the enormous benefits that water engineering and control have delivered to humanity. Our domination of the water cycle, as with our rule of the land, has given the human species in the industrial era advantages that would once have been unimaginable: unlimited clean, fresh water, literally 'on tap' and delivered wherever and whenever we need it. (Lynas ch 6 2011).

And that miracle of water engineering and control was the product of public action. So when it comes to those parts of the world which lack access to clean water, what does Lynas propose? Privatisation. ‘There is a simple solution to this: privatisation. The provision of water must be deregulated and privatised; taken out of the inefficient and often corrupt hands of the state, and handed instead to the private sector.’ (Lynas ch 6 2011). Lynas’ apolitical engineering approach stands revealed as a agenda. Privatisation is not and has never been a ‘simple solution’ and if Lynas suggests that it is, then he is being disingenuous. We have had a hard neo-liberal agenda since the late 1970s and this emphasised the inefficiency and corruption of the state, ‘the dead hand of state bureaucracy’. Deregulation and privatisation were efficient because they were efficient by definition. We know that this political agenda is designed to redistribute power and resources from capital to labour. And we know that the balance of public and private in economies around the world is never as crudely black and white as this. 

Lynas’ argument here is limp in the extreme: ‘I am aware that this proposal will be controversial, and that water privatisation is typically opposed by NGOs and social movements on the grounds that it will disadvantage the poor.’ (Lynas ch 6 2011). Of course he knows the proposal will be ‘controversial’. All of his proposals are ‘controversial’. They are certain to be ‘controversial’. Lynas has gone through the dominant or typical environmentalist positions and inverted them. This is not ‘radical’. To be radical is to go to the root. And it is not new. These ideas have been around for a long time. There is nothing original in Lynas’ arguments. Oh, and the grounds for opposing these arguments are much greater than that they disadvantage the poor – apart from the social injustice it is rank bad economics, as government bailouts are now proving.

The evidence that deregulation and privatisation generates efficiency is mixed to say the least. More critically, this is part of a programme which can be called the corporatisation of public business. Economist John McDermott details the process by which private corporations target vast swathes of the public domain such as health and education and seek to put them in the private realm to boost the flagging rate of profit (McDermott 1991). Lynas is free to parrot the claims of efficiency if he likes, such as critics of the corporate capture of the modern state should also be free to engage in their politics without being labelled ‘extremists’. If Lynas denies the right wing character of his politics, hiding behind his pseudo-scientific rhetoric, then he is a plain ideologist. He must know the evidence and the argument against deregulation and privatisation. And before he indulges in his labelling of critics as marxists and extremists he should check the experience of programmes of deregulation and privatisation in Germany. Here, liberalisation has been piecemeal and sporadic, with failures and inefficiencies causing German people, through their federal structure, to check and constrain attempts at privatisation. This example is never cited for one simple reason – it flat contradicts the private good, public bad scenario of ideologists. Lynas should have another word with his friend Matt Ridley. Ridley is the apostle of free markets and the private sector. On his watch, Northern Rock went belly up and had to be bailed out by the taxpayers.
(I have written at length on privatisation and deregulation, the contrasting fortunes of the social market economy and the liberal market economy, world trade and even development in Peter Critchley  Industry and Europe 4 vols 1995). 
Lynas’ radical new thought seems to be embracing neo-liberal ideology some four decades since after the fact. The idea that society's ills result from government and the inefficiency of state intervention and the corruption of the state are not radical and not new – they have been the orthodoxy for the past thirty years. I have no intention wasting time on this hoary old debate. But I’ll give Lynas, politics rather than economics lay behind the neo-liberal agenda. Nobody decried the dead hand of government more than Ronald Reagan. Yet as President, Reagan presided over the biggest nationalisation in history when he bailed out the State Illinois Bank in 1983. 

The public has been bailing out capitalism for a long time now. ‘The $7.5 billion bailout of Continental Illinois, the nation's eighth-largest bank, in 1984 was only the latest installment paid on the government's financial commitment to prop up the supranational banking system. It began ten years earlier with Franklin National Bank, a major international bank based on Long Island that ranked among the top twenty in size in the United Slates.’ (Wachtal 146).


By 2012, the ‘philosophy’ behind neo-liberal politics has plainly run its course. Neo-liberalism purported to increase efficiency and competitiveness, yet Britain went into deficit on trade account for the first time in its history in 1983 and has never been out of deficit since. Germany, still a regulated economy, is alongside Communist China as the biggest trading nation in the world, with record trade surpluses. Lynas casually refers to deregulation and privatisation as a ‘simple solution’. The ‘economics’ are indeed simple enough to understand, hence the ease with which the private good, public bad mantra is propagated. Lynas falls for it and propagates it himself in a back-handed way. ‘Opposition to privatisation makes the implicit assumption that the public sector is doing a good job’ (Lynas ch 6 2011). Only in the same way that opposition to the public sector makes the implicit assumption that the private sector is doing a good job. This is what Lynas does. The corrupt and inefficient state is another straw man that Lynas can knock down. Lynas pompously declares that the assumption that the public sector is doing a good job is ‘a notion that fails to stand up to empirical analysis.’ (Lynas ch 6 2011). Perhaps he should take a leaf out of his own book and subject his claims for the efficiencies of deregulation and privatisation to empirical analysis. He doesn’t. All we have is the usual cherry-picking. Lynas’ argument is full of examples of poor reasoning like this. Of course, an ‘implicit assumption’ is unlikely to stand up to empirical analysis. Perhaps Lynas will now subject neo-liberal claims to efficiency to the same empirical analysis and examine the falling rate of profit across the deregulated economies, the sluggish growth, the lack of dynamism, the failure to generate high skill, high productivity employment. The empirical evidence is clear that neo-liberal economics have not produced the famed economic miracle but has confirmed the downward spiral of the private economy. These claims were exposed back in the 1980s. Why is this not clear to Lynas? State subsidisation and taxpayer bailout. Remove the state and state expenditure from these deregulated economies and see how long they last. Five minutes is my guess.


Lynas is simply wrong. I offer plenty of empirical analysis in my four volume study Industry and Europe (1995). That work reveals the politics behind neo-liberal economics. The free market is rigged to the core to be an anarchy of the rich and powerful, a de-facto global state which is insulated from democratic intervention and control. 

Lynas refers to the ‘often corrupt hands of the state’. The world is ‘often corrupt’ in all its aspects. Even cricket has suffered scandal. There are a few things that Mark Lynas has missed in his keenness to be ‘radical’ - the gap between rich and poor hitting record levels and growing, financial scandals, corporate corruption, and the global crash caused by the unrestrained greed endemic in the banking system. And still there are people calling for deregulation and privatisation. 

James Lovelock has the nerve to condemn ‘urban green ideology’ as the most ‘deadly’ idea in history. Ideology, in Marx’s critical sense, refers to ideas which conceal and obfuscate in order to preserve existing asymmetries in power. To take a simple example, the statement ‘what’s good for General Motors is good for America’. This is an example of dressing up a private interest as a general interest. Capitalism, a specific way of organising economic activities, becomes ‘the economy’ in general. And so on. Ideology. Lynas says nothing of the inefficiencies and corruption – nor the class interests – associated with deregulation and privatisation. That is ideological. The failures of deregulation and privatisation are manifest and yet the response is to call for even less public involvement and even more deregulation and privatisation. It is as like claiming that a car crash is caused by the brakes. We should recall here the economist Joseph Schumpeter, a conservative himself, who argued that it is because the car has breaks that it can go so fast. Underlying it all is the superstitious belief  that an unregulated economy will somehow produce a 'spontaneous order'. As Freud lamented, after all the science and reason, people will still tend to believe what they want to believe. With taxpayers bailing out the banks to the tune of hundreds of billions, we are entitled to reject any article of private faith that has such public impact and comes at such public expense. For all of the promises of efficiency, it seems clear that the public realm has been simply subsidizing irresponsible and greedy gamblers to indulge their ‘animal spirits’ at the expense of the public realm, the general interest, the economy and the environment.

I referred earlier to the popularity of neo-liberal economics on account of its simplicity. The private sector is motivated by the need to make money, so private profit seekers are certain to be efficient. I last saw reasoning like this in a book for CSE economics at school. Lynas seems to have read it.
‘Privatisation of water in Argentina has even been linked with a decrease in child mortality, confounding the expectations of leftist social campaigners. The reason is simple: private companies seek to make a profit, so in a competitive market they tend to increase the efficiency of their service to customers so as not to lose earnings unnecessarily.’

As Charlie Brown used to say, ‘good grief’. ‘Leftist social campaigners’ have said plenty about Argentina, Chile, Brazil, India all of them. Lynas does a neat line in isolating cases and picking his data to imply that the left and the greens are always wrong. It is the same approach that climate science deniers adopt with respect to the evidence. Environmentalists said that this ice cube would melt at 3-27 pm whereas in fact it melted at 10-43 pm and this proves they are making it up for political reasons. I have no idea whether Lynas is right or wrong on this or that piece of cherry picked data and, frankly, I’ve got better things to be doing than finding out. My point is that his whole approach is untrustworthy, polemical and political. Everything he says comes with a side and a slant and that marks the whole thing as toxic.

Lynas has learned absolutely nothing. No one accepts those simplistic claims of text book economics. Even at O level we were told that these were not real-world assumptions but ideal types designed to elaborate a principle. Perfect competition highlights the principles behind the operation of the market but not the real world market. In the ideal, companies are price takers, in the real they are price makers. And so on. Yet Lynas gives us the ideal assumption that does not withstand empirical analysis. Companies must be efficient to make a profit, therefore private enterprise increases efficiency. We know the claim. It has been debated long enough, with one empirical study after another exposing its deficiencies. There are market failures, there are obstructions to the market, there are social practices and institutions which prevent markets working as they do in the text books. Whether or not a market is efficient depends on how the market is arranged – elementary stuff, but news to Lynas. I have no doubt that Lynas will boost his connections and boost his pay. This is music to the ears of the rich and powerful. The only problem is that this line has been peddled for decades and is now very dog eared. Read any of the books on economics I cited above, the debate has long since moved on.

The Toxicity of Nuclear
Lynas diminishes the dangers of nuclear power.
‘Compared with these natural doses, the radiation releases from nuclear power stations are typically very low.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). Maybe, maybe not, but that doesn’t make nuclear safe. If nuclear is so benign, why the need for safety procedures bordering on paranoia? Lynas’ argument would imply that such a concern for safety is attributable to psychological reasons rather than health reasons. People need to feel that they are safe. Why the panic after nuclear disaster? Paranoia. Lynas rubbishes the connection between radiation and cancer, claiming that it is only the ‘occasional study’ which demonstrates the link. It’s the kind of claim that smokers make with respect to the evidence for passive smoking. The research on that link is out there and can be studied at length. More interesting is the way that Lynas plays down the dangers of nuclear accidents. This is what he writes about Chernobyl. ‘Chernobyl was a long way from being, as some have claimed, 'the world's worst industrial disaster'.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). We can stop right here. The issue of whether or not Chernobyl was the ‘world’s worst industrial disaster’ is not the issue. To point to other disasters does not make Chernobyl anything less than a disaster. Lynas deliberately frames the argument around a non-issue. He proceeds in a similar vein of denial: ‘Nor was the death toll counted in the tens, or even hundreds, of thousands, as anti-nuclear campaigners and the media have often asserted. Exhaustive studies of affected populations, firemen who attended the blaze (many of whom received colossal radiation doses), and the thousands of 'liquidators' who later cleaned up the site, yield an estimated death toll that currently stands at less than 50. Several thousand children did suffer from thyroid cancer as a result of radioactive iodine doses received from Chernobyl - but as thyroid cancer is relatively treatable, by 2002 thankfully only 15 of the estimated 4,000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer had proved fatal. All this could have been avoided had the Soviet authorities distributed iodine pills to the affected populations.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). 
At least this is an improvement on Brand, who claimed that to date there has been no deaths at all associated with nuclear energy. But to say that something is treatable hardly makes it safe, on the contrary. This means that, without treatment, radiation is dangerous and is deadly. With a breathtaking naivety typical of those who see politics as engineering, Lynas adopts the ‘it could all have been avoided’ approach which claims the technology never fails, only the politicians and managers. And so long as human beings remain all-too human, that’s how it will always be. Lynas’ claim that problems with nuclear can be avoided if governments were all wise and all powerful is hardly reassuring. Lynas can join the rest of us in search of Plato’s philosopher-king. Even if we democratise the notion and argue for the rule of reason under the God Species, we are still well short of that happy conclusion. There is also a problem with the way that Lynas addresses the evidence. The effects of radiation are indirect and long-term. James Lovelock adopts a similar little trick when he claims that deaths from nuclear accidents are zero. As though a nuclear disaster is the same thing as a car crash, where the immediate physical impact is measured and nothing more. We cannot prove which particular cigarette was responsible for any particular cancer, but the link with smoking is clear.

The implication of Lynas’ argument is that we need to pay little attention to safety. He would no doubt deny this, but why not? If radiation is so benign, natural, since the consequences of nuclear accident are so miniscule, why pay any attention to safety? Nuclear power is safe, so there’s no need for safety precautions. The public won’t buy this and neither will governments nor insurers. We know, Lynas knows, that the radiation from Chernobyl can still be detected all over Europe and that farms from the Swedish Arctic to the English Lake District are under strict control. There is an exclusion zone around the damaged reactor at Chernobyl and to this day it is almost entirely uninhabited. 

Lynas follows the lead of Lovelock and Brand here and claims that the fear of radiation is responsible for more deaths than radiation itself. He claims that people's self-identified status as 'Chernobyl victims' has led to dependency, poor health, alcohol abuse and even suicide.’

The unfortunate truth is that the general post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear hysteria, reinforced by exaggerated death tolls and impacts published over subsequent years by environmental groups, has probably worsened the victim status trauma suffered by the people who lived in the area. Indeed there is strong evidence that fear of radiation has been much more damaging than radiation itself: consider, for example, the large number of additional abortions undertaken by women in Eastern Europe who considered themselves to have been exposed and therefore likely to bear deformed or diseased children. (Lynas ch 7 2011).

I can hear the sound of flapping white coats – the fear of radiation causes more death and illness than radiation itself. This has got to be satire. But to be serious, there are sound evolutionary reasons as to why people possess an instinctive fear. Scientists write as though human beings were just robots with brains. Present reasons and evidence for the intellect, push the buttons and the human automatons respond accordingly. Actually, ideas, beliefs, empty promises, wishful thinking, pious hopes, sales pitches and so on lead people astray. Over the course of evolution human beings have developed an instinctive scepticism that predisposes them towards the tried and tested and against uncertain ideas. It is not good enough to deplore people’s fear as irrational, it could be sound evolutionary sense at work. The proof of the efficacy of the instincts? Human beings have survived, as evolution’s great victors, often against the odds. There is a tendency for scientists – convinced that they themselves are right – to promote their view over against the views of the people. The people must be educated to understand the science. The scientists need a good education at the hands of the people. We are the people, John Steinbeck has Ma Joad say at the end of The Grapes of Wrath, and the people just keep going, keep coming back.
To ignore people’s fear here is merely to propose the politics of arrogance. The case for nuclear is, at best, unproven, so as things stand people are well within their rights to be sceptical. 
It is one thing to call for an open minded debate which properly assesses the evidence. This is not Lynas’ approach. Instead, there is caricature and denigration. ‘The emotive impact of anecdotal evidence from Chernobyl has been used relentlessly by environmental groups in support of their battle against nuclear power.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). What? Well who would have thought it, anti-nuclear campaigners cite a nuclear accident in their campaigns against nuclear power. Well I never. They never miss a trick. But what does Lynas mean by ‘anecdotal evidence’? I have been involved in disasters and can therefore tell anyone a tale that comes straight from the horse. I have heard ‘experts’ giving their conclusions and it is soon obvious they haven’t got a clue what they are talking about. This denigration of ‘anecdotal evidence’ is typical of those serving powerful interests expropriating the planet’s resources. Whenever the expropriated argue back, we are told that this is not real evidence, ‘merely’ anecdotal evidence which can therefore be dismissed. The same approach is adopted to those mountaineers who report that the ice peaks are melting, sailors who point out sea pollution and so on. It isn’t scientific evidence and isn’t presented as such. It may be ‘grey’, but it is still evidence. It is dismissed because it serves the interests of the rich and powerful as they set about enclosing the global commons. But Lynas shouldn’t be allowed to give the impression that ‘environmental groups’ rely only on ‘anecdotal evidence’ in their campaign against nuclear power. The research has been done and fills volumes. Lynas doesn’t acknowledge this and shows no awareness of its existence. It is easier to dismiss a case based on anecdotal evidence, of course. No doubt, the case for nuclear has the weight of proper research behind it. That’s the impression we are meant to get from this. Lynas claims that Greenpeace present propaganda as fact and cannot back their claims by ‘scientifically authoritative studies’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). It would be interesting to hear Greenpeace’s response. Has Lynas responded to Friends of the Earth’s offer to debate with him? Lynas cites Greenpeace’s claim that 'nuclear power is inherently highly dangerous' and that 'another catastrophe on the scale of Chernobyl could still happen anytime, anywhere'. Lynas dismisses this: ‘This assertion ignores the fact that the Chernobyl-type reactor, aimed primarily at producing plutonium during the Cold War, was inherently dangerous and that none were built outside the Communist bloc.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). But what does that mean? It means that nuclear is only dangerous to the extent that government and politics are dangerous……. I suggest that Lynas opens up a few history books here. If the world goes nuclear, what kind of reactor do you think the poorer countries trying to catch up the richer countries will be using? What safety standards do you think they will apply? Japan is hardly a modern, wealthy, democratic nation and yet its government played fast and loose with nuclear power and got found out. 

Not that nuclear disaster seems much cause for concern.

But what is most striking about the ecological impacts of the Chernobyl disaster is how limited they were. There is little evidence of negative impacts on biodiversity anywhere except within a very small area immediately surrounding the reactor that received the highest doses of radiation. Some classes of animals also seemed relatively unaffected: wild birds were raising apparently healthy chicks in the area within months. (Lynas ch 7 2011).

The assertion that ‘some’ animals ‘seemed’ ‘relatively’ unaffected is hardly a compelling argument. Does this sound like the ‘anecdotal evidence’ that Lynas has just condemned Greenpeace for using?

This is a serious issue, requiring research, evidence and reasoned argument. Yet Lynas’ argument is remarkably thin in these respects. The sweeping claims made on Chernobyl are not backed by a thorough investigation of the issues or a careful evaluation of the wealth of published research on the question. Instead, Lynas relies on the person who coordinated the UNSCEAR report and then supports his position by reference to the person whose makes his living from nuclear reassurance. There is a rush to judgement here that renders the case unreliable. Further research is needed here before the case is even made, let alone established.

Rather than solid research, Lynas waxes lyrical about nuclear energy. Chernobyl is no nuclear wasteland. No, it is a veritable Eden, a paradise regained.

Moreover, the general environmental recovery was spectacular: forests began to regrow within a year, whilst scientists studying the soil invertebrate fauna found a 'total recovery' of biomass within two and a half years, and in species diversity within a decade…. Scientists working in nearby woodlands in 1994, less than a decade after the disaster, were amazed at how unaffected wild animals seemed to be…. Those people who have returned to live in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone frequently tell outsiders how they now have to put up with an annoying profusion of wildlife. Leonid Petrovych reeled off the list to me as we sat outside Chernobyl village church: deer, wolves, wild boar, eagles, all confirmed in biodiversity studies by scientists. (Lynas ch 7 2011).

Paradise lost and found. I read the same thing in Lovelock’s The Vanishing Face of Gaia (2009). Nuclear disaster is the way back to Eden. Lynas portrays Chernobyl as a Paradise. The only thing missing is the talking snake. Or maybe not. It depends on what you mean by knowledge.
Even Lynas seems to hear the flapping of white coats here and reigns himself in. ‘Again, I am not suggesting that biodiversity has benefited from radiation, except as a result of its unintended consequence of reducing everyday human pressures on wildlife.’ (Lynas ch 11 2011). Lynas’ journalistic nostrils seem to smell something overblown in the claims made for the new technologies. That’s fine, except that it doesn’t support the claim that human beings are the God Species, quite the contrary. Lynas uses the term ‘the God species’. Now he strongly implies that if we get rid of human beings, then the planet will be a veritable Eden. 

Lynas comes to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Something ‘went badly wrong in Japan on 11 March 2011’. In this case a magnitude 9.0 offshore earthquake followed by a 14-metre tsunami, striking the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. Without electrical power three of the reactors began to go into meltdown. To maintain some level of cooling, sea water had to be pumped in and the army had to drop water from helicopters in a desperate bid to maintain water levels in the spent fuel ponds. ‘The entire plant will have to be decommissioned at enormous expense.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). ‘Enormous expense’. That’s decommissioning for you. That’s why there will never be private insurance and funds forthcoming. Nuclear is feasible only with massive government underwrite. At a time that the global economy is going belly up and governments are less and less able to draw on financial resources, we are being asked to go nuclear, the most financially prohibitive of all the energy sources.

We had to suffer the nuclear is safe and benign proselytising of Lovelock and Brand, we were assured, given the current state of engineering sophistication, nuclear accidents are a thing of the past. So how does Lynas explain the Fukushima disaster? By setting up another false antithesis. 

But context is all, and within the context of a tsunami disaster that likely killed 28,000 people, Fukushima's death toll is still - and will likely remain - zero. (Lynas ch 7 2011).

Well, by that reasoning, Fukushima is less dangerous than those posh girls riding their horses at the equestrian or a day trip to Bangor. Lynas employs the same tactic Lovelock employed, limiting deaths from a nuclear disaster to the actual accident, ignoring the excess deaths that result in the years to come. Had people drank the poisoned water, eaten the poisoned vegetables, remained within contaminated areas, what then would the death toll have been? There is also a distinction to be made between an unavoidable natural disaster and a preventable non-natural disaster. An asteroid hitting the planet would cause more deaths than the refusal of people to use seat belts in cars, but that doesn’t mean that people shouldn’t belt up.

Far from belting up, Lynas carries on with this line of reasoning. ‘I repeat: context is everything, and no energy source is without danger. People die in industrial accidents making steel for wind turbines, and fall from roofs whilst installing solar panels.’ Yes, and Rod Hull fell off his roof fixing his satellite dish. 

Lynas’ reasoning is based upon an obvious non sequitur. To argue that nothing ‘is without danger’ does not mean that we ought not minimise or avoid danger. It certainly does not mean that nuclear is not dangerous. The problem with nuclear is how difficult it is to control in its impacts and effects. Like Lovelock, Lynas concentrates on the accident itself, not the aftermath. It is the aftermath that most concerns critics.

‘Some analysts have conducted assessments of 'deaths per terawatt-hour' which find nuclear to be even safer than renewables as an energy source.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). Yes, and I’m Titania, Queen of the Fairies. Pull the other one. A debate such as this requires thought rather than statistics. Back in 1982, I took the results of all the football games played in the old English Division One between the top ten teams in the final table to prove that Swansea City were the best football club in the land. Swansea had finished sixth in the final table. However, reducing the table to the top ten teams and calculating the results between them, I discovered that Swansea were top of the league. You can do a lot with data. I still believe that Swansea were the best team in the 1981-82 season, just as Lynas believes that nuclear is the safest energy. As Freud argued, even when all the evidence is in, people will believe what they want to believe.

Lynas is even more fanciful when he comes to the problem of nuclear waste. He claims that nuclear waste is only problem because anti-nuclear campaigners do not agree with the proposed solutions. 

These solutions are quite simple: once spent fuel rods are removed from the reactor core, they are stored in cooling ponds until their radiation levels decline sufficiently for them to be stored in dry steel casks. The levels of radioactivity emitted decline by a thousand times in 40-50 years. In the longer term, geological disposal of waste that cannot be recycled or otherwise put to good use (which the vast majority can) is a straightforward engineering challenge that poses negligible risks over the long term. (Lynas ch 7 2011).

I might be slow, but I don’t see how that is a solution. Spent fuel rods go in cooling ponds and the dry steel casks, the levels of radioactivity then declines a thousand times in 50 years. Geological waste that cannot be recycled is an engineering challenge. So, the problems of nuclear waste are not that great to begin with, radioactivity declines massively when stored, and can be recycled. Any outstanding problems will be solved by engineering. Lynas seems to go from asserting that radioactivity is benign to claiming that the problem – what problem? – declines with time. ‘Few people seem to realise that the radioactivity of nuclear waste declines with time; and the more radioactive the waste is to start with the more quickly the levels of radiation decline.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). The bigger they are, the harder they fall. It’s a statistical trick. Having denied that radioactivity is dangerous, Lynas now states that the more radioactive the waste is to start with, the more quickly the levels of radiation decline. Still remains radioactive, though, for 24,000 years at that. That’s an awful long time in politics.


Lynas, Brand and Lovelock make great play of the fact that the Chernobyl disaster happened in the Soviet Union, an inefficient state which put science in the service of the military and politics. The argument won’t wash. In the first place, the Soviet Union had a space programme to rival the US, hardly evidence of inefficiency. In the second place, the idea that nuclear is perfectly safe if the political regime does the right thing is a breathtaking naivety that is a positive menace. Immanuel Kant referred to the ‘crooked timber of humanity’. Out of nothing so crooked can something entirely straight be made. If the scientists want to worship the straightness, cleanness and purity of their knowledge and power, that’s fine. It’s when they put it at the service of the crooked timber of humanity that we will have problems. To blithely assert that we must become good at living as gods ignores too much history and politics to be countenanced. A heavy dose of scepticism is in order here.

Lynas makes some remarkable blunders in his reasoning. For instance, he states ‘The volumes of nuclear waste are also tiny compared with other competing technologies.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). Well, maybe they are, for now. But not when the whole world goes nuclear, which is what is being demanded. ‘This is not an 'unsolved problem'. It is not really much of a problem at all.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). Nuclear waste is no problem at all….Convinced? Me neither. What’s wrong with the argument? Just about everything. Most of all, it is the mode of reasoning. The case isn’t argued at all. Lynas proceeds by assertion and employs a familiar bag of tricks – false antithesis, cherry-picked research, easy targets, straw man caricatures, statistical sleights of hand. I have cited a few of these along the way. Whatever his claims, Lynas’ book is not about making the case for nuclear on the basis of the evidence. Lynas is giving a sales pitch, no more. He doesn’t actually go deeply into the arguments for and against nuclear at all, merely focuses on the campaign literature of environmental groups. That’s politics and that’s fine, as politics. But the reasoned case lies elsewhere and that is what Lynas should have been contesting, not the public face.


Most distasteful is the way that Lynas sets the debate at crude extremes. Only this week (April 2012) The Guardian cited documents revealing how the government is concealing subsidies to the nuclear industry. Researchers have been exposing such underhand support of nuclear for decades. And I mean researchers, people who can cite evidence and who know that methodology is more than cherry picking data. Bearing this in mind, read how Lynas portrays the anti-nuclear case: ‘What would be most tragic, however, would be for a new generation of young Greens to be indoctrinated with the unscientific anti-nuclear prejudices of the old.’ (Lynas ch 7 2011). 
How patronising. Lynas’ book is full of scarcely reasoned assertions, blank denials and cherry picked studies. Leaving aside the evidence for and against, Lynas’ approach counts against his case. His tendency to abuse and caricature and simplify the arguments of others does not indicate a scientific attitude. It has politics of the worst kind all over it. Note the implication of the passage above. We, on the one hand, are scientific and reasoned and spread enlightenment; they, on the other hand, are unscientific and prejudiced and spread propaganda. Lynas writes with all the missionary fervour of someone who has just read a book for the first time in years and now believes the rest of the world has got it all wrong.

I hope this book makes a clear case that environmentalism must change, and on the nuclear issue more change is needed than perhaps in any other area. Leaving behind strong ideological commitments is always painful, but in a changing world is often necessary. If we are to properly address the challenges posed by the planetary boundaries, environmentalism will have to raise its game. (Lynas ch 7 2011). 

Raise its game!!! There is a wealth of scientific literature on nuclear power, books and articles with a mass of research gathered over decades. Lynas gives us half a chapter of assertions, citing the studies that back his claim, reducing opposing claims to generalisations, painting post-nuclear Chernobyl as an Edenic paradise, and then calls for others to raise their game.

He asserts that ‘leaving behind strong ideological commitments is always painful’. I come back to Marx’s conception of ideology as  a set of ideas that conceal and obfuscate in order to protect existing power relations. Lynas refers to the need to abandon ideological commitments in a changing world. Ask yourself the question, though, whether existing power relations and social structures will change as a result of embracing the new technologies? I think you will answer ‘no’ and that should tell you something about where the true ideological commitment lies here. Lynas pretends to be radical but really his view changes nothing. Environmentalism is certainly changing the world and aims at further change. There are Greens in governments, Green mayors, even a Green MP in the UK. To take one example of many, Freiberg has a Green mayor and the city is thriving. Lynas calls on environmentalists to raise their game. Go figure. Lynas’ book really reads as an attempt by those threatened by change to break up the opposition as it encroaches on their territory. George Orwell trusted the acute political nostrils of the ruling class and it is clear that power is preserved by anticipating and undermining threats. Environmentalists should have the courage of their convictions, remain true to their principles and remember that their position is based on science, reason and evidence. There is nothing in Lynas’ book that environmentalists have not heard before and have not firmly rejected on the basis of reason and evidence. This cannot be emphasised more strongly. Lynas, Brand et al should not be allowed to monopolise the claim to science, reason and knowledge.








The flimsy foundations of scientistic and technocratic approaches to politics rest on the implicit assumption that morality, ideas, culture, principles are just so much ephemera of no consequence at all compared to hard tools. The Bible talks of the blind leading the blind into the ditch. It refers to those who cannot see beyond the end of their own nose because they are guided by the immediate senses and interests, not by ideas and principles. The Bible says, "Where there is no vision, the people perish." Guess which side of the divide Lynas is on.

Pragmatism beats purism. Every time. (Lynas ch 8 2011).
Every time? It depends on what you mean by purism, of course. If purism means some lofty ideal that sets the standards for human behaviour impossibly high, then of course pragmatism beats purism. Isn’t that a somewhat trite observation, though? I take it that ‘pragmatism beats purism’ is a meaningful statement. Tony Blair got great mileage by saying that principle without power is useless. Fine, except that power without principle is pointless. The two go together so that practice is guided by theory and infused with ends and values. You do not have to choose between power and principle. Which begs the question why Lynas is concerned to force the choice between one or the other. 
In terms of serious moral philosophy, moreover, it is not clear at all that Lynas is right in any case. Socrates demonstrated by the way he faced death as a moral choice that the dignity and worth of human beings is found in much more than survival. Socrates could have evaded his fate but chose to remain in his Athenian prison and face execution. He chose to stay on a point of principle. Lynas would no doubt reduce Socrates to a physical mechanism of blood, bone, sinew and gristle. But what dignity a human being without moral choice? That, ultimately, is what humanity is about. This essential aspect of humanity is entirely lacking in the perspectives of Lynas and Brand. The neurologist Viktor Frankl writes well on this in Man’s Search for Meaning. Frankl was a Jew who spent three years in a concentration camp, seeing his family taken away one by one. He came to understand that whenever a human being is stripped of everything in life, one thing remains, the dignity that comes with knowing that one can choose to live or die. That’s moral choice. That’s the kind of purism that defines our essential humanity. Lynas thinks pragmatism trumps purism ‘every time’. ‘Every time’, he insists. So it is not unfair to put this question to him: what is the pragmatic approach on the part of the citizen to Nazism and the pragmatic response to the Nazi Final Solution? Does human dignity depend upon what works? With or without power, it is perfectly possible to take a principled stance against Nazi persecution and extermination of Jews. What would the pragmatic approach be within Nazi Germany? A purist would take a stand on the sanctity of human life, of all human life. What would a pragmatist stand on?

Lynas states the case for gambling on the planet’s future.

In my view, the arguments against intentional geoengineering are strong, but run the risk of amounting to a demand that we should merely stick to inadvertent geoengineering - that we should, in other words, go ahead and remove the aerosol sunshade anyway, and then just see what happens. I cannot readily accept that accidental planetary management is necessarily better than deliberate planetary management, so I think it is premature to reject geoengineering as a short-term and limited climate mitigation option. 

Keep gambling on the technology, only that as the stakes get higher, the potential losses become all the greater. Except that Lynas doesn’t see it as gambling at all. He really does think that we are in control of our actions and can predict and/or control consequences. It would be a first in history. We would indeed have become as gods.

In my view simply knowing what we are doing means that none of our actions in future that affect the climate can be called unwitting. Our hands are on the thermostat whether we like it or not, so sooner or later we are going to have face up to the need to make a decision about what temperature we want our planet to be at over the longer term. (Lynas ch 8 2011).

I don’t believe it. My question would be why writers who constantly claim to be rational can write stuff like this without the slightest awareness of its manifest insanity. Lynas shows no awareness at all of the long history of lunacies practised by men thinking they are as gods.

But scientific research and development of different geoengineering strategies should be stepped up, and funding from world governments increased. I have no doubt that even flawed solar-radiation management with serious unintended outcomes would be much better for the planet and humanity in general than four, five or even six degrees of global warming. (Lynas ch 8 2011). 

What kind of odds are those? Are there no other options? Notice how ever increasing energy demands and inputs are simply assumed. Is there no possibility at all of scaling energy use back? That is the solution, a whole new way of life. The human race has been on a trajectory to disaster from the start. It needs new modalities and mentalities, that is obvious. Instead, ‘science and technology’ will save us. This is blind faith. The joke is that the contours of the low carbon economy are already visible, programmes have been outlined and costed. We know what we need to do to make changes that stabilize global warming before four degrees of warming. This is the alternative to a gambling which has serious unintended consequences. It is entirely absent in Lynas’ book. 

At this point, one has to distinguish James Lovelock’s position from that of Brand and Lynas. Lovelock’s support for technological solutions is far more cautious and far more respectful of the Earth’s complexity. In an article entitled ‘Such drastic climate therapy could make things worse’ Lovelock argues that as more and more people come to realise that realise that global heating is real, ‘we should not be surprised that public policy is edging ever nearer to geoengineering, the therapy our scientists are considering for a fevered planet.’ 

It is in this vein that the Royal Society, the UK’s senior scientific society, has published the report "Geoengineering the Climate". The meeting which launched the report was hosted by the president, Lord Rees. Professor John Shepherd, who chaired the study group, declared that the goal of the report was to investigate theories of "intervening directly to engineer the climate system, so as to moderate the rise of temperature" and to "separate the real science from the science fiction". Doesn’t all science fact start as fiction? Imagination and intuition play a central role in scientific theory and practice. 
Geoengineering is an attempt to check global heating by deliberately changing the air, oceans and land surface of the world. Lovelock states the basic science accepted by most sensible people. The Earth has heated by about one degree Celsius as a consequence of human activity removing the forests and other ecosystems that serve to keep the Earth cool. Further, the flow of CO2 into the air has been increased by 6% as a consequence of burning coal, oil and natural gas. On this, there is broad agreement. Lovelock poses the crucial question: ‘If we started global heating, can we reverse it by engineering?’ 
Lovelock goes through the various schemes proposed. One is the injection of sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere, which oxidises to form the white reflecting particles that can offset global heating for a time. This is within our capacity. Other ways to reflect sunlight includes putting large mirrors or diffusers of sunlight in orbit around the sun or spraying very fine droplets of sea water from the ocean surface to make the natural surface clouds whiter. These schemes bring about cooling by reflecting sunlight away. Cooling could also be achieved by removing the carbon dioxide or methane from the air. Klaus Lackner has proposed making artificial trees to do this; others, following the lead of Johannes Lehmann, would sooner see vegetation capture CO2 and then, after harvest, turn the plant waste into charcoal and bury it. And so on. We are not short of engineering solutions. 
But what’s the point if the fundamental social relations that organise technics in an ecologically destructive manner remain unchanged? Lovelock states the options coolly and dispassionately. But his heart, clearly, isn’t in it. The words with which he concludes his article are wise.

Geoengineering implies that we have an ailing planet that needs a cure. But our ignorance of the Earth system is great; we know little more than an early 19th-century physician knew about the body. Geoengineering is like trying to cure pneumonia by immersing the patient in a bath of icy water; the fever would be cured but not the disease.
Many of us feel a sense of unease about using geoengineering to escape global heating. Most of the planetary therapies have side effects, potentially as severe as the disease itself. We know that the cooling by Pinatubo was accompanied by droughts; cooling alone does nothing to prevent the ocean growing ever more acid as the carbon dioxide dissolves in the water.
Before long, global heating could reach a level that makes geoengineering an enticing option. Indeed, cautiously applied it may help by buying us time either to adapt to climate change or to develop a practical scientific cure. We have, as yet, no comprehensive Earth system science; in such ignorance I cannot help feeling that attempts by us to regulate the Earth's climate and chemistry would condemn humanity to a Kafkaesque fate from which there may be no escape. Better, perhaps, to learn from the wiser physicians of the early 19th century; they knew no cure for common diseases but also knew that by letting nature take its course, the patient often recovered. Perhaps we, too, had better use our energies to adapt and leave recovery to Gaia; after all, she has survived more than three billion years and has kept life going all that time.

So are we Gaia’s intelligent elite or not? We need to sure that we locate our place and integrate our technics within planetary boundaries and rhythms, not against them. That doesn’t make us gods as such, but it recognises that we are divine sparks by nature. I am agnostic with respect to technology as such. What kind of technology and to what purpose is it used are the key questions. Certainly, I would argue that a democratic and a soft technics are better than a hard, centralising, authoritarian technics like nuclear. However, in a general sense, technologies are neither inherently good or bad in themselves. The character of the application and use of technology depends upon the social relations within which technology is set. And that context is precisely what is missing in the conception of planetary engineering. Saving human civilisation from eco-catastrophe is well within our current technical capacity. The real question is why we are allowing the new and emerging productive forces to remain shackled to the narrow end of making money. This, in the end, is where the proposals for planetary engineering put forward by Brand, Lynas and others not only fail but fail miserably. Instead of applying the new productive forces in such a way as to bring about the new ecological society, instead we get another instalment in techno-industrial frenzy. Rather than planetary engineering to entrench and expand the ecologically and socially damaging capital system, we need to employ the new productive forces as part of a wider transformation of society, away from the exploitative and hierarchical relations of the capital system to a sustainable form of society founded upon active democracy and human flourishing. Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, understood this point clearly, distinguishing his views from those proposing business and politics as usual. In 1950, Wiener wrote of the ‘human use of human beings’:





That’s a perspective wholly lacking in the views of the techno-fixers and fetishisers, and that is why their proposals, for all of the technical capacity involved, will fall short of their goals. Pointing to the promise and potentials of technology is not difficult at all, in fact that’s the easy part. How technology is organised and applied within specific social forms is the difficult bit, involving conscious human purpose, deliberation and decision on ends, politics. The real questions concern social development, learning and change, human beings gain consciousness of the potentialities available to them and act to achieve "better" forms of social organisation. Social crises are a matter of challenge and response, human beings learning by problem solving, thereby moving to a higher stage of development. As Karl Marx argued in the 1859 Preface:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.

Marx EW CCPE 1975: 427

In his book Science and Social Action, Stephen Bodington argues that the technological powers now at our disposal make the transition to a classless socialist society feasible. 





The book was written in 1978. That’s three wasted decades. Rather that achieving socialism, resources of all kinds have been poured into propping up the capitalist corpse.






So, in criticising the various schemes for planetary engineering, I am not denigrating technology and denying the technical capacity of human beings at all. I am pointing to the way in which science-based technology, the new productive forces, are contradicted by capitalist relations. The potential of our technics now transcends the narrow limitations of the commodity form. We are not short of technologies. However, social problems require social solutions. We need to generate an alternative to commodity-based socio-economic relations in which products are valued for their exchange value, not for their use value. Bodington calls for a social transformation bringing about non-hierarchical plan-based socio-economic relations. ‘In elementary form these relations are simple. People agree what needs to be done, decide who does what and then do it. Social groupings (work-teams for example) acting thus together are as old as human speech and human work. But such relationships involve a specifically human characteristic — conscious planning in advance by means of imagination’ (Bodington 1978:163).

As Karl Marx wrote:
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. He de​velops the potentialities slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of its forces to his own sovereign power. We are not dealing here with those first instinctive forms of labour which remain on the animal level. An immense interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity from the situation when human labour had not yet cast off its first instinctive form. We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic. A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. This subordination is no mere momentary act. Apart from the exertion of the working organs, a purposeful will is required for the entire duration of the work. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work and the way in which it has to be accomplished, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as the free play of his own physical and mental powers, the closer his attention is forced to be. 
The simple elements of the labour process are (1) purposeful activity, that is work itself, (2) the object on which that work is performed, and (3) the instruments of that work. 

Marx CI 1976: 284/5

‘Relationships determined by consciously conceived plans, allocating functions and determining a common purpose to be held to over some given period of time, clearly exist in innumerable instances today and have long existed in human history. This is nothing new. What will be new about the plan-based structure is the status of social planning as the ultimate determinant of structural relations.’ (Bodington 1978: 

That’s the stage we are at, that’s the real challenge before the human race. It’s time to rediscover politics and the role of collective struggle and action in bringing about change. Contemporary planetary engineering lacks that conscious political component. It has an implicit political aspect, and it’s not nice.

The Politics of Pusillanimity
Lynas’ political approach is that of the coward.

Appeals to public action must be framed positively, and not fall into the trap of sparking a media and political backlash. Sacrifice and austerity are out; competition and innovation are in. The 'deniers' are waiting in the wings, and if the wrong triggers are pressed it will only be a matter of time before any constructive debate on mitigating ocean acidification is destroyed by the same politicised trench warfare that has overtaken the debate on climate change. (Lynas ch 9 2011). 

So it’s OK to abuse ‘Greens’ and ‘environmentalists’, but don’t upset business and power in case they fight back. All argument and debate must be framed positively, Lynas claims, but he has caricatured and abused the green position throughout his book. The ‘deniers’ are not going to go away just because of sweet reason. Lynas has just confirmed their worst suspicions with respect to politically motivated environmental activists. Lynas fails to understand that environmental crisis, like economic crisis, is a political question. The closer that proposed changes get to existing power relations, the greater the political backlash. No amount of polite phrasing will avoid the need for politics. At some point, you are serious about change or you are not. That’s politics. Lynas is reasoning like one of those old utopians who thinks that change is as simple as presenting a rational case to those in power, thinking that they are open to persuasion. He should read Green Backlash by Andrew Rowell (1996) which shows clearly how the more political effective greens have become, the more the environmental cause has started to influence the public agenda, the greater the political backlash. It has nothing to do with the way the environmental cause is expressed and everything to do with power interests. Greens should make it difficult for particular interests to cloak themselves in the general interest and to that extent should moderate their claims and language appropriately. Although it is better to avoid stating the case at extremes and to attemp to achieve general appeal, sooner or later, a backlash will come. There will be a need to take sides and make a stand.

Lynas seems to think that he can swing the deniers his way. He refers to the Global Warming Policy Foundation and other luminaries who make a career out of denying the reality of global warming. Why does he think they do this? Could their defence of ‘free’ markets have anything to do with the assertion of the power of capital over labour? There is little point in trying to avoid a backlash from these characters. They are already in the field and fighting. In Divided Societies, Ralph Miliband distinguished between class struggle from above and class struggle from below. If people are not fighting class struggle from above, this does not mean that the class struggle is not going on. Every day of every week, the rich and the powerful are waging class struggle from above. Wake up Lynas. Lynas thinks it is all a matter of reason. ‘In scientific terms, the criticisms levelled by Ridley and other ocean acidification sceptics are no more valid than the reasons they have already given for not believing in global warming.’ (Lynas ch 9 2011). He’s right, but being right cuts no ice in the class struggle.
It is impossible to read Lynas criticising Matt Ridley without a sense of irony.

In a November 2010 op-ed for the Times newspaper, Ridley draws an analogy with acid rain, which he asserts was also the 'scare' of its day. Utilising all the classic tactics of climate-change deniers, he uses this false analogy (it is false because acid rain was real) to back a charge of grant-funding vested interests by marine scientists, before cherry-picking (and misinterpreting) a small number of scientific studies that appear to contradict the consensus position on the biological impacts of ocean acidification, and generalising on this basis that the whole thing is exaggerated. (Lynas ch 9 2011).

That sounds like a succinct critique of what Lynas himself has done on nuclear energy. Ridley phrases his language to persuade the reader to think that peer-reviewed science published by eminent researchers is no more valid than a Greenpeace press release, and perhaps just as self-interested. ‘Ridley rounds off the piece by adopting the voice of the unbiased ordinary person and lambasting 'the media' (always a convenient straw man) for allegedly not reporting the truth. ' Before I started looking into this, I assumed the evidence for damage from ocean acidification must be strong because that is what the media kept saying. I am amazed by what I have found,' he concludes.’ (Lynas ch 9 2011). 
Indeed, yes, the media is always a convenient straw man. James Lovelock makes constant reference to ‘the media’. This is lazy and avoids the real issue at stake. Lynas is expert in unravelling the modus operandi of the climate change denier. The problem is that he himself has employed every single device he identifies here in his own book. This kind of stuff just feeds the prejudices of those already persuaded one way or the other. If there is a case for nuclear, then this sales pitch is not it. The way Lynas frames his argument is enough to make one suspicious.


Lynas comes to an issue which, he says, ‘goes to the very heart of this book.’

I write here about fundamental planetary ecological limits, physically hard-wired boundaries in the Earth system that can be identified scientifically and that humans must learn to respect if the planetary system as a whole is to remain reliably stable and hospitable to our species and many others. Yet most enthusiasts for free markets and capitalist economics find the idea of ecological limits hard or impossible to accept, and choose to believe instead that the expansion of human material consumption - even on an obviously limited single planet - can continue for ever. (Lynas ch 9 2011).

I couldn’t agree more. The problem is that earlier in the book Lynas argued strongly in favour of continued economic growth. He even claimed that economic growth was a necessity that is ‘non-negotiable.’ Lynas also attacked the political left as ‘extremists’ who are more motivated by their hatred of markets, capitalism and corporations than by the need to protect the environment. But it seems that there isn’t really a contradiction. ‘I believe that these diverging points of view can be reconciled, but only if both sides of the debate are prepared to be more open-minded.’ (Lynas ch 9 2011). Well, yes, the issue is not for or against growth but the quality of economic activity and the setting of economic purposes within planetary limits. 

Lynas now holds out the olive branch. ‘I have been frequently critical of the environmental movement in this book, but my argument with conventional environmentalism lies more with strategies than ultimate objectives: if the science about planetary boundaries is ever to gain popular credence and political lone it is surely the Green movement that must be its most passionate and determined champion.’ (Lynas ch 9 2011). 

Lynas has spent the entire book rubbishing ‘Greens’, claiming they have done more harm than good. The press coverage that Lynas received all concerned the same thing – is it time for the greens to change? So what is Lynas proposing, that the Greens can save the world but only if they adopt his policies? Lynas couldn’t even save the Maldives after he was appointed adviser to President Nasheed in 2009, what chance has he got of saving the planet.

Climate change (and, by extension, ocean acidification) is politi​cally toxic to the libertarian right precisely because it forces humanity to confront the necessity of respecting planetary limits - in this case regarding the capacity of the Earth system to tolerate emissions of greenhouse gases. I do not join with many Greens in accusing right-wing climate sceptics of being 'anti-science': as I have shown in earlier chapters, Greens are equally anti-science when it suits their own biases on issues like nuclear power and genetic engineering. 

That sentence is poorly written. Lynas denies that that right wing climate sceptics are ‘anti-science’ because ‘Greens are equally anti-science’. Which implies that right wing sceptics are anti-science, then.

Of course, the whole issue is not principally about the science at all, it’s about the politics. The libertarian right are scared stiff of political intervention showing the possibilities and extending the scope of public regulation. There follows a piece of political nonsense from Lynas.

But I do believe that the political right, with which I share some sympathies in many ways, has committed a serious error in cleaving to a dead-end denialist position on climate change - and thereby sacrificing the opportunity to frame economically liberal and free-market policies with which to combat it. At the same time, the capture of the Green movement by the political left has reinforced this sorry divergence, rendering Greens more marginal and less credible in the popular mind at the same time as reinforcing the political backlash from the right. (Lynas ch 9 2011).

Someone should tell Lynas that the Greens are winning more and more seats at every level of politics and have elected their first British MP. The Greens have been in government. Indeed, the Greens formed part of the Irish government and lost power owing to their association with right wing neo-liberal economic policies, not their left wing politics. Lynas should read about the German city of Frieberg with its Green mayor. Far from being marginalised, the Greens have rarely had a greater political profile. Yet Lynas refers to a ‘Green left’ ‘determined to dig itself still further into this political cul-de-sac’. Again, he reverts to caricature in asserting that the Green vision is ‘an unappealing narrative of communitarian austerity’. As an example he cites the launch in January 2011 by the UK Green Party and New Economics Foundation of a report calling for austerity and sacrifice entitled 'The New Home Front'. Lynas should read James Lovelock’s book The Vanishing Face of Gaia (2009) because this is what Lovelock calls for and celebrates.

The language chosen changes the way an argument reads. This is what Lynas writes. ‘Britain's only Green MP, Caroline Lucas, made the symbolism all too clear by holding the launch event in the Imperial War Museum.’ (Lynas ch 9 2011). Lynas earlier claimed that the Greens were increasingly marginalised. Now, to reinforce that impression, he refers to Caroline Lucas as Britain’s ‘only’ Green MP. The meaning would change radically had Lynas stated that Lucas is Britain’s ‘first’ MP. Far from being increasingly marginalised, the Greens have never had a greater public profile across the world. Which begs the question of what Lynas is really up to. Instead of demanding that the world changes, he demands changes in Green politics. That surely has to be significant.

In reality we can build our way out of climate change using a smart combination of innovation, investment and regulation. Lucas and NEF, fanatically anti-nuclear, leave themselves little option but to insist on dramatic cuts in energy use because they reject a main source of zero-carbon power. Reading through their proposals, I find myself agreeing instead with the responses of some right-wing pundits, who viewed the recommendations in 'The New Home Front' report as a recipe for economic disaster or worse. (Lynas ch 9 2011).

The odd part is the extent to which Lynas’ new perspective fits with the perspective of the climate change deniers. Lynas proceeds from man made global warming and climate change  as the greatest threat facing human beings. His recommendations are intended to address the issue of climate change, cutting back carbon emissions and investing in no or low carbon forms of energy.

Climate change deniers are motivated more by political instincts than scientific reason. They challenge climate science but it is plain that they equate the climate change agenda with "socialism by the backdoor". The Greens are really Reds in that they want government intervention in the ‘free’ economy. The deniers are economic liberals who, like the capital system they defend, deny that there are natural limits to human activity. Capital is an endless system that pursues infinite growth in a world of finite resources. But, of course, there are natural limits, in the form of the great natural cycles: carbon, nitrogen, water, and so on. Lynas’ book is organised around the notion planetary boundaries. Yet, paradoxically, Lynas’ technological solutions offer a way of powering the capital system without having to accept political and institutional restraints in respect of natural limits. The technology contains the promise that planetary boundaries can be cheated. Human beings through their technology can exploit, destroy and pollute in perpetuity. And that endless logic fits the capital system and its accumulative imperative like a glove. Of course, it’s a delusion that will ensure long term environmental collapse.

Lynas is perfectly within his rights to go and join the political right, if he is in so much agreement with them. And I dare say they will make him feel welcome. But let’s have some intellectual clarity and political honesty here, Lynas is really arguing for a ‘Green capitalism’ on terms of the ‘free’ market and corporate power. He should have the guts to make that case. It has been made before, of course, so Lynas is hardly being original. The Green Capitalists Industry's Search for Environmental Excellence (John Elington 1987) was written a quarter of a century ago. 
But it is too easy to split this up into a left and right divide. The political right are not all of a piece. It is the libertarian right who are trying to frame the global political economy as the anarchy of the rich and power with whom Lynas has most in common. Lynas’ argument are very different to those presented by Conservative MP Zak Goldsmith in The Constant Economy. Lynas has been setting up the Green case as a left wing politics. Much of what Lynas has criticised as left wing political ideology can be found in Goldsmith’s book. But to recognise the existence of a green politics on the right wouldn’t fit the simplicities of Lynas’ case.
Lynas is free to put the case for a Green corporate capitalism. We have heard it all before. Lynas can go away and join the ‘green capitalists’ if he wants. As to his proposals, I won’t hold my breath. It is pretty obvious where that kind of reformism goes, and it has been since Marx slaughtered the various utopianisms in the Manifesto. Marx’s communism may or may not be beyond humanity’s capacity, it’s too soon to say, but green capitalism framed along the lines of the free market and corporate power will die an ignominious death long before capitalism itself. The corporate capture of the state characterises democratic politics in the contemporary world. Every mainstream political party has a pronounced pro-business, pro-market wing. The Greens do not need one. Lynas is spoiled for choice if a pro-business agenda is his politics. He doesn’t need to be Green at all. The Greens certainly don’t need someone whose political acumen is so feeble that he cannot distinguish friend from foe.

My hope is that if we can persuade influential climate-change sceptics - and thereby by extension the wider portion of the public which suspects that global warming is exaggerated - that the Green left's proposals for tackling climate change are not the only options on the table, then we can begin to move beyond the denialist backlash and craft a political narrative that places growth, innovation and aspiration at the centre of our response to the real challenge of ecological limits. (Lynas ch 9 2011). 

Lynas thinks we can avoid the political battle lines being drawn. He thinks he can put politics on ice. That kind of anti-politics or end of politics is always suspicious. Close the front door and politics has a nasty habit of crawling in through the bathroom window. Like George Orwell, I much prefer to political nostrils of the ruling class. Know your enemy. The ruling class know theirs. The price of avoiding a denialist backlash will be a Green politics so anodyne as to be pointless. If Lynas thinks he can persuade the climate science deniers – I’m damned if I’m going to give them the title of sceptics – to any position less than a free market which amounts to the global anarchy of the rich then he is a fool, a dangerous one at that, to the extent that anyone is daft enough to listen to him. I suspect that with more thought, though, and a bit more reading, Lynas will change his views again.

Lynas shows some awareness of the fact that industry fights tooth and nail against regulation. He asks why we managed to make such a good job of ozone regulation? He points out that the CFC industry fought hard and successfully to prevent any international controls on the production of ozone-depleting substances, and powerful blocs of countries stymied the attempts of some more enlightened governments to move forward more quickly with the protection of the ozone layer. That’s what is happening on a much larger scale with respect to the climate. But if Lynas knows that industry and its political servants fights so hard and so successfully against controls, then why is he so concerned to deradicalise the Green movement in an effort to persuade the climate deniers? It seems that Lynas really does think that the appeal from and to science will win the day. He claims that scientific research ‘helped convince vacillating policymakers that the ozone issue had to be tackled, cemented public support, and made a denialist industry position look environmentally irresponsible. (Lynas ch 10 2011).  And that is plainly what he thinks will happen on climate science. As Sam Cooke said about the change that’s gonna come, ‘it’s a long, long time coming’. The reason is that action on climate requires much greater controls on business than action on CFC, and it hits much more powerful interests in the process. Lynas writes that ‘the leap of faith taken by governments led to a tipping point, which turned the whole dynamic of the ozone issue from one of stasis to one of rapid change.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). Sounds fantastic and certainly contrasts with the inertia of international climate politics. If Lynas thinks that this is going to happen on climate change then he will need to explain why it has not already happened in light of some three decades of top level debates and conferences. Lynas argues that the tipping point towards action can only be crossed by politicians, ‘and to do that the corporate lobbyists seeking to protect the status quo must be ignored in the wider interests of human society and the global environment.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). 
This call expresses a breathtaking optimism that runs contrary to political experience. Lynas shows no awareness whatsoever of the symbiotic relationship between the state and capital. For the state to ignore business interests amounts to a defiance of the law of political physics. The power of the state is secondary and derivative. The state must facilitate the process of private accumulation as a condition of its own resources and legitimacy. Failure to appreciate the force of that point has been the graveyard of reformist politics since ever. Capitalism is not a public domain, but a regime of private accumulation. Lynas’ confidence that political leadership can ignore the corporate lobby, capital in general, entails a belief in the primacy of politics and the public domain over the economy. 
It requires a major leap of imagination and conviction to argue that the primacy of politics within capitalism holds great potential for systemic transformation. To say that progress can be made through political leadership is one thing. To expect that the entrenched interests of capitalist power can be effectively dissipated by that means alone is quite another. The idea that pervasive structures of private capitalist power can be fundamentally altered through public mechanisms of political representation requires an imprudent degree of faith in the power of reason to persuade. Reasoned appeals within political processes is necessary but insufficient to effect such transformation. The extent to which the appeal to reason succeeds is not a contingent matter. The imperatives of capital accumulation, modernization and profitability need to be facilitated by the provision of the right political circumstances. That these mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation must persist is not a political option to be decided by reason but is a condition of the preservation of the social system. Lynas’ assertion of the primacy of politics over economics demonstrates an unwarranted degree of faith in the power of the public realm within the capital system.
Any politician who has been in government could disabuse Lynas of that notion. A politician is in office but is not in power. In truth, Lynas’ approach here is akin to the old 1950s pluralism in which change is a matter of bringing pressure to bear on public institutions rather than the struggle to restructure social relations. Critical Pluralism has long since moved beyond this position. Here is Charles Lindblom:

Because public functions in the market system rest in the hands of businessmen, it follows that jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and the economic security of everyone all rest in their hands. Consequently government officials cannot be indifferent to how well business performs its functions. Depression, inflation, or other economic disasters can bring down a government. A major function of government, therefore, is to see to it that businessmen perform their tasks. (Lindblom, 1977: 122-3).

It would be interesting for Lynas to tell us how government could ever be willing enough, let alone strong enough, to ignore the pressure coming from corporate capital. State and capital are in symbiotic relation, they are not antithetical. The corporate interest is far stronger with respect to climate change than it ever was with respect to the ozone layer. The leadership politicians have given here have all been on the side of the corporations. Yet Lynas makes environmentalists just as responsible for failure. ‘I also believe the environmental movement is partly responsible for this ongoing failure by promoting an alignment of climate-change mitigation with austerity, sacrifice and high cost.’ (Lynas ch 9 2011). What rot! Lynas is a political naïf. There is an old syndicalist poem called ‘Know thy Enemy’. 

“He does not care what colour you are,  
provided you work for him;
he does not care how much you earn, 
provided you earn more for him;
he does not care who lives in the room at the top, 
provided he owns the building;
he sings the praises of humanity, 
but knows machines cost more than men; 
bargain with him, he laughs and beats you at it; 
challenge him and he kills;
sooner than lose the things he owns, he will destroy the world.”

(Front cover Workers’ Control Ken Coates and Tony Topham ed 1970 Panther)

It’s all there in the last line, ‘sooner than lose the things he owns, he will destroy the world’. Sooner than give up his profits, the capitalist will destroy the earth. He already is. Lynas needs to read this poem, learn its lesson and learn it quick. Capital is suspicious of all regulation since it sets an example for future action on the part of the people.
Lynas declares that his main ‘concern about attacks on the concept of economic growth is that there really does seem to be no conceivable alternative at present.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). That’s the point. Under the capital system, there can never be a conceivable alternative to economic growth. Capital expands its values or the system collapses. Of course, Lynas lacks an understanding of political economy, so his position is an unconscious expression of this accumulative imperative. But it is a weak argument. One of Popper’s most telling points against Marxism concerned what he called ‘moral futurism’, the idea that since communism is inevitable it must therefore be good. Like all arguments concerning inevitability, it turned out to be both immoral and wrong. What matters here is what kind of economic growth do we want? To ask and to answer that question is to reinstate moral choice over against assertions of inevitability, necessity and determinism.

Lynas argues correctly enough that ‘the alternative to growth in the modern market system is painful contraction, unemployment and political instability, as numerous recessions since the 1930s have demonstrated.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). Lynas needs to relate this necessity to the imperative of capital accumulation to say anything worthwhile. He doesn’t. What if Marx is right and the contradictory dynamics of the capital system are such that one day, sooner or later, it will collapse? That seems more than plausible at the moment. Lynas starts teaching his granny to suck eggs. ‘Given the need for interest to be paid on capital, and for increases in labour productivity to be balanced out by higher levels of overall production, growth is central to successful capitalist economies.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). It’s called the systemic imperative for the private accumulation of capital – no mystery for marxists. A generation has grown up in politics simply assuming that Marx was wrong and learning nothing by way of political economy. They are psychologically and politically unable to even comprehend the collapse of capitalism. Sad, really. They will all have to learn the hard way, yet again. At present, Lynas is reinventing the wheel.

Lynas states that ‘no one argues, however, that the kind of rapid double-digit rates of growth seen today in successful emerging economies are appropriate for the likes of Europe, Japan or North America. In developed countries, 2-3 per cent per year is plenty.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). This implies that the actual rate can be turned up or down by political fiat – something that governments have learned they cannot do. Lynas continues: ‘This differential is helping to reduce global inequality too, in stark contrast to the fears expressed a few years ago by the anti-globalisation movement. But even in rich countries, zero growth is not a viable option.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). One wonders if Lynas wrote this book in the depths of a cave? Even right wing politicians are expressing worries about the stability of the global economy. The anti-globalisers are queuing up saying we told you all along. Read what Lynas writes below and wonder whether to laugh or cry. He actually thinks that the global economy – on the brink of meltdown - is the bearer of ‘good news’.

Looking further out into the future, it is perhaps possible to envisage a world economy that enjoys constant growth even as its use of materials is static or even declining, thanks to de-materialisation. (Lynas ch 2011).





To conclude, there are four key areas where Lynas makes worthwhile points:

1.	The identification of nine planetary boundaries sets the parameters for humankind to define clear goals for maintaining a healthy planet. 
2.	Relating the concept of planetary boundaries to the crisis in the climate system facilitates a better understanding of the critical nature of the planetary situation, inducing us all to review and revise current strategies and positions. 
3.	Lynas’ view that the political polarisation between left and right on climate change and increasingly other environmental issues threatens any chance of progress on these global environmental issues is worth closer examination. Pope Benedict XVI has called for a dialogue between experts and people of wisdom with ‘the aim of reaching agreement on a model of sustainable development capable of ensuring the well-being of all while respecting environmental balances.’ The resolution of the ecological crisis will be sustainable only on the basis of a broad consensus of people who will make the abstract model work in practice. However, the call for long term thinking for the common good always sounds more reasonable when made in abstraction from specific social relations and perspectives. The view seems plausible at the general level, but soon fractures in the interstices of a social reality divided by interests and positions and classes. Lynas is facing the age old political problem of how to make the appeal to the general good plausible in a social reality that rests on particular interests. Lynas simply ducks the question by calling upon Greens to pull their radical punches and give those with a vested interest in the status quo every reason to carry on consuming, despoiling and polluting. Lynas simply displays the age old politics of the coward, don’t ask for changes that are likely to upset the rich and the powerful. 
4.	The last key conclusion of Lynas’ that is of value is his argument that humans beings are incredibly inventive. Indeed they are. That observation is right but trite. The important point to argue is that it is not technologies that will be our salvation but our technics, technologies set within the right framework will enable ingenuity to get us out of the mess we have gotten ourselves into. 

Here, at least, Lynas is investigating the right areas and pointing in the right direction. But there is plenty wrong with Lynas’ mode of reasoning and with the conclusions he draws.
 
Let’s begin the easy bit – the facts. In an article, the environmental journalist Robin McKie writes that ‘factual errors detract from Mark Lynas's otherwise smart proposal on how to save the planet’. This assessment is far too generous to Lynas. On controversial issues with potentially deleterious consequences such as GM crops, nuclear power, biotechnology, evidence counts. Lynas’ cavalier approach to facts counts decisively against his proposals. Even the briefest examination of Lynas’ claims produces evidence that exposes his key claims as unsubstantiated assertions riddled with errors. The point is worth emphasising given that Lynas has publicly condemned ‘the lies of Green zealots’. His book is littered with factual errors.

Organic farming produces the same yields of corn and soybeans as does conventional farming, but uses 30 percent less energy, less water and no pesticides, a review of a 22-year farming trial study concludes. 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/07/050714004407.htm

Small-scale farms could abate world hunger: UN. "...shift from mono-crops doused with chemical fertilisers and pesticides to more sustainable techniques that can both increase yields and repair the environment..." 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hkksny8ezlpvp6T2OlOsXK5JMWwg?docId=CNG.78a9420d6edf2ec29ea35f273275b1ef.771

Genetically engineered corn and soybeans in the United States for more than a decade has had little impact on crop yields despite claims that they could ease looming food shortages. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g53DoblG25y7O5t4KPsuzYyxMd6Q

Conversion to small organic farms therefore, would lead to sizeable increases of food production worldwide. Only organic methods can help small family farms survive, increase farm productivity, repair decades of environmental damage and knit communities into smaller, more sustainable distribution networks - all leading to improved food security around the world. 
http://www.cnr.berkeley.edu/~christos/articles/cv_organic_farming.html

Covering so wide and complex a terrain, errors are inevitable, easily spotted and corrected. Much more damaging in my view is Lynas’ mode of reasoning. There is a tendency to caricature, set arguments at extremes, and present ‘environmentalists’ as straw men.

The environmental movement is so disparate that we have to question whether we can refer to a movement in any meaningful sense at all. Yet Lynas fails to acknowledge that diversity and complexity and instead lazily classes all environmentalists together. James Lovelock does the same thing. The reason is obvious it makes it easy to label and abuse all those with whom one disagrees in the form of crude caricature. The obligatory, historically illiterate, reference to Luddites is never far away, as ‘Greens’ are portrayed as ideologically driven, politically motivated, anti-capitalist, anti-technology, scientifically illiterate dreamers. They all do it. In complete ignorance of the Luddites sophisticated call to set technology within a moral and social matrix to ensure the good of all, Lovelock, Lynas, Toffler et al all condemn Greens as backward looking Luddites. Only Brand fails to give Luddism a mention. He does, however, drag out poor old Rousseau for an abuse of ‘back to nature’ Green utopianism. Another misreading.

But it all depends on what you mean. It is clear that in this instance abuse is a short-cut route that allows the abusers to avoid the difficult work of engaging with the specific arguments of actual Greens and environmentalists. It reduces the Green position to a wildly inaccurate caricature, which is the point, of course.
Of course, it doesn’t take a second to cite pragmatic, pro-technology environmentalists with impeccable scientific credentials, seeking to strike a balance between town and country in an urban-based society. It just makes it easier to shout ‘back to nature’ and claim that environmentalists are utopian dreamers. It’s patronising rubbish that thrives only on ignorance. 
Certainly, environmentalists have every justification in criticising the capital system for the way that its endless pursuit of private monetary gain is wreaking havoc to the planet and inflicting gross inequalities on society. It is politically arguable where the balance of right and wrong lies between being ‘anti-capitalist’ and ‘pro-capitalist’. I take it that politics has not yet been abolished and the technocratic dystopia has not yet been achieved. It is telling that Mark Lynas thinks that being ‘anti-capitalist’ puts environmentalists out of touch with the majority of the population. It is even more telling that Lynas’ economic analysis comes straight out of an elementary text book. You could just about get away with this notion of free markets in the very early days of the neo-liberal insurgency, but no longer, not now that we are at the fag end of neo-liberalism.
Because Lynas doesn’t understand this point about capitalism being a private regime of expansion of values, so he cannot relate the issue of economic growth to the accumulative imperative at the heart of the capital system. He returns time and again to the issue of whether or not we can have growth. He concludes that we can within planetary boundaries. ‘Our global civilisation can continue to flourish indefinitely within the 'safe operating space' provided by the planetary boundaries.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). Lynas’ argument is irrelevant because he does not ground the analysis in the social relations of production. All reference to planetary boundaries is abstract if ecological limits are not related to the accumulative logic of the capital system. The argument is not about the relative merits of economic growth and no-growth, but the accumulative imperatives driving economic growth. Lynas talks as if this is a matter of political choice within a public domain. That is precisely what the socialist challenge aimed for but failed to achieve. Capitalism is a private regime of accumulation, meaning that we do not have that public choice. The economy expands or there is crisis. Expansion is a systemic imperative, not a free choice. So Lynas’ ‘pro-growth agenda’ is neither here nor there. The capital system rests on the self-expansion of values, it is by definition a system of growth. And the purpose of growth is valorisation and accumulation. Lynas writes as though he can pick and choose the kind of growth that occurs. That would be the case if the economy was a public domain. It isn’t. Lynas now takes flight into economic fantasy, bestowing all manner of goodies upon the world.
Lynas notes that growth in consumption, like growth in population, tends to top out once a certain level is achieved. Well, it depends on what is being consumed. Necessities, yes. But wants are endlessly in being capable of psychological inflation. This was Keynes’ point. Lynas continues to make cheap points:

Moreover, once a certain level of prosperity is reached, people tend to shift their concerns away from consumption and towards other areas of life satisfaction. It is no accident that environmental groups like the New Economics Foundation, which worry about the psychological and social evils of overconsumption, only flourish in rich countries. (Lynas ch 10 2011).

The NEF well know this. We all know about the Easterlin Paradox and other such studies which show satisfaction from economic growth to increase up to a certain level of development and then tail off. Marxists have long called for even development in the global economy. It is perfectly possible to criticise the overconsumption in the developed world whilst demanding economic development in the underdeveloped world. Lynas seems to imply that if we opt for one approach, we cannot have the other. The fact that Stewart Brand also adopted the same approach would indicate that the argument is not innocent. It is an attempt to use the need for economic development in the poorer nations of the world to silence the moral and cultural criticisms of capitalism rising in the developed world. 
It’s not even clear what Lynas thinks he is proving here, unless his target is some unidentified environmentalist who simply says ‘zero growth’. This hasn’t been the typical view for donkeys years. Yet Lynas dresses up the bleeding obvious as a point of great intellectual import. ‘To a semi-destitute family picking over a rubbish dump on the outskirts of Manila, such concerns must seem as irrelevant as they are self-indulgent.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). Well, yes, obviously. It’s a trite observation. Who disagrees with this? That’s right, nobody other than Lynas’ straw man. This is yet another example of Lynas setting up a false antithesis. He adopts this approach so often it becomes tedious to point it out. But every instance needs to be highlighted to prevent Lynas scoring cheap points. The fact that an endless material accumulation does not generate extra happiness but rather is associated with increasing frustration and dissatisfaction is not ‘irrelevant’ and is not ‘self-indulgent’. What is self-indulgent is a global economy that has those in the developed world getting increasingly miserable on a hedonistic treadmill at the same time that there are families eking an existence out of rubbish dumps in the underdeveloped world. It’s all one economy, an economy of global injustice, exploitation and uneven development. To take the side of the starving and the destitute against those criticising the very economic system that is generating poverty and destitution is disingenuous. And cheap. Lynas adopts a sneering tone with respect to the argument that if the developed world could reduce consumption then the developing world would emulate us by limiting their aspirations for development and prosperity, thereby helping the environment. Well, it would be better if the developing world didn’t emulate the excessive consumption of the developed world, so cutting back consumption makes sense, morally and politically, especially if it can be a part of redistributing resources across the planet. Lynas comment here? ‘This is a particular favourite of well-meaning, environmentally aware middle-class audiences in prosperous areas.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). Yes, get the patronising comment in. Would it be better if the middle-class in prosperous areas simply opted for a selfish individualistic lifestyle concerned with their own private good, hogging the greater proportion of material resources to themselves? Many do. I note no criticism of them in this book. These accusations select rather soft targets. The bulk of the literature is clear enough that living standards in the underdeveloped world need to be improved by economic growth whilst the excessive consumption of the developed world needs to be reduced. If there are any patronising middle class people in prosperous areas arguing otherwise, Lynas should supply the names. Another straw man, perhaps? 

If humankind is to survive as a species with a civilisation – i.e. live well and not merely live – then a massive reduction of consumption is imperative. All the technological fixes in the world will not be enough to avoid the necessity of a change in human behaviour. That is what is so dangerous about the arguments of Brand and Lynas. One can debate the pros and cons of the technologies they propose in terms of the research and the evidence. But the pretence that technological capacity can allow us to continue to evade the necessary change in behaviour will surely ensure our doom as a civilised species.
Lynas argues that ‘there can and should be no argument against rapid and sustained growth throughout the developing world.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). Fine. But who contests this and why? What kind of growth? Growth powered by fossil fuels as in China? There is, in other words, an argument. The question is why overdevelopment in one part of the global economy has proceeded hand in hand with the deliberate underdevelopment of another part of the global economy. When Lynas addresses that issue, his lectures on the need for growth would matter. There always can and always ought to be an argument about economic growth, mind, in that this determines how growth is undertaken and how its rewards are distributed. There’s always an argument. Unless we want Stalin’s forced collectivism, regardless of the health and welfare of the workers. Would Lynas be in favour of ‘rapid and sustained growth’ if it is achieved by a slave economy. Adam Smith justified slavery in The Wealth of Nations, if slavery could be proved to be a more efficient way of producing. Does Lynas agree? Does he need to? He rules out any argument. Lynas’ reasoning is very loose and that is always a hostage to fortune in politics.

The truth is that people in poorer countries - to the extent that one can generalise - are desperate to increase their security by having access to modern medicine, fair employment, capital, and a whole host of other things that those of us living in rich countries have taken for granted since birth. (Lynas ch 2011).

Lynas’ bluff can be called here. Who amongst the Green movement denies this? If he can find a name – and I would be surprised if he can – then I would like to hear it. This is not a view which is representative of any great number of environmentalists. Just another phoney target.
Lynas doesn’t miss the opportunity to get some old standbys into the argument. 
Just consider that in 2009, whilst emissions fell in the US and Europe thanks to the recession, China added more to its CO2 output in a single year than the entire emissions of the UK, Spain and Ireland combined (about 900 million tonnes).

Not that old saw! It’s as though Lynas is a contestant on some panel game in which you have to make as many references to given words as possible within certain time constraints. It’s as though Lynas is ticking them all off the list as he goes. Insofar as it matters, the picture changes when it comes to per capita figures. Of course a country of one billion people emits more CO2 than three nations with combined populations of 150 million people. You can play around with absolute and relative figures all day to prove that the world is a magic rabbit called Jasper.

Humanity has so far transgressed only three of the nine planetary boundaries - biodiversity, climate and nitrogen - and has successfully navigated away from a breach of one, the ozone layer. Boundaries on ocean acidification, land use and water use are still avoidable. I am confident that we can respect them, and move back into the safety zone with the first three, without the need to try and limit human aspirations. I hope this book has shown convincingly that whilst ecological limits are real, economic limits are not. (Lynas ch 10 2011).

Only by ignoring the accumulative logic and dynamics of the capital economy. There hasn’t actually been any economics in this book, other than assertions of economic growth. Lynas does define the planetary boundaries and hence can develop a notion of ecological limits. What he hasn’t done is decouple ‘the economy’ from the accumulative logic of capital. That means that Lynas’ proposals for economic growth are hollow. Capital will continue to seek to expand its values as a systemic imperative regardless of ecological limits. Since capitalism is a regime of private accumulation rather than a public domain, attempts to constrain economic growth within ecological limits will always fail. Other than extolling the virtues of markets and privatisation – which isn’t an argument – there is no model of a functioning economy set within ecological limits at all in this book. Those books are out there. This isn’t one of them. I suspect that Lynas knows precious little about economics, given his predilection for big and bold claims.
Lynas optimistically declares that humanity can manage the planet - and itself - towards the transition to sustainability. And he is right that ‘the grounds for optimism are at least as strong as the grounds for pessimism’. He is certainly right to argue that ‘only optimism can give us the motivation and passion we will need to succeed.’ (Lynas ch 10 2011). That is an important point but it needs to be related to an ethic that serves as a regulative ideal, a vision of a feasible future that is well within our grasp. ‘Voices of doom may be persuasive, but theirs is a counsel of despair. The world - and our own children - deserve better. The truth is that global environmental problems are soluble. Let us go forward and solve them.’ (Lynas ch 11 2011). 
It’s possible to argue that we should look beyond the eye-catching ‘God Species’ claim of the title and understand that Lynas is simply arguing for wise global resource management. Indeed. As the book ends, Lynas seems ready to start writing the book he promised us at first. Lynas’ thesis is a promising one, the human race as The God Species. This surely amounts to a demand that the human race morally lives up to its technical and institutional powers. The problem is that Lynas did not follow that thesis up, leaving his concluding argument for optimism curiously hollow. He gives us a claim rather than an argument. We are left wondering what might have been.
There’s nothing particularly remarkable about the call for wise planetary management. It’s how we understand that management that counts. It’s Job’s old question: ‘'Where can wisdom be found?' (Job 28:12 20). And here, Lynas’ proposals fall short. He argues for an energy system that continues to pump out highly toxic materials, getting into the land and the atmosphere and accumulating up food chains for millennia? We will be eating our own waste. He insists on GM food which, for all of the big promises made by the corporations who design and control the technology, has failed to deliver increased yields, which for all the claims made on safety is already infecting wild plant species with herbicide resistance genes.
This is not business as usual; this is a turbo-charged industrialism. Engineering of this kind is speeding us and the planet towards the apocalypse.
There is a need to trace the environmental question to its roots in the capital system. An appeal to ecological sensibility and reason presupposes the existence of the very things that are lacking in capitalist society and which need to be created. Not the least reason for the current malaise of the environmental movement is the fact that it has been confined to the terrain of the capital system. Marx warned the labour movement over one hundred years ago that labour cannot win on the terrain of capital, and that same warning should be heeded by environmentalists. On this terrain, it is the rule of capital which prevails and systemic imperatives which dominate. The problems don’t go away, they just get worse until Mother Earth, in her eternal wisdom, resolves the issue in her favour.
Production and consumption subordinate to the imperatives of capital accumulation prevents the creation of sound management based on a recognition of the nine planetary boundaries. That recognition of social and ecological ends is not how the capital system operates. The central dynamic is accumulation, everything else, good or bad, is a secondary, unintended consequence. The message is clear, if you want a system of sound planetary management, then you will have to uproot the capital system and its imperatives and put a system of social production in its place. Anti-capitalist? The alternatives are before us, a capital economy or a healthy planet – you cannot have both. The capital system is a competition of capitals. One capitalist kills many. Any company can always be undercut by another who can compete cheaper and dirtier. It tends to be forgotten now that the anti-socialist economist John Maynard Keynes called for the socialisation of investment. It is time for the socialisation of production too, with economy and ecology once more merging around principles of sustainability and guided in accordance with the democratic will.

Rather than a genuine vision of a better world, we simply get survival within an enlarged version of the present. Lynas gives us big business as usual – ‘economic growth’ defined in the accumulative terms of the capital system. There is nothing in Lynas’ argument that suggests that human beings are gods in the sense of having inner divinity as moral beings. Instead,  human beings remain how Lynas defined them in the first chapter – planetary killer apes, only now in charge of massive technical power, including nuclear power. Lynas spends a chapter on human beings as being killers and cannibals. He then explicitly rules out the necessary moral and behavioural changes proposed by ‘environmentalists’ and instead focuses upon the perfection of technical means as a solution to ecological crisis. Killer apes armed with nuclear power – what could possibly go wrong?

So is the human race the ‘God Species’? Nietzsche argued that ‘Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to.' The question is whether human beings are capable of living up to their power in a creative way. The proof of constituting a God Species will lie in choosing life over death. Currently, global arms expenditure stands at $1.7 trillion. The programme to stabilize population growth, level off carbon emissions and secure Nature’s life support systems would cost around 12/13 percent of that figure. The human race could start its progress towards becoming the God Species by diverting just a small portion of the money it spends on death and destruction to purposes of supporting and enhancing life. The God Species in the title is not a description, rather, it is a prescription. Human beings have to prove their case.
So what on earth happened to the God in the title The God Species? It is evident that Lynas equates the God of the title with technology, particularly nuclear power. This won’t turn out well at all. This is just the classic mistake of hubris. It never turned out well in the past and it never will turn out well. Lynas, of course, will retort here that this is the same old accusation of hubris. It is. Because it’s the same old case of power and knowledge going to human heads. Out of nothing so crooked can something entirely straight be made. The attitudes of the utopians of technology can be contrasted with Gandhi who spoke in disparaging terms of 'dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need  to be good'. Any argument silent on values can be treated with scepticism. It seems to imply that we are relying on the perfection of things rather than upon our own moral characters and choices. Einstein stated that the modern predicament is that we have a perfection of means and an imperfection of ends. Until we address that question of ends seriously, our means will continue to misfire. 
Writing in The Guardian in 2008, under the heading ‘There goes the “green revolution”’, Mark Lynas argued that the planet's ecological crisis makes the current financial crisis look small and insignificant. But the UK chancellor of the exchequer, Alistair Darling ‘doesn't seem to get it.’ Lynas wanted to shift the UK economy on to a greener track, creating jobs and reflating the economy at the same time. ‘Investment in "green growth" could theoretically take us in a different direction’, Lynas states, ‘but the government has shied away from the challenge.’ So too, it now seems, has Lynas. ‘I have still got hope’, Lynas concluded in 2008 with respect to the ‘green revolution’. It seems that now he has none. Politics has failed the planet. It’s new technology or bust. Let’s face it, if those are the only options, it’s bust.

6 CONCLUSION – ENGINEERING OR ENVIRONMENTALISM?

Many who read this will be wondering why I should have given so much space to an argument for planetary engineering that I judge so negatively. I should have preferred to have ignored Lynas and Brand and their ilk, but that is not an option given the interest that has been shown in their arguments, the coverage they have received and continue to receive and the influence they may have. 
Since planetary engineering is being increasingly touted as having some serious solutions to the accelerating crisis in the climate system, then it merits close attention. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly common to read statements in the press that the planetary engineers are true environmentalists, whereas the Greens are blocking the resolution of planetary problems on account of their ‘ideological’ opposition to this or that technology. Take Nick Cohen in The Observer, who opines that all true environmentalists are pro-nuclear, since nuclear is the only way of weaning the planet off fossil fuels. This is serious politics. The promotion of eco-engineering is being accompanied by a denigration of political and social ecology, and that comes with big consequences. Are we engaged in social transformation leading from one social order to another, or merely equipping an existing order with sufficient energy to allow it to keep on polluting?

Planetary engineering is an environmental anti-politics, a depoliticisation and a demoralisation of the environmental cause. It is an anti-environmentalism. The planetary engineers offer us a dystopian vision of the future in which food and energy and therefore people are controlled by global elites with the collusion with the state. The crisis in the climate system is being exploited to further this dystopian agenda. Necessity is the plea of tyrants, said Pitt the Younger. It is not an argument. Yet the planetary engineers are exploiting environmental necessity to further their technocratic agenda. 


The political failures of environmentalism cannot just be attributed to the denialist industry. Ugly and inconvenient truths are seldom popular and do not win elections. When it comes to books, people deserve a sound and well-researched analysis of the problems that confront the human race. Instead, we are told that men are gods, nuclear power is safe, GM crops will feed the world and that we can carry on consuming with no adverse consequences as if there is no tomorrow.
Far from addressing the planetary crisis, the recommendations of the eco-engineers will accelerate it. The dream of nuclear energy, biotechnology, GM food and genetic engineering equips and powers the very consumption, destruction and pollution that is already eroding the carrying capacity of this planet. The technological fantasies of the planetary engineers will merely keep the lights on in Tinseltown, ensuring that the long term threat to life on Earth is increased. The eco-engineers are thus concerned that the band wagon keeps on being supplied until the wheels finally fall off and we all crash down to Earth with an even bigger bump.

So there should be no surprise at the extent of the rebuttal of a very thin argument. Because, whilst the arguments are easily unravelled under even casual scrutiny, it is in the way in which these arguments articulate certain social interests and power relations that their true significance lies. The case for nuclear is easily met in terms of the cost of commissioning and decommissioning, timescale, safety, geopolitics. Unless governments in financially straitened circumstances write a blank cheque, no company and no insurer will touch nuclear. So why does it keep coming back? Why does GM food keep coming back? There is a common thread in all these new technologies – they are authoritarian rather than democratic, centralising rather than decentralising, under the control of existing power rather than available to communities. They fit existing relations, they do not challenge them. And that applies to ideas for planetary engineering. It is a substitute politics that fits existing relations of class power. As Marx wrote in The German Ideology:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.

Marx GI 1999: 65

Marx’s argument makes it clear that the reach and the influence of ideas is not necessarily a function of their truth or quality. On the contrary, the dominant intellectual force tends to articulate the interests and the worldview of the dominant material force. In a market economy based on the institution of private property, market economics extolling the virtues of private enterprise will be assumed to be more contiguous with reality than an economics advocating social planning.

Of course, Marx was not so crude as to argue that the dominant ideas of any age reflect the dominant material interest in any simple sense. Such a weak argument exists only in the minds of those critics who prove their worth only by selecting such easy targets. Marx engaged in a lifelong critique of mystifying ideas is necessary with the express view of undermining the grip and the influence they may have over people if they went unchecked. And Marx was also concerned to turn attention upon the social relations which such ideas rationalised and concealed and protected.

In the case of planetary engineering, critical attention is all the more necessary for a deadly serious reason. The planetary engineers’ insubstantial attack on political and social ecology and their insubstantial alternative to a Green social transformation exploits the deep and proper concern there is today about climate change and global heating. This concern is abused by arguments which proceed from the threat of eco-catastrophe to a pre-determined conclusion. Nothing about the very real problems of global heating, poverty, famine etc make nuclear, economic growth, GM food etc solutions. They are possible solutions that need to be discussed rationally and critically. The same argument applies to those who propose wind farms. In the film The Age of Stupid, people struggling to deal with climate change in the future are shown asking how eco-catastrophe could have come about. Because, comes the reply in one scene, people objected to wind farms where they lived. The inference is that wind farms are the solution to the threat of climate change and global heating. Actually, that doesn’t follow at all. There is nothing about stating a problem that establishes the veracity of the solution proposed.

To present critics of any solution proposed as being responsible for the problems adumbrated is a cheap bullying tactic, and it seems all sides in the climate wars use it. 
It is often claimed, and it is something that the eco-engineers highlight in their own self-image, that their proposals are at least relevant to the crucial problems facing human civilisation. That may well be true, but it is no more true than the recommendations that political and social ecologists have been making for decades. Thought, analysis, criticism, research have yet to become so facile that merely addressing a serious problem is sufficient to vindicate the solutions proposed. Unfortunately, that is the style adopted by the planetary engineers. People are starving, GM technology has the potential to feed the world, GM is the solution and its critics are the problem. The same reasoning with respect to nuclear power and global heating is employed. To repeat, a proposed solution is not necessarily correct simply because the problem has been stated. 

The planetary engineers share a mode of reasoning which comprises a number of salient characteristics: an uncritical acceptance of conventional thinking; blind submission to existing power; tendency to caricature; stereotypical thinking which turns complex ideas into simple black and white choices; denigration and even vilification of critics and opponents; lack of self-awareness and self-criticism; a penchant for moralism and scientism in lieu of a genuine system of ethics and scientific methodology; a cynical view of human nature.

But there is another question here. One can debate whether the various forms of technology being advocated by the planetary engineers really can save the planet or the species. But what is of more interest is the insistence that environmentalists should change their principles and perspectives and embrace the new technologies. Why the need for the support of the environmentalists? Even in a general sense, assuming that all environmentalists are in the one camp, their numbers are far outweighed by those supporting mainstream parties within the conventional political arena. Come election time, and the environment barely rates a mention. The support or the opposition of environmentalists will do nothing to prevent other political forces from advocating and implementing the new technologies. 

Whilst the rhetoric and the rationale might be slightly different, there is little to distinguish the arguments as to how we power and feed the world which are coming from the likes of Brand and Lynas from the those of the large corporations. Keeping company like that, why do these eco-engineers insist that environmentalists commit suicide by ditching their principles, at the very moment that the ecological message is advancing and the warnings issued by ecologists over the decades are being vindicated? That the arguments of ecologists have been overlooked for so long, whilst those of planetary engineers receive such coverage, is significant. How is it that some ideas are deemed more relevant and more realistic than others? How does selection proceed according to specific social relations? 

The questions answer themselves.

That’s why I call these people planetary engineers and managers rather than environmentalists. They are equipping and powering capital and managing people and planet for capital. They have abandoned the difficult ground of politics and ethics and ideas for the mad fantasies of technoscience controlled by corporations. And if anyone is still in doubt, uncertain about the evidence for and against, just look at the extent to which climate change deniers are slavering at the mouth in their effusive praise of planetary engineering. 
“There is more to life than simply increasing its speed” declared Gandhi. And that’s what really disappoints about the planetary engineers – there is no real change, certainly not in direction, only an increase in speed.
Ecology as politics is today confronted with two broad problems. To take the first problem, the ecological movement is faced with problems of theory; analytical and empirical questions concerning the nature of the environment, the way we value nature, the various environmental movements, the forms and principles of an ecological society worthy of the name, the moralities and the strategies that are required in constituting it. It should be apparent that there are ecologists and environmentalists, Greens and conservationists of the most diverse persuasions. This means that it is much more easy to ask questions than it is to supply answers. I shall state my view clearly. Attempts to assert specific approaches, directions and solutions as the only legitimate ones, over against alternatives, is an example of the old top-down monological mode of thought, action and organisation that ecology as a broad movement dissolves. The engineering approach too easily fits the old monocratic mode of industrial politics. The exponents of such a view – and the point applies to all those radicals and ecologists who seek to go it alone – are acting against the first principle of ecology - the law of "integrated systems." To assert that only those who advocate nuclear energy are true environmentalists is not only a crude example of delegitimising alternative platforms, it contradicts ecological principles. This concept of interactive cooperation is based on the way that nature actually functions, and is the complete antithesis of monocratic forms of thought and action.

Ecology as politics is necessarily nebulous, fluid, unstructured. Hence the many forms of organisation and practice within environmentalism. In a very real sense, there is an environmental ‘movement’ only in the most general of senses. Greenpeace and the RSPB are same but different. The practice of discerning ecological principles and turning them into political effect must, therefore, be a many-headed, collective effort embracing myriad groups, organisations and individuals. In light of this, open debate, alternate platforms, the careful presentation of arguments and evaluation of other views, revision and emendation of conclusions in light of criticism and contrary evidence, are all as crucial as are political commitment and enthusiasm. The very last thing that ecology as politics needs is faction fighting and endless splitting. The mode of argument adopted by the planetary engineers does precisely that. Indeed, the accusations and insinuations of the planetary engineers with respect to Greens and socialists and anarchists etc could easily be read as an intervention designed to break up and stall the advance of ecological thinking, destroying the principle of integrated systems, dividing the environmental movement up within and having environmentalists involved in internecine conflicts and debates. How else to explain random comments that environmentalists have been starving people on account of Green principle, that there is a connection between Greens and Nazis, that Green ideology is potentially the deadliest ideology ever seen in history? The planetary engineers make these and many more such claims. Reduced to basics, their ‘alternative’ is no alternative at all but simply amounts to economic growth within existing economic arrangements powered by new technologies under central and corporate control. In which case, the politics of the planetary engineers is very clear. This is not ecology as politics at all, it is an assault upon such a politics.

And this brings us to the second problem. As the climate crisis intensifies and the demand for environmental action becomes more urgent, political ecology finds itself confronted by a singularly hostile political and intellectual environment. Many can support a Green politics that is raising issues. It is when dealing with those issues starts to take practical form that the real political fight begins. At this point, ecology as politics comes under serious assault, attacked from all directions by those with a vested interest to dismiss the ecological message, deride ecologists, belittle ecologists’ hopes as dreams and denigrate their achievements as self-serving illusions.

The likes of James Lovelock, Stewart Brand, Mark Lynas and those who follow them must know this. Yet they indulge in the very same devaluation of political and social ecology. 

So besieged by powerful interests is ecology as politics that those who speak and write on ecology have a responsibility to argue in a spirit of moderation and openness, recognising the complexity of the issues under attention, the seriousness of the problems and the tentative nature of conclusions drawn and solutions proposed. Instead, we are treated to argument by simplification and caricature – ‘so much for the leftist dread of centralized corporate control of global food production through genetic engineering’ Brand asserts, having failed to properly engage the arguments of ‘leftist’ political economy. The problems are analysed by easy reduction and the solutions proposed by intellectual short-cut. The Green and the socialist cases are presented in terms of the kind of hackneyed vulgarizations that are normally found in particular right-wing newspapers, and the letters pages at that. Accusations that Greens want to dismantle and destroy ‘all technology’ (Lovelock) and send us back to nature have been firmly rebutted umpteen times over, and are easily identified by the fair-minded as the vulgarizations they are. The crisis in the climate system is real and growing. Those who are attempting to spur action to avoid eco-catastrophe are frequently besieged and beleaguered by powerful forces. The planetary engineers claim to be serious in addressing the climate crisis, yet they indulge in the crudest caricature and misrepresentation of Green positions. In a political environment in which the ecological message struggles to be heard, this is a dual dereliction. Not only does it obstruct fruitful discussion and debate, it reinforces the prejudices within political coverage render the ecological concern secondary to the more immediate, more tangible problems of ‘the economy’ and national security. It can only serve to render the political environment even more hostile to political ecology, at a time when the need for political leadership and action to avoid ecological catastrophe is becoming urgent.


No, the lengthy rebuttal of the case for planetary engineering in no way reflects the quality of the engineering argument. I read and rebutted as I went, the arguments meriting no deeper treatment than that. Rather, the lengthy treatment reflects the reach and the influence of the engineering argument with respect to the defence and the promotion of the dominant material interests of existing society. There is nothing less than a redefinition of environmentalism being proposed here. The planetary engineers are proposing an environmentalism that corresponds to capitalist relations. That being so, engineering solutions are part of the process by which the capital system is bringing about eco-catastrophe, they are not a coherent response to it.

The environmental movement arose as a response to a growing awareness of the potential for long term damage caused by environmental disasters and crisis in the climate system. Originating in the 1960’s, the real explosion came in the 1980s. However, there has been a long, long process of political procrastination. Jonathan Porritt commented on Rio in 1992, I didn’t expect much and I wasn’t disappointed. We have come to expect even less as the years went by. That politics has failed. It is in this context that planetary engineering needs to be set. It’s a surrogate which despairs of finding a real solution. If this is the best we can do then we might as well admit that the game is up and that the human race, the supposed God species, has run it's course. It’s a Requiem for a Species as Clive Hamilton titles his book. Some 99% of species that have ever lived on the planet are already extinct. We are just another species that will come and go on Earth. It’s just that there’s no real reason to go just now. The truth is that we are hastening our demise through our own collective stupidity, we have generated vast mechanisms of collective power without developing the means of exercising collective control. We are trapped within systems which foster individual rationality – self-interest – and bring about collective irrationality – the destruction of health and well-being. Earth will continue and other life forms will no doubt flourish long after we have gone, which may be a good thing from Gaia’s perspective. Except that Gaia doesn’t have a view, Nature just is. Gaia needs us in order to be known herself.

As for Brand and Lynas, their engineering is not equipped to treat moral and philosophical issues seriously. Their techno fixing will merely give the whole world to capital, selling out the poor and powerless in the process. It profits a man nothing to sell his soul for the whole world, it profits him less to sell it to capital – he loses the world in any case.
We’ve been here many times before, making concessions to capital in the name of realism – that’s how we’ve ended up in this predicament, despite all the powerful productive forces at our disposal. The environment and the people, particularly the poor, are always the first to pay the price. 

In light of the hard questions, the proposals of the planetary engineers are feeble. They may or may not be within technical and institutional and financial capacity – though there are real doubts here – but the kind of pragmatism that Brand and Lynas espouse is one that lacks the political and moral courage to face the harder questions of changed human behaviour and social transformation, the only sure conditions of achieving the sustainable future we need in light of the looming eco-catastrophe. This is an existential question concerning what it is to live well. We should not live to endlessly produce and consume as if on some hedonistic treadmill, but produce and consume only to the extent we need to in order to live well. That’s the big question. Yet it is the very thing which is discarded when politics and ethics and philosophical anthropology are discarded in favour of a ‘workaround pragmatism’. We will never advance towards the social and ecological paradigm so long as planetary engineers are telling capital and its lickspittles that an environmentally sound version of business as usual is feasible. 







PART TWO THE POLITICS OF GAIA

7 TECHNOLOGICAL FIXING AND GAIAN GAMBLING

Science and Ethics
The human race faces an ecological crisis of great and growing magnitude. Through its technical power, humankind has fundamentally altered the balance between human beings and the atmosphere, something which has resulted in an unprecedented warming of the earth. For all of the impressive technological achievements of the modern world, power is still generated and vehicles are still fuelled with coal, oil, and gas. The problem is that with a constantly expanding economy and a constantly growing population, the combustion of those fuels is heating up the planet beyond a point at which sustainable living is possible. At the same time, more than a billion people remain trapped in dire poverty. Millions of children die from preventable diseases and malnutrition, and in many countries, violence, corruption, terrorism, and oppression are the realities of daily life.

Each one of these problems is serious enough. Taken together, they read like the writing on the wall, in big capital letters. We are now at a turning point in human history, one that requires great moral and political leadership and generational responsibility. It is time to step up to the plate and answer the question as to what kind of civilisation we want. We may have to act to save civilisation as such.
In Greek mythology, Gaia is Goddess of Earth. Not unnaturally, many are inclined to read James Lovelock’s Gaia thesis as proposing that Nature is a Goddess, alive and infused with purpose. Look again. Lovelock’s Gaia may be a self-regulating organism, but it is a machine. It lacks conscious direction and purpose and is mechanistic to the core. As Lovelock sardonically said in response to Richard Dawkins’ erroneous criticism: ‘Gaia is alive in the same way that the gene is selfish’. Lovelock doesn’t believe that nature really is alive, Gaia is merely a metaphor that allows us to relate to a machine.

The most salient characteristic of the mechanistic materialism which has been the dominant scientific paradigm since the seventeenth century is that the world is ‘dead’ matter, blind chance, accident and necessity. Mind doesn’t matter and thought is a mere epiphenomenon of neural and chemical processes. And there is no God, either. Max Weber described the instrumentalisation of world via the processes of rational modernity as a disenchantment, which means ‘disgodding’. The more science explains the world, the less meaning the world has. That is the tragedy of modernity. So how does Mark Lynas manage the trick of reintroducing divinity in his intriguingly titled book The God Species? He doesn’t. He doesn’t even try. It is more than probable that he doesn’t even see what is at stake. Stewart Brand begins his book Whole Earth Discipline with the line that ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ Note the imperative ‘have to’. This is profound. The problem is that none of these books get beyond surface level. Over one hundred years ago, Nietszche declared that ‘God is dead’ and we have killed him. Many leave the point there as a simple statement of atheism as the only rational standpoint given the expansion of science. Nietzsche’s point was anything but an assertion of such a crude eighteenth century materialism. The belief in God came with an overarching objective morality that gave meaning, purpose and direction to the lives of human beings. Nietszche was making the point that with the death of God, human beings would now have to live up to the onerous moral responsibility of being gods. Nietszche doubted that human beings could live up to that responsibility. 'Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to,'  argued Nietzsche, and this brings us right to the central flaw of the ‘thinking’ contained in the books by Lovelock, Brand and Lynas. For all the claims that Nature is a Gaian Goddess and that human beings are the God Species, these are mere metaphors, with no substantive content whatsoever. Just as Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine, so human beings are machines. Indeed, the point goes further. Where Nietszche calls for human beings to creatively live up to their powers, moral and mental as well as technical and physical, these authors are technological fixers whose emphasis is firmly on technology. There is nothing by way of culture, morality, psychology in the solutions these authors offer to deal with the problem of ecological crisis and potential civilisation collapse. There is nothing by way of creative intelligence and mind, just gadgets. Morality is reduced to ‘lifeboat ethics’, deciding who can live and who can die, and politics is premised on a ‘constant battles’ view of history. Nietzsche is motivated by an ideal of personality achieved by a state of balance between what human beings are and what they can do and can be. That is what is required for human beings to become as gods and be good at it. 

The likes of Brand and Lynas resurrect HG Wells’ old ‘men as gods’ fantasy and seem to think technology will bring us to Heaven on Earth. To weigh into this area of ‘men as gods’ armed only with the simplicities of science is asking for trouble, and trouble, frankly, is all over the pages of these books. As Jacques Prevert wrote: 'The road to Hell is paved with good inventions.' Biotechnology, nuclear power, geo-engineering, GM food.


Nietszche did take this question seriously and applied some deep thought to it. So what’s new? Nietzsche would have asked if he was offered these books as evidence of new thinking. For Nietzsche, a purely 'scientific' interpretation of life would have 'nothing, really nothing, of what is "music" in it'. There is no understanding contained therein, because, of course, science does  not deliver meaning. It is on the wrong side of the fact/value, object/subject divide for that. With all the talk of Gods and Goddesses, I would have expected arguments of some profundity. Here is Albert Einstein: 'To know an answer to the question, "What is the meaning of life?" means to be religious.' And here is Wittgenstein: 'To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.'

To live as gods and become good at it means to live with meaning, to invest life with meaning. All three books talk of civilisation and the need to save civilisation. Civilisation is not technology, never has been and never will be. 


At this point there is a need for clarity on the fact/value divide. I have throughout made reference to this divide, which holds that an ‘ought-to-be’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’. This statement needs qualifying. A distinction needs to be made between the way that fact and value have come to be separated in specific social and historical relations – the modern world – and from the principle as such. In The Moral Landscape (2011), Sam Harris argues strongly that the fact/value distinction can be overcome and that science can and should determine values. Whilst that challenges a philosophical convention that has been a consensus view since Hume, the more one thinks about it, the more it becomes apparent that the idea that there is a boundary between fact and value is an illusion. Scientists are guided by values in their work whilst those concerned with morality have always responded to and incorporated the latest knowledge into their work. That, of course, does not mean that fact has shaped values. That precise relationship remains contentious. Aristotle studied biology and other sciences and clearly thought that his knowledge of the natural world had implications for his politics and ethics. Similarly, much later, Hegel held that the ‘is’ is the ‘ought-to-be’ in the process of becoming. When Marx examined social reality as a field of materialist immanence, the likes of Popper condemned him on account of his historicism and moral futurism. Popper famously singled out Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx for criticism in his The Open Society and its Enemies. Popper distinguished Marx the maker from Marx the prophet. In fact, in sticking hard and fast to the fact/value distinction, Popper failed to appreciate the active role that Marx assigned to creative human agency in bringing immanent lines of development to fruition. These lines of development are frustratable, human beings may fail to act or may be blocked in taking action. But if human beings act as moral beings to realise potentialities for an alternate future immanent in existing lines of development, then fact and value come together to shape the future. Marx’s alleged ‘futurism’ lies in the moral agency of human beings, not in the laws of history. The future is morally justified not merely because it is inevitable but because it has been brought about by creative human praxis with a view to enhancing the human ontology.
The main point is that the fact/value distinction is typical more of the Anglo-American tradition and can certainly be challenged. If the ‘ought-to-be’ cannot be derived from the ‘is’, do we just discard it altogether or simply make it up arbitrarily and impose it on reality from the outside. Ironically, the philosophical convention derives from David Hume, who sought to show the impossibility of deriving an ought-to-be from the concept of God. The problem is that the fact/value distinction has cut morality off from all aspects of human knowledge, begging the question of from where an ‘ought-to-be’ can be derived. The time has come to reinstate the old Aristotelian essentialism here and ground ethics in an understanding of human nature, affirming the distinction between the human being as s/he is and the human being as s/he could be if s/he realised his/her telos. 
My case against Stewart Brand, Mark Lynas and their ilk is not so much that they fail to respect the distinction between science and morality, fact and value, but that they seek to displace the latter by the former. There is a case for establishing a link between fact and value, and the arguments of Brand and Lynas etc presuppose that link. But this requires that politics and morality be treated seriously as fields which concern creative human self-realisation rather than being considered mere epiphenomenon of a crude physicalism or technologism.

There is a need to be clear about one point, technology is not a philosophy, is not a morality and does not compose a civilisation. Technology is not a culture. Technology is not God and can never substitute for God without some highly expensive Faustian price being exacted. There can be no philosophy or morality of technology because technical power is something entirely distinct from wisdom. To think otherwise is to be guilty of pride. Far from living up to the claim that human beings are to live as gods, the claims of Brand, Lynas and Lovelock assert an aggressive technological gambit. The powers assigned to science and technology presume that the excessiveness long promised by the scientific revolution is now finally possible. Actually, a closer look reveals that the claims rest on hope and wishful thinking than any sound scientific promise. It is apparent that it is the machines who are living as gods, not human beings. We have finally reached the summit of modern alienation: our own machines have finally replaced us. This isn’t wisdom at all, since wisdom implies limits, and that is precisely what these utopians of science and technology do not recognise even in the face of ecological crisis and catastrophe.

If there is nothing new about these criticisms of technological powers exceeding moral capacities, the point is that there is nothing at all new about the ‘new’ thinking offered by the technological fixers. Every expansion of knowledge or power in history has tempted human beings into hubris. The ‘gods’ in the pages of these books are not human beings but the new idols of science and technology. 'Must we ourselves not become gods?' Nietzsche asked the question in a morally profound way, challenging the very hubris that more simple minds indulge in. 
To live as gods requires much more than technological powers. The responsibility is much more onerous and exacting than that. The need to save civilisation is an imperative that Brand, Lovelock and Lynas urge upon us, but civilisation is much more than mere survival, just as life is much more than mere existence. Technology is not civilisation.

Lynas’ book has been used to demand that Greens have a clause 4 moment and embrace the very things they have been fighting against. That is a demand for moral and political disarmament in face of the enemy. It is a call to recognise the enemy as a friend. It is an appeal designed to fail. Which implies another motivation. An attempt to label greens and environmentalists as politically motivated activists with no link to science. The worse thing about this is that Lynas at least knows of the hard politics driving climate catastrophe.

Mark Lynas has impeccable credentials for writing a book dealing with practical measures for tackling climate change. His previous book was entitled High Tide: The Truth about Our Climate Crisis (2004). What made the argument of this book compelling was not just the evidence concerning the impending threat of global warming — the world is not short of such books – but the way that Lynas reveals the extent to which global warming is affecting people's lives and the planet in the here and now. We are well beyond the debate as to whether climate change is happening and who or what is responsible. Lynas’ High Tide is a narrative, in which the effects of global warming are exemplified in the lives of real people experiencing climate change first hand. Lynas also offers a damning indictment of American environmental policy: "Climate change begins and ends in America. We all know that the United States is the world's largest polluter, and yet the sheer weight of responsibility that Americans now carry of the world's plight has barely touched the national psyche." This book ought to have been the impetus for a much-needed wake-up call to politicians as well as a rallying cry to people to engage in politics. Neither seems to have happened and perhaps this lies behind Lynas’ sudden eagerness for the technological fix. He seems to despair of a political solution, and is acutely aware of the extent to which climate pressures are pressing. He is now condemning Greenpeace for using ‘anecdotal evidence’, when it was such evidence which formed the strength of his earlier book.
Herein lies the paradox. The real solution to the climate crisis can only be a long term sea change in culture and politics, the way human beings organise their interchange with nature. Yet the environmental crisis is near at hand and demands action now. Human beings are thus caught in a pincer movement. The long term solution is too long to come to the rescue in time; the short term solution is too shallow and superficial to effect real change. Which leaves us with the technological gamble.

The science behind the discovery of global warming reveals the all-important story of how scientists discovered, confirmed and made public the very human causes behind the changes affecting the climate. The problem is that the world is not ruled by science and government responds to pressures and influences other than science. The human causes behind climate change can only be properly addressed by politics, human action, human responsibility. Human beings taking responsibility for the powers that they have created and unleashed. That notion of responsibility is very different from the application of technological power to solve problems.

The great merit of Nietzsche is to have spelled out the real imperatives and implications with a force, clarity and vigour that only the most foolhardy or hubristic overlook. The death of God to which Nietzsche pointed was the death of the Christian God. And that implied the death of the Christian morality which had given meaning and order to civilisation for millennia. 'When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives oneself of the right to Christian morality . . . Christian morality is a command: its origin is transcendental ... it possesses truth only if God is truth - it stands or falls with the belief in God.' That implies the end of kindness, compassion, forgiveness and everything else involved in loving our neighbours as ourselves. There is no lifeboat ethics in a Christian morality, no necessity to wage and win ‘constant battles’ for scarce resources. 

Deicide, Nietzsche calls it, but to live without God, or to live as gods in a new age of scientific materialism, has some stark implications:
To talk of just and unjust in themselves has no sense whatsoever — it's obvious that in themselves harming, oppressing, exploiting, destroying cannot lie 'unjust’, inasmuch as life essentially works that way, that is, in its basic functions it harms, oppresses, exploits, and destroys - and cannot be conceived at all without these characteristics.

Abandon the belief in objective morality and the categorical imperative of justice goes also. In the absence of a divine Judge, there is no reason to expect justice. If there is no God, there is no transcendental 'Thou shalt not'. Nietzsche makes it clear that we are in a world ‘beyond good and evil’, beyond morality, beyond limits. It is the plainest delusion to believe that, under pressure of some perceived necessity or imperative written into nature and biology, that we can abandon belief in God and leave nothing unchanged. And it is the plainest insanity to think that our technological powers can substitute for real gods. 

Of course, for science, talk of moralities and divinities is merely so much meaningless talk. There is no objective morality, morality is no more than value judgements, mere subjective opinions, all equally true and by the same token all equally false. This is the world beyond good and evil that Nietzsche predicted as an inevitable corollary of scientific nihilism. For scientists, technologists and engineers to now demand that we have to live as gods and get good at living as gods begs the question as to why it has taken them this long to address this, the central question of modernity. 
Nietzsche is not a minor philosopher and his prophetic moralism, or anti-moralism, has been pondered at length for over a century. It seems that our best scientific minds are more practical in their inclinations than they are rational, and see only that reason that concerns means, to the neglect of that reason which comes with an ineradicable ethical component. Somehow, the scientists have missed what Nietzsche saw and stated most clearly – that the abandonment of Christian ethics through science creates the space for a viciously Darwinian denouement. The strong must eliminate the weak, might must prevail over right, the rich must prey on the poor. The principle of caring for the weak and the needy is contrary to nature and obstructs the full working of the logic of power. The Christian ideal of the universal love of humanity means, in practice, 'the preference for the suffering, underprivileged, degenerate: it has in fact lowered and weakened the strength, the responsibility, the lofty duty to sacrifice men'.

It is worth noting the extent to which contemporary neo-Darwinians, spurred on by the likes of Richard Dawkins, concentrate their fire upon religion but have precious little to say about the kind of morality which comes in its stead. Intentional or not, this kind of moral destruction will lead to the kind of predatory Darwinian world predicted by Nietzsche and glimpsed already in Hitler’s Germany. Richard Dawkins says some interesting things in the 2006 edition of The Selfish Gene:

My own feeling is that a human society based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live. But unfortunately, however much we may deplore something, it does not stop it being true. This book is mainly intended to be interesting, but if you would extract a moral from it, read it as a warning. Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has ever aspired to. (Dawkins 2006 ch 1). 

This passage is breathtaking in what it reveals about what Dawkins knows to be true, and yet which he seems not to have assimilated in his public pronouncements on religion and morality. To put the point simply, the major religions have always known that there is a worm in the apple and that it isn’t possible at all to read morality straight from pure, unadulterated nature. Generosity and altruism and what Catholicism continues to call ‘the common good’ do indeed need to be taught because, by nature, human beings are selfish, competitive and aggressive. Living according to pure, amoral, nature, life in society would be ‘nasty, brutish and short’. Yet Richard Dawkins has devoted his public life to the destruction of religion. He is less clear about what kind of morality is to be taught in its place. That leads us straight back to nature and ‘a very nasty society’ based on ‘the gene's law of universal ruthless selfishness’.

The point is that many scientists fail to take morality seriously and, as a result, risk plunging us into a Darwinian dead end. Note how often reference is made to a lifeboat ethics in contemporary books concerning the survival of civilisation. The notion of ‘lofty duty’ that one finds in Lovelock and Brand is the plainest rationalisation for the crudest of biological imperatives. Lovelock seems to think that the 500 million or so survivors are likely to be those best fitted to the new planetary order. We need to bear in mind here that, in the main, the rich and the powerful are more inclined to sacrifice others rather than themselves. It is not without relevance that Lovelock argues for an increasing in spending on the armed forces and for the rule of the warlords. This wouldn’t lead to the survival of the fittest at all, only those who command the most resources in the here and now. That is, the very people who have brought the world to the edge of disaster. One has to wonder who the likes of Lovelock consider to be the fit and the unfit in today’s civilisation.

Nietzsche writes some chilling words in The Will to Power.

The biblical prohibition 'thou shalt not kill' is a piece of naivete compared with the seriousness of the prohibition of life to decadents: 'thou shalt not procreate'. Life itself recognizes no solidarity, no 'equal rights', between the healthy and the degenerate parts of an organism: one must excise the latter - or the whole will perish. - Sympathy for decadents, equal rights for the ill-constituted - that would be the profoundest immorality, that would be antinature itself as morality!

I take these scientists and technologists at their word and presume that when they argue for the survival of civilisation, they do indeed mean civilisation. Whatever it is that Nietzsche describes in the passage above, it isn’t civilisation. Civilisation requires deep thought and hard labour, an ongoing effort at creating and sustaining meaning and purpose and order. To live as gods means more than wielding technological powers. To live as gods means to live up to the objective morality once underwritten by God. If the death of God is simply interpreted as the end of good and evil, assertion of power and blind natural imperatives, then human beings will become brutal, ruthless, mean and hard; they will seek to impose their will on others; they will eliminate the weak, the poor, the disabled, all those deemed subhuman; and technical power will magnify the violence that objective morality has restrained for so long. 





Nietzsche had a premonition that some vast tragedy was unfolding before his eyes, as a direct consequence of the death of God and the abandonment of Christian morality. 'One day my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous - a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience, a decision that was conjured up against everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no man, I am dynamite.'

For a long time, Nietzsche’s premonition has been associated with the murderous madness of Nazism. The problem is that human beings are still failing badly in the demand that they have to live as gods. And that premonition of some vast tragedy unfolding seems all-pervasive in the modern world. By comparison with what is to come, Nazism may look more like a sparkler than dynamite.

The technologists talk like gods but lack the moral and intellectual equipment with which to back up their claims to divinity. Instead, they offer their machines. This is idolatry, hubris. These may be old and familiar accusations but we are faced with the same old assertion of salvation through technological powers. And this time the technologists are not even guaranteeing the results. Where once the Prometheans of the scientific assault upon nature were certain of progress, now they are forced to deride the precautionary principle as a safety net for cowards, and claim the right to gamble on uncertain outcomes. Brand writes at length on fear, the fear of the ignorant in contrast to the bold bravery of the scientists and engineers. The priority is to survive. To throw technology irresponsibly at nature merely to survive is fear at its most extreme. 

The process of disenchantment stripped the world of its divinities. Science teaches us that we do not need God to explain the world, only observation and measurement. The redundancy of God is something that is assumed rather than accepted. So long as we are concerned to explain the world as a physical, inanimate entity, there seems little reason to invoke the God hypothesis, to paraphrase Laplace. 

But that’s really not the end of the matter. There is more to life than explanation. Human beings require meaning. ‘Philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere. Where, then, are we going? Always to our home.’ (Novalis, Fragments). It is impossible to be at home in a world that lacks meaning, that is unfamiliar, that lacks structure and purpose. Science reveals a world that is counter-intuitive and counter-factual. It may be the world as it really is, as revealed by scientific measurement and observation, but it is not a world that would be recognised as a lived reality. Since the dawn of civilization, human beings have reflected on the place that humanity has within the universe. Compared to the vastness of all that exists, human beings feel so small as to be insignificant. Yet if they thought and acted as though human life really was insignificant, it is difficult to see anything approaching civilisation being created and sustained. There is no denying nature’s endless circularity of birth, death, rebirth, and there is no escaping that cycle. Our words and deeds are little more than a ripple in the ocean. But that is the wrong way to look at things. An act which may be an infinitesimally small part within the totality of things possesses an enormous significance when viewed from the perspective of the individual actor. If human beings are grains of sand on the beach, those grains of sand possess a world within them. The world may have existed billions of years before human beings, and may well exist billions of years after the human species has become extinct. But human life has the spark of eternity within it, and that is the meaning which it brings to the inanimate physical events and cycles, natural and social, which environ human relations. The pagan view sees the world in terms of the vast impersonal forces of Nature. James Lovelock never tires of repeating that Gaia the Earth Goddess is no doting mother and that species which transgress planetary boundaries will be eliminated. There is now growing recognition from the major world religions for the need for humanity to respect and look after the Creation. For a long time, however, there was some hostility towards ecology as a new paganism. Thus, back in 1973, the Catholic archbishop Robert Dwyer condemned the 'worship of the Environment' as a 'new cult of Nature Unspoiled' which was 'anti-human'. The archbishop restated the traditional view of 'Nature as Enemy, the alien force, to be conquered and broken to man's will'. It is an attitude which stands opposed to the need to develop an ecological sensibility as a condition of ensuring the survival of life on earth, and so can be condemned as extreme. But behind the hostility there is a valid point. Nature as such may not be ‘anti-human’, but it is amoral and indifferent. Earthquakes, floods, famines, droughts, etc are all natural processes which come and go within the cycle of birth, growth, decline, death, rebirth. This is not a cycle which cares one way or the other with respect to the lives of individual human beings. Archbishop Dwyer can be criticised for an unnecessary dualism between Creator and Creation. Looking after the Creation is surely part worshipping the Creator. But the serious point is that human beings have a moral purpose which is quite distinct from physical events and natural cycles. The science of ecology and biology are in danger of unravelling the world of moral codes, principles and ties by which humanity has sought to invest life with meaning and regulate its affairs in a judicious and fair manner. This is dangerous for the simple reason that Nature as such doesn’t care. ‘Who cares for you?’ Alice challenges the pack of cards. If human beings are merely a pack of physical processes, then the question is put again – ‘who cares for you?’ Nature doesn’t care. 

In their historical praxis, human beings have built a second nature on top of first nature. There is a world economy with its systemic imperatives, a world state system with its institutional imperatives, international laws, and the information superhighway. What these various aspects of the social system have in common is that they are all impersonal. Max Weber characterised capitalist modernity as a bureaucratic order which proceeded ‘without regard for persons’. How to assume conscious common control of these supra-individual, to achieve a re-personalisation at a higher level of development, was Marx’s lofty, and still far from being fulfilled, ideal. Until the realisation of this ideal, the global social order is a vast impersonal network that proceeds without regard for persons. The social system is as indifferent to individual human beings every bit as much as the tornado or the earthquake or flood which sweeps us away. ‘The economy’ no more cares about who suffers as a result of crisis than does Nature in a heat wave or a cold snap. Human beings are facing an environmental crisis of an unprecedented scale since the dawn of civilisation, but Nature couldn’t care less about the effects of global warming. It’s human beings who care, it’s human beings who have the capacity for moral choice, it’s human beings who can assume responsibility and act.
In this respect, it becomes apparent that the vast impersonal forces that govern our lives are blind, uncaring and unresponsive. Scientists and engineers like Lovelock and Brand target sentiment and sentimentality. Lovelock correctly condemns those who take a ‘a sentimental view of nature’ (Lovelock ch 8 2009). But examine this passage from James Lovelock, and the ‘anti-human’ character of Nature worship identified by archbishop Dwyer becomes apparent.
Much too slowly some begin to understand that the welfare of Gaia is more important than the welfare of humankind. The science of Gaia confirms the threat to the Earth but allows us to continue the older naturalism where normally the Earth is benign but like ancient goddesses sometimes ruthless, and only humans are sentimental. To be truly green we have to rid ourselves of the illusion that we are separate from Gaia in any way. We are as much a part of her as anything alive and we should feel tied, as in a good and loving marriage, until death us do part. (Lovelock ch 8 2009). 
One can agree with the idea of a partnership, but the first part of this statement places Gaia as inanimate Nature before human welfare. ‘Only humans are sentimental’, Lovelock claims. Stewart Brand also declares: ‘Ecological balance is too important for sentiment. It requires science.’ (Brand ch 9 2009).
The science of Gaia, however, reveals only blind, indifferent, unsentimental Nature. The question remains, ‘who cares for you?’ It is a question not only addressed to human beings, but also to Nature. The danger of Lovelock’s position is that by asserting that the welfare of Gaia is more important than the welfare of humanity, the question some might be inclined to ask is why, if Nature doesn’t care for us, why should be care for Nature? Because we depend upon it and are a part of it, obviously. But that requires an ethic, not a science which reveals only impersonal, physical processes. Nature’s processes are not addressed to human beings personally. No more than those of the economic system. We may stand in their way, and get brushed aside or trodden on if we don’t move. But impersonal systems by their very nature are unmoved by our plight. Impersonal systems, natural and social, do not relate to human beings as persons. They are indeed unsympathetic. Only human beings are sympathetic. Only human beings determine good and bad.

In such a world, there is no overall meaning, only fleeting, transitory experience. There is no escaping the cycle of birth and death. Human hope is merely a prelude to despair, disillusion and death. The greatest statement on the meaninglessness of human life given from a scientific perspective came from Bertrand Russell in 'A Free Man's Worship':

That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins - all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's salvation henceforth be safely built.

There is no doubting the eloquence. Russell offers us a coherent vision, but a bleak one. It is difficult to think of a civilisation that can be founded on a heroic despair. Russell’s collaborator on the Principia Mathematica A.N Whitehead wrote well here: "But if men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants." The only options are hedonism and stoicism, to face hopelessness and meaninglessness with a stiff upper lip, or simply enjoy yourself in whatever vicarious pleasures that may come one’s way. 

Russell may have given an eloquent statement of heroic despair, but Russell never acted in his long public life according to its prescriptions. The statement makes no sense of Russell’s own life. Russell had a passionate commitment to truth and justice and fought from first to last as though these things mattered, above and beyond physical causes. Russell hated inequality, injustice, war, cruelty, torture, repression in life and not only recognised these things for what they are, he fought them from first to last, from the First World War to the Vietnam War.
The irony is that Russell acted in a religious manner. In thought, he may have been agnostic with respect to God, but in deed, Russell acted as though life mattered above and beyond indifferent, unsympathetic nature. In the religious vision, human beings are not alone in the universe, and not insignificant. Human beings are here and are aware because someone somewhere willed them into being, giving us a connection to all that is. It is this personal God which connects the within and the without, which enables human beings to recognise themselves and their own personal uniqueness in the faces of others, that invests the great forces of first nature with meaning —astronomy, physics, biology, ecology, neurophysiology, genetics— as well as the parallel forces of second nature, society — social relations and structures, class conflict, power struggles. That’s the answer to the question ‘who cares for you?’ Human beings care for each other and, in so doing, invest the world with meaning and purpose. 

The Moral Fabric – the Ought and the Is

The consensus view in both religion and science is that whilst science can explain and describe the factual world, it can say nothing about values. To derive an ‘ought-to-be’ from an ‘is’ breaks the philosophical distinction between fact and value.  This distinction between fact and value is now being strongly challenged by neuroscientist Sam Harris. Harris argues that we can address questions of meaning and morality through science.


I am open to Harris’ claim that we can go beyond the fact/value distinction. Harris argues that we should think about morality in terms of human and animal well-being, seeing human beings as conscious creatures within the moral landscape. Here is a morality that is connected to the human ontology. Again, Marx’s essentialism entailed a critique of those structures and relations which contradicted and inhibited the human ontology in favour of those arrangements which corresponded to and enhanced the human ontology. This begs the question of just what is the human ontology and how it can be conceived and understood. This is where things can get awkward. Harris is a neuroscientist and takes his stand on neuroscience. Marx pointing to history as a process of human self-creation, human beings incarnating their essence within specific, alterable social relations. As a neuroscientist, Harris thinks that science can and ought to determine morality. Determine? What about freedom as human self-determination in the Marxist sense? When Harris writes ‘that some cultures will tend to produce lives that are more worth living than others’ (Harris 2011:191), we enter the danger zone. For Marx, this would entail a demand for universality, that the lives of all humankind should be worth living. If science is serious about shaping values, then it needs to take ethics and politics and history seriously as the creative endeavour of the human species. The danger is that scientists will insist on the primacy of scientific fact here, with neurobiology actively determining human praxis. This is the wrong way round. Creative human praxis builds on the basis of biological fact as potentiality and capacity. That’s why human culture is infinitely varied despite the same species make-up.

So I am more than happy to challenge the fact/value distinction, so long as it takes morality seriously rather than simply reads values off from fact. The facts which enhance or inhibit a good life are discerned and evaluated not merely by biological functioning but by an ethical anthropology. Sam Harris is one of the ‘new atheists’. His positive argument tends to get lost in his tendentious criticism of religion. Against those who criticise scientists of being ‘arrogant’, Harris writes of the ‘humility’ of science. ‘In my experience, arrogance is about as common at a scientific conference as nudity. At any scientific meeting you will find presenter after presenter couching his or her remarks with caveats and apologies… The totality of scientific knowledge now doubles every few years. Given how much there is to know, all scientists live with the constant awareness that whenever they open their mouths in the presence of other scientists, they are guaranteed to be speaking to someone who knows more about a specific topic than they do.’ (Harris 2011:124). 

This is fine, insofar as it applies to scientists in the company of other scientists. The point about scientists ‘being arrogant’ is directed at the way that scientists speak to non-scientists, as though scientific knowledge constitutes the whole of human knowledge. Not so. But read what Harris writes on the previous page.

Reasoning errors aside, we know that people often acquire their beliefs about the world for reasons that are more emotional and social than strictly cognitive. Wishful thinking, self-serving bias, in-group loyalties, and frank self-deception can lead to monstrous departures from the norms of rationality. Most beliefs are evaluated against a background of other beliefs and often in the context of an ideology that a person shares with others. Consequently, people are rarely as open to revising their views as reason would seem to dictate.
On this front, the internet has simultaneously enabled two opposing influences on belief: On the one hand, it has reduced intellectual isolation by making it more difficult for people to remain ignorant of the diversity of opinion on any given subject. But it has also allowed bad ideas to flourish—as anyone with a computer and too much time on his hands can broadcast his point of view and, often enough, find an audience. So while knowledge is increasingly open-source, ignorance is, too. (Harris 2011:123).

This lament is nothing new. Harris is speaking with the outraged voice of eighteenth century materialism. We are back in the world of the Enlightenment, only in more crude, simplified form. Adam Smith writing of the moral sentiments and David Hume writing of sympathy have more insight than this. The emotional and social ties of human beings define what human beings are. Human life will never and can never be defined, still less lived, by cognitive rationality alone. An excellent book to read here is How to Relate Science and Religion by Mikael Stenmark (2004). Here, Stenmark shows that since cognitive resources are limited – the brain can hold only so much information, there is only so much time available – there are eminently rational reasons for human beings to take things on trust and authority and to act out of habit and custom. And Harris himself gives the reasons for this, the sheer extent and complexity of scientific knowledge means that scientists have to address each other in a spirit of humility. ‘Given how much there is to know, all scientists live with the constant awareness that whenever they open their mouths in the presence of other scientists, they are guaranteed to be speaking to someone who knows more about a specific topic than they do.’ (Harris 2011:124). Precisely. As the stock of human knowledge expands, we become more and more aware of how little we know. So scientists, in their own company, are cautious.

That might be good science, but it makes for a bad politics and morality. On this reasoning, scientists know more and more about less and less and end by saying nothing about anything. Human society cannot survive on the basis of this kind of cautious agnosticism, so Harris’ argument that human behaviour fit the norms of a very thinly defined rationality falls. A.N. Whitehead argued that whilst man may not live by bread alone, nor can he live by disinfectants. It’s a sage observation that those indulging in crude eighteenth century rationalism would do well to ponder at length.

Harris condemns ‘wishful thinking, self-serving bias, in-group loyalties, and frank self-deception’ which ‘lead to monstrous departures from the norms of rationality.’ He argues that ‘most beliefs are evaluated against a background of other beliefs and often in the context of an ideology that a person shares with others. Consequently, people are rarely as open to revising their views as reason would seem to dictate.’ The internet ‘has also allowed bad ideas to flourish… So while knowledge is increasingly open-source, ignorance is, too.’ (Harris 2011:123).

So, perhaps, Harris ought to consider the value of tradition, custom, social ties and affective bonds, all those things which comprise a cultural and psychic reality and identity. To simply assert the norms of rationality here, conceived as some abstract pursuit of truth, invites the elimination of much that enables human beings to give meaning and value to human life. Harris’ rationality is so thin and attenuated as to invite a reaction against reason. Reason pushed beyond its limits issues in its opposite. I have written on this in the paper The Irrational Use of Reason. 

Harris’ arguments point to the limits of scientific reason in public life. Harris argues that science should determine values, but his conception of knowledge as scientific makes it clear that science is of limited value in the public world of human beings.

It is also true that the less competent a person is in a given domain, the more he will tend to overestimate his abilities. This often produces an ugly marriage of confidence and ignorance that is very difficult to correct for. Conversely, those who are more knowledgeable about a subject tend to be acutely aware of the greater expertise of others. This creates a rather unlovely asymmetry in public discourse—one that is generally on display whenever scientists debate religious apologists. For instance, when a scientist speaks with appropriate circumspection about controversies in his field, or about the limits of his own understanding, his opponent will often make wildly unjustified assertions about just which religious doctrines can be inserted into the space provided. Thus, one often finds people with no scientific training speaking with apparent certainty about the theological implications of quantum mechanics, cosmology, or molecular biology.

In other words, only experts can speak. Harris has just pointed out that the explosion of scientific knowledge means that even scientists are circumspect in the company of other scientists. Human beings are public animals, social animals, and need to communicate. Harris is here pointing to the limits of science when it comes to shaping values. Unless Harris is proposing something akin to a Platonic Guardian class, the rule of the scientists, then there is a need for judgement in public life, assimilating knowledge as best we can as a matter of public practice and process.
Is it possible to develop a ‘citizen science’ organised around a cognitive praxis which treats human beings as knowledgeable agents? Harris laments the fact that ‘cognitive biases cannot help but influence our public discourse.’ (Harris 2011:124).

There is definitely a case for arguing that Harris underestimates the extent to which society is a learning mechanism and that rationality is the end state of a process. This comes out clearly when he vents his spleen against religion. He makes several tendentious comments on religion and then denies the ‘combativeness’ of which the ‘New Atheists’ are accused. ‘We are merely guilty of assuming that our fellow Homo sapiens possess the requisite intelligence and emotional maturity to respond to rational argument, satire, and ridicule on the subject of religion – just as they respond to these discursive pressures on all other subjects. Of course, we could be wrong. But let’s admit which side in this debate currently views our neighbors as dangerous children and which views them as adults who might prefer not to be completely mistaken about the nature of reality’ (Harris 2011:175). 

Dangerous children? What possible reason could we have for thinking human beings behave as dangerous children? It is scientists who write about killer apes and selfish genes. It’s like the old joke about homo sapiens being a good idea. We have found the missing link between anthropoid apes and homo sapiens – it is us. Harris has given good reasons why ignorance rather than knowledge tends to prevail and why reason as such does not constitute the whole of human social life and does not feed the whole person. 


In which case the question is how can we alter and shape cognitive biases so as to encourage human flourishing? Unfortunately, this is not the question that Harris is answering. He really does mean that science determines values. Not so. Human beings determine values. That science can furnish the knowledge to enable human beings shape values and create a flourishing life for themselves is certainly a promising field to explore. But Harris takes a wrong turn from the first.





If our well-being depends upon the interaction between events in our brains and events in the world, and there are better and worse ways to secure it, then some cultures will tend to produce lives that are more worth living than others; some political persuasions will be more enlightened than others; and some world views will be mistaken in ways that cause needless human misery. Whether or not we ever understand meaning, morality, and values in practice, I have attempted to show that there must be something to know about them in principle. And I am convinced that merely admitting this will transform the way we think about human happiness and the public good. (Harris 2011:191).

Harris’ argument is perfectly consistent with the long tradition of ‘rational’ philosophy which affirms an essentialist materialism. Harris’ concern to close the gap between fact and value through a notion of human well-being and flourishing has its roots in the 'rational' tradition of political philosophy dating back to Aristotle and demonstrating a normative concern with the most appropriate mode of life for human beings. To this extent, I am in broad agreement. Harris is also aware of the extent to which our intuitions concerning happiness are often quite wrong. He is a rationalist who is aware of the extent to which human beings are often ‘very bad judges’ when it comes to how to act to attain happiness. I have no trouble in reading Harris in terms of an essentialist materialism that opposes moral relativism. Again, I am in agreement. My problem is that Harris doesn’t follow up the positive aspect of this project but seems more concerned to undermine religion. On the basis of the fact/value distinction, science deals with the realm of fact, where truth is possible, whilst religion does meaning and morality, where respect for relative positions is essential. Harris is more concerned with asserting the claims of science over religion than he is with actually developing an alternative morality.

Ultimately, Harris does not deliver on his promises. He concludes his book with a call to transform the way we think about ‘human happiness’ and the ‘public good’. Add ‘well-being’ and ‘flourishing’, and we would seem to be in the middle of a modern day recovery of Aristotle. Appearances, however, are deceiving. Harris makes one single solitary reference to Aristotle in The Moral Landscape, and that is buried in the endnotes. Here, he refers to the work of the philosophers William Casebeer and Owen Flanagan (Casebeer, 2003; Flanagan, 2007), who have ‘resurrected Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia, which is generally translated as "flourishing," "fulfillment," or "well-being." While I rely heavily on these English equivalents, I have elected not to pay any attention to Aristotle. While much of what Aristotle wrote in his Nichomachean Ethics is of great interest and convergent with the case I wish to make, some of it isn't. And I'd rather not be beholden to the quirks of the great man's philosophy. Both Casebeer and Flanagan also seem to place greater emphasis on morality as a skill and a form of practical knowledge, arguing that living a good life is more a matter of "knowing how" than of "knowing that." While I think this distinction is often useful, I'm not eager to give up the fight for moral truth just yet. For instance, I believe that the compulsory veiling of women in Afghanistan tends to needlessly immiserate them and will breed a new generation of misogynistic, puritanical men. This is an instance of "knowing that," and it is a truth claim about which I am either right or wrong.

I can agree that the good life involves a commitment to moral truth as ‘knowing that’ and not just a case of ‘knowing how’. The two go together. The problem is that Harris is appropriating Aristotelian terms and employing them to add flavour to a rehashed utilitarianism, with flourishing and well-being in the place of pleasure. It doesn’t convince, for the very many reasons why utilitarianism doesn’t convince. In passing, the extent to which the resurgence of virtue ethics has also been accompanied by an attempt to couch reheated utilitarianism in Aristotelian form can be noted. For instance, in The Environmental Responsibility Reader James Connolly contributes ‘The virtues of ecological citizenship’. Connolly states that ‘in order to use the language of virtue, we are not restricted only to the Aristotelian idiom.’ And, indeed, he isn’t. ‘My account is, to this extent, compatible with at least some versions of utilitarianism and is not dependent on an Aristotelian conception of virtue.’ (The Environmental Responsibility Reader M Reynolds ed 2009). Utilitarians would be better off addressing the many damaging criticisms that have been made of utilitarianism rather than stealing the clothes of a resurgent Aristotelianism. 

But having mentioned Aristotle it is worth pointing out that Aristotle too was a scientist who sought to ground politics and ethics in the biological facts of life. Aristotle defined the human being as a zoon politikon, a political/social animal, needing a politikon bion, a public life, in order to flourish. Zoe refers to life, animal life and is the origin of the word zoology. Bion refers to life and is the origin of the word biology. Aristotle is the foundation of the case for deriving values from facts, connecting science with politics and ethics.

It is worth speculating why the ‘new atheists’ shy away from the Aristotelian tradition. The answer seems obvious. Aristotle has been the most powerful influence on Catholicism since Aquinas and upon Islam since al-Farabi. Same with Judaism and Maimonides. And in addition to religion there is the revolutionary implications of Aristotelian politics, which Marx fully explored (see Meikle 1985). Meikle makes clear the extent to which Marx's communism exhibits the characteristics of an Aristotelian substance. The polis, for Aristotle, was a substance comprising individuals who are themselves substances (Meikle in Carver ed. 1991: 303/9). The notion of flourishing serves as a radical concept which challenges any structures and conditions which inhibit the human ontology. 

In recent years, Marx has been targeted for reasons of his essentialism. In poststructuralist, postmodernist and feminist accounts, the whole notion of ‘essences’, that something is essentially something and possesses a potentiality that implies a certain line of development is anathema. The great mantra has been ‘there is no necessary relation’ between x and y. As Terry Eagleton commented, it must be pure coincidence that merchant bankers tend not to be revolutionary socialists. It has long been time to reinstate essences and essentialist modes of thought as against Humean scepticism. And this is part and parcel of overthrowing the fact/value distinction. 

David Hume's argument that you cannot derive an ‘ought-to-be’ from an ‘is’ was directed against religion and the idea that morality can be deduced from the existence of God. This has since become a philosophical convention which has severed morality from the rest of human knowledge. Hume's is/ought distinction can be challenged. I agree with Dennett:

If "ought" cannot be derived from "is," just what can it be derived from?.. . ethics must be somehow based on an appreciation of human nature—on a sense of what a human being is or might be, and on what a human being might want to have or want to be. If that is naturalism, then naturalism is no fallacy (Dennett, p. 468).

If we look at the history of the fact/value distinction, it does seem to be more a canon of Anglo-American science and philosophy. The Continental and the Eastern tradition is less dualistic when it comes to the knower and the known, subject and object. In Hegel’s philosophy, for instance, the ‘ought-to-be’ is the ‘is’ in the process of becoming. It was Sir Karl Popper who condemned Marx for his ‘moral futurism’, the idea that certain trends and tendencies within material reality count as ‘good’ on account of being inevitable. Popper had a point with respect to determinism and inevitabilism, but, of course, Marx was an essentialist pointing to necessary lines of development, not to inevitability. What mattered for Marx with respect to reality was its material futurity. Marx’s essentialism identified the world as a field of materialist immanence. But the change agent realising immanent potentiality was human praxis guided by moral ends – the end of the realised human society of realised human beings, an eminently Aristotelian conclusion.

With Marx, the ‘naturalism’ of which Dennett speaks is based on essentialism and implies communism.

Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within the entire wealth of previous periods of development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution. (Marx EW EPM 1975).

Marx shows precisely how an ‘ought-to-be’ can be derived from an ‘is’. Here is where naturalism shapes morality and politics. 
Scott Meikle has written well on Marx's essentialism and the way it has been attacked from an atomistic perspective.





Marx’s essentialism entails lines of development which lead to socialism (Meikle 1985). The idea of socialism as the historically necessary society is quite distinct from both 'inevitabilism’ and 'possibilism'. Socialism is therefore rooted in material developments rather than being just one possibility amongst others. That said, lines of development are frustratable (Meikle 1985:57/8). Human beings have to act to actualise necessary lines of development. This is the role of morality and politics in creating conditions for human flourishing. Human beings may fail to act. They may be blocked from taking the necessary action. The realisation of immanent potentialities requires human intervention and action. Politics and ethics have an active role to play. At the level of actualisation, one recovers the importance of politics and morality transformatory forces. Harris calls for a transformation leading to human happiness and the public good in the last line of his book. Unfortunately, as in the case of Richard Dawkins and AC Grayling, rationalism is being used as a phoney radicalism for liberals fighting the old battles of the eighteenth century Enlightenment rather than being allied to a politics and ethics which seeks the true triumph of reason in the battles being fought in the contemporary world. 

That the ‘new atheists’ are so aggressive in challenging religion yet so supine and silent in face of real power with respect to economic and environmental crisis is a paradox worthy of further comment. Major battles are currently being fought all over the world concerning resources, their use and distribution, their control and waste. Who are the radicals of science fighting? God. A chimera. If there really was a God promising hellfire, I wonder if the ‘new atheists’ would be so vociferous in their campaigns? I doubt it. It seems that the old cause of Enlightenment reason against feudal superstition permits a radical posture that is safe as compared to taking a political stand on the truly crucial issues in the modern world. In his Models of Democracy (1987), the political theorist David Held defines a crisis with transformative potential as a crisis which ‘involves challenges to the very core of the political and social order.’ A strong case can be made for claiming that the global economic crisis and the ever looming environmental crisis are crises with transformative potential. The ‘new atheists’ are nowhere to be seen where radicalism matters. Instead, they are involved in a re-run of the old Enlightenment battle, as though that is the most important issue facing the modern world.

Frankly, I’m much more impressed with Marx than with the phoney radicals drawn from the ranks of the well-educated, well-off middle class. As far back as 1843, Marx was arguing for the Feuerbachians to abandon their struggle against religion as a phoney war. Atheism is merely a negative expression of human potentiality, an attack on the wrong target. 

Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975). 
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo. (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975). 

Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true sun. Religion is only the illusory sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself. (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975). 

Religion is the cry from the heart and soul of alienated, atomized human beings who have need of illusions on account of the dehumanising conditions experienced in everyday life. If religious ideas are illusions, then they are illusions, moral ideals even, which express a psychic need. Fulfilling that essential human need requires an end to heartless and soulless conditions, the atomism and instrumentalism of a society which have been overrun by money and exchange value. Marx does not, therefore, waste time attacking religion as illusion. Instead, as a true radical, he goes to the root of the matter, the alienated system of production.

But since the existence of religion is the existence of a defect, the source of this defect must be looked for in the nature of the state itself. We no longer see religion as the basis but simply as a phenomenon of secular narrowness. We therefore explain the religious restriction on the free citizens from the secular restriction they experience. We do not mean to say that they must do away with their religious restriction in order to transcend their secular limitations. We do not turn secular questions into theological questions. We turn theological questions into secular questions. History has been resolved into superstition for long enough. We are now resolving superstition into history. The question of the relationship of political emancipation to religion becomes for us the question of the relationship of political emancipation to human emancipation. (Marx EW OJQ 1975).

The ‘new atheists’ have hit the reverse button and have turned secular questions into theological questions, social questions into religious questions. Fighting the battles of the Enlightenment saves making a stand on the political issues of the day. But, in light of Marx’s argument, it is clear that our great rationalists have reverted to an eighteenth century position. By turning secular questions into theological questions, they avoid the real power structures of the modern world and have therefore resolved history into superstition. Ideology, in Marx’s critical sense of the concept, is a system of ideas which obfuscates reality so as to preserve existing power relations. 

So it is worth wondering what lies behind this ‘new atheism’. It seems to be an obvious example of a meme war, a deliberate attempt on the part of biologists to wipe out religion. What would that achieve? That would not, in itself, create the conditions of true human fulfilment that, for Marx, was the only way of transcending religion. Instead, we would have heartless and soulless conditions without the comforting illusions that speak to and satisfy a psychic need. Marx, of course, wanted a world with heart and soul. The biologists have neither, only the biological imperatives of survival.

There are always good reasons to be sceptical whenever the abolition of the fact/value distinction is proposed. The lack of circumspection on the part of some scientists is remarkable given their extreme agitation whenever religion interferences with science, as with Creationism, to take an obvious example. The proposals too often take the form of a determinism which reduces morality to physical causes. That would be bad enough, if the assertion of biological determinism was limited to the discarding of morality, but such assertions often go much further into the realm of scarcely reasoned nihilisms. In condemning religion for its fantasies, scientific determinists and reductionists engage in the wildest fantasies of all. Cue Richard Dawkins:

The argument of this book is that we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes . . . Like successful Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness ... If you wish ... to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. 

Dawkins The Selfish Gene 1976:2-3

Compare this to Nietzsche:

‘This world is the will to power and nothing beside . . .
Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, subjugation of the strange and the weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of its own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest exploitation.'

We have seen above what this Nietzschean world beyond Judaeo-Christian morality implies. In short, it involves the strong eliminating the weak, the rich preying on the poor, the healthy getting rid of the infirm, the young eliminating the old. Nietzsche knew it and Nietzsche spelt it out clearly. Whether or not the likes of Dawkins, Harris, Blakemore et al can see this, or even want to see this, is doubtful. In The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins declares that even if a statue of the Virgin Mary waved to them, they should not conclude they had witnessed a miracle. (Dawkins 1986: 159.) I get the impression that if the Virgin Mary stripped stark naked and declared ‘Fooled you! I am really Inanna, the Queen of Heaven’, Dawkins still wouldn’t believe it. He would probably argue that all the atoms contained in the statue just happened to move in such a way as to make it appear that a sacred striptease had just been performed. Some people just see what they want to believe rather than believe what they see. But it is still worth pondering the motives at work.


Mary Midgely in The Myths we Live By (2011) puts this pertinent question with respect to the claims made by biologists like Dawkins:

though the tone is sternly reductive, the positive proposals made are certainly not economical. They are lush speculative outgrowths, designed to stimulate the imagination of readers to move in unexpected directions rather than to discipline it. Of course not all reductions carry such surprising cargo, and you may well wonder whether I am justified in saying - as I do want to say - that reduction is never value-neutral, never just aimed at simplicity, that it is always part of some positive propaganda campaign. You may ask: does reduction always aim in some way to debunk or downgrade the more complex thought that it simplifies away in order to exalt something else?

So when Harris as a neuroscientist proposes to dissolve the fact/value distinction, we need to be very, very clear precisely what ‘ought-to-be’ he is proposing on the basis of biological fact. Sam Harris is a strong advocate of atheism. Richard Dawkins has said that Darwin made it possible to be an "intellectually fulfilled atheist." (Dawkins 1986: 6). It is a fine line which separates strong advocacy from plain bigotry. Richard Dawkins has stated in print that anyone who denies evolution is either "ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked—but I'd rather not consider that.)” (Dawkins 1989: 34.) No, but he implies it, helping himself to a religious concept to proselytise for his scientistic faith. Does this apply to those scientists who are legitimately testing the evidence and the argument for evolution? Would Dawkins dare make such a statement with respect to those who deny climate science and the case made for anthropogenic global warming? Dawkins, of course, is more interested in those with religious faith and is therefore concerned to set the debate at extremes. He clearly sees evolution as a winnable battle and is trying to set up a fight with religion on this ground. The Catholic Church, of course, accepted evolution eons ago and in Teilhard de Chardin had a palaeontologist of the highest order, working in the field before Dawkins was even born. So it seems like Dawkins is stoking up a phoney war. Rather than take Dawkins on on the scientific ground of evolution, he should be tested on what values he draws from the science. Dawkins needs to spell out his ethic and how it relates to biology.

Suppressing legitimate intellectual debate is one thing. Dawkins has form here. His abuse of James Lovelock when he first published his Gaia hypothesis is not evidence of a commitment to scientific truth and openness but of blind, unswerving faith. But beyond the intellectual community into the society of everyday life, real flesh and blood human beings, the resort to name-calling and denigration with respect to beliefs just invites conflict and worse. The words of the ‘new atheists’ are not those of true scientists in pursuit of the truth but of true believers who think that they, and they alone, have found the truth, and that everyone else should agree that this is the one and only truth. If evolution is a scientific theory, then it should face the same criticism with respect to evidence and argument that all such theories face. It should be questioned. True, unreasoning and ill-informed criticism coming from value positions that have little or no basis in fact is irritating. As you read the material being spewed out by climate change deniers and you soon get very annoyed. So what do you do? The ignorant, in time, get better informed. Even the stupid learn, or just go along with the consensus as it shifts. But the insane? They go to the psychiatric hospitals, as in Stalinist Russia. The wicked? They go to the stake. There is no great distance at all from calling people ‘wicked’ to adopting coercive measures to end their wickedness. An exaggeration? John Maddox, the editor of Nature, has openly stated that ‘it may not be long before the practice of religion must be regarded as anti-science." (Maddox 1994: 185.) And if that is what they say in public, imagine what they say in private. Very many scientists have no problem with religion and argue that the practice of science and the practice of religion are perfectly compatible. To take a famous case, Robert Winston is a fertility expert of world renown and a practising Jew. Anti-science? We are moving into the realms of intolerance and bigotry, and that never augurs well for the future. Philosopher Daniel Dennett compares religious believers to wild animals who may have to be caged. He also asserts that parents should be prevented from ‘misinforming’ their children about the truth of evolution (Dennett 1995: 515-516.) I’d like to know how Dennett proposes to police this. How does he propose to monitor this? Thought police in the home? Children being intervened with respect to the beliefs of their parents? Once the state is involved in determining and enforcing belief, from where do challenges to a very soon sterile orthodoxy come from? Marx argued for the dissolution of religious illusion by ending heartless, soulless conditions. What the new atheists envisage is the epitome of heartlessness and soullessness. This is not a vision of peace and harmony. It is one thing to engage in polemics – and polemical attacks repel more than persuade – but to promise repression, coercion and violence with respect to those who refuse to accept ‘the truth’ is repugnant. This isn’t so much putting politics on ice as putting it in prison or sending it to the gallows. As we move to consideration of the ‘new atheist’ Sam Harris and his emphasis on some lives being more worthy than others, this point should be kept prominently in mind.

Sam Harris, like Richard Dawkins, is an aggressive critic of religion and consistently targets the connection between morality and religion. He is a neuroscientist and he takes his very strong stand on science. Harris’ justifiable statement that one does not have to believe in God to be moral very quickly becomes a justification for discarding religion. Fine. But if most people believe in the absolute sanctity of human life - that it is always wrong to kill another human being – this can be attributed in no small part to the influence of the great religions. The great religions insist on an objective morality that affirms the moral worth of all human beings. And, to be fair to Sam Harris, he too insists on the notion of moral truth, and attempts to relate it to biology. I am in agreement here. Harris opposes moral relativism. Again, I am in agreement. But as yet the biological foundations of moral truth have yet to advance far enough to envisage it replacing the objective morality established by religion. There are a billion Catholics and a billion Muslims in the world. Add 500 million or more Hindus, and that’s some support for objective morality. The non-religious moral truth being proposed by Harris is possible and is valid, but it is far from being secure or widespread. The danger is that in undermining religion without replacing its objective morality opens the doors to relativism. And this ethical and cultural relativism leaves humanity wide open to any number of different approaches to the question of which lives are worth living. Many natural societies have practised infanticide and euthanasia for the survival of the group as a whole. 

This isn’t Harris’ view, at least, if it is. he doesn’t spell it out. And it isn’t exactly what the philosopher Peter Singer, another strong advocate of the ‘life worth living’ argument, advocates. But it is a view that could prevail in the absence of an absolute ethic with respect to human life.
Singer gives examples of an individual in an irreversible persistent vegetative state, kept alive as a body without meaningful conscious states or any chance of recovery or hope for their future. In this instant, Singer argues, euthanasia or mercy killing may be appropriate. In this state, an individual has no capacity for pleasure or for any preference about how they live. They don't have a strong wish to carry on living, because they are incapable of having wishes at all. By the same reasoning, of course, they don’t have a strong wish to die either. And this makes the whole area contentious. As resources come under increasing pressure, with an ageing and a growing population at a time of economic and environmental crisis, this quality of human life issue will be taken out of the hands of philosophers and scientists and made subject to social and political decision. The finer distinctions will not be respected.

Peter Singer has been accused of affirming a Nazi ethics for arguing for euthanasia in special circumstances. Singer’s parents were themselves Jews who had to flee the Nazis. The Nazis killed thousands of sick people and physically and mentally disabled people on the grounds that their lives were allegedly not worth living. It would, however, be wrong to call the Nazi programme 'mercy killing', since it was meant to eliminate 'useless mouths', people unable to work or who were contaminating the Aryan race. Singer’s view is based on the quality of life and therefore contains a sense of 'mercy' that is not evident in the Nazi view. To many, that seems a very fine distinction which is easily overlooked in practice, particularly when resources come under increasing pressure.
And the same applies to Harris. The ‘life worth living’ argument could be used to justify creating the conditions for an Aristotelian flourishing for all, as with Marx. But it would be dangerously naïve to ignore the way that, within instrumental relations that see individuals as well as human groups as competitors for scarce resources, the notion of a life worth living could reflect not moral principle but social and political expediency. 

Sam Harris denies that he is an optimist, and yet he claims that the moral progress of the species is undeniable. He cites as an example racism in the USA, pointing out the decline of lynching. That racism could take newer forms, the sanitized forms of the penal system and death row, he doesn’t recognize. Black people are more likely to be arrested, convicted and receive longer sentences for the same crimes committed by white people. Arguments for moral progress that are insensitive to the social facts are always cause for suspicion. 
Harris condemns religion for treating human beings like ‘dangerous children’ whereas science addresses them as adult, rational beings. Harris presumes the end state of rationality to be the current state, he presumes the identity that we are still working towards. Human beings are very far from being the wholly rational beings that Harris calls them. Plenty depends on the extent to which Harris’ claims for science to determine values succeeds. The fact that we have been struggling to achieve some such thing since Aristotle connected biology to politics and ethics should give us reason for caution. I am in broad agreement with Harris, so long as he tempers his rationalist fervour with an awareness of the limits of reason. 

Simply reducing politics and ethics to science, reading off values from biological and neurological facts, is not the same thing as exploring the extent to which scientific knowledge can be of value in politics and ethics. Only on this condition is the fact/value distinction overcome rather than simply denied. The suspicion is that Harris has not proven his case. This doesn’t mean that the split between science and morality cannot be overcome. I think it can and should be overcome. I think some such notion is at the heart of the greatest philosophies of human self-knowledge, from Aristotle to Spinoza to Hegel and Marx. But there is a difference between overcoming the distinction of fact and value on the one hand and enlarging the sphere of science to encompass morality on the other hand.


Harris denies that he is aggressively anti-religious, claiming that he and his colleagues are ‘merely guilty of assuming that our fellow Homo sapiens possess the requisite intelligence and emotional maturity to respond to rational argument’ (Harris 2011:175). That works as flattire and not as argument based on experience and reason.
In contrast, Harris considers religion to treat human beings as ‘dangerous children’. Compared to Harris’ question begging optimism with respect to the role of reason in human affairs, religion offers a more sane and sober view of the world and human realities than a meaningless disenchanted rationality denuded of moral ends. Harris is challenging the notion that science cannot shape or influence values but, up to this point, the extension of scientific rationality and the decline of objective morality has produced a moral nihilism. One need only refer back to the first Darwinian revolution and how the case for eugenics and euthanasia was increasingly normalised, until Hitler put Darwinism in practice. Harris takes his stand on Home Sapiens. In Homo Sacer – Sacred Man – G Agamben makes this comment:

There is no reason to doubt that the "humanitarian" considerations that led Hitler and Himmler to elaborate a euthanasia program immediately after their rise to power were in good faith, just as Binding and Hoche, from their own point of view, acted in good faith in proposing the concept of "life unworthy of being lived." Hitler ended it in August 1941 because of growing protest on the part of bishops and relatives. (Agamben 1998).
In the middle of the most murderous war in history, during which the Nazis gassed and murdered millions of human beings, Hitler closed down his euthanasia clinics on account of the continued, consistent criticism from religious authorities giving the clinics a bad name. This religious protest was based on the principle that all life is sacred. Science is now chipping away at that principle. For those brought up with the religious ethic of the sanctity of all human life, the question that some lives are more worth living than others is a demand for universal flourishing. The fate of marxism and socialism should give some indication of the political, socio-economic and psychological obstacles in the way of such an ideal. The danger lies in dissolving the distinction between fact and value and yet falling short of the ideal. We could end up in a moral wasteland. As late as the late sixties poor black women were being subject to enforced sterilization in the USA. Even social democratic Sweden had such programmes. Where was the criticism of the scientists with respect to eugenics and euthanasia? Be careful what you wish for. And be careful of having to choose between facts and values, science and religion. 

Hubris
Lovelock at least has the merit of facing natural necessity with courage.

‘Our contemporary industrial civilization is hopelessly unfitted to survive on an overpopulated and under-resourced planet, deluded by the thought that clever inventions and progress will provide the shoehorn that fits us into our imaginary niche. I think it is better if we accept and understand how poor is the chance of our personal survival, but take hope from the fact that our species is unusually tough, has survived seven major climate catastrophes in the last million years, and is unlikely to go extinct in the coming climate catastrophe.’
Agreed. Human hubris has more than deserved its nemesis and maybe the best thing that human beings can do now, if we really are past the point of no return, is to settle accounts and make their peace with nature within and nature without. The ‘constant battles’ that Brand refers to throughout his book are battles within human nature, between human beings in society and between civilisations and environments. 
It has to be said, however, that Lovelock’s Stoical acceptance impossible to square with his enthusiasm for nuclear energy, geoengineering and lifeboat ethics and politics. Rather than a last throw of the technological dice, wouldn’t it be wiser to establish some more appropriate and balanced first principles on which the survivors could renew civilisation in a more sustainable way? This seems far more sane and sober than Lovelock’s advocacy of nuclear energy, with all the problems that that bequeaths future generations.

Werner Herzog tells the tale of when he was on a plane that had to make an emergency landing. ‘We were ordered to crouch down with our faces on our knees and hold our legs,’ says Herzog, ‘and I refused to do it.’ The co-pilot came out from the cabin and ordered him to do as he was told. Herzog told him, 'If we perish I want to see what's coming at me, and if we survive, I want to see it as well.’ Herzog refused to assume what he called an ‘undignified position.' Whilst Herzog received a life ban from the airline, the company went bust two years later.

The morale of the tale is that we should be prepared to face anything that's thrown at us, particularly if we have asked for it. You face the music with dignity, not with panic and fear. ‘Everyone has come close, sometimes very close’, Herzog continues. ‘It has no significance on how I conduct my life. I'm simply not afraid. It's not in my dictionary of behaviour.’

Asked about death, Herzog replies: ‘Frankly speaking, I couldn't care less. And it doesn't make me nervous.’ He is pessimistic about the future of humanity: ‘when you look at human life on this planet, we are not sustainable. Trilobites died out, dinosaurs died out. Life on our planet has been a constant series of cataclysmic events, and we are more suitable for extinction than a trilobite or a reptile. So we will vanish. There's no doubt in my heart.’
When asked about helping to save the world, Herzog replies that ‘saving the world is a very suspicious concept. I'm as responsible as it gets in my situation. I drive my car less than 10% of what I used to drive 20 years ago. I'm not into consumerism. But when it comes to the end of the human race, there are certain suspects. Microbes can come and wipe us out. It can happen fast. Avian virus or mad cow disease, you name it. Microbes are really after us. Or a cataclysmic volcanic eruption which would darken the skies for 10 years - that's gonna be real trouble. Or a meteorite hitting us, or something man-made. I don't believe we'll see a nuclear holocaust but there are quite a few scenarios out there.’

Herzog is talking about the breakdown of society. ‘You mean anarchy and cannibalism? Yes but there would be survivors. Maybe 10% would survive, enough to replenish the species. I'm talking about total extinction. We are not sustainable.’ (Werner Herzog, The Guardian Guide, Saturday 14 April 2012).

I refer to Werner Herzog’s views at length for his brutal honesty. He is prepared to look reality stark in the face and take whatever is coming. When asked about death, he states matter of factly that ‘it’s of no significance’. What we see here is an acceptance of the fact we live within a blind, indifferent nature. But that understanding of nature is one-sided in that it pertains only to dead physical matter, causal processes, hard facts. Of course, such nature is indifferent. What makes the difference is the appreciation of interrelationships, between each other and between ourselves and other life forms within nature’s web. Surely, it would be some such notion that would ensure that the sustainability of the human species. The human race needs to change and needs to fit planetary boundaries. 

The implication is that sustainability is an impossible task for an innately stupid and greedy species. In The Guardian Weekend of 19/05/2012 quotes the singer and civil rights campaigner Harry Belafonte stating that his greatest fear is ‘that humans are in fact the least of all the species, and in our pursuits we will wind up destroying all life.’ 

Whilst Lynas titles his book The God Species, the opening chapter defines human beings as killer apes. There is plenty of evidence that human beings constitute anything but the God Species. Ideally, human beings may have the potential to live wisely on the planet and thereby live life to the full extent of their manifold capacities. We are far short of that ideal. 
At present, the human race does not look sustainable. Human beings need to change themselves in order to live within planetary boundaries. We either fit Gaia or face the music. That’s arguable, but some such choice is implicit in Lovelock. Lynas’ book contains a whole chapter on the killer ape thesis and yet does not show how human beings change themselves through history. Brand asserts that human nature doesn’t change much, only science. Which begs the question, what is the point of saving civilisation if it doesn’t entail any change, let alone an advance, in human behaviour? Survival? For what? The unexamined life is not worth living. Existence as such is not a purpose. The purpose of life is not just to live but to live well. Surely, if the arguments of Brand et al have any value then they require a change in human behaviour. Without that, then Herzog’s point that ‘we are not sustainable’ applies. My point is that whereas Herzog faces the prospect of our demise dispassionately, with dignity, our eminently rational scientists and technologists and engineers evince nothing less than fear and panic. Advocating no change in our unsustainable behaviour, they throw all our technological toys at a problem of our own making. They are afraid. Fear stamps all their recommendations. They have no faith in the potential of human beings to change their behaviour and change their way of life. Instead, science and technology will save us. They gamble on technical power. It’s an ‘undignified position.' If we are to perish, we should have the nerve to see what's coming at us, if we survive, we should want to see it as well. The technological gamble is a plain evasion, a simple lack of moral courage, a denial of death which comes at the end of a machine culture which has ever been a denial of life. 

At its simplest, the crucial point at issue refers to the imbalance in the distribution of technological, rational and moral capacities in human society. This is not a new problem at all but the defining characteristic of capitalist modernity. It pertains to the Weberian pathos of means and ends, the inversion of fact and value, the enlargement of means to the status of ends, the loss of meaning. One thing is certain, to identify human power with its technological capacities is not learning to live as gods but is to commit the classic Faustian mistake of modernity. Been there, done it, didn’t work, made things worse, brought us to this. Einstein was entirely correct: "The significant problems we face cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them." In this respect, we can condemn the planetary engineers for their crass scientism, their crude materialism and for their superstitious belief in progress.

Goethe has Faust and Mephisto give their minds and their magic to the Emperor, in return for rights to unlimited development of the land, including licence to exploit the workers they need and displace the indigenous people they don’t need. This is to exchange a technological revolution under existing political authority for political revolution as such. "Goethe could not seek the path of democratic revolution," Lukacs writes. Goethe’s Faustian political bargain does not seek a genuine alternative future, only "another way" to a progress that leaves the world unchanged: "Unrestricted and grandiose development of productive forces will render political revolution superfluous. (Lukacs 1969: 157.) Thus Faust and Mephisto help the Emperor prevail, science and technology are put in the service of political power, and Faust gets a share into economic development. 

To repeat, none of these books address human beings as creative, thinking, moral agents of change, none of these books take political, cultural and social transformation seriously. On the contrary, creative agency is identified with machines, technological gadgets and gizmos. The emphasis remains firmly on the technological control and mastery and manipulation of nature, the bending of nature to technological will. There is no recognition of limits. The myopia is remarkable and frankly alarming. All three authors recognise the scale of the looming ecological disaster, yet it strikes none of them that it is the irrational faith in science and technology to encroach upon nature without limit that has brought us to the abyss. Remarkably, even when ecological crisis finally forces us to confront limits, we get assertions of unlimited scientific and technological power at its most extreme. The technological fixers, it becomes apparent, are really gamblers. They point to necessity as an imperative and state in dogmatic terms that we have no choice but to gamble. For all of the talk of science and reason trumping romanticism, the technological fixers are not reasoning at all. They are gambling. They are not offering reasons for action based on the pull of feasible, beneficial outcomes but rationalisations based on the push of necessity. After the big talk of the book titles, what is offered is a profound let-down – a species that merits the title ‘the God Species’ does not play dice with Gaia. It seems that these religious terms are a mere cover for the same old Faustian manipulation of nature, mere form without content. 

Nuclear scientists, molecular biologists/genetic engineers and the US government are gambling not only with our present lives and with those of the coming generations but also with our souls and our bodies of rebirth through our Mother the Earth for all eternity. (Sjoo 1992 ch 2)

Instead of profound thought, scientists offer words as mere metaphors for making science simple for the uninitiated and ignorant. Here is scientist Robin Dunbar in The Trouble with Science justifying the metaphorical approach: ‘Part of the writer's problem is that an article written at too technical a level discourages readers who cannot understand what is being said.’ Richard Dawkins's description of the gene as ‘selfish’ is a classic example of scientists using metaphor to make a complex point simple enough for the non-expert to understand. The term selfish is meant to be understood metaphorically and not literally. ‘A literal interpretation of any of these terms would create nonsense and, indeed, would often contradict the very point being made’ argues Dunbar. ‘Lacking a suitable language from everyday experience, physicists and biologists have been forced to use everyday language (it is after all the only one we have), but they use it in a metaphorical sense, often signalled by a deliberate punning element.’
Or, as Johnny Rotten shouted to the audience at the end of the show at the last Sex Pistols reunion, ‘ever feel like you’ve been had?’ The fact that scientists can only be comprehensible by ‘anthropomorphising’ their terms and theories may be the biggest joke of all. The life that mechanistic and materialistic scientific theories deny has to be implied metaphorically in order for the work of scientists to have any meaning at all. If there’s no mind then it doesn’t matter. The old puns are the best. Dunbar’s argument makes it clear why science can never rule the world. It can explain, it can describe, it can inform. But its counter-intuitive approach to knowledge means that it will always be at some remove from human experience. That’s what give it its value as science. But the knowledge needs to be assimilated within human experience to be comprehensible, not imposed upon it. A world governed by science would be incomprehensible, alien, all objective structures lacking meaning.

These books make it clear that what we need most of all is a new vision of the future. Yet Brand explicitly repudiates ideas, theories, ethics. He advocates pragmatism as ‘a practical way of thinking concerned with results rather than with theories and principles.’ Rather than moving from moving from one ideology to another; ‘the shift is to discard ideology entirely.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). That lack of vision seldom brings about a happy conclusion.

There are people who ask questions. To get a pertinent answer, argued Jacob Bronowski, it is necessary to ask impertinent questions. The important thing, Einstein said, was to keep questioning. Then there are those people who don’t ask questions. These are Keynes’ ‘practical men’ who, as they busy themselves in solving problems, are slaves of some ‘defunct’ thinker. The Christian socialist RH Tawney was scathing in his criticism of ‘practical men’ who cared nothing for theory, and so were unable to see the world beyond the end of their own noses. 
‘Such a study, to be of value, must start by abandoning the conventional assumptions, popularized by economic textbooks and accepted as self-evident by practical men ….’  (Tawney 1982 ch 9). 

It  is the business of ‘theory’ to examine and innovate, to generate new ideas and bring them to the notice of the ‘practical men’, thus challenging established methods, subverting complacent conservatism and keeping the world fresh and vital through criticism and suggestion.
Such questioning disturbs the ‘practical men’ for whom politics is merely administration and engineering, inputs and outputs, causes and effects. Engels’ optimistic view was that socialism could reduced the state to being merely ‘the administration of things’. As though such a state could resist expanding its scope by reclassifying human beings as ‘things’. The Nazi Adolf Eichmann was a capable administrator. Hard working and diligent, he was a man who got things done. From 1942 Eichmann was in charge of transporting Jewish people, men, women and children, to concentration camps in Poland, including Auschwitz. I make the point that these were human beings. In the practical approach to problem solving, Jewish people were merely ‘things’ to be administered. Eichmann had a key role in Hitler's 'Final Solution, the plan to kill all Jews living in land occupied by the German forces. Eichmann, as a practical man, did not waste his time with theory. The Final Solution was not his idea. As a practical man, he let others determine the ends and then got down to business to ensure the most efficient means for achieving the ends he was given. Eichmann was heavily involved in organizing the railway system that transported Jewish people to the concentration camps. He got things done in a most efficient way. 
The world would be a better place if our practical men displayed more respect for theory, worked from a moral position and were prepared to question the goals which are given to them. Eichmann was a man who lacked theory, lacked values. Eichmann stands as a warning as to what can happen when practical men who do not question merely execute the tasks given to them. Whilst Eichmann did his paperwork efficiently in his office, millions were sent to their deaths. To Eichmann, the Final Solution was a practical problem that needed to be resolved in the most efficient manner possible. Whilst Eichmann ensured that the job was done, people died, from typhoid or starvation, from overwork, from gas. 
For Stewart Brand, engineers see the environmental problem neither as a romantic tragedy nor as a scientific puzzle ‘but simply as something to fix.’ ‘Romantics love problems’, he asserts, wheras, engineers solve problems.’ Brand defines the engineering approach: ‘Instead of yelling "Stop!" engineers figure out what the problem is, and then make it go away. They don't have to argue about what is wrong; they show what is right.’ Mark Lynas agrees with this line, asserting wildly that ‘pragmatism beats purism. Every time.’ (Lynas ch 8 2011). Every time? History cannot be Lynas’ strong point. 
In Nazi Germany, problems were solved. Practical men like Eichmann ensured that ‘the trains ran on time’. Except that these trains were cattle trucks full of human beings, on a long and traumatic journey to extermination, often without food or water, in extreme weather, with many dying on the way. The details of the gas chambers retain their capacity to shock, despite their familiarity. But perhaps the most shocking thing of all is what Hannah Arendt called the ‘banality of evil’. 

It would be more reassuring to conclude that Eichmann, like anyone who played a role in the Holocaust, was simply evil. Eichmann was a practical man who got the job done. His job was to find efficient ways to send people to their death. Eichmann was not one of the architects of the Final Solution. He was innocent of theory, morality, ends in this respect. He didn’t question the ends which were external to him. He didn’t question the assumptions that lay behind the problem he was given to solve. 
To Hannah Arendt, Eichmann was an ordinary, average man whose failure to think and to question led to disaster, destruction and death. 
After Eichmann, practical men who choose not to think can no longer claim not to be responsible for the consequences which follow their concern to ‘get the job done’. Eichmann is proof that an unthinking man can be as dangerous as an evil man. Evil men are few and far between. It should be easy to identify the likes of Hitler and detect his evil purpose. Unthinking men who have transferred their moral responsibility to rules, orders and systems are far more common, less easy to identify with the consequences of their action and incredibly dangerous in their banality. Many think that Arendt overstated this banality, the idea that practical men like Eichmann simply looked upon Hitler's Final Solution was a career opportunity for them. Critics are right to insist on personal moral responsibility. But there is something all the more chilling about Arendt’s claim that Eichmann was sincere in claiming to be doing his duty. Practical men are not concerned with theory, only with getting the job done. Eichmann didn't display the strong hatred of Jews which characterised Nazism. He had simply accepted the official line and failed to question existing political and social arrangements. Eichmann had obeyed orders. He had broken no laws and no rules, never killed anybody directly, simply acted reasonably according to the job he had been given. By taking commands, he lacked responsibility for the consequences of his practical work. He didn’t question because it was not his job to question, just to do.
Eichmann had the blood of millions on his hands, and yet told the court the reason he couldn't have become a doctor was because he was afraid of the sight of blood. Hence the banality of evil. Eichmann was an ordinary person who got on with his job, a product of a system that deterred people from thinking and questioning. Many dislike Arendt’s argument, thinking that it lets Eichmann off the hook, taking him at his work to have been simply following orders and doing his job. Maybe Eichmann was simply hiding behind role as functionary as an attempt to escape responsibility. But Arendt’s argument concerning 'the banality of evil' makes a real point concerning the everyday irresponsibility of a bureaucratic, instrumentalised order. Max Weber characterised capitalism’s anonymity as a society that functions ‘without regard for persons’. That’s a system with a dangerous level of irresponsibility built into its very institutional and psychic fabric. 
And that is what is so dangerous about the focus on practical problem solving without regard for theory, morality, ideas, ends. Like many doing their jobs within a system that proceeds ‘without regard for persons’, Eichmann lacked the courage, the intellect and the imagination to think critically, to question the ends he was given, to evaluate and judge, to choose. It all comes down to moral choice as the essential quality that defines a human being as human. Eichmann simply did his job and sought the most efficient means to given ends. 
Evil men are rare and quite easy to spot. Practical men are common and also quite easy to spot. What is much more difficult to see is the disaster, destruction and death that can follow as a result of a failure to question, think and choose. Looking at Hitler’s Final Solution, there is a moral responsibility charged to all involved to ask, if that’s the solution, what on earth is the problem. By failing to question the problem he was handed, Eichmann participated in genocide. From the perspective of the practical man, however, Eichmann was merely setting train timetables. As is often said, the trains ran on time in Nazi Germany. The engineers got things done, with no need for theory and morality. As if that’s a good thing in itself. Visionless pragmatism might not, in itself, necessarily lead to disaster, destruction and death. But it can do nothing to stop evil either. In its lack of courage, intellect and imagination, visionless pragmatism creates a climate of irresponsibility that invites the banality of evil. The banality of evil neither excuses nor justifies evil, it explains it; and in explaining evil, it makes us all conscious of our moral responsibility, ensuring that we think critically, question and take responsibility for all that we do.
The Bible says, "Where there is no vision, the people perish." Today, confronted by so many problems of a seemingly insoluble nature, many find it impossible to envision a better future, much less the kind of solutions that might bring this future within reach. Technological fixes are just more of the same. Technology cannot offer this vision and people no longer have faith in technological solutions. A new vision is required, one that involves people and inspires people, gives them hope. A gamble is not the same thing as a vision and does not inspire hope. The need to gamble only reinforces the impression that the whole situation is hopeless.

The critical issue—for individuals, organizations, and governments alike—is knowing where we want to be and how we can start of in its direction. Technological fixes change nothing and take us nowhere. They are concerned with keeping the same show on the road. It leaves the forces and drivers generating the problems unchanged. We need a real alternative, one that inspires people to move to another way of organising existence. The importance of the imaginary, cultural vision, lies in the way that it becomes an object of our willing, shaping our expectations and driving a transformational change. The important point is that in this alternative vision it is human beings who are the change-agents bringing about the future society, not their technologies. It is an actively democratic and democratising process. A shared vision acts as a force of innovation, inspiration and orientation, and the real function of designers in this process lies in imagining some situation or condition that does not yet exist but which is described in such a way that people conceive it as comprehensible, feasible and desirable, a vision of a possible alternative future that is so easily within their grasp that people can make it the real object of their willing. 

The economic system is in a process of collapse, corrupt, crime ridden, kept afloat by state funding; escalating consumption and profit hunger continue to despoil the planet and deplete resources. The system cannot be sustained and there seems little point to waste precious resources on trying to save it, resources that could be better used on delivering the alternative. The infuriating thing is that the tools to create a healthier society organised around sustainable living already exist — we just need to devise the social and institutional practices that enable people to use them in their everyday lifeworld. Frankly, that has to be better than gambling on technology.

The strangest paradox of the twentieth century is that as the technological and institutional tools and resources to build the good society became available, people seemed to lose the will to bring it about. Formerly, the will to create the good society was ever present but lacked material capacity. Now we have that material futurity, the will has weakened. It needs to be emphasised, however, that for all of the growing pressures and problems listed by eco-alarmists, for the first time in history human beings have the technological, institutional and financial resources to eradicate poverty and hunger, to invest in education, health, family planning, and to create sustainable urban and rural infrastructures the world over. In an economically and politically integrated world, the resources exist to allow us to make a substantial investment in a sustainable future for all those living on the planet. It is only the political that is lacking. Without the appropriate social and ethical matrix and political framework, technology will continue to misfire. And the bigger the problems, the bigger the ambitions, and the bigger the disasters.

We need a vision of the sustainable society for the twenty-first century, a society that is in synchronicity with the earth and its natural support systems, not a society whose technology is out of control and demanding too much of the planet. The fossil fuel-based, automobile-centred, throwaway economy that developed in modern capitalist societies is not a sustainable system — neither for the countries that shaped it nor for those that are bent on emulating them. In fine, the task is to start building a new economy, one powered with carbon-free sources of energy—wind, solar, and geothermal—one that reuses and recycles resources and has a diversified transport system. Rather than relying on technological gambles, we need to engage in politics so as to alter the trajectory of modern society and put ourselves on the path of sustainable progress. This requires a massive mobilization but it is this organisation and involvement that is the best hope of meeting the climate challenge in such a way as to preserve the contours of a civilised society. The various goals of this political programme — stabilizing climate, stabilizing population, eradicating poverty and famine, restoring the economy's natural support systems — are mutually dependent, which means that it is only possible to deliver in one area by acting at the same time in all other areas. It is only possible to attain any one of these goals by at the same time achieving the others. The real solution to the environmental crisis lies in shifting the global economy off the decline-and-collapse trajectory. As tough a task as this is, it is based on sound reasoning, available resources, popular will and positive outcomes. It is, in other words, a genuine alternative to a crisis ridden order, respecting democratic control and the moral dignity of each and all. The same cannot be said for the gambles offered by technological fixers. 
Of course, it all depends upon one’s estimation of possibilities and probabilities. Underlying the scenarios of the technological fixers is a deep pessimism. They clearly do not believe that a political programme offering substantive long term change is likely. They lack a sense of an alternative future, a sense of people being change agents capable of creating a future society that is in substantial respects different to the present society. The future is no more than the present enlarged. History has been abolished.

Such pessimism is both unwarranted and unworthy. There are better options. Further, there is something morally questionable about a generation that has done most to bring about environmental catastrophe being so predisposed towards playing fast and loose with the lives and livelihoods of future generations. Make no mistake, there are real costs and real consequences attendant to any gamble. Somebody will have to pay the costs and face the consequences at some time. Why not us? Why our children? It is easy to gamble with someone else’s future prospects and lives.

It is to be regretted that the obvious conceptual and practical connections between the integrated systems of society and their ecological parallels in nature have not been exploited fully to generate a coherent and cogent eco-praxis and eco-pragmatism, the exercise of technical and moral capacities in an ecologically benevolent way. This points to the need for developing a visionary eco-technology. By incorporating ideas from both scientific and political ecology, technicians and engineers expand the spaces within which to develop an imagery that echoes the mutable and evolutionary changes found in nature along with the flexible and creative application of knowledge through human learning and communication. 

The law of integrated systems is the first principle of ecology. This entails a concept of interactive cooperation and proceeds from the way that nature actually functions. The law sees the interrelation of the parts within the whole and is the antithesis of individualist and isolationist behaviour. 

In practice, this implies the need to situate activism within a broader movement. There is a need to transcend the immediacy of a particular campaign or the concern with a particular belief and keep the larger ecological picture in view. The typical campaign or protest serves a valuable purpose but is not itself going to achieve the ecological society. That is a matter of institution building. Movements which remain at the level of grassroots protests can contest power but they cannot restructure power and embed power 





If a civilisation stands on the brink of disaster, it also stands at the edge of our understanding, evading our ability to predict and control. Any suggestion otherwise is mere rational pretence. It is a technological bluff which now needs to be called lest we plunge further.

What does this mean for humankind? The Gaia hypothesis of James Lovelock is most valuable not as science but as a myth that inspires action. Reading Lovelock’s call for the suspension of democratic government alongside his enthusiasm for nuclear power and other such authoritarian technics, it becomes clear that Gaia, considered as a finished and scientifically defined model could function as a dogma in the hands of technocrats. And that is why I prefer to refer to ‘Gaea’, denoting the world as a living organism.
The biologist Lewis Thomas writes in scathing terms of those who we could describe as planetary technocrats:

Our deepest folly is the notion that we are in charge of the place, that we own it and can somehow run it. We are beginning to treat the earth as a sort of domesticated household pet, living in an environment invented by us, part kitchen garden, part park, part zoo. It is an idea we must rid ourselves of soon, for it is not so. It is the other way around. We are not separate beings. We are a living part of the earth's life, owned and operated by the earth, probably specialized for functions on its behalf that we have not yet glimpsed. 

The deep wisdom of the Gaean vision thus delivers a simple message. But Gaia as a scientific theory is something else entirely. Lovelock recognises that his sense of Gaia as a living organism is more a hunch and an instinct than a science. In scientific terms, Gaia is a self-regulating machine, with laws of its own. Once more, an elite lays claim to esoteric knowledge of inexorable and unalterable ‘laws of nature’, to which the masses are subordinate. This is an epistemology of rule and domination, not a genuinely holistic and egalitarian ethos. Knowledge is power. It is no step at all from the view that the biosphere is an exactly tuned machine to the claim on the part of some that they know exactly how this machine works. This scientific elite not only claim that it is perfectly safe to tinker with the machine, but that they have the technology to improve its operation. And this elite will claim to rule in all of our interests. This elite will claim that they can be trusted to safeguard our interests. With new, safe, even more powerful technology, all problems of population and pollution disappear, leaving us feel free to produce, consume, build, breed, and pollute to our hearts' desire. 
The greatest value of the Gaea hypothesis is not that we are all powerful in this crude technological sense but that we are dependent on a much larger entity, indeed, interdependent with all manner of animate and inanimate life. It is remarkable how much power is claimed for technology on the basis of a knowledge which underscores just how little we know. We know that Gaea works and has worked for a very long time. Gaea is a vast research project some billions of years in the making. We know it works, we know very little about how it works. And yet, with precious little knowledge, we claim the right to intervene.

We need to respond to the threat of climate change and global warming on the basis of the best knowledge at our command. But the response needs to be flexible rather than dogmatic, building in a reflexivity so that when our knowledge changes with our interventions and actions, we modify our response in an appropriate manner. To use technology simply to prolong the ecologically wasteful and destructive practices of the existing system is to remain in denial of the inevitable. We need to see crisis as opportunity and transform our industrial and transportation systems, change our consumption patterns and diversify our energy sources. Whilst stabilizing global warming is the most difficult problem that the human race has ever faced, the solutions are already available. There is no need to indulge the fantasies of the technicians and engineers and invoke the magic powers of science and technology, a bogus hocus pocus in which we draw a pentagram on the floor and summon up the nuclear and genetic gods. The problems may well be difficult, but their solutions are not abstruse or unnatural, and, if undertaken with foresight, may well lead to a healthy and sane society.

That is what is so galling about those who so unthinkingly advocate the technological fix. It betrays a loss of nerve, a lack of imagination and a self-defeating lack of faith in human beings and the power of human agency. If human beings are so irrevocably stupid and greedy, then even if – and that’s a big if – the technological fixes do work, the same problems caused by greed and stupidity will not be long in returning on an ever greater scale. At the very best, the technological fix merely delays the inevitable.
A more optimistic view would hold that humankind, having created a problem, has the mental and moral capacity and courage to transform itself and change its mentalities and modalities so as to resolve the problem for the greater good.
The technological fixers no doubt see themselves as optimists. They are not; they are the biggest pessimists of all. They despair of any solutions to the environmental crisis that involves changes in behaviour, human action, alternative lifestyles. They assume that human beings as they are express an eternal human nature. The position of the technological fixers expresses an illogic that betrays its origins in a society that has so inverted means and ends that it is congenitally incapable of getting its priorities in order. They are not so much technological fixers as technological fetishizers. And the position is utterly illogical, self-contradictory. Human beings cannot save themselves by a change of morals and cultures, but the technology created by human beings can. Technology is an expression of the human character, and is as good or bad, creative or destructive as we are. Mentalities and modalities change together and it is human agency which is the crucial change agent.

The notion that, through our technology, we have become gods comes with the moral imperative that humankind should face up to its responsibility to manage the planet. For the fixers/fetishizers, this means intervening in and altering the planet’s life-support systems. Those who appreciate how poor our understanding of these systems really is are far more cautious. There is a clear division here between earth-conquest and earth-care.
Much depends on how we define optimism and pessimism. Pessimism in all its guises can be rejected. Fred Pearce is correct to argue that ‘there is little to support the view of pessimists that somehow we are draining the resources of our planet in such a way that we are doomed. Moreover the technologies that could drag us back from the abyss are well known, if not yet fully developed. And the cash is there, too, though largely still in military coffers. So is the ingenuity. About half of all the scientists in the world work for the military. If all this creative energy and money were spent on helping to develop the world there would be plenty of resources to go round.’ (Pearce 1989: 166). 
The great engineering and technical projects proposed by the fixers/fetishizers are not required. What is required is a change of existing priorities and directions, the appropriate use of existing democratic technics, a scaling back of energy demands, a reallocation of monetary resources through a new conception of environmental security. Any who doubts Pearce’s claim that the money is there should just look again at the global arms budget of some $1700 trillion. The scientist Carl Sagan worked out that the Cold War had cost some $10 trillion. Noel Brown takes up the story: 'I asked Carl what can you buy with $10 trillion? He said everything. Every boat, every factory, every farm, everything.' A new concept of security needs to be developed to change these priorities. Brown identifies the 'ecological security' of the planet as a more potent threat to human survival than any threat to the security of nations. For Brown the Cold War showed that 'society is willing to make long-term investment of a significant magnitude in what it considers to be essential for its security. We need the same kind of investment now to ensure our survival on this planet. Let us say that we are engaged in a Cold War on behalf of the Earth and we need to make that kind of investment. Perhaps we will do it if we can see with the kind of immediacy and gravity that the other Cold War projected. Maybe the new slogan will be not "Rather dead than red" but "Rather green than dead."'

That’s the challenge which the technological fixers/fetishizers completely duck. Indeed, the ease with which social and political problems are turned into engineering problems with engineering solutions betrays a political naivety, or worse, which invites a global technocracy claiming to manage Gaea, but in truth managing the global population as the new dronehood of ‘the Machine’.

The likes of Brand and Lynas are spokespersons for the planetary technocrats positively bursting with testosterone as the prospect of the adventures and conquests that lie ahead. But if we view the ecological crisis as merely an opportunity to demonstrate the power of our technics, then we are certain to make yet another mess of things. The optimism of the fixers/fetishizers with respect to technology betrays a deep pessimism with respect to human nature. Optimism with respect to technology ought to have been shattered by global warming, the price to be paid for the ‘progress’ of industrialisation, but instead the claims made for science and technology have been inflated even further. It seems that nothing less than complete collapse will suffice to take the human race down a peg. At various points, James Lovelock seems to relish the prospect of Gaea claiming her revenge. But there really is no need at all for humankind to be ground under the heel of a cruel, outraged, violated nature.

It is time to completely re-think not only our relations to the planet but to our own creations, our social arrangements, political institutions, technics. The total control envisaged by the technological fixers/fetishizers is a dystopian vision of a world rationally managed, a bureaucratisation so thorough that not even Max Weber in his most pessimistic moods could have conjured it from the darkest recess of his mind. The chapter titles in Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline speak volumes: ‘City Planet’, ‘New Nukes’, ‘Gene Dreams’, ‘It’s all Gardening’, ‘Planet Craft’. This is planetary management, not a culture, a way of life. Such a ‘vision’ sees the Earth as a formal ‘garden city’, a neat and tidy spaceship or, more likely, lifeboat, for some but not for all. Weber wrote of disenchantment and Marx wrote of the holy being profaned. The idea of Gaea as a mechanical system governed by an elite of "planetary engineer-managers” is certainly impious and idolatrous. Most of all, however, it is simply tiresome, indulging an ancient fantasy from the infancy of humankind. And I am certain that its origins lie in a male envy of the life giving powers of women. Whereas women attain immortality through giving birth to the next generation, men seek immortality through their machines, subjugating nature in the process. The figure of thanatos, the death instinct, stalks the modern mechanical world, suppressing eros, the life instinct at every turn. If there is no going back to the primordial unity of Eden, there is at the same time no future in the fetishistic fantasies of the technicians and engineers, who, through their technology, seem to want to become not only the fathers of a new planet, but the fathers of all life.

If the Gaea hypothesis has any enduring value, it lies not in the scientific knowledge of a self-regulating system but in the sheer complexity that will always elude the total control of human experts. The ‘men as gods’ fantasy of absolute power is not only profane and dull, it is fatuous. It is the oldest delusion and human beings ought to have grown beyond that stage. A greater Gaean wisdom tells us that whilst human beings can never completely subjugate nature, nature can certainly completely abandon the human species.

“No wonder the Planet Managers are fond of satellite imagery. They are sons of the sky god. They know that seeing is controlling. The international space station is the ultimate Tower—or, rather, it is the first Tower, finished after a delay of five thousand years and major cost overruns. When Russian, American, Japanese, and German astronauts chat merrily as they take in the view, the project of Babel will be realized at last.”

There is great irony in this. God had worried that should man ever reach the heavens and look down, he would assuredly come to see himself as a sky god, and come to re-arrange the pieces of creation as if in charge of the great evolutionary game. Well, certain men have been doing these things for a long time, without waiting for the conquest of space. And the fixers/fetishizers cannot wait to take complete control of Gaea. However, whilst some get excited at the prospect of becoming gods, others have seen the image of Earth from space and re-discovered a long suppressed empathy for the ancient Goddess, Mother Nature. Far from separating us from nature, the space image of Gaea has reminded us of the oneness and interconnection of all things. For millennia, patriarchal civilisation has violated Nature but now, when some salivate at the prospect of becoming gods, others are seeing our dependence on the ancient Goddess.

All this fevered activity is doomed to failure. Every attempt to impose order with these new technologies will only accelerate the crisis, reinforcing the very high energy usage bringing about eco-catastrophe. The ‘solutions’ are just so self-defeating. In manipulating genes to produce food, create new forms of renewable energy, cure disease or raise IQ, the evolutionary wisdom acquired through billions of years will be impaired and even destroyed. Centralising, authoritarian technics like nuclear power will simply entrench and expand a socially iniquitous and environmentally destructive economic system. Even renewable energy infrastructures will simply supply this system with an ecologically efficient energy. Rising social inequality and injustice will be accompanied by high-energy control and surveillance technologies to deal with crime, political protest and social conflict, further dissipating precious resources from society whilst issuing in new forms of repression and antisocial behaviour. The planetary engineer-managers will not succeed in their mad, megalomaniacal quest for divinity, but they may well succeed in taking all of humanity down with them. Like Klaus Kinski, in the title role of Aguirre, the Wrath of God, a mad conquistador on his quest for gold down the Amazon, adrift on a raft, leading his men to certain death in pursuit of god-like power.

The Age of Ecology
Many contemporary technologists and engineers would not be considered legitimate examples of ‘Greens’ within the strict definition of environmental technology today. This is clearly the company that Brand keeps. This does not mean that there is an irrevocable division between technique on the one hand and value commitments on the other. Bridging that divide is the key to sound eco-praxis. It needs to be emphasised that little if anything in the built environment that homes the human race (obvious exceptions being the habitat built by the remaining aboriginal cultures) can be described as ‘truly green’ in the sense of being entirely natural. It is not a case of being for or against technology but of what kind of technology. Human beings live in technologically created and dependent societies, meaning that the question of survival is both technical and natural – both plugged into the same sources of power. 
In the larger picture, however, environmental technology in itself is little more than sticking plaster treatment where major surgery is required. Certainly, the ‘every little bit counts’ aphorism counts in sustaining a viable eco-pragmatism. Changing the world is a team sport and there is a place on the team for everyone. But for every little bit to count requires that the aphorism is activated on all levels of human enterprise. This requires changing the fundamental philosophical and moral values of science and technology, as well as a mercilessly critical look at their relation to politics and economics. The fundamental message of my argument is that the fragmentation of theory and practice needs to be overcome through a more profound commitment to the concept of integrated systems and interactive cooperation. This respects the many-sidedness of the environment, built and natural.

Whatever the perceived merits of science and technology may be, as a conceptual and philosophical statement, the assertion of technical power as divine is the ultimate confirmation of idolatry, an object veneration that fails to connect with the integrated systems and multi-dimensional sense of purpose that characterises the new Age of Ecology. 






The Hardball Politics of Climate Change Deniers
Nothing concentrates minds more than the prospect of future oblivion. For all of the warnings of eco-alarmism, the evidence has firmed up to point to the likelihood of imminent eco-catastrophe. Geologist Ian Plimer takes his stand on science and the methods of observation, measurement and experiment. He argues that ‘a climate catastrophe was provided for an anxious public by scientists who had everything to gain by frightening us. They put forward an ideology that is blind fundamentalism, unrelated to scientific facts. Politicians build new bureaucracies and pose as environmental saviours without having to face the consequences of their actions. Heads must roll. Meanwhile, the planet will do what it has always done: change’ (Plimer 2009). Plimer also wrote the book Heaven and Earth: Global Warming – The Missing Science). 
‘Blind fundamentalism unrelated to scientific facts’? That should be easy enough to expose, then. James Lovelock wrote that science is remarkably self-cleansing and bad theories tend not to last long. Plimer’s theories were quickly disposed of, but there is no need to rebut Plimer’s arguments at length. There are books and articles which have done that, which have exposed his faulty reasoning, his selective approach to evidence, the way he sets up false antitheses. Of course the planet will continue to change. The fact of natural cycles is not being denied. Further, the fact that there are natural cycles of change does not rule out the point at issue – man-made climate change, its causes and extent. Intellectual titans like Peter Hitchens refer to ‘warming zealots’, citing tendentiously argued books like Christopher Booker’s The Real Global Warming Disaster as serious, well-balanced science. ‘Facts have been ruthlessly twisted, suppressed or invented. Scientists are greatly divided on the subject. Many people – and bodies – presented as experts actually have little or no knowledge of the science involved. Gullible politicians and gullible media men and women have repeatedly fallen for it. Hucksters, profiteers, world government fanatics and, of course, the EU (always searching for an excuse to increase its power) have latched on to it.’ (Peter Hitchens, The inconvenient truths Mr Gore and his fanatical friends didn’t tell you about climate change, The Mail on Sunday, Nov 28 2009).

Fine, if the climate science is so badly in error that Peter Hitchens can spot it, it should be easy for real scientists to pick it apart. The problem is that further research confirms rather than refutes the case for anthropogenic global warming. If Plimer, Hitchens et al can prove otherwise, they are free to publish. And that’s about as much of that manifest nonsense as anyone can suffer.
The assertion that the science is somehow ‘made-up’ is the easiest to deal with. James Lovelock writes well of the scientific method here, arguing that science is remarkably self-cleansing. Bad theories have a short shelf life in science. Global warming deniers – and they are deniers rather than sceptics – should put up or shut up. The claims made by the likes of Plimer have been looked at, time and again. If we are to stick to observation, measurement, experiment – the scientific method – then the case for man-made climate change remains in place. The furore over the so-called ‘Climate Gate’ is instructive here. Day after day in newspapers like the Daily Express we were fed with tendentious articles which poured scorn on climate science. Each article contained an obligatory reference to the scientists at the University of East Anglia who, ‘allegedly’, were caught manipulating the evidence. Day in, day out, drip, drip prejudice, stupidity and wilful ignorance exalted to high principle. The whole thing was investigated at parliamentary level, with the most august bodies of international science involved, from the National Academy in the US to the Royal Society in Britain. The report concluded not only was there no malpractice, but that the new scientific evidence which has accrued since firms up the case for man-made global warming even further. Interesting how little comment this report received in the press. If Peter Hitchens and his ilk believe that this science is ‘made-up’, then he affirms the possibility of distinguishing truth from falsehood. He should publish his research, falsify the erroneous and prove the truth. He doesn’t do this, of course. Instead we get the same cherry picking of facts and instances, flagging up of anomalies, and assorted red herrings, something which will always be possible in a subject as vast as climate science.
Hitchens makes the point that ‘many people and bodies’ presented as experts ‘have little or no knowledge of the science involved’. Well, many do, so Hitchens should put the case against to them. He cannot, of course, because his knowledge of the science is also little or none. That doesn’t stop him from asserting, with great certainty, that certain positions, with solid research and evidence behind them, are false. 
The language exposes the agenda here. We are on the side of truth and reason whereas they are fanatics and zealots out to dip the public purse. Throw in a lot of boo-words and hate-figures, and you have tapped into the emotions and prejudices of your target audience. 
To repeat, there is nothing – nothing – preventing any of these deniers from publishing their conclusions, presenting their evidence, falsifying bad theories, doing their own research. They will have to argue their case, much like NASA scientist James Hansen in his twilight years, who is still having to argue his case that the imminent climate catastrophe is so great that much greater international action is needed. Just what vested interest can a venerable scientist with decades of experience and service behind him have to continue, in his seventies, to argue his case for the seriousness of man-made global warming? To read the likes of Neil Hamilton, ex-mp who lost his seat to anti-sleaze campaigner Martin Bell, write about the climate change ‘gravy train’, is vomitable. What’s the science? What have you got? Time and again these characters are asked to show their hand and time and again it is shown that they are bluffing. Their bluff is called – put up or shut up.
In Gaia, James Lovelock (2000), exhibits the cool calm of the true scientist, avoiding the pejorative terms, the name-calling, the opinions masquerading as facts, the impugning of motives.

During the next and scientifically correct stages in the development of the theory, it may become all but incomprehensible to any but its own scientific practitioners. Do not make the mistake of those disgruntled humanists who will reject Gaia because it is part of a science they do not understand. There is nothing solid in their claim that science is malign or bogus. Science is wonderfully self-cleansing and bad theories have a short life. (Lovelock 2000 Pref). 

Quite. By taking his stand on measurement, observation and experiment, Ian Plimer gives the impression that he is a real scientist whereas those who argue for man-made climate change are eco-fanatics and zealots. It is an obvious ploy to appropriate reason for oneself and deny it to one’s opponents. It saves us the task of having to meet criticism, insulating us from contrary evidence. Plimer’s science has been subject to damaging criticisms but that has not altered his mode of argumentation. Because, of course, the real zealots and fanatics are those who, in the name of science, are actually systematically rubbishing the hard, painstaking work of scientists simply because the conclusions are a threat to certain powerful interests in the global economy. That really is the crucial point. The argument that global warming has been made up by scientists so that politicians can increase their power and raise taxes belongs in La-La Land. Think about it. We have had decades of financial, political, military and psychological warfare against ‘Communism’, with the reds being flushed from under every bed. Having seen off the Soviet Union and the threat of international communism, we are supposed to believe that powerful political and economic elites, hankering after world government, have invented a science which shows capitalism to be ecologically unsustainable? Having gone to the nth degree to see off communism and protect capitalism to the core, we are expected to believe that business and government the world over are colluding in a scientific fraud that states that capitalism is ecological suicide.

As Freud pessimistically concluded, with all the science in the world, people will still be inclined to believe what they want to believe.

The sheer idiocy of the claims made by deniers is manifest. It’s the fact that many people can’t see it that is the problem. It soon becomes clear that we are not dealing with science at all. Any positive claims made can be taken to the relevant bodies and authorities, published, examined, discussed and – with this material – firmly rebutted. Plimer’s theory of volcanic eruption, for instance, has been examined time and again and it is abundantly clear that volcanic impacts fall well short of the climate effects they purport to explain. That doesn’t prevent Plimer from hawking the same failed theory around the newspapers, where he is described as a ‘distinguished professor of geology’. The Mail on Sunday doesn’t point out his links with coal and Australia’s fossil fuel industry, mind. Would that be the kind of vested interest that deniers never fail to suggest with respect to climate scientists and governments? For the record, James Lovelock has worked throughout his career as an independent scientist, living off his own earnings and spending them on his research. Lovelock has been outside of government and industry.

I have spent so much time wading through this cess-pit of climate science denial not because of the merits of the case against climate science. It is a clear attempt to spread confusion where there is clarity and drag the world of fact into the world of opinion. The whole thing saps the spirit and could have been designed to destroy the hope and optimism of reformists by giving the impression that nothing matters and nothing changes. The deniers case simply reduces itself to a handful of lies, prejudices and fears. If a strong case against any aspect of the science behind climate change could be made, it would be made. To date, if we stick to the science, the evidence pointing to man-made global warming is stronger than ever and is being strengthened by continuing research. And that, ultimately, is all that matters. The rest is rubbish.

So why waste time with the deniers? For the simple reason that they are powerful, well-organised and show how politics trumps science every time. And because, even if they haven’t fooled themselves on the science, they are certainly out to fool others.

I may be doing the likes of Lovelock, Brand and Lynas a disservice, but reading their books I get the clear impression that they underestimate the power of politics and of vested interests who masquerade behind the public good. Failure to appreciate the centrality of politics and power structures is almost excusable if one is engaged in pure science, but these books  come with positive proposals concerning technology and the application of science. Brand does make a passing comment here. He refers to the case of the climatologist William Ruddiman who, after publishing Plows, Plagues and Petroleum, found himself the target of a barrage of propaganda:

These newsletters opened a window on a different side of science, a parallel universe of which I had been only partly aware. The content of these newsletters purports to be scientific but actually has more in common with hardball politics.

Most of these articles come from contrarian web sites that receive large amounts of financial support from industry sources. In many cases, the authors are paid directly by industry for the articles they write. . . .

This alternative universe is really quite amazing. In it, you can "learn" that CO2 does not cause any climatic warming at all. You can find out that the world has not become warmer in the last century, or that any warming that has occurred results from the Sun having grown stronger, and not from rising levels of greenhouse gases. One way or another, most of the basic findings of mainstream science are rejected or ignored.

Yes, to a real scientist, the claims made by climate change deniers are preposterous. Yet how often does one hear the likes of Booker being cited in argument as having shown that climate science is all ‘made-up’, a ruse to raise taxes, a gravy train for bureaucrats and politicians, a scam for business to dip the public purse in the name of environmentalism? People are not comfortable discussing the science, but they are wide open to suggestion once the argument is reduced to motives and interests. ‘They’re all in it for the money’. Any idiot can shout that, and indeed they do.

The point is that scientists and technicians had better develop a sharper political acumen than they have shown so far, otherwise they will be eaten alive by those who will do anything and say anything to protect the ecologically destructive economic system. Pseudo-scientific propaganda against climate change is not science at all, which is why it survives any amount of refutation and falsification. The problem with technological solutions to social and economic problems is that they have a tendency to avoid the political problem and, worse, they smuggle in the politics – the preservation of existing power relations – in by the back door.

The Politics of the Technological Fixers
One of the most irritating features of the Lovelock, Brand and Lynas books concerns the broad brush criticism of ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Green’. Who are these? Environmentalists and Greens come in many different varieties and can be found at opposite ends of a continuum. It is on this issue of global warming and climate change that the principal environmental types reveal their essential characters. Some are concerned to harmonize our interchange with nature, changing the ways we govern our interactions with nature, structuring rules and institutions so that humans are allowed maximum freedom in relation to nature, consistent with respect for nature and for others. Then we have the green capitalists, who adopt a laissez-faire attitude to economics and ecology. To these, both nature and the economy operates according to laws of its own. The goal is to set the right prices and correct any market failures so that markets adequately reflect relative resource values. Reformers, who may be called environmentalists, seek to make incremental progress by identifying and remedying specific threats to environmental and human health. Then there are those who seek to promote the long-term health and beauty of nature as such. These could be deep ecologists concerned with protecting the natural balance of eco-systems or those with a more aesthetic appreciation of the land. So ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Greens’ cover a wide spectrum, from mitigating direct, immediate impacts to the health of humans living today to those concerned with the long term perspective that recognises the health and well-being of future generations and other life forms within nature. 

The books by Brand and Lynas and the specific proposals suggested by Lovelock identify these authors as technological fixers. Here, the focus is on promoting the best technology in order to remedy pressing environmental problems. They take their stand on technology and claim to leave ideology and politics to others. Such claims are rarely innocent, not at the level of motives and never at the level of consequences. Those who are content to leave the work of goal setting to others should be prepared to see their technics misfire and generate consequences they had not (or secretly had) intended. 

Not that those proposing technological fixes lack ideology and politics. Marx’s critical conception of ideology is helpful here. Ideology in this conception is not a system of ideas as such but a process which serves to obfuscate reality so as to preserve existing power relations intact. To eschew ideology and politics is often highly ideological and political. With respect to technological fixes, the plain danger is that the goals are set by the system and its external imperatives, with technology being applied to preserve the status quo and leave the fundamental problems unaltered. If it is the case, as many argue, that it is the capital system itself, with its expansionary drive and accumulative imperative, which is the driver of eco-catastrophe, a technological fix will achieve little more than a more efficient way of ensuring ecological collapse. There is a paradox well-known to ecologists that gains made in increases in efficiency are more than cancelled out by the expansion that efficiencies make possible. We achieve a more efficient pollution, a more efficient destruction.

The arguments of Pollan reveal the dangers of technological fixes. Pollan is a technological fixer who believes that human beings ought to follow nature, letting it guide them in their manipulations. He can argue like a deep ecologist: ‘Learn to think like running water, or a carrot, an aphid, a pine forest, or a compost pile.’ He urges us to remember, however, a garden ethic is ‘frankly anthropocentric’. [232, 227].) Not that anthropocentrism worries a technological fixer. Pollan’s point is that a skilled gardener can tease nature into providing humankind with a limitless bounty. Far from recognising limits, which has been a central environmentalist message, Pollan believes that Nature poses no limits at all. Those environmentalists who urge recognition of limits fail to understand that the Earth is an open system, receiving inputs of sunlight daily. This daily supply of sunlight makes everything possible. Environmentalists have long been trying to din the message into the public that ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’. Somebody or something somewhere pays for every lunch on the planet, and the more and bigger the lunches, the bigger the price. It’s just that not everybody pays the full price. Pollan will have no talk of such limits: ‘in terms of the global ecosystem, there is a free lunch and its name is photosynthesis.’ OK, the notion of Nature’s plenitude goes back to medieval Christianity. It all depends on whether human beings can live by a theology of enough. Gandhi famously said that nature produces enough for man’s need but not for man’s greed. What we are really talking about, though, are systemic imperatives that drives expansion, forcing human beings to go beyond satisfiable needs in pursuit of wants capable of endless inflation.
Pollan argues that it is possible to reverse the second law of thermodynamics. Our environmental problems ‘have more to do with our technologies and our habits and economic arrangements than with the planet's inherent limits or the burden of our numbers’.
That is the strong case for humanising technics so that they work for human ends rather than systemic imperatives. This seems a defensible claim, since it doesn’t just propose a technological fix as a stand-alone but connects technology with new socio-economic arrangements and altered habits and practices. Technology is set within a matrix of politics and culture, which is the only way of ensuring technics do not misfire.
This makes the point that it is perfectly possible to envisage technology playing a strong, creative role in solutions to the environmental problem. The problems concern lack of balance. Something that is really striking is the streak of selfishness and self-importance running throughout the Brand and Lynas books. Lynas adopts the title The God Species and Brand opens the book with the line ‘We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ Yet there is nothing in these books on God, ethics, religion. The accent is firmly on fact against value. There are occasional hints that human beings need to live up to their powers and take hold of their future in some conscious way. This grand Hegelian vision soon dissipates into the all too familiar idolatry of science and technology. The problem is this, that the scientific and technological revolution stemming from Bacon, Newton and Descartes is now in old age. If science and technology do indeed have the solutions, it begs the question as to why Brand justifies his technological gambles by reference to time running out in face of the pressures of climate change. How is time running out? Charles Darwin argued that nature has all the time in the world. It seems, though, that human beings haven’t. And that is because human beings, through science and technology, see themselves apart from and above nature. That is the self-importance of these authors. There is no sense of the need for a changed relationship of human beings to nature, only an ever more thorough and aggressive technical mastery. It doesn’t strike Brand, any more than it strikes Lynas and Lovelock, that this necessity they refer to is not natural but is entirely the artificial product of the application of science and technology in the service of material expansion and gratification. Not one of these books address that expansionism at the heart of ‘the economy’. Instead, all three authors pepper their ‘pragmatic’ assertions with a casual but persistent sniping against the ‘political left’, ‘leftists’, and ‘extremist anarchists’ – who are, we are warned, ‘nutty’. 
The arguments in these books are weakened by the straw-man constructions of environmental thought and politics that are strewn throughout their pages. The odd remark seems casual, as though the author is more concerned to develop his own positive case rather than waste time criticising alternate positions. In which case, one can accuse the authors of laziness, ignore the points made against ‘environmentalists’ as vacuous and instead focus on the case being made by the author. Except these straw men litter the pages of these books, giving the overall impression that environmentalists and Greens really are ill-informed wishful-thinkers, zealots, fanatics and bigots more concerned with prejudice and politics than with real science. Further, these pejorative constructions serve as a background noise that supports a technological vision of experts active in nature as a man-made environment. The impression is clearly given that ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Greens’ are scientifically illiterate, naïve at best, and have never really examined the evidence on nuclear, GM crops, and so on. There is a wealth of research material and field work from ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Greens’ on all these issues. It is Lynas and Brand whose work seems thin in this respect.

A number of the comments that Lovelock, Brand and Lynas make about ‘environmentalists’ are plainly caricature rather than accurate description. Sometimes, they are literary constructions designed to present an argument in crude and obvious form. The fact that particular environmentalists or environmental bodies are rarely named reveals that the purpose is to state an extreme in order to expound a truth. The patronising tone towards ‘environmentalists’ is bad enough, they ‘mean well’ but should now learn some real science. Some examples drawn from real life would add strength to these criticisms. It’s a game that all can play, of course. How many examples do we have of scientists and experts who have got things badly wrong over the years? Much worse, however, is the extent to which the caricatures fit the image of ‘eco-fanatics’ and ‘eco-zealots’ constructed by those leading the backlash against environmentalism. 

No-one writing in the contemporary climate should be allowed to claim innocence here. Back in 1996, Andrew Rowell published the book Green Backlash which showed how, just as the scientific message started to translate into political action, so powerful interests mobilised and organised to manage and manipulate popular opinion with respect to climate science. The clear political intention is to so stymie the science as to prevent substantial and serious change. So we get the endless repetition of the view that climate science is pseudo-science put around by failed socialists and communists with a political axe to grind, by politicians and bureaucrats who want to raise taxes, by self-seeking publicists who want to make money out of public credulity, by corrupt Third World governments who want to ‘guilt-trip’ the west, by Green zealots who don’t know any real science. 
My old Director of Studies once told me that ‘there’s a lot of rubbish in the world, you can’t take it all on and it’s not worth wasting breathe on’. He was right. This is such manifest rubbish that it doesn’t merit a point by point rebuttal. The issue is why many human beings still can’t think for themselves. That, ultimately, is the real solution to our problems – proper thinking, the use of what Cicero called ‘right reason’. What is most staggering, however, is the extent to which Lovelock, Lynas and Brand go along with the caricature of environmentalists and Greens who have put the time and effort in, year in and year out, to bring the science to public notice. That, really, is unforgivable and reveals an alarming political naivety. The deniers rubbish climate science but at the same time they rubbish environmentalists and Greens as ‘eco-zealots’ and fanatics who are concerned only with the politics and know nothing of the science. This was the charge made by James Dellingpole against George Monbiot on BBC TV. Which science is this that the likes of Dellingpole are concerned to protect? The very same climate science that deniers claim is ‘made-up’. Monbiot noted Dellingpole’s silence when asked to cite his scientific reading and evidence. That’s the measure of Dellingpole and his ilk. If Lynas really does think that he can traduce environmentalists and somehow persuade climate change deniers of his moderation and pragmatism, then he is a fool, and a dangerous one at that. 

The comments which Lovelock, Brand and Lynas make describe no sizeable or significant element within the twenty-first century environmental movement, and nor do these authors offer any systematic evidence in support of their claims. Instead, there are odd examples, here and there, the significance of which are extended to environmental thought and politics as a whole through broad brush caricature.

However they may be described, the political left have consistently criticised and opposed the capitalist economy that has driven the planet to the brink of ecological disaster – and economic crisis – and have sought to engage in the political work of building an alternative social order. What do the ‘pragmatists’ of science and technology offer as an alternative to leftists and extremists? Hilariously, Brand refers to the need to start building the low carbon economy of the future, only to rule it out as being far too difficult, for being far too expensive and for taking far too long to achieve. And this is where the selfishness comes in. One could accept an argument which states that the looming ecological crisis can no longer be arrested. It’s too late to turn back, argues Lovelock. Fine. The human race has had it coming. This is the nemesis that follows hubris. Rather than make peace with the world, the scientists, technicians and engineers are going out in a hubristic rage, still refusing to accept that all their technical power and know-how is as nothing against nature. So we get Brand justifying any number of insane geoengineering gambles with the oceans, the weather, the land and the atmosphere; so we get the endless assertion that we have to go nuclear. Rather than accept failure, these characters will turn the planet into a wasteland. It is the Fall of Man for the new post-science age. However, the 500 million who Lovelock estimates will survive climate catastrophe will not have a pristine planet to fit themselves more appropriately to after the Fall of Science. Instead, they will be living with the long term consequences of the failure of a selfish and stupid race armed with powers beyond its control and comprehension.

The approach adopted in these books is usually described as a ‘technological fix’. Actually, all of them are driven by visions of impending collapse, causing them to discard the precautionary principle and try almost anything technically feasible, so long as it doesn’t take too long. The authors are not so much technological fixers – they admit that they are working with uncertainty and cannot guarantee outcomes – as technological gamblers. What is most disappointing about the books is the political cowardice, the moral flabbiness and the intellectual laziness. Because in terms of institutional and organisational capacity, technical know-how and material resources, the transition to the low carbon economy is feasible. There is no need for wild gambles.

Sustainable Living as the Politics of Hope
Lynas, Lovelock and Brand have overplayed their hand. If the ‘necessity’ they cite is as grim as they portray, then it would be better to find some Stoical courage and face the day of reckoning that human hubris has long since invited. But there is always a self-defeating streak of pessimism and cynicism in such appeals to necessity. 
Insofar as life is more than mere physical existence, human beings have examined themselves, their purposes and the world they live in and have entertained hopes for something better. Few among us have not been alone and in the dark wondering whether there are any grounds for hope. Neither to examine ourselves and our world, nor to hope or despair as a result would mean that we were much less than fully human. Reasons for despair are never difficult to find. There has never been a time when human beings somewhere on the planet have not died needlessly from hunger or disease. Political corruption, war and genocide, billions wasted on mass consumption. Or an arms budget of $1.7 trillion, a figure so huge that it would take six times recorded history to count out at the rate of a dollar a second. When we learn that we are in the grip of a mass extinction of a rate last seen some 65 million years ago, that many things that add what Darwin called ‘grandeur’ to life are being wiped out — birds and bees and butterflies, coral reefs and ice caps, polar bears and sharks and oranges — then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that not only has the human race had it, it more than deserves its miserable fate. That is what is so disappointing about this ‘God species’ thesis. Human beings do indeed have the power to harmonize its relations to nature within and nature without. It’s just that technological fixers fail to live up to the moral and psychological dimensions of that challenge.

Undoubtedly things are bad and the problems are substantial. The future, more than a few suspect, is likely to be so bleak as to be unthinkable. That’s the biggest denial of all. To seek to overcome this bleakness by a final assertion of technological mastery is the plainest evasion. This is not a vision of the future at all, merely an even more extreme assertion of existing power in order to deny the inevitable. History really has come to an end in this technological vision, with nothing learned from the past and the future as nothing more than the present enlarged. The technological fix is not motivated by a vision of the future as something different and better than the present, but by necessity, the notion that the problems we face are such that we have no alternative but to gamble on technology.
This is despair and despair is a trap that blinds us to solutions and alternative that are available under our noses. I like to quote the example of a children’s toy from one of the civilisations of meso-America. It was an animal on wheels. It was a toy for children which suggested the invention of the plough. Yet the idea of applying the wheel to the land and improve agricultural efficiency never occurred to anyone. The solutions to problems are more often than not under our noses, it’s just that we lack the conceptual or cognitive capacity and imagination to see the obvious.
The case from necessity and inevitability can be resisted immediately. If problems have reached such an advanced state, then it is too late anyway and human beings should find the moral fibre to face the music. Humanity has had been ample enough warnings going back to the early critics of industrialisation, followed by the conservationists of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in the early 1960’s was really a final wake up call, not the beginning of a new era of environmentalism. 

In this situation, the first thing to do is calm down and think things through. The worse that environmental problems get and the more tangible these problems become, the more we need to keep a clear head and apply reason. Panic is pointless, other than giving those who have yet to come to terms with the problem something to do. And it is also more than a little undignified, a final spasm of self-important selfishness and stupidity.

But it is worth emphasising that none of the problems that we face are insurmountable. The technological fixers have a large truth on their side in that there is no technological reason why all seven billion human beings on this planet cannot live well side by side with each other. The technologies are not only possible, they are already available. The design innovations are feasible and social change is well within our scope. The resources are available. A $1.7 trillion planetary arms budget shows just how much money is available for the necessary transition. Steven Biko argued that the biggest weapon in the hands of the oppressor are the minds of the oppressed. The greatest obstacle standing in the way of a bright green future lies in our own heads — human beings simply cannot imagine a future that is different and better than the present. In any genuine resolution of environmental problems, the changing of mentalities and modalities proceed together in one and the same process.

For all of the poverty in material resources that so many suffer on the planet, the worst poverty is the poverty of imagination. This ensures that people cling to beliefs, attitudes and norms to which they have become accustomed by force of habit, routine, and everyday necessity. There has been a revolution of decreasing expectations in which people come to accept the tired clichés of politicians and journalists as realistic thinking, accept the worst behaviour as ‘human nature’, and fall for a retread of tried and failed ideas as ‘new thinking’. Such people come in time to take for granted the idea that real change is ‘utopian’. They allow others to cheat them of their future.

In the ancient Greek polis, citizenship was an active identity which conferred a moral responsibility upon the citizen. Any question a citizen asked of politics was a question that they were forced to ask of themselves. The most courageous and important thing that any individual can do is to ask questions of themselves as creative agents. Answering these questions involves each person coming to envisage a much better future. This imagining pertains not to a utopian daydream but to a feasible future, imagining in the way that an architect imagines a building — as a feasible goal that can be made real.

No one needs to undertake the task of imagining a future for the world as a whole — although such a vision may help as a goal of future striving. In the very least, each individual can begin by examining their own lives, and the lives of those around them. We need to imagine our own futures, transformed so as to embody and express our deepest hopes concerning how the world ought to be. We can imagine the time when we have learned how to live well with each other, doing no harm to the planet. This will be a time when we work to make a difference for the better of all, not a profit for ourselves. We can imagine a revivified public community in which citizens are also friends and neighbours, flourishing together, and the politicians who represent us are people we respect and admire for who they are, not what they are. Imagining with a focus on a feasibly better world, it becomes possible to move in the direction of sustainable living in a time and a place in which these hopes are made and lived as realities. In the first instance, the most important thing to do is to start to work towards building those lives. There is no need to wait for ‘the Revolution’, whichever form it takes – political, technological, there is never a shortage of candidates. This everyday process of building the future is the revolution, the individual means in the process of forming one large end. No charismatic leader or vanguard is required. The tools for the job are at hand, in the form of each person as citizen, and are synergised by people joining together. The future is something that human beings can create together. The green future comes into view when each person, today, is prepared to imagine that future as a real possibility and determines to live as though that ideal were already real. Living in this manner is not only a requirement of creating the bright green future, it is already to live the good life, to live to some purpose, in the present. This is the surest antidote to despair, pessimism and cynicism. 

Environmental author Edward Abbey declared that ‘sentiment without action is the ruin of the soul.’ Thought and action must go together. Action informed and orientated by deep thought and feeling enables us to invest our lives with meaning and purpose, connecting people together, keeping our spirits high and our sight focused on the future. This is the only certain formula for any enduring, long term transformation, given that in changing the world, we change ourselves in the process. The point is that any enduring, long term solution to the problem of environmental sustainability must rely on a holistic formula that embraces mentalities and modalities as well as technologies, and not simply be a series of one-off fixes. There is a need to establish the basis for hope, to imagine a better future, make it an object of future willing, establish connections and work with others, pool resources, share tools and know-how, start building the future, day by day, year in year out. It is a long term project but it always starts right now and has something for someone to do every day.

The philosopher Immanuel Kant presented his realm of ends as an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (Kant 1965: B.372), a goal of future society, and a concept of future life (1965: B.836f). As the 'real object of our willing', the realm of ends is an idea of reason which is practically necessary to inspire the moral action which is required by human beings make the ideal real (Kant 1965B8.372; Kant 1956:121f). There is a need, when building the future society within the shell of the old, to keep one’s vision on the horizon. Failure to develop that vision risks a narrowing of the sights to an all too obviously failing a present. Caught up in the immediacy of decline, it is all too easy to conclude that tomorrow is certain to be worse than today. It is a useful to develop the habit of seeing every ending as a beginning, so as to imagine the future as better than the present, in the same way that waking is the end of sleep. As H. G. Wells put the point, "All of the past is but the beginning of a beginning; all that the human mind has accomplished is but the dream before the awakening." 
The problem with technological fixing is not so much the technology. Certainly, there are serious arguments to be had concerning nuclear power, GM crops, biotechnology and geoengineering. The issue is not these technologies in themselves. The fact is that any technology has to be set within the wider matrix of political institutions and economic arrangements so that we can evaluate its purposes and uses. There needs to be a bigger picture, with technology fitted into a broad plan. Where this bigger picture is missing there are strong grounds to be sceptical. Politics always, always has a habit of coming in by the back door and taking over. There is no avoiding questions of goals, aims and visions. Those who do avoid those questions very easily fall back on the status quo as the default position. That means an unchanged institutional and systemic context armed with a greater range of technologies.

Many civilizations have faced environmentally induced crises in the past and it is a sobering fact that, sooner or later, so many have been unable to change sufficiently to avoid collapse. These civilisations have typically been confronted by one or two destructive environmental trends, usually deforestation and soil erosion, occasionally climate change. In contrast, twenty-first century civilization faces a number of environmentally damaging trends, all of which are human-made and coming to reinforce each other to bring about a single total crisis. To deforestation and soil erosion may be added aquifer depletion, crop-withering heat waves, collapsing fisheries, melting mountain glaciers, and rising sea level. And these are just the most obvious manifestations of the ecological crisis. There has been plenty of research work delineating these trends and outlining their consequences. Those who blandly assert that environmental change is a natural process and we will do what we have always done and adapt cannot have given the problem much thought. Of course, civilisations haven’t always adapted, they have often collapsed into barbarism and cannibalism. The rising tide of environmental refugees and failing states will make adaptation well-nigh impossible. The time to adapt is now, reversing current trends by engaging in the common project of building the bright green sustainable society.

That is the real drawback with technological fixing. Above and beyond the controversies concerning the particular technologies, an overwhelming emphasis on technological solutions to ecological problems takes attention away from the reality creating and constituting eco-praxis which alone forms the core of sustainable living in the future society. The world is ecologically and economically interdependent, meaning that the contemporary environmental crisis is uniquely singular and global in scope. This ‘total’ context requires an overarching plan which is equipped to deal with the crisis in a total way. In this globalised environment, piecemeal fixes – technological and political – have little practical purchase since the human race will achieve the goal of sustainable living together or will go down together. Above and beyond the technological fix, there is an overarching need to develop and embed this global planetary ethic in everyday social practices and governmental programmes. Without that, our technologies will be no more than pea shooters once the planet is on the move.

Simply put, we need a global plan to save civilization, a plan which is programmable, translates into public policy and which alters social practices. 

To the credit of Lovelock and Brand, they do realise the scale of the environmental crisis on the horizon. Climate science deniers routinely abuse environmentalists as ‘alarmists’. Brand wanted to know why James Lovelock, the ‘gentle alarmist’, is no so ‘alarmed’. Lovelock replied: ‘The year 2040 is when the IPCC is estimating that Europe, America, and China become uninhabitable for the growth of food. They're grossly underestimating the rate of temperature rise, so that 2040 may be 2025. People don't realize how little time we've got. The planet really is on the move.’ ‘I don't think there's much doubt at all now amongst those few of us that have worked on the problem, that the system is in the course of moving to its stable hot state, which is about 5 degrees Celsius globally higher than now.’

That’s the alarming reality which has persuaded Lovelock, Brand and Lynas to gamble on technology. They are short-term gambles with very long odds against their success. There is indeed for a massive concerted effort to be undertaken with wartime intensity and speed. This is to ask the human species to do something it has never done before and engage in civilisation building as a conscious project. Lewis Mumford once argued that the most important factor making for great city building and architecture is time. Time is a resource that is now in shortest supply. There isn’t time for organic evolution. Historical precedent is lacking since global civilisation as a whole is facing a total ecological threat.


The unstated assumption of the case for technological fixing is that the conditions for civilisation building in this manner do not exist, time is not on our side and the quick and dirty option of technology is the only game in town. That is to point to an underlying pessimism running through the technological fixers argument.
In which case there is a simple choice to be made. Gamble on the technology and buy time for longer term solutions, or embark on those longer term solutions now. 
The long term plan for sustainable living has four components: stabilizing climate, restoring nature's life support systems, stabilizing population, and eradicating poverty. All of these form essential components in the transition to the low carbon economy. Changes of the magnitude required demand massive changes in lifestyle, which means that at some point, sooner rather than later, people need to get active and play a role. 
One sees here the head on collision between politics and science. The central task concerns what is necessary if the climate is to be stabilized, not what is likely to be politically popular. A climate stabilization plan which calls for an 80 percent reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 2020 clearly involves substantial changes in lifestyles. For this reason it makes political sense to identify the changing of circumstances as a self-change voluntarily undertaken by people themselves. As a political package, this task is pretty much unsaleable if people remain passive individual voters as opposed to active citizens joining together in a common purpose.

This is hard political work, but it will have the biggest payoff. Of course, technological fixing and institution building are not mutually exclusive alternatives. The problem is that the emphasis on technology can encourage a focus on the short range to the neglect of the big social and psychological changes. Brand and Lynas do indeed rule out the emphasis on broader cultural changes. There is a failure here to take long term environmental change seriously.

The contours of the emerging renewable energy economy are clearly visible as fossil fuel prices rise, panic over peak oil spreads, and concerns about climate change move increasingly into the centre of public life. The old high carbon economy, fuelled by oil, coal, and natural gas, is increasingly being replaced with an economy powered by wind, solar, and geothermal energy. 

There are three principal aspects to the task of reducing carbon emissions and bringing about the new renewable energy economy. 
1.	Raising the efficiency of the world energy economy while restructuring the transport sector. 
2.	Cutting emissions in the energy sector by replacing fossil fuels (oil, coal, and natural gas) with renewable energy (wind, solar, and geothermal). 
3.	Ending deforestation whilst engaging in a massive programme of planting trees and stabilizing soils.

To bring the increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations, currently standing at 387 parts per million (ppm), to 400 ppm by 2020 requires a 80 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. Once the rise is halted it is possible to start to reduce CO2 concentrations to the 350 ppm recommended by climate scientists.
The case for a global plan is that it enables joined up thinking and action. The essential components support each other and strengthen each other. Environmental justice and social justice go hand in hand. The restoration of the earth's life support systems — involving reforestation, soil conservation, protection of fisheries, and aquifer stabilization — will all help to eradicate poverty and, in turn, stabilize population, economic development accelerating the shift to smaller families. Ultimately, the attainment of the goal of sustainable living depends on the extent to which we combine the goals of stabilizing climate, restoring nature's life support systems, stabilizing population, and eradicating poverty in an integral plan. The global nature of the crisis evades piecemeal solutions.

The positive message that one can take from the books by Lovelock, Brand and Lynas is that the human race is equipped with a technological capability that far exceeds past civilisations. There is no reason to passively submit to environmental eclipse. But we can go further than that and argue that in addition to technology, the financial and institutional resources required to achieve the goal of sustainable living also exist. 
Restructuring to achieve the low carbon energy economy entails a shift to more energy-efficient technologies along with the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable sources. This can be achieved by a global carbon tax of $200 per ton by 2020 which is offset by a reduction in income taxes.
A major shift in public priorities is required. The budget for restoring the earth's life support systems, stabilizing population, and eradicating poverty amounts to some $200 billion per year in additional expenditures. This may sound like a lot but represents just 13% of the annual global arms budget of $1.7 trillion (2011 figures according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Switching resources in this manner requires a change in mentalities via a new concept of national security. This recognizes the new ecological threats to our security on a global basis and reallocates the security budget accordingly. This makes far more sense than James Lovelock’s call for increased spending on the armed forces to deal with ecological refugees and conflicts over resources, a call which betrays that inherent pessimism behind the positions of the technological fixers – they just don’t believe that political and cultural change is going to happen and are just involved in a struggle for survival. 

Defining the specific components of the global plan raises the question of how goals are translated into public policy and how the ideal is made real. This raises the question of popular support, organisation and mobilisation. There is a need here to delineate modes of social action and change, how to achieve a progressive and ongoing transformation of society, and get people to appreciate the urgency of implementing essential goals.

It’s not that Brand, Lynas and Lovelock are silent here. Brand does refer to a bottom up civic activism. The problem is that the thinking isn’t really integrated into his whole argument and one is left with the feeling that it is something of an appendage to his main argument concerning technology. There is no doubt that it is technology that Brand thinks will be our saviour, not our social and ecological activism. To which we can argue that without the emergence of an active citizenship as a social movement, our technical power will remain detached from human purposes and priorities, serving a system that functions according to its own imperatives. 

There is endless reference to reason and rationalism throughout these books. There is constant reference to non-scientists as ‘sentimental’ and ‘romantic’. Well, as Marx wrote, reason has always existed, just not always in rational form. Stripped to essentials, the practical proposals of these books amount to nuclear energy, preparation for war, the rule of warlords and the end of democratic government, and a whole range of ill-considered gambles in biotechnology, genetic engineering and geoengineering. That these supposedly pragmatic arguments focused on solutions should reduce so easily to this indicates that behind the thin veneer of rationalism there is an inherent pessimism running throughout the whole scientistic project. These books are nowhere near as rational as their authors claim; instead, there is a scarcely reasoned nihilism which stems directly from the profound pessimism at the heart of science’s dominant paradigm of mechanistic materialism. There is no purpose in nature, no life, no design. In the new religion of science, these are sins of teleology and vitalism. Hence, to the death, the scientists and technicians are willing to destroy nature, not to save humanity, but to prove the idols of science and technology right after all and despite all evidence to the contrary. Of course, like all true priesthoods, the scientists and technicians claim to have the salvation of the people at heart. Even as the people are abused as being ignorant of science and ruled by prejudice, Brand et al claim to be saving them from starvation and other such things. They decide the terms of this salvation, of course, through GE crops and corporate control of farming. And, of course, the people will need to be ruled by warlords for their own protection. Not all can have a place on the lifeboat after all. The world is nothing but ‘dead’ matter in the dominant scientific paradigm and this is the assumption that lies behind the thinking of these authors.

Having read the reviews and features in the press, one is entitled to ask ‘is that it?’, ‘Is that all there is?’ This isn’t so much bold new thinking for the brave new world as the fag end of the old worship of science and technology. Apart from anything else, the writing and the vision lacks the verve and imagination of an HG Wells. And this gets to the point. There are many who are currently quick to conclude from the latest researches in neuroscience that the brain is merely a physiological thing, all chemistry and neurons, that mind is a function of matter and that human beings merely project illusions on the world. To merely ask the question ‘how do they know?’ is suffice to reveal the philosophical illiteracy at the heart of such claims. ‘You’re nothing but a pack of neurons’ asserts Francis Crick. How does he know? To know that indicates that the world is more than a mass of illusion, that there is some such thing as truth and that it is possible to escape this dreary neural and genetic determinism biologists take delight in asserting. The bleakness of these views exposes the black heart at the core of science. It isn’t a genuine religion and it isn’t even a genuine gnosis. And the greatest of scientists have known this all along. It would be wrong to judge Bacon and Newton by the thoughts and actions of the epigones. These are not so much standing on the shoulders of giants so much as living in their pockets. The same goes for Charles Darwin, who wrote that above and beyond biology, it is the 'mental powers' and 'moral sense' of humanity that really makes the difference in evolution. 

It is here that these books really fail. A title like The God Species promises much but delivers next to nothing on the matter. Instead of an integration of moral and technical capacities, there is the same old assertion of technological fixes. Darwin was not so cheap as this contemporary scientism and addressed the real issue here. Darwin understood that argument focusing exclusively on physical laws and development is insufficient. Since ancient times, human beings have been considered unique on account of a higher intellectual capacity. Homo sapiens means rational man. ‘Man’ may be an animal but he is the rational animal. Any plausible account of humanity and human development must explain this, the most important of human qualities. Those over-impressed by contemporary neuroscience and neuro-biology are currently taking great delight in denying this rational and ethical component to evolution. It is all of a piece with the bleakness of the scientistic vision. But far from seeking to deny the problem, Darwin saw the need to explain reason as the product of natural selection as a genuine problem. Darwin saw the mental differences between animals and human beings as ones of degree rather than of kind. The intellectual capacities of humans are much more impressive than those of any other animal. By pointing to natural selection in the evolution of the human mind, Darwin didn’t so much deny human intelligence as point to the richness of the mental lives of non-humans. This point is consistently misunderstood, having Darwin reduce humanity to a mindless animality. That wasn’t his point at all. Darwin revalued animal life in denying human uniqueness. He continued to emphasise that human beings far exceed all other animals in linguistic ability, thought, and reason. Darwin may have denied differences of kind between humans and animals, but Darwin’s view means that those who wish to emphasise human specialness are still free to creatively explore the differences of degree. 

And this is where these books disappoint in a most profound way. There is precious little by way of thought, imagination and reason in them, merely a dreary procession of whiz bang wheezes by the newest Tonka toys in the shop. There is nothing at all to suggest human beings living up to their billing as gods, the machines do all the work. Brand openly repudiates philosophy as an indulgence at the start of his book. He starts by claiming we are as gods and so have to get used to being good at it. Then he bars thinking. He wants results and nothing delivers results better than machines and their servants the engineers.

It begs the question of where the human mind went? Missing in action, it seems.

The Metaphysics of Hope
The question of mind is no metaphysical irrelevance. Metaphysics are never an irrelevance. Nature, necessity, cause, freedom and determinism, purpose, meaning – these are all essential questions which define what it is to be human, much more than bone and sinew. In The Approach to Metaphysics (1947: 264), EW Tomlin argues that ‘apart from metaphysical presuppositions there can be no civilisation.’ This is worth bearing in mind when technological fixers start talking about the need to save civilisation. I take them at their word and presume that it is civilisation that they want to save and not just some basic physical existence at no remove from natural necessity.

For human beings, it is essential that the Universe contain or fit within a moral order, one that places them and allows them to place themselves, along with others, in a meaningful, even exalted, position. This is why I expected so much and felt so let down by references to the God species and living as gods, since such talk promised to set human beings and their powers within nature as a moral construct. Instead of metaphysics, though, we get the same technological dodge. What many scientists fail to see is that metaphysics, taking the world of value seriously, is not about opposing science as belonging to the world of fact. Rather, it is about a widely felt human dis-ease with a scientific view of the world reduced to physical substance and devoid of moral value. The question of civilisation is the question of human well-being, whether or not life is worth living. Whether or not the world and the life it contains is meaningless or meaningful is a moral question and is not one that can be answered by factual knowledge or technological capacity. Is life, nature, the planet just physical stuff, neatly arranged by natural selection or accident and chance, or is there some inherent meaning and value within it? If there is meaning and value, is it embedded there or have human beings invested it there? Whichever side one takes in this dispute concerning the moral status of life and nature, whether meaning and value is inherent or whether we, as moral agents, place it there, the point is that human beings are meaning seeking creatures. That is what civilisation entails. This is something of an old-fashioned view now, but the words of Matthew Arnold are worth pondering: ‘What is civilisation? It is the humanisation of man in society’. This humanisation is other than mere physical existence, survival, but points to what human beings do with their natural gifts. And that is why metaphysics is as essential to human health and well-being as technology, even more so since it concerns ends rather than mere means.

That is why many weigh in so passionately on this issue. Ecology is always a human ecology and it evinces a moral purpose. Those coming at this from a scientific perspective struggle to see this and too easily are led to dismiss the concerns of non-scientific ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Greens’ in the most patronising of terms. They do not understand real science and therefore have nothing relevant to contribute. This attitude is most pronounced in Brand’s book. But there is plenty that the scientific mind itself lacks. We return again to the poverty of vision, of imagination, the lack of a moral intelligence. 

There is no need to set science and ethics as alternatives. How to join the world of fact and the world of value has kept philosophers employed for centuries now and it is a fair and legitimate undertaking. However, if we are forced to decide, ask the question of which, between science and ethics/metaphysics, which standpoint is most likely to generate awe and reverence toward nature? Science views nature as a purposeless mechanism comprising atoms bumping around, possessing no intrinsic value or meaning whatsoever. Human beings, as meaning seeking animals, see nature as more than that, or at least they tend to unless brainwashed by science. Of course, I am loading the question there, a disreputable practice unworthy of a great mind. But in coming to any conclusion here it is worth bearing in mind that contemporary science exhibits an obsessive concern to drive life, purpose and meaning out of natural processes, thus placing human beings on the same amoral level as stones. From the standpoint of natural science, human beings and stones, animate and inanimate nature together, are merely so much physical matter. The idea that humans possess moral worth is considered to be a product of human convention, as though that non-physical and non-natural aspect somehow lessens the value of morality and meaning. Richard Dawkins likes to draw the analogy between God and the unicorn. Well, anyone may struggle to point to real physical entities fitting the words, but the ideas are no less real for that. Human beings live by ideas and map the world with ideas. That is what human beings do naturally, seek meaning and invest the world with meaning. If scientists can’t see that and if science doesn’t have tools sophisticated enough to handle that, then so much the worse for science and scientists. The rest of us need not develop any inferiority complex in this regard. We return again to the poverty of the imagination.
The full import of what Michel Foucault wrote back in the 1970s concerning the de-centring of the subject is slowly becoming apparent. Nietzsche too got wind of this. With the death of God, how long can ‘man’ also survive as a subject possessing moral value? The claim that human beings possess natural rights has exactly the same scientific status as the claim that God has created the world and guided all evolution. From this perspective one can argue that science's mechanistic conception of the planet has been instrumental in the human misuse and abuse of nature, including our own nature. Once nature is reduced to just physical matter, morally valuable only as a result of human convention, then degradation, despoliation and destruction becomes all too probable.

So this is the case for metaphysics, the case for seeking meaning and value in nature within and nature without. In a world reduced to physical existence and survival, human beings live smaller and smaller lives, forever fearful of a future which promises that we shall die as we lived, in a morally vacuous world completely indifferent to human life and its worth. All the technology in the world and all the resources plundered from nature cannot fill up the massive void where the human soul once was.

Within a mechanistic materialism, the human mind is nothing special, merely the product of the blind operation of chance events, as pointless and as meaningless as everything else within a universe of dead matter. Darwin saw the problem from the first: ‘But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?’ (Darwin Autobiography.) Precisely. Volumes of neuro-biology and books influenced by neuro-biology are being spewed out by people congratulating themselves on having ‘demystified’ mind, reason, thought, creativity. Everything that was once considered to make human beings special and unique is being reduced to ‘dead’ matter. Which begs the simple questions ‘why does it matter?’ and ‘how do you know?’ They are the simplest of philosophical questions but are sufficient to defeat assertions of neural determinism. Nous triumphs neurons every time.

And this gets to the heart of the matter. James Lovelock’s Gaia thesis holds that nature is a self-regulating organism. Human beings are part of this Gaia, of no great importance one way or the other. The logic would seem to point to human beings fitting the contours of Gaia, learning to live within its patterns. Yet that is precisely what Lovelock, Brand and Lynas argue against. Instead, there is a heady demand that human beings use their scientific and technical know how to regulate nature and hence live as gods. Nature remains dead matter. Make no mistake, Lovelock’s Gaia is still a machine. Gaia may be a Greek Earth Goddess, but Lovelock’s nature is a self-regulating machine devoid of conscious design and purpose. So how is it that human beings are as gods? Surely, to be consistent with mechanistic materialism, the human mind is as dead as nature’s matter. It seems not. Except, the closer one examines the arguments, the more apparent it becomes that it is not human beings who are alive at all, but their machines. In typical hubristic flourish, science and technology have been invested with existential significance. For all of the talk of ‘the god species’ human beings are not gods at all in these analyses, they are mere appendages to their machines. And that is what is so depressing about these books. They are shallow and superficial and utterly bereft of any deep thought and philosophical insight. With a lack of historical awareness that simply beggars belief, ages old technological tinkering driven by ‘results’ is offered as new thinking. It’s the oldest recipe in the cookbook. This pragmatic ‘busyness’ is the reason that humanity stands on the brink of ecological disaster. 


A quote from Lewis Mumford’s Sticks and Stones is apposite:

In the Norse fables, the dwarfs are regarded as queer monsters, because they are always "busy people" who have no pride or joy except in the work they perform and the mischief they cause.
The great heresy of the modern world is that it ceased to worship the Lords of Life, who made the rivers flow, caused the animals to mate, and brought forth the yearly miracle of vegetation: it prostrated itself, on the contrary, before the dwarfs, with their mechanical ingenuity, and the giants, with their imbecile power. Today our lives are perpetually menaced by these "busy people"; we are surrounded by their machines, and for worship, we turn their prayer wheels of red tape.
It will not always be so; that would be monstrous. Sooner or later we will learn to pick our way out of the debris that the dwarfs, the gnomes, and the giants have created; eventually, to use Henry Adams' figure, the sacred mother will supplant the dynamo. The prospects for our architecture are bound up with a new orientation towards the things that are symbolized in the home, the garden and the temple; for architecture sums up the civilization it enshrines, and the mass of our buildings can never be better or worse than the institutions that have shaped them.

No, not human beings as gods, but monstrous gnomes, dwarfs and giants wrecking the planet and leaving their debris for future generations, whoever and however few they may be. Not much of a legacy, really, and testimony not to science and technology but to a misplaced faith in the power of machines.
This isn’t life, this is mere existence, a dis-eased survival in which human beings, with all their technical powers, give each other the impression of being in control but in truth are frightened out their highly expert and educated wits by the recurrence of ancient nightmares. We thought we had conquered nature but have found instead that we have made our own natures the orphans of our technology. This is the tale of the sorcerer's apprentice. We have disenchanted our world only to find that we are ruled by technological dwarves with the magic powers that once belonged to nature. To write that we are as gods so we have to get good at being gods is at least a recognition of this Faustian predicament of a humankind caught in a world which has inverted means and ends, but the resolution of this inversion requires more than top talk and technology. The promise that we may live as gods is better understood as a vision of Heaven for the poor in spirit; instead, rather than Heaven, the poor are offered a continuation of physical existence so long as they submit to being trained and educated to perform as knowledgeable servants able to manipulate and unleash the technical installations of an all too earthly power. This is not to live as gods but as moral dwarves. There is no growth in imagination or intelligence, just the same small mindedness. This is the technological dystopia of a world completely instrumentalised and rationalised, a reason which has been gutted of its moral component. Such a world may be skilfully organized, but emits sounds and vents furies which are proud of signifying nothing. Whole modes of thought, action and organisation have evolved to justify this nihilistic condition. A world which science has thoroughly disenchanted and emptied of meaning seeks to escape from its meaninglessness by investing mere existence, mere survival, with the magic of words without flesh, forms without content, with an idolatry that issues in monstrosity.
Those who embrace the technocratic utopia with such relish may be driven less by idolatry than by alarm at the scale of environmental predicament we face. It may be a triumph of hope over experience, but there is a sense of entering the last chance saloon armed with the best technology we have available. Yet the ideas that the technological fixers offer are very far from being the radical new thinking they are presented as. On the contrary, they are merely forms of the same cultural misdirection that has brought modern civilisation to its ecological predicament. What is new is the intellectual bullying to which environmentalists are being subjected to induce them to abandon long standing – and well researched and well reasoned – oppositions to certain technologies. It all savours of a well organised attempt to spread confusion and dissension within a movement that threatens to effect real social change. 
The arguments for science and technology are easily placed. Faced with nature’s revenge against arrogant human power, we witness an even more arrogant and even less potent assertion of hubris. Only this time we all have to join in, critics included, as though there will be added safety and certainty in numbers. That arrogance will ensure further destructive misfiring, further wasted resources and potentials. The technological fixers claim that we know well enough how to manipulate nature at will — so they reassure themselves and so they ask us to believe. It is superstitious nonsense and I don’t believe a word of it. It is a blind charge forwards, using blunt instruments in an attempt to get what we want, and exhibiting mentalities which are disconnected from any true knowledge of ecology and from any visions of sustainable living. 

Such scientistic modes of thought and action take us all the way back to the fragmented view of nature and to an atomistic understanding of the human experience, despite any number of books over the decades which have shown clearly that it is precisely these attitudes that have been instrumental in precipitating ecological destruction. The real damage is here, in turning people’s minds away from sound ecological thought and practice by the seductive promise of quick fixes and cheap victories. Technological fixes, this reasoning holds, are more than enough to deal with environmental problems. The popular appeal of this promise is apparent since it allows people to carry on with their environmentally destructive practices. But the promise rests on a wholly false premise. The idea that the scientists and technicians have been waiting outside the city walls waiting for the call  to come to our rescue is fanciful; they have been within the city walls, indeed the citadels of power, for quite some time now. The falsity of the claims made for technology ought to be abundantly clear to all. The fact that it isn’t constitutes the moral aspect of the ecological predicament. From the attempts to set science and technology within ecologically sound and sane practices, we have drifted through psychological inertia and political procrastination into false imperatives of technological manipulation and economic survival. 

By avoiding the need for concerted political action and substantial social transformation, technological reasoning of this type overlaps far too cosily with the contemporary pro-market and pro-business politics. Conspicuous by its absence in the many recommendations for saving civilisation is anything that could be called serious politics, politics as concerned with key questions of authority, power, control, distribution of resources, alternative ways of organising the relations between human beings in society as well as the interchange between society and nature. What there is is James Lovelock lamenting the passing of the old ‘benign’ environmentalism before the socialists turned up and made the issue political. Sorry, James, but criticisms that the world isn’t as it ought to be and proposals to change the world this way or that necessarily involves politics. It doesn’t augur well that whenever environmentalism develops a political edge, well-known environmentalists get cold feet and bail out. Or do scientists still think that appeals to the existing political class will suffice? How many times does poor old James Hansen have to be rebuffed by the politicians before scientists wake up politically?

Such thinking fails to realise that the individualistic, consumer-oriented culture is both morally and materially flawed. It certainly ignores the substantial evidence and literature which shows that human arrogance vast. 
The mentalities of technological fixing certainly puts serious environmentalists in a tricky position, since environmentalism is not against science and technology at all, but calls for a nuanced approach in which technologies are applied in a democratic and sustainable way. It is all too easy to pitch the claims for technology at an extreme and then proceed to condemn critics as being against science and technology. If there are people daft enough to fall for that – and there are, read that Nick Cohen in The Observer and his view that everyone knows that true environmentalists are in favour of nuclear power – then more fool them. It is always easier to adopt positions pitched at extremes and which reduce complex issues to simplicities. Unfortunately, the case that Brand, Lynas and Lovelock make for nuclear energy and GM crops has this character, which is enough cause for suspicion.
Environmentalists are indeed convinced that the success of the environmentalist cause requires that science plays a positive role and forms an integral part of any overall plan. By ignoring the need to integrate science and technology within an integral framework involving politics, social and civic activism and morality, indeed by emphasising the autonomy of science and technology from any constraint, as in the justification of risk and the rejection of fear, the technological fixing advocated by these books is cause for dismay. Nothing has been learned and a lot has been forgotten. It seems also that a great deal is being distorted. The nuclear wasteland of Chernobyl is presented as a veritable paradise, an Edenic landscape populated by creatures of every kind, with the exception of the naked man and woman. The picture that Lovelock and Lynas paint of Chernobyl as a wild idyll is so vivid and vibrant that a talking snake would not be out of place at all. And the suspicion in all of this is that we are indeed being persuaded to eat of the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge, once more being led down the garden path to the exit. From what to what isn’t at all clear.

The proper response to these books is to meet the cases made for each individual technology with reason and evidence. Lord knows, there is enough of it already on nuclear and GM crops alone. One notes how thin the sources cited are in the books, given the wealth of published research. And beyond criticism, environmentalists should take the opportunity to present their own case with greater clarity and force. And balance. That is, by taking on arguments at their strongest, and presenting those arguments in a fair and full manner. This is more than Brand, Lynas and Lovelock have done. Their presentation of alternate views is tendentious to say the least, caricatured to make it easier to present their own arguments. The lack of balance in these books puts them at the level of opinion rather than knowledge. They are books designed to provoke debate and excite controversy rather than seriously address and settle complex issues. That’s fine in itself. The problem comes when people start to cite the arguments as though they were authoritative. The arguments are highly contentious.

Of course, there is a need to steer clear of the anti-science and anti-technology ideas that Brand, Lynas and Lovelock rightly condemn. Who actually denies this? That such arguments are made sounds suspiciously like an underhand attempt to remove science from controversy and suppress debate around specific issues raised by science and technology by concealing the particular behind the general. Being pro-science does not mean being automatically in favour of any technology produced by science. Nuclear energy is not science as such. Bio-technology is not technology as such. Parts are never the whole. There is nothing remotely scientific about conflating science with its products. And there is nothing necessarily good about the technologies produced by science. Again, those who conflate the parts and the whole, the method and the products, invite suspicion. Either they do this deliberately in order to caricature critics and silence criticism, in which case they are duplicitous; or they are philosophically illiterate, in which case they dupes hardly worth taking seriously.
There is a tendency to portray any criticism of a particular scientific advance or technological breakthrough as being anti-science and anti-technology. The criticism applies to specifics rather than to the whole field. I am not even sure what an anti-science and anti-technology position could look like. Even if people switched off their electricity and generated their own energy, that would involve a science and a technology of some description. The criticism is vacuous in that it doesn’t apply to any known position, not even to hermits. The criticism really reads as an attempt to silence criticism so as to give scientists full autonomy. This is to propose an anarchy of knowledge and know-how. No one has this autonomy, not even gods. God needs a partner. Evolution is always a co-evolution. Human beings are social beings, relating to each other in society. Brand argues that since we have become as gods we had better get used to being good at it. Does he reserve divine status for scientists alone or are the rest of included in the ‘we’? 

If we need to distance ourselves from an anti-science and anti-technology platform, there is also a need to reject the kind of play-dice-with-nature arrogance that is being presented with increasing fervour. Good science is far removed from such arrogance and depends on clear, critical thought as well as imagination and moral and social intelligence — that is, thought is never completely abstract but relates to the concerns and problems of the day. Today, this means taking environmental ideas seriously, in both their moral and political dimensions and not just as strictly scientific issues. 

The human race is having to deal with a range of environmental problems not because there is something wrong with our planet but because of human behaviour. The solution to these environmental problems is not more technological tinkering with the planet, as though the planet is failing in some way. Rather, the problem is that human beings are not living well on the planet. It is not nature that is deficient but human behaviour towards nature. This deficient behaviour expresses a human arrogance which is based not upon true reason, with its moral component, but upon an inordinate faith in science and technology, upon reason reduced to its instrumental aspect. Reinstating reason with its moral component, and recognising relations to others, means that means are once more connected to ends so that we come to act with greater humility and respect towards nature. These are the basic environmental truths which come to be neglected whenever human beings assume the task of ‘improving’ nature via the instrumental use of technological power.
All over the world, in different times and places, there is no shortage of examples of resource misuse. Many environmental catastrophes that human beings have faced in the past – for example, the Dust Bowl conditions facing American farmers in the 1930s, have not been caused by nature, as many observers sensitive to nature could see. Droughts and winds and other such natural phenomena are normal aspects of places suffering from catastrophe. A closer investigation of many ecological catastrophes, going back to the time that Plato pointed out problems of deforestation in Attica 400 years BC, soon reveals the damaging impact of social practices and technologies. The most salient characteristics of environmental problems point to human action rather than nature’s deficiency as having by far the greater share of responsibility. One can refer here to the radical individualism of human beings, the commitment to a laissez-faire conception of private property, an egoistic attitude that sees no limits to nature’s resources and the faith that technology is powerful enough to overcome any checks that nature seems to offer. 
Empowered by the rights of private property, driven by the accumulative imperatives of the market, and bereft of any ecological understanding, human beings have long since acted as though they were gods, omnipotent beings subject to no natural limits. Of course, a true divinity implies a genuine wisdom that sees the whole picture and respects the legitimate claims of everything that makes for human and planetary well-being. Some such notion seems implicit in Spinoza’s conception of Deus sive Natura, the idea that God and Nature are one and the same thing, a single, self-subsistent whole. Human beings can never be independent of that whole; human freedom means thinking and acting in accordance with the proper functioning of the whole and the parts. This is what Spinoza calls amor intellectualis Dei – the intellectual love of God/Nature. This is to take the claim that we ought to live as gods seriously as a moral imperative. This is a very different notion from an even more aggressively promoted faith in technological powers. At this point, Brand and Lynas may bail out and claim that were being provocative rather than serious. Even then, it is very revealing that the only way they can deal with divinity is by reference to technological power. That is idolatry rather than wisdom. Much more impressive is Spinoza’s argument in the Ethics that the aim of the wise should be to rise above the illusory perspective of sensory experience to achieve the ‘absolute viewpoint’. Spinoza argues that 'it is of the nature of reason’ to rise above the illusory perspective which sees things ‘under the aspect of time’ (sub specie durationis) to achieve that ‘absolute viewpoint’ which sees the universe as God sees it, 'under the aspect of eternity' (sub specie aeternitatis). 

When Spinoza argues that 'It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity’, he is referring to reason as involving much more than in its technical and instrumental aspects. Spinoza explains that to talk about eternity is to talk about the existence that follows from the nature or definition of God/Nature, not as 'everlasting existence' but as timeless, like relations between mathematical figures.


It is not difficult here to imagine our engineers and technicians, eminently practical men who get the job done, dismissing Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura as meaningless metaphysical sophistry. Such short-sightedness lies at the heart of the human predicament, the failure to take ideas seriously meaning a blinkered reliance upon means elevated by default to the status of ends. We are entitled to ask Brand, Lynas and Lovelock to live up to the extremely large claims they make with respect to divinity. Of course, Lovelock can reply that his goddess Gaia is merely a metaphor to enable us to better empathise with nature as a machine. Maybe, although Lovelock’s reasoning has increasingly shown a reverence and awe with respect to nature that can only be described as religious. Brand and Lynas quite openly claim that human beings have become as gods, bringing with it the responsibility to live as gods. Divinity, however, is a moral imperative, something which neither Brand nor Lynas seem remotely aware of. That blind-spot is worrying because, stripped of the moral dimension, the quality of divinity is removed from human beings and invested in technology. That is not to live as gods at all. That is simply to state the Faustian character of disenchanted modernity at the extreme. Far from resolving the problems of a world stripped of meaning and overrun by instrumental rationality, such proposals are the final realisation of modernity’s inverted rationalisation. As with all Faustian pacts, at some point the price has to be paid. We have been given the power of technology as part of the bargain we made for the control of nature. That power is not the means of avoiding having to pay the price at the last, it is what we bought in the first place. This is the process that Max Weber referred to as disenchantment, the increasing technical mastery of nature emptying the world of its meaning. Did we really think that our technologies really were magic powers? That illusion should have long since been dispelled. Some seem unable or unwilling to give up the faith.

So those practical minds who sneer at useless metaphysics should think again and, this time, start thinking deeply. If God and Nature are interchangeable, aspects of the same substance, then it follows that for human beings to live as gods means showing respect and awe towards and indeed knowledge of Nature. Technology is simply part of a greater intelligence and wisdom, it is not the mediating term standing between God and Nature. Scientists who are still clinging to the old mechanistic faith are looking increasingly old-hat. Contemporary scientists are proposing arguments not dissimilar to the old metaphysics, whether they are writing of the Big Bang or the elusive Theory of Everything (or unified theory). In Quantum Theory (2002), John Polkinghorne states that in the quantum universe ‘It is intelligibility (rather than objectivity) that is the clue to reality - a conviction, incidentally, that is consonant with a metaphysical tradition stemming from the thought of Thomas Aquinas.’ 

Nature is no longer what it once seemed but is a deep and veiled reality against which our old technological powers are mere blunt instruments. Stephen Hawking asks: 'Is the unified theory so compelling that it brings about its own existence?' This argument implies that the universe must be the way it is, and had to be created this way, because no other universe (or lack of one) was possible. This is a metaphysics that Spinoza would have had no trouble understanding. As a supreme metaphysical idea, Spinoza's Deus sive Natura belongs in the Big Bang class. The Euclidian mathematics which proved the argument may have been eclipsed, but the compelling beauty of a single substance governing itself by immanent laws is unsurpassed. 

What Stephen Hawkings refers to as ‘the mind of God’ is similar to Spinoza’s idea of a pure and disinterested reasoner. Hawking’s conclusion to A Brief History of Time is famous, but it is taking the human race an awful long time to appreciate its practical importance:

‘If we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason - for then we would know the mind of God.’

The American physicist Frank Tipler goes even further: 'People talk of God as the creator of life. But maybe the purpose of life is to create God.'

Theoretical physics advances the idea of the participatory universe, in which everything is the observer and everything is the observed. Eminent physicist, John A. Wheeler, spent his career working on the fundamental questions of relativity and quantum theory. His findings led him to discard the concept of an isolated observer and instead developed the idea of man as a participator of the universe. Wheeler argued that, with respect to the origins of the universe, we cannot avoid the question whether a basic principle in cosmogony is self-reference. In 'Is physics legislated by cosmogony?' Wheeler argues that '... the universe as a self-excited system was brought into being by "self-reference". The universe gives birth to communicating participators. Communicating participators give meaning to the universe'.

In his physics, Wheeler shows how physicist and photon are involved in a creative dialogue that in some way transmutes one of the many quantum possibilities into an everyday, fixed reality. This means that the act of measurement plays a role in deciding what gets measured. 'In some strange sense,' says Wheeler, 'this is a participatory universe.' (John Archibald Wheeler, 'Beyond the Black Hole', in Harry Woolf (ed.), Some Strangeness in the Proportion. David Bohm, 'A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter', in The Journal of the American Society of Psychical Research, vol. 80, no. 2., p. 126, also uses the expression 'participative universe', and Ilya Prigogine, Order Out of Chaos, p. 299, speaks of 'knowledge that is both objective and participatory'.)

Beyond particles, beyond fields of force, beyond geometry, beyond space and time themselves, is the ultimate constituent (of all there is), the still more ethereal act of observer-participancy? (John Archibald Wheeler and Wojcieck Hubert Zurek, Quantum Theory and Measurement, p. 199.)


To point out the full extent of what this observer-participancy implies, Wheeler refers to an old Hebrew legend. In this legend, Jehovah and Abraham are arguing with each other as to which of them is better able to account for the world as it is. Jehovah tries to assert his authority over Abraham, 'You would not even exist if it were not for me.' 'Yes, Lord, that I know,' Abraham replies, 'but also you would not be known if it were not for me.' (Wheeler Order Out of Chaos, p. 293.)

Here we are on the right lines if we are to take seriously the question of living as gods. To be gods is to become observer-participants transmuting quantum possibilities into reality. In the 1958 edition of  L. J. Henderson’s The Fitness of the Environment (first published in 1913), Professor George Wald of Harvard gave us a startling but entirely justifiable 'new' concept: 'Let me talk a little frank nonsense about this, make of it what you will. It would be a poor thing to be an atom in a universe without physicists. And physicists are made of atoms. A physicist is the atom's way of knowing about atoms.'
In a similar fashion, a neuroscientist is the neuron’s way of knowing about neurons. We can develop this idea across science. Nobel Laureate Ilya Prigogine presents the same idea in eminently scientific terms when he argues that 'whatever we call reality, it is revealed to us only through an active construction in which we participate.'

So if we are serious about searching for divinity, there are sound scientific reasons to look much further than technology and beyond the products of science. Divinity lies in intelligibility and our role in activating it. Indeed, in comparison with the new physics, the continued faith in the power of technology to allow us to live as gods appears mere juvenilia, an infantile disease.

The continuous growth of an environmental consciousness throughout the twentieth century exhibited a close and detailed attention to ecological interconnection and a growing recognition of and respect for nature's inherent, inscrutable complexity and diversity. True wisdom lies in this ecological sensibility, in the intellectual, moral and practical recognition that Nature is more dynamic, more interwoven, and more mysterious, veiled in quantum terms, than has hitherto been realized. Cast in the light, the crudities of our technological fixers are exposed in the sharpest relief. Certainly, Nature in its intricacy can get out of order and thus fail to meet human needs, but more often than not this ill-balance is the result of semi-clever humans overestimating their knowledge and overharvesting Nature’s usable resources. To keep Nature functioning in order and balance, human beings need to recognize our ignorance more than our knowledge and thus with greater humility and less arrogance. We need to cultivate our intuition with respect to natural knowledge and rely less on the findings of mechanistic science and the powers of technology. Living well as gods depends upon the genuine integration of moral and technical capacities. The failure to acknowledge our dependence upon nature has meant that technology, far from giving us mastery over nature, has more problems than it has solved. The proof? The environmental mess we are facing now. If technology was the solution, we wouldn’t now have a problem. Human rationality, it should now be abundantly clear, is much less potent than we have been brought up to believe. This science stands revealed as a false religion worshipping false gods.




Whether in its parts or as a whole, Nature is still in large part unknown or very feebly understood; many natural processes, cycles and interactions are hard to trace and even harder to evaluate. We know more about Mars than we do about the oceans, yet that doesn’t stop us from dumping wastes without regard for consequences. At some point, acidification means that a carbon sink becomes a carbon source. But we carry on. Decisions about the use and consumption of natural resources continue to be made behind veils of ecological ignorance. The phrase ‘no such thing as a free lunch’ does not mean that everyone pays a just price. To capital, nature is one big free lunch. The price for the accumulation of material quantity in our economic system is exacted from nature but, sooner or later, is paid by all of us. 
The more we come to understand about nature, the more the scale of our ecological ignorance becomes apparent. Any decisions taken with respect to technology and its use need to proceed out of recognition of our limited knowledge and understanding. To argue as though there is a climate of fear because we have become a pampered, risk averse generation – which is what Brand suggests – is palpable nonsense. The real cowards are those who refuse to even question let alone abandon their naïve faith in their gadgets and develop the moral fibre to face the consequences of human hubris. If this is the end, then so be it. You can’t say we haven’t been warned. It is the technological fixers, no doubt suffering from an existential crisis born of the manifest failure of their technology, who demonstrate true cowardice here.
The point against acting irresponsibly has nothing to do with fear but evinces the sound and sane recognition that it is dangerous to act based solely on what little is known when that knowledge is so obviously incomplete. To brush past this perfectly clear and legitimate point by suggesting that such sage advice is born of fear is unworthy of serious argument. It is manifestly irresponsible to propose or undertake substantial action based only on few facts that can be empirically verified with any confidence, when innumerable other relevant facts remain unproven or unknown. It is just this cavalier attitude which ensures that science and technology generate another two or three problems for every one it solves. And it is just plain bad science. Proper scientific research insists on scientific proof; scientism, science reduced to practical affairs, does not. 
The fact that there are wide gaps in our scientific knowledge of nature does not mean that we are powerless to act. On the contrary, we are able to do what human beings have always done and draw upon our innate deep-seated intuition. The truly wise managers of the land work with nature rather than against it, learn to follow its and respect its built-in wisdom, even when it is not entirely understood. It is wise to recognise that things can go wrong and that mistakes are inevitable; it is foolhardy to act big when possessed with little knowledge. It is prudent to allow for second chances; suicidal to gamble on an all-or-nothing approach. It is wise to look after all the parts and their interactions whenever tinkering with nature. The law of unintended consequences cautions us to proceed with earthcare and earthcraft. Prudence is absolutely crucial given nature's inherent dynamism and interconnection, something which ensures an unpredictability that is an abomination to Baconian science. There is even a sense in which the failure of the project of technological mastery is driving an ever more furious assault against nature, as though scientists cannot accept that their god has failed. That which they cannot have, they must destroy. Nature cannot be mastered, therefore it must be destroyed. It is better than having to recognise how little we know.

The question of how we approach nature has met with a number of widely divergent responses. Some think that caution is so clearly right that there is no need for further debate. We should proceed out of awareness that whilst we know a little, but not it all. There is, however, an increasingly aggressive attitude being taken towards the precautionary principle. Brand himself argues that this principles serves to inhibit science and means that human beings punch far below their technical power. Brand’s views chime very easily with an increasingly powerful libertarian influence within global politics and policy making. This view is couched in terms of individual liberty and private property: individuals should be free to alter nature and exploit and enjoy their property as they see fit, and can be legitimately restrained only if the evidence of harm is manifest. This reasoning completely inverts the precautionary principle, putting the burden of proof firmly upon those who claim that harm will occur. These defenders of individual liberty and private property go even further and demand that that evidence of harm should be pitched at the level of scientific proof, admissible in a court of law. This is very clever as a political strategy since it takes the point about ecological ignorance and how this should caution against action, and turns it against ecological defenders of nature. Where once our ignorance of nature and of the consequences of our actions justified caution, since we cannot prove benefit and non-harm, now that very same ignorance is being exploited to say that unless we can prove harm, we should not be restrained in our use of property and technology. If the left hand doesn’t get you, the right hand will. One the one hand, action is justified on account of our scientific knowledge and technical know-how; on the other hand, restraints against action on account of ignorance are being stripped away since, given this ignorance, we cannot prove harm.
Those who condemn metaphysics as so much medieval sophistry should pay close attention to Brand’s criticism of the precautionary principle. His whole book makes some very strong statements in favour of nuclear energy, biotechnology, GE crops and geoengineering. He asserts that those who know the most, the scientists, are the least afraid. In other words, we can tinker with and manipulate nature on account of the certainty that scientists have in their knowledge. When forced to acknowledge how little we do know and how uncertain the consequences of our actions are, Brand attacks the precautionary principle as the product of fear. If we are ignorant of nature it means we cannot prove harm and are therefore free to act.
It remains to point to the powerful corporate interests behind these vociferous defences of individual liberty and private property. The assault on the precautionary principle is all of a part with an attempt to restructure the global economy as an anarchy of the rich and powerful. No one and no position is ever innocent of politics.

Brand’s reasoning is not new at all. And it is so consistent with the dominant libertarian strain of political thinking that it is easy to suspect a connection. It is worth going back to the origins of the precautionary principle. Rachel Carson's principal criticism in Silent Spring was that pesticides were being used in a reckless manner, and that greater caution was required. Her most vocal critics distorted, deliberately or otherwise, this issue of caution. This response simply turned claims of ignorance around against those advocating caution. We cannot prove harm for the same reason we cannot prove non-harm. One side argues that caution is the only appropriate response, the other that caution is an entirely inappropriate restraint. Carson’s critics argued that pesticides are being properly used so long as their overall harmfulness could not be fully proven. Since the evidence of harm was incomplete, then the case for caution is not persuasive, and therefore Rachel Carson was wrong to challenge pesticide use. 
There are many problems with this reasoning. Leaving aside the point that the burden of proof should be upon those proposing changes, the most obvious thing to say is that by the time the evidence of harm meets the standard of proof required, it is already too late to prevent harm. The scale of harm depends upon the scale of intervention, and that could easily be fatal. But the key point here is that this argument amounts to licence. A restraint that applies only after the fact presumes a freedom to act and create the fact in the first place.

There are, then, alternative ways of relating human action to nature. These are complex issues concerning the balance between knowledge and ignorance, the limits of our cognitive resources and perceptions, the power of human reason and the fallibility of rationality, the wisdom of acting cautiously given our capacity to err. It is said that Socrates was the wisest of all because he knew that he did not know. The most foolish are those who know nothing but think they know it all.
There was a point when it seemed the human race was learning the truth of the balance between knowledge and ignorance. Where once we introduced exotic species into landscapes, unaware of and unconcerned by possible harmful effects, we started to pause and evaluate. Far too many free actions have gone awry for us to be too sanguine when technological fixers target the precautionary principle. That caution is misrepresented as fear. It doesn’t matter how that pausing and pondering is phrased, it is an essential component of wisdom with respect to nature. Human action is good when it avoids gambles with nature that we can ill afford to lose. Human action is good when agents refrain from charging ahead without proper reflection upon consequences. 

Within the environmental movement as a whole, there is no issue that causes more controversy and generates more confusion about nature, and about environmental policy in general, than the status of science and the appropriate role of technology in the use, alteration and manipulation of nature. This is not surprising since science and technology embody and express human knowledge as power. This denotes a capacity for good and for ill and, as such, brings us to the heart of the matter. It is the tales of Frankenstein and Faust – human beings making bargains with devils and coming to be controlled by their powers, playing god, being god. It profits a man nothing to give his soul for the whole world, but for nuclear power? GM crops? 

To go forwards in clarifying what is involved in living well, we need to address this issue of the scope of human knowledge, power and action. We need to be clear as to what science is and what technology can and cannot do, and how influential technics ought to be in the decision making and policy making process. To begin with a modest observation, quite often far too much is demanded of science and technology. It is not so much that science and technology fails but that it is given far too much work to do, resulting in them being unduly slighted. The simple truth is that science and technology alone, unaided by morality and culture, are inadequate to the task. 
To resolve these issues, there is a need to understand clearly what is entailed in the scientific study of nature. The aim of science is to furnish understanding about nature and learn how it works. In an ideal world, science would issue in complete knowledge of nature and how it functions in every given location. Only with that perfect knowledge would it be possible to predict accurately the direction that nature is likely to take. Only with that perfect knowledge would it be possible to predict how nature would react to particular human interventions or disruptions. Of course, such perfect knowledge is the ideal and is unlikely ever to be achieved. The main point to note, however, is that this scientific work is descriptive in nature. What science does is describe what nature is, how it operates, and how it will function. What science does not do is make prescriptive statements based on the goodness or badness of nature. Science in itself cannot make normative judgements, although it can inform such evaluation. In itself, science has no power to evaluate nature. 
This points to the fundamental flaw in any project that identifies human beings as ‘the God species’ on account of its scientific knowledge and technological power. It would be a strange kind of God that cannot evaluate, cannot prescribe ideals, cannot determine ends, cannot distinguish good from bad. This is something that science cannot do.

So there is a clear distinction here between describing nature and evaluating it normatively. To argue that science is purely descriptive is not to denigrate the role of science in yielding knowledge of nature. That knowledge can certain inform the attempts to evaluate nature. The point is that science alone and unaided cannot prescribe the good with respect to nature and human action and use. So if the claim made by Brand that we had better get good at being gods is serious, then there is a need to be clear that an essential part of rising to the challenge lies in recognising that scientific knowledge and technological power form only one part of solution, the part which concerns the means. The ends have to be supplied from elsewhere. Presuming, of course, that living well as gods is a human rather than a Faustian project. There is little that could be called ethics in all these books, no matter the references to gods and goddesses. For some scientists, the fact that science cannot prescribe morals means that morality is not scientific, so much the worse for morals.


In yielding knowledge of nature, in identifying the most efficient means to ends and in measuring human utility, science certainly has a positive contribution to make, but unaided, on its own merits, it remains inadequate to the task. Science is silent on good land use, how nature can be used to promote conviviality, convenience, collegiality, and a high quality of human life. Science can say nothing about values. Science is similarly inadequate when it comes to politics. The worst aspects of technological fixing is the underhand way in which politics come to be introduced under the cover of technical reason. The issue of GE crops, for instance, is a highly political question concerning the distribution of resources, ownership and use of the land, contracts, trade deals. The conflict and the exchanges involved are not scientific matters. Those who try to make these issues a matter of science are really trying to insulate contentious issues from political controversy, political intervention and political change. Ask yourself just who benefits from such depoliticisation and demoralisation.
Many aspects of human utility are shaped in practice by the preferences that people, individually or collectively, make. This is basic to democratic politics and embodies the principle of self-assumed obligation, the idea that individuals are obligated only by those laws that they themselves have played a part in making. Science can inform this process whereby individuals come to express their preferences, but it cannot itself determine these preferences. Anyone who either overrides these preferences by reference to scientific knowledge or, worse, restricts legitimate preferences to what has the backing of scientific knowledge, is plainly overstepping the boundaries. Not only do we get bad morals, we also get bad science to boot. In fine, human utility is determined by setting science and technology within a moral matrix constituted by non-scientific factors. 
No doubt, such a proposal may be considered an affront to science. To point out that science is confined to determining means in the world of fact outrages science’s pretensions to god-like status. But science cannot prescribe ends and must fall silent in the realm of values. Brand writes that we had better get good at living as gods. This begs the question of what is meant by good? What types of living count as good? What is virtue? Do we owe any duties to future generations? These questions are preeminently normative and cannot be answered by mere description. Certainly, science has a role to play in supplying the knowledge that helps clarify ethical considerations and inform moral choices. Thus, when thinking about protecting a certain wilderness, science gives us the knowledge to determine the protective steps that need to be taken to successfully undertake the task. That said, to repeat the point so that its full force is clear, the essential reasoning shaping ends is non-scientific. It is the business of science to find facts, it is for morality to determine ethical norms. Part of the challenge in living well as gods is to recognise this distinction between fact and value, means and ends, science and ethics, and ensure that the legitimate claims of all aspects of human thought, action and organisation are respected in their places. But will science accept its status as one part of a greater whole, the part that concerns means? To conceive science as God involves the inflation of a part to consume the whole. 

The same reasoning applies with respect to the role of science in establishing appropriate levels of caution. Science deals with the known, not with the unknown. This is why economic libertarians see a way of undermining the precautionary principle by having ecologists having to prove harm at the level of science. It switches the burden of proof from the exploiters of nature to the protectors of nature, knowing fine well that in the realm of the unknown no such scientific proof is possible. 
Ultimately, we have to make that distinction between science and ethics, fact and value again. Science is a way of explaining how nature functions, not whether, why and how nature ought to be altered, used and enjoyed. Science has a role to play in informing the answers to these questions, but the answers are moral and political rather than scientific. Scientists can demonstrate how much we know and don’t know and can estimate error and show the most efficient means to given ends. But the precautionary principle ultimately rests on prudential considerations, not scientific facts. And wild claims of scientific knowledge and promises of beneficial consequences are an obvious attempt to subvert prudential reasoning. Prudential reasoning, exercising good judgement and acting with foresight, is a way of dealing with ignorance and the inevitable errors in human calculation and action. Immanuel Kant argued that it is only by establishing the limits of reason that we can come to realise the full potential of reason. We need a mode of reasoning and deciding which recognises those limits and understand that whilst there is knowledge there is ignorance. This prudential reasoning is not a core principle of science. The attack upon the precautionary principle in the name of the freedom of science can be resisted and prudential wisdom affirmed over against scientism.
Given the demonstrable limitations of science when it comes to morality and politics, it should be clear that descriptive terms proper to science cannot be substituted for normative judgements, ethical considerations and political decisions. This does not mean rejecting science but setting it within a matrix which is infused by ethical, prudential, and other non-scientific considerations. Only when this framework is in place is it possible for human beings to creatively live up to its powers and hence live well as gods. Without that framework, all we will have is the same old misfiring of technological capacity.
And there is another good reason for holding firm to this distinction between science and ethics, the descriptive and the normative. Just as science cannot determine ends, so it cannot give us an alluring vision of the good life which is powerful enough to inspire human beings and encourage them to make it the object of their practical will. Read the books of Lynas, Lovelock and Brand, and the word which crops up the most is ‘survival’. Brand may talk of getting good at living as gods, but there is no vision of the good life and living well in his book. To succeed, environmentalism requires a vision of the good life that is available to us all if people embraced ecological ideas. This is a moral position that functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The vision of the good life inspire the eco-praxis that is the condition of the realisation of that vision. This is environmental politics as a whole lot more than science and technology and which promises more than survival. There is a need to outline the contours of the future ecological society and demonstrate by power of example what the environmental message is all about. Environmentalism today needs more vision and more practice, generating ecological values and incorporating them within practical projects, allowing people to live them within the everyday social practices of their neighbourhoods, communities, towns and cities. Environmentalism is not just about survival and is not even just about sustainable living. It is about living responsibly but also about living well. We need a vision that incorporates health and well-being, an aesthetic appreciation of life and nature, strong communities, and eudaimonistic ways of living that bring a deep and enduring  satisfaction. That amounts to a bit more than a power station in a beauty spot to supply energy for industry.
To repeat, nothing in this argument is anti-science. To set science within a wider framework is not constrict and inhibit science. Science has never stood alone and can never stand alone. Further, science alone cannot constitute a civilisation. We need to be alert at all times to the attempts of the opponents of environmentalism to confuse and cloud the issue and to smuggle in politics behind value-neutral and technical arguments. There is a clear sense in which those who seek to present an environmentalism that emphasises science and technology but is free of ideology and politics drift all too easily into the camp of the critics of environmentalism. Reading the arguments of Lynas, Brand and Lovelock and there is nothing at all that would not belong in the corporate, libertarian, and technocratic camp of environmentalism’s enemies. The casual references to politics build to form a coherent picture, with denials that the corporations are in control of the global economy and with cheap put downs of the socialist position. According to Brand, GM crops benefit local farmers and have nothing to do with corporate monopoly power. I could add ‘all evidence to the contrary’ here, except that Brand doesn’t spend any time debating political economy. 
As with economics, so with politics. Environmentalism is possible only when democracy is effective and people have real power, can exercise real choices. The political systems all over the world have been subject to corporate capture. Big business and finance rules the political roost, so it should be no surprise that environmentalism is floundering at the top level. There needs to be a double democratisation here, with reforms opening up the political process at the level of conventional politics combined with the revitalization of citizenship and true citizen democracy in the civic sphere.
There is some discussion of this in Brand, but it isn’t enough and most important of all it isn’t integrated within a broader framework.

There needs to be an overall goal and an overarching ethic that motivates behaviour and obligates all within a future oriented project. The environmental movement needs a goal, a planetary ethic which articulates a vision of harmoniously living with each other and with other species on the planet. This ethic portrays the rightful place that each and all have on the planet, not as aliens engaged in conquest but as beings who are at home. Such a conception presents a vision of human flourishing within an ecologically healthy land.

To realise this vision, the environmental movement as a whole needs to embed its values and express them consistently and repeatedly in word and deed. There is a need for an eco-praxis that not only draws increasing numbers into its orbit but demonstrates its worth and its practicability by the power of example. To repeat, science and technology serve as means and instruments but cannot supply the necessary vision. An environmentalism that lacks vision is unlikely to win extensive support and will thus fail to reorient public thinking to anything like the extent that is required.
A piecemeal approach is doomed to fall far short of what is required. A total problem, which is what the environmental crisis is, requires a total solution. To eschew an overall vision or goal is to hobble the project from the start. Too much environmentalism is currently undertaken with little thought about how to join all the thought and action together so as to synergize effort. Indeed, the obvious antipathy that Lovelock, Brand and Lynas display towards those bracketed as ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Green’ should indicate the extent to which reference to ‘the environmental movement’ is a misnomer. There are a lot of environmentalists of many varieties and persuasions, from right across the political spectrum, from anarchists to Conservative MPs. Collectively, the environmental cause has little by way of an overall goal and many would doubt that it could ever generate such an overarching ethic given the disparity of its component parts. But an overall ethic is possible, one that respects the diversity of the parts within a greater whole. The first principle of ecology concerns the law of ‘integrated systems’ and affirms a concept of interactive cooperation on the basis of the way nature actually functions. This principle is the very antithesis of individualism, isolationist behaviour, piecemeal action.
Incremental, piecemeal environmental work too often proceeds with little thought about larger ecological landscapes and wider ecological consequences. Specific interventions and policies are promoted with little regard for how each project relates to another within a greater whole. This needs to change. The last thing we need is civil war breaking out within the environmental camp, with splitters and popular fronts and renegades in every corner. Indeed, at risk of provoking such a conflict, the very strong statements made in favour of contentious technologies combined with casual abuse and ridicule of the opponents of these technologies seems designed to spread confusion and dissension within the ranks. The response of Friends of the Earth is the right one. Not only are they not afraid of the issues raised by Lynas, they have offered to debate these issues with him any time. Brand and Lynas give the distinct impression that ‘environmentalists’ silence debate on nuclear, GM crops, biotechnology. Actually, these issues have been debated over and again, drawing on the mass of research that has piled up over the years. But the purpose of debate is to clarify issues and form conclusions. Brand and Lynas seem to want greens and environmentalists to abandon political activism in favour of a permanent agnosticism. And whilst we are all still debating, the crucial decisions will have been taken and there will be nothing left to debate. Sorry, but reason is not an endless debate but a moral obligation to see the woods for the trees. 
The simple point is this, that overall coherence and internal cohesion are required if the environmental movement is to thrive and grow, allowing it to draw increasing numbers in whilst moving on to issues of urban sprawl, habitat fragmentation, public health, Green collar economics and other issues of practical concern.

Scientific arrogance, ignorance, and burdens of proof. 
The concern with wise living – how else do gods live? – must address the whole question of the limits of knowledge, of human ignorance and of factual uncertainty. This is no abstract issue concerning the philosophy of science but is of direct practical relevance. The issue goes right to the core of environmental disputes, particularly at the interface where science meets politics. Environmentalism has to address this ignorance and generate well-crafted approaches which are able to accommodate it. Failure to do otherwise leads to either of two things, a free hand for science and technology in the service of state and corporate power on the one hand and a paralysis of eco-praxis on the other.

Science delivers factual knowledge of nature and how it works. But it does not deliver complete knowledge. The great paradox is that the more science comes to know about nature, the more we come to know how little we know. Since our ignorance about nature is vast, we ought to act cautiously before and when tinkering with it. The idea is simple. As John Wayne put it in The Shootist, ‘never jump into the river until you know how deep it is’. And what’s good enough for John Wayne is good enough for me. Where there is money to be made, there has never been a shortage of people jumping in, quite often getting in way above their heads and drowning. 

In The Lesser Arts, William Morris put the point with unarguable force and vigour. 
Is money to be gathered? cut down the pleasant trees among the houses, pull down ancient and venerable buildings for the money that a few square yards of London dirt will fetch; blacken rivers, hide the sun and poison the air with smoke and worse, and it's nobody's business to see to it or mend it: that is all that modern commerce, the counting-house forgetful of the workshop, will do for us herein.
And Science—we have loved her well, and followed her diligently, what will she do? I fear she is so much in the pay of the counting-house, the counting-house and the drill-sergeant, that she is too busy, and will for the present do nothing. 
Indeed yes, there is a good reason why the precautionary principle is in place and needs to be respected. And there is good reason why the people in the counting-house want its dissolution – there is money to be gathered. Brought up in a commercial civilisation organised around monetary ties, we have become accustomed to seeing the world through the distorting lens of competition, ambition, self-aggrandizement and greed. 
To repeat, the precautionary principle is based on good sound science. The expansion of scientific knowledge has increased our awareness of the extent of our ignorance. The unintended ecological consequences of a single discrete act are so many and so extensive that it is well-nigh impossible to trace them. To proceed with caution, providing options to correct mistakes, makes sense. Who, really, is inconvenienced by hesitation? One of the more disreputable features of the arguments for GE crops is the emotional blackmail involved, with GE crops offered as the solution to global famine and critics portrayed as enemies of the starving millions. There has never been an excuse for mass famine and many of the critics now portrayed as being responsible for blocking the delivery of cheap food to the people have been at the forefront of showing how the global political economy, not nature, lies behind global famine. In the decades when critics of political and economic arrangements have attempted to expose the argument for natural causes of famine as a lie, technological fixers, Brand’s practical men who get things done, were busy getting things done for government and business. Practical men, we understand, don’t waste time with political controversies, with those awkward questions which concern who gets what and why. Now, all of a sudden, they have become passionate in the crusade against global famine. The politics of famine never much worried them before. What has changed? To repeat, the problem of famine is one of distribution, not production. The problem could have been resolved long before GM crops. The failure of the technological fixers to recognise this point means that we are entitled to be suspicious of the business and political interests that may be lurking. Nothing about the technology of GM crops alters the patterns of distribution that generate famine in the first place. On the contrary, the same people cement and centralise their control over the world’s food supply. It is not likely that they have people’s health and well-being at heart – they never have had in the past, presenting socially induced famine as natural calamities.

The scientist and thinker Jacob Bronowski makes a brilliant argument here with reference to Einstein’s rejection of the presidency of Israel:

I bring in the name of Einstein deliberately because he was a scientist, and the intellectual leadership of the twentieth century rests with scientists. And that poses a grave problem, because science is also a source of power that walks close to government and that the state wants to harness. But if science allows itself to go that way, the beliefs of the twentieth century will fall to pieces in cynicism. We shall be left without belief, because no beliefs can be built up in this century that are not based on science as the recognition of the uniqueness of man, and a pride in his gifts and works. It is not the business of science to inherit the earth, but to inherit the moral imagination; because without that man and beliefs and science will perish together. (Bronowski 2011 ch 13).

It is not the business of science to inherit the earth, it is not the business of scientists to be as gods. That moral imagination of which Bronowski spoke so eloquently is more than science. To eclipse the moral imagination through the over-extension of science will doom us all.

Ultimately, real, enduring progress is concomitant on the growth of social intelligence and ecological sensibility. We need an overall plan, a goal, a grand vision of a flourishing modus vivendi and, over and above factual knowledge and technical know-how, this requires a system of values.

The idea that only those with scientific knowledge and technological expertise can qualify as gods runs through the Lynas and Brand books and gives the strong prescriptions offered a malodorous quality. There is a peculiar flavour to these books, a dissonance that is apparent from the start, a lack of balance. Reading through the books, one is struck by how little respect is given to alternative views and platforms. There is a patronising tone and worse, an emphasis on the lack of knowledge, expertise and understanding that various groups have, the full range from environmentalists to consumers. 
Lovelock, Brand and Lynas may not be as expert as they think, demonstrating a shallow understanding and poor grasp of many issues, setting up straw men to knock down, employing vacuous generalisation, presenting extreme positions as the norm, exhibiting a startling political ignorance and revealing a very selective approach to the evidence. 
But let us presume, for sake of argument, that the authors are all-knowing scientists of genius. That would still not justify the divinity of the intellect they propose. Brand repeats time and again that the scientists are the ones who ‘know the most’, implying that they are the ones who should be freest to act. Hence the assault on the precautionary principle. Far from saving civilisation, this intellectual arrogance can only destroy it. As Bronowski argued so eloquently, ‘If we are anything, we must be a democracy of the intellect. We must not perish by the distance between people and government, between people and power, by which Babylon and Egypt and Rome failed. And that distance can only be conflated, can only be closed, if knowledge sits in the homes and heads of people with no ambition to control others, and not up in the isolated seats of power. (Bronowski 2011 ch 13). 

I quote Bronowki at length because there is a tendency on the part of hubristic scientists to dismiss their critics as non-scientists. I stand alongside Bronowski. 

Arguing from a scientific perspective, Bronowski is clear that knowledge empowers each and all, not as gods, but as citizens working in concert for a common cause. Bronowski thus rejects the view that a scientific society entails a world run by specialists. ‘A scientific society is one in which specialists can indeed do the things like making the electric light work. But it is you, it is I, who have to know how nature works, and how (for example) electricity is one of her expressions in the light and in my brain’. (Bronowski 2011 ch 13). This points to the democratisation of power and knowledge, the philosophy of reality constituting praxis.

The search for the eudaimonistic foundations for human flourishing and a fulfilled society continues, but it is a moral project rather than a scientific one. Civilisation is constituted by much more than quick technological fixes. If science and technology are the solution, then why do we have a problem in the first place? We have had some four centuries of scientific revolution and technological expansion, time enough for the resolution of our problems. And, of course, science and technology have more than delivered on their part of the bargain. It is morals and politics that are failing and there is no scientific solution to this problem. ‘Our actions as adults, as decision makers, as human beings, are mediated by values, which I interpret as general strategies in which we balance opposing impulses. It is not true that we run our lives by any computer scheme of problem solving. The problems of life are insoluble in this sense. Instead, we shape our conduct by finding principles to guide it. We devise ethical strategies or systems of values to ensure that what is attractive in the short term is weighed in the balance of the ultimate, long-term satisfactions’. (Bronowski 2011 ch 13). 

Friends of the planet can hope, pray and take action in pursuit of a new ethical order in which human beings flourish, valuing the affective ties that connect each and all as well as the environing natural systems, affirming their individuality through both social relations and natural and achieving an inner and outer harmony within a settled communal and ecological modus vivendi. 
There is nothing inevitable about any of this. One can be optimistic, one can be pessimistic. One can debate probabilities and decide nothing. Ultimately, well done is better than well said. But what can be said is that this vision of future society is perfectly possible and faces no insurmountable institutional, political, scientific, and psychological obstacles. 

The environmental crisis is an unprecedented ‘total’ challenge that is impossible to ignore. To meet that challenge, our carbon based commercial civilization needs to be restructured around an ecological and moral sensibility that is encapsulated in the title of Carolyn Merchant’s book Earthcare (1995). The point is that we need an ethics and a politics that takes better care of the nature around us as an essential condition of our own well-being. The planet is our home, the only one we have. We occupy it together, increasingly close together as the world gets smaller and the population gets bigger. 

The point was expressed in almost poetic terms by Barbara Ward and René Dubos in Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet:

Alone in space, alone in its life-supporting systems, powered by inconceivable energies, mediating them to us through the most delicate adjustments, wayward, unlikely, unpredictable, but nourishing, enlivening and enriching in the largest degree - is this not a precious home for all of us earthlings? Is it not worth our love? Does it not deserve all the inventiveness and courage and generosity of which we are capable to preserve it from degradation and destruction and, by doing so, to secure our own survival?

Ward and Dubos 1972:299

These are good questions, all of them, and all of them to be answered in the affirmative. We are being called upon to rise to the challenge of civilisation building and it is plain what our response should be. The answers to the questions are clearly ‘yes’. Yet, given the way that the global political economy is arranged, hundreds of millions of individuals are involved in social practices and relations which mean that, every day, they are effectively answering in the negative. Caught up in instrumental, monetary relationships, they have to put egoism before altruism. An affirmative answer to those crucial questions posed by Ward and Dubos presumes a social identity that does not as yet exist. An ecological sensibility can only emerge within social relationships which allow individuals to make common cause with each other as well as with environing nature. At the level of science there is agreement that nature is an intricate, interconnected web of life. This means that what human practices do to nature in one place can have an impact in other places, often far away from the original scene. The science of ecology is clear that the health and happiness of one family is linked to the activities of other families, both near and far. On this planet, we are all everybody else’s neighbour, we are all in each other’s backyard. But the ecological sense of nature as a seamless web of life is contradicted by social relationships which separate individuals from each other, set individuals against each other in the competition for scarce resources, that disconnect us from each other and from the environment. That, ultimately, is why ecological appeals to the ‘one earth’ and the ‘one home’ fail at the level of practice. Individuals have to act within atomistic, egoistic and instrumental social relationship, however much they may respect and recognise nature as an interconnected web of life. To change that requires politics and social transformation. Only with a new social identity with the appeal to ecological interconnection succeed.

In addressing his fellow Revolutionaries, Benjamin Franklin declared that we either hang together or we shall all hang separately. Well, we are hanging separately at the moment as a result of having to live and work within atomistic and instrumental social relationships. In uniting around a common cause, the American Revolutionaries recognised that they were in it together, and that is precisely what we need to recognise today. 

The time has come for a new ecological politics that is concerned to make our landscapes and townscapes, our homes as well as our planetary home as healthy, as beautiful, and as life-affirming as they can be. This means opposing the quality of being over against the quantity of having.

The social fabric at the heart of every nation forms an interwoven whole and, as such, is on a continuum with nature’s interconnected web of life. An injury to one is an injury to our collective whole. This applies to our neighbourhoods, our communities, and our natural places. Ill health in one place entails ill health in the one home that we all inhabit. Well-being in that planetary home implies well-being in all places.


We can rise to these challenges, just as past generations have risen to whatever challenges have been put before them. Given our technological capacity, our global connections and communications, our institutional infrastructures, technological powers and financial resources, we can draw on resources far in excess of those available to past generations. Perhaps we have an excess of material resources and a deficiency of moral resources. My favourite architect Frank Lloyd Wright was shocked when three of his students refused to jump in six feet of water on a cold November evening to rescue a part of a generator that had fallen in. "The idea!" replied Mr. Wright. "And you boys are supposed to be young!" Wright took off his shoes, socks, and coat, plunged into the water and pulled out the lost part. Back home, he couldn’t get over the fact that those strong young men had proven to be so cowardly. "How can it be?" he asked his wife. "I'm surprised. All you had to do was take off your shoes and coat and get into the water. That can't hurt anyone. They're old men, those fellows, that's what they are. I never ask anybody to do anything I wouldn't do." What to Wright was a natural act appeared to be an incredible feat to the three young men an incredible feat. To Wright, they lacked "simple courage."

In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Karl Marx wrote that ‘the production of too many useful things produces too many useless people.’ It is worth pondering the riddle of the Sphinx, what starts on four legs, walks on two legs and ends on three legs? The answer is ‘man’, beginning life as a baby, walking as an adult and employing a walking a stick in old age. The ancient Greek for the stick is the derivative of the word technology. In becoming over-reliant on technology, we have become less capable of using our own innate abilities. We have become the ‘old men’ that Frank Lloyd Wright derided.

‘Simple courage’ is really all we need to see through and break through the fetters, mental and social, that have us droning our lives away and hurrying civilisation to oblivion. It is indeed possible to create a sustainable social order that combines economic prosperity and ecological health. And it is perfectly possible to enhance and enrich individual liberty as we engage in a common endeavour to make our planetary home healthier, happier, more beautiful, and more supportive of the good life. Yes, ‘the good life’. ‘I don’t want to buy a pig in a poke’ came the response from my DOS when I raised the vision of ‘the good life’ with him. He was right to be sceptical. But the good life is not a chimera, and there is such a thing as the common good too. We share our society and our land with each other and, indeed, with a remarkably diverse array of other life forms. Richard Dawkins calls the diversity exhibited by nature The Greatest Show on Earth (2009) and he’s right. If evolutionary theory has done one positive thing, it is to have emphasised that this whole show has not been set up for our benefit or enjoyment but that we are merely part of the show. But it’s a good show all the same and we all have a part to play. In a very important sense, we do not own nature. It is not ours to possess. At best, we are stewards and tenants, and a new theology of ecology is developing along these lines. Not before time. We have spent so much time worshipping the Creator that we have neglected the Creation. The two go together. We have a duty to care for nature for the benefit of our grandchildren and their grandchildren. And in practising earthcare, we benefit our own well-being too. Virtue is its own reward, as the great Plato told us from the first.

All of this amounts to new kind of progress, a moral progress beyond material expansion and technological capacity. This involves a broader vision of community, one that includes all of life as well as future life. The image below comes from Richard Dawkins’ Greatest Show on Earth. Here, Dawkins expresses his love of the dancing sifaka. 


It would indeed be a world poorer in spirit if the dancing sifaka should become extinct.
Scientific, industrial and democratic revolutions combined to usher in a new civilisation based on material expansion and individual human rights. It has brought us this far and set us new challenges. Over the years, we have constantly revised our conception of progress and, generation by generation, expanded the moral circle to include others, the marginalised, the poor, the oppressed, the outsider, the other, women. This moral expansion can go further. With the globalisation of economic relations and communications we can expanded the boundaries of our communities to reach out and draw in new members, peoples of different race, colour and creed. This is to create the one home in a social and political sense as a continuation of our civilisation building as a moral project. As an ecological project, this involves changing the ways we live on the land so as to embed and express respect for the fundamental forces of nature.

James Lovelock argues for increased arms spending and preparation for war and the rule of the warlords. Where the money for this increase comes from is anyone’s guess. The world already spends $1.7 trillion on arms. And what of his blasé argument concerning the survival of the fittest 500 million? This sounds like the survival of those who can afford the biggest and best weapons, the richest and the most powerful, the people who have brought the planet to this Hobbesian war of all against all, not those who fit the contours of the land. These people are the least fit. We can do better than this nightmarish vision.

The Earth Policy Institute estimates that restoring the planet's life support systems, stabilizing population, and eradicating poverty would cost less than $200 billion of additional expenditures a year. That might seem like a lot of money but it represents a mere 13% of the current global arms budget. Since Freud, many social theorists – Fromm, Marcuse, Reich and many more – have pointed to a dialectic of eros and thanatos running through modern civilisation. It is as if there is a death instinct stalking a disenchanted, nihilistic world stripped of its ends, its values and its divinities. That’s the paradox of evolutionary thinking. Stripped to biological imperatives, human beings are deprived of meaning other than survival and thus lose the will to survive. Human beings need a sense of the transcendent. That $200 billion is the price of a new security concerned to prevent civilisation collapse. We can pay the $1.7 trillion price for the old security and ensure that collapse. To have to choose between eros and thanatos is nothing new, of course. 'I have set before you life and death, the blessing and the curse. Therefore choose life' (Deuteronomy 30:19). 

This is why it is shallow to oppose pessimism and optimism. These are not the choices. Some of the most intelligent thinkers and actors in history, the ones who have done the most to push back the boundaries of freedom, have been diehard pessimists. Some of the people who have done the most damage and taken us all headlong into the deepest of waters have been cock-eyed loony optimists. There is a greater moral responsibility here, beyond moods and characters, relating to judgement. Human beings are free, choosing animals. Life is choice and it is in our power to choose life. Herein lies the dignity of all human beings. That is what is so repugnant about the assertions that scientists are the ones ‘who know the most’. Know the most about what? Their own particular specialism, maybe, but there is more to life than that. If lack of knowledge is used to deny choice then in no time we will have no freedom, and no meaning. It is that dignity that makes us humans rather than things. If we deny freedom at the level of moral choice, we will lose it in practice in no time at all. Socrates was the wisest of all because he knew that he did not know. He met his end taking a stand on moral principle and, as a result, set the benchmark for humanity. It is only by recognising that we do not know that we go on to attain true knowledge. 

The Feasible Alternative Future
There is no reason why we cannot move away from fossil fuels. The problem is one of timing. The challenge is to close coal-fired power plants before the ice sheets and ice caps disappear. We can look upon the Greenland ice sheet as a test case. The melting of the Greenland ice sheet will raise the sea level by over 20 feet. This will mean the flooding of hundreds of coastal towns and cities and of the rice-growing river deltas of Asia, resulting in hundreds of millions of environmental refugees. As such, Greenland represents our whole planetary condition. If the human race cannot organise, mobilize, intervene and act to save the Greenland ice sheet, then it is unlikely to be up to the task of saving civilization in its current form. 

In similar fashion, global poverty and famine can also be eradicated and the growth in population can be stabilized if we act quickly and decisively enough, with sufficient – and available – resources. The demographic trap can be sprung in such a way as to raise living standards. The question is whether we can act quickly enough before global civilization starts to unravel?

This is a demand for change, for self-change as well as for institutional change. Here, institutional, political, cultural and psychological inertia merge and feed off each other. The crucial question is how we can get people involved, acting and moving. 

Lewis Mumford wrote that: ‘the difficult we do immediately; the impossible will take a little longer’ (Mumford  Letters 1972:149). Rapid change as a deliberate strategy is not impossible. One can agree with Lewis Mumford that the key factor in the evolution of cities and civilisation is time, evolution as an organic process that grows out of its own soil and soul. But time is something we do not have. Instead we have to combine our intellect, wit and will with our substantial resources and engage in a process of civilisation building in a conscious manner. But it is not impossible. We do not need the example of forced modernisation of Stalinist Russia, one can look at the developmental states developed by the countries of continental Europe as they sought to catch up with industrialised Britain. Or the US economy. Or, even more apt perhaps, the war economies of 1914-18 and even more 1939-45. The point is that the restructuring of political institutions and economic arrangements can take a few years, even months, rather than decades The major environmental problems we face can be resolved in  a sustainable way in a matter of a decade with concerted, coordinated effort. Isn’t this what Brand and Lynas are arguing, that technology can buy us the time we don’t have? They may have part of the truth, there. But a half-truth is not only half true, it is also half wrong. The problem with technological fixing is that we can end up backing the wrong technologies whilst ignoring the other necessary transformations required in our institutions, social arrangements, culture and psychologies. Get it slightly wrong on nuclear power and GE, and the consequences can be fatal.

The general point is that the technologies, institutional capacities and financial resources exist to stabilize climate change, eradicate poverty, stabilize population, restore nature's life support systems, and, above all, give us the reason to hope that inspires action. Look at the resources that have been thrown into efforts to bail out a corrupt and failing capitalism, look again at the $1.7 trillion global arms budget and look at the lengths our global leaders go to prop up their failing system. A fraction of these resources and of these efforts targeted well is all that is required to reorient civilization away from the decline-and-collapse path and point it in the direction of sustainable living. 

It is an irony that as the world has got bigger in a new globalised environment, political thinking has tended to get smaller. Every proposal of political reform leading to an alternative to a failing social order is met with the question ‘where’s the money going to come from?’ The same place as bail outs for banks, subsidies for industry, and investment in arms production comes from. The money is there. The resources are certainly there and always will be so long as human beings exist. Effective and enduring environmental action does come with a price tag. But any evaluation of the costs of environmental action is only meaningful when considered alongside the costs of non-action.

Piecemeal efforts and one-off expenditures will not be enough. Environmental action requires a total programme rather than half-baked penny pinching half-measures. It has been calculated that the external funding required to stabilize population and eradicate poverty amounts to an additional expenditure of $75 billion per year. These efforts need to be accompanied by an earth restoration effort if they are to succeed. Protecting topsoil, reforesting the earth, restoring oceanic fisheries, and other such measures have been estimated to cost $110 billion in additional expenditures per year. Combining both social and ecological goals within one programme thus involves an additional annual expenditure of $185 billion. This involves a new concept of security in a globalised environment, one that looks more at health and well-being, the quality of life, rather than just the protection of material quantity behind national border. This new defence budget is a mere 13% of global military expenditures and whereas current defence policy fosters national and ethnic rivalries and generates global insecurity, the new defence budget fosters peace and cooperation. 
Here we come up against not institutional, technological and financial constraints but mental and moral constraints. The great poet William Blake referred to the ‘mind forged manacles’ of humankind. Every society and every civilisation normalises its own beliefs and its own purposes as the one and only true reality. That cultural and psychological inertia is what we have to break. We can point out the facts and figures easily. The states of the world focus substantial resources on building an ever-stronger military. In 2011, global military expenditures accounted for $1.738 trillion, with the US accounting for the largest share of total with an expenditure of $711. China spends $143 billion, France $62.5 billion, the United Kingdom $62.7 billion, Russia $71.9 billion, Japan $59.3, India $48.9, Saudi Arabia $48. The resources to restore the planet and save civilisation are already there; they are being spent to destroy life.
Politics is not rational and simply pointing to facts and figures will not suffice. At the same time these states undertake such expenditure, the threats posed by increasing environmental deterioration, poverty, and population growth continue to be ignored. At the level of reason, the case is unarguable. For less than $200 billion of additional annual expenditure, hunger, illiteracy, disease, and poverty can be eradicated, and the earth's soils, forests, and fisheries can be restored. As part of the same process we can build a global community in which the basic needs of each and all are satisfied in a way that does not harm nature’s support systems. That is the real reason why we can refuse the technological bluff, what Lewis Mumford called the megamachine’s bribe. The technological fixing of Brand and Lynas rests on a faulty premise, the notion that ecological necessity is now so pressing that we have run out of time and our options have narrowed to gambling on our technologies. It is not clear that this is exactly what they believe. Brand, for instance, extols the virtues of the city planet, arguing that urbanisation is a process of global greening. Whilst that claim needs to be examined more closely, the point is that it involves a recognition that enduring environmental transformation involves much more than technology and much more than specific technologies. For the same effort and the same resources that Brand and Lynas demand for nuclear energy, GM crops, biotechnology and geoengineering, we could have a genuine resolution of the environmental crisis through the fundamental restructuring of civilisation. Technological fixing does not examine fundamentals but tackles the problem at the wrong end – it leaves the pillars of the same ecologically destructive temple standing and equips the system with more efficient means of ensuring that the roof falls in on us all.
The issue will be decided by the extent to which we succeed, as a matter of organised and deliberate political purpose, in shifting resources from environmentally destructive to environmentally sustainable activities. Resources are financial, institutional and technological as well as moral, cultural and psychological. It is resource shifting in this holistic sense rather than additional expenditures and technological applications, that is the key to restructuring civilisation so as facilitate sustainable living. We don’t really have to live as gods to achieve this. The moral responsibility that comes with an active and informed citizenship would be more than enough.




Brand argues that we need to get good at living as gods. Fine. This is to meet Nietzsche’s challenge that human beings should only have such powers that they can creatively live up to. We can agree on this, but it begs the question of whether all too human beings can indeed live up to that promise. And how we can do it. In truth, we do not need to pitch the challenge so high. We are not being called upon to sacrifice our lives on the slaughterbench of rational modernity. It is the present death-dealing destructive system that is forcing us to do that. To change direction requires only that we become politically active and make lifestyle changes. All we are called upon to sacrifice is our attachment to the false promises of industrial civilisation. We need to become citizens in a life affirming earth restoration core, working together for a common goal and changing our lifestyles in the process. We have been sold a false prospectus. Endless consumption does not bring true happiness and fulfilment, only an enervating hollowness. The contributions that we make each and every day, whether in time, money, effort, changed consumption patterns, will all make a difference in the cause of saving civilization. There is a tendency for people to see their own contributions as too small to make a significant difference. This is wrong for a couple of reasons. In the first place, in line with Plato’s argument that virtue is its own reward, becoming a virtuous person is reward enough in itself, becoming the best that one could ever be. That is a significant difference with respect to one’s personhood. In the second place there is the grain of sand argument. A single grain of sand may well lack significance alone, but together, when the sand starts to shift, it becomes an irresistible force.


Ultimately, we are back to Socrates and moral choice. In the end, when human beings have been stripped of everything they have, they still have that capacity for moral choice. We can choose to live or we can choose to die. Deuteronomy says ‘choose life’. We don’t have to. Ours wouldn’t be the first civilisation to die, although it could be the last. But we do have the choice, you and I. We can continue with big business as usual and accept the megamachine bribe, we can pretend that environmental problems are being managed or a merely ‘made up’ as an excuse to raise taxes. That’s the easiest option. That’s the path of the coward. And it is to choose death by default. The economy will continue to destroy its natural support systems until finally civilisation implodes from within. The changes are so slow that we see them in only the small effects that are easily normalised. The old French proverb of the lily pond is pertinent here. Over a thirty day period, the lily in the pond doubles in size each day. Instead of tackling the problem at the start, we wait until the lily threatens to cover the whole pond. That moment comes, of course, on the very last day, when it is far too late to act. That’s the ultimate evidence of harm, proof at the level of scientific fact, demanded by those who are out to weaken the precautionary principle. 

We know enough to exercise prudential judgement and change direction as responsible citizens, moving the world onto the path of sustainable living. But the choice has to be made, life or death. 

We can see the strong promotion of new technologies for what it is, a moral evasion. Any attempt to avoid the necessity of moral choice will simply revert to the default option of ecocide. The choice we make now will affect life on this planet for all the generations to come. This is what is so alarming about the strong and tendentious advocacy of nuclear power. We gamble on others’ health and welfare in order to save our own spineless selves. It takes real moral courage to choose life. It is not impossible. Since we know enough about the root causes of environmental problems, we can also join together and act to solve them.

There is an alternative to gambling with Gaia and it’s called ‘worldchanging’. Worldchanging is a teamsport, and there is a place in the team for everyone. We are not short of alternatives at all. Back in the seventies a popular Christmas present for children was something called a ‘compendium of games’. There was always something in the box for everyone, something to engage the interest and induce one to join with others to engage in some game or other. The book Worldchanging: A User's Guide for the 21st Century is a compendium of solutions, some little known but tried and tested by experience, and spread by the power of example, some innovative and new, some bold but as yet untried, many traditional. There is such a rich welter of activities and practices all over the world that there is something somewhere for everyone to do. Nicholas Stern is a strong advocate of the power of example. The question Stern is most frequently asked in governmental circles is ‘is somebody somewhere already doing this and making it work?’ (Stern 2010). His response is in the affirmative. The charges of utopianism, ‘it can’t be done’, are refuted by practical experience. By power of example, we publicise and generalise ecological practices. Worldchanging deals with what is already being done, but at the same time extends the boundaries of the possible by encouraging us to imagine what could be — in our own homes, in our communities, and for the planet as a whole. This challenges the false fixity of ‘what has to be’. There is nothing inevitable about our institutional infrastructure and our social and economic arrangements. A too heavy an emphasis upon environmental problems led Murray Bookchin in the 1980s to denounce ecology as the new ‘dismal science.’ There are good reasons for gloom, when critical analysis is detached from practices and solutions. Taken together, Worldchanging’s compendium of solutions presents a vision of an alternative future that is neither gloomy nor catastrophic, but which is well within our grasp and so fills us with hope. To build that alternative future, indeed to have a future at all, we need a generation of everyday heroes and heroines, individuals who have the simple moral courage to think things through, see things in new light and the guts to meet the environmental crisis head-on. This applies to all individuals on account of their human dignity, that capacity to exercise moral choice. This is what is so offensive and so disabling by Brand’s comment that the scientists are ‘those who know the most’. Whatever our expertise, whatever our talent, whatever our work, we all know something. Only God knows it all. And we are very far from being gods.

"Worldchanging" is a grouping of practical visionaries who are finding, exchanging, assembling, and disseminating knowledge — with each other and with a global audience that continues to grow. This is revolution as a continuous process, not a single event. Worldchangers are the forecasters of alternative futures. In their practises they reveal that the tools, models, and ideas for building the alterative society are already here. The essential elements of the future society are already under our noses. Worldchangers are the people who supply the organizational impetus for the ongoing work of civilisation building. Everywhere you look on the planet it is possible to find clusters of engineers, academics, journalists, designers, civic activists, campaigners, futurists, technicians, and in many cases these agents of change fulfil more than one role at the same time. Martin Heidegger had a concept of dwelling in the fourfold of sky, earth, divinities and mortals, not just inhabiting in a place, colonising it, but dwelling in it as a true home. Too often, we appear as aliens using our technology to occupy a foreign land. We need to learn how to dwell in a place, make it a true home. This is to become true natives at home with our place in the world. This requires more than expert knowledge but above all a novel cultural and ecological sensibility. Worldchangers are not impressed by arrogant claims made for and on behalf of knowledge. They are themselves a particularly knowledgeable and insightful lot. They exhibit a unique ability to take the isolated shafts of information and knowledge to form a coherent picture of a more enlightened way of life. That is wisdom and it points, again, to prudential judgement. It is not a case of knowing the most but of becoming the change we want to see.

The elitism of technocratic solutions is wholly inappropriate and inadequate to the task in hand. Worldchanging is a team sport, and every person on the planet has a position on that team. Learning, as a change in behaviour, is more important than elitist claims to expertise. From a religious perspective, Thomas Moore wrote a book entitled A Life at Work The Joy of Discovering What You Were Born to Do in 2008 which is highly apt with respect to building a future worth living in. Learning, as a change of behaviour, is never easy in itself, but discovering what each of us feels we were born to do, in that way that only we can do it, yields a joy out of the recognition of the uniqueness of each and every one of us. 

Plato argued that the unexamined life is not worth living. Environmental crisis is forcing us to examine ourselves, our lives and our purposes as never before. The question "What will I do?" has become the key question of our time.
Since these questions are not easy, it is wise to distrust those who offer easy answers. To repeat, if technology is the solution, we wouldn’t have a problem. This essay doesn’t supply a to-do list but is more concerned with getting people to rethink their lives so as to generate altered perspectives on change. This is why I have laboured Brand’s claim that the scientists are the ones who ‘know the most’. They don’t know it all, no one does. Know-nothing know-it-alls have never been in short supply in failed states and civilisations. Know-alls are invariably wrong for the very reason that they are more impressed by the little they know than the great deal they don’t. More important than the few who ‘know the most’ are the many who have the nerve to embark on a voyage of discovery and learn how to make a difference for the better in concert with each other. They are team players and they pull their weight, generating new knowledge, mapping the world with ideas, suggesting ways for new solutions and opening up new vistas on the future. The joy of discovering what you were born to do is reality changing and life affirming, finding a way to make your life count.
The technological bluff can be called. The only safe, sane and rational option is to channel all available resources into the creation of a new civilisation based upon renewable energies, creating new industries, providing millions of jobs, and redefining security as the protection of the climate and environment. Those who argue against the renewable energy economy, indeed, those who attempt to conceal fundamental institutional and political questions behind technology, should be treated with scepticism. Without taking a position on nuclear energy or GM crops or biotechnology, it should be apparent that these issues are contentious, controversial and complex. It is immediately apparent, regardless of one’s particular position on these technologies, that the discussions of Brand, Lynas and Lovelock are not only not balanced between the many pros and cons, but skewed. That is reason enough to ignore the arguments as anything more than opinion designed to provoke debate. The implication that ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Greens’ are shy of such debate is plain calumny. These technologies have always been debated and continue to be debated. There is a failure here to differentiate intellectual work and research from political activism. Of course, environmental activists have a decided view with respect to their positions. At some point, debate has to end and conclusions, however conditional and provisional, has to be drawn. To criticise an environmental activist for being anti-nuclear is cheap and easy. It’s like criticising The Socialist Workers Party for being socialists. Well, they would be, wouldn’t they. The difficult part is to go beyond the political activism to the argument, evidence and research behind the anti-nuclear position, God knows there is enough of it. Brand, Lovelock and Lynas’ assault is firmly on the political activists and movements. That’s significant. The assault is political, not intellectual. They are demanding that political activists abandon politics and opt for the cautious agnosticism of scientists. As environmentalism becomes a central part of the public realm, therefore getting into positions to effect real change, the charge of political activism rather than real science is made. As though the claims made for nuclear coming from Lovelock et al are not political! 
In taking on the political activists, Lovelock, Brand and Lynas avoid the case made against nuclear by scientists. Researchers detail the very many reasons why a new nuclear programme is not the answer. The more research is done, the clearer the case against nuclear and in favour of renewable energy becomes, not only in terms of energy efficiency and safety and security, but in terms of a whole range of social benefits, from employment to community control. But apart of the case for and against nuclear, there is a way of arguing the case for and the case against, one that is even-handed, balanced, meets criticisms at their strongest rather than their weakest, cites evidence rather than collects opinion etc. It is not so much the argument for nuclear that mars the presentations made by Brand, Lynas and Lovelock as the mode of argumentation they employ.

The avoidance of politics and the failure to envisage substantial changes in social arrangements and practices is a real cause for concern. It is evasion. Having grown up in a civilisation built upon fossil-fuels, we find it difficult to envisage a renewable energy economy. We return to the poverty of the imagination and an inability to envisage that complex societies could be organized differently. We need to develop the epistemological and structural capacity to see through and to break through prevailing social relations. This is what worldchanging eco-praxis entails. There is no doubt now that we need an ecological revolution that changes the way we live and how we use our resources, material and moral. The global economic crisis is what David Held (1987) calls a crisis with transformative potential, a crisis so deep that its resolution entails the fundamental transformation of a society. Such a crisis involves the erosion of the fundamental organizational principle of a society so that change involves a new political and social order. (Held 1987 ch 7). The convergence of environmental and economic crisis offers a unique opportunity to engage in fundamental transformation and develop the low-carbon, resource-efficient and socially sustainable economy, enabling social control and moral responsibility, and long term sustainable living.

There are those who thing we are now well past the point of no return. Here is what James Lovelock said to Brand: ‘The earth will continue to move to its hot state almost regardless of what we do… Peter Cox at the Hadley Centre in our country has done some very careful analysis on how little CO2 is needed to start the automatic jump from the cool to the hot state, and it's an astonishingly and worryingly small quantity. He probably doesn't want to be quoted. It turns out to be about a quarter of a gigaton of carbon per year. Now that compares with the eight gigatons that we're actually emitting to the atmosphere. So you'd have to cut back below that level to keep it stable, and you wouldn't succeed if it's already on course up towards its hot state. You're not going to turn it back."


It’s not that we haven’t been warned. We have ignored those warnings and are still doing far too little far too late in the day. Is a ship of fools worth saving? Even if you save the ship, the fools will soon be headed for the rocks again. Technology cannot save us, we can only save ourselves. We continue to live off the earth's natural capital and use our borrowed time to evade moral decision. However, there is a growing realization that this is the time for action, for imagination and for understanding that we can act together to create a sustainable world; but there is a role for all of us to play in making this a reality.

Sustainable living advances the possibility of transformation  on a vast scale. This does not entail a change in human nature but that we merely act on the better part of our natures to realise our full potentialities. The human species is defined by the term homo sapiens, rational man. It is about time that we lived up to that billing. Human nature, even with all its capacities for cruelty and violence and destruction, also has the capacities now most required to meet the challenge of global crisis. In Aristotelian terms, to be happy is to flourish in terms of one’s essential potentialities, to be useful and function as a human being, to live lives that matter. There is no better way to flourish than to act in such a way as to make a contribution to planetary well-being.

Moreover, there is increasingly strong scientific evidence that Aristotle was right. The notion that man is a zoon politikon is a truth which is both simple and profound. Human beings are social animals who need each other in order to be themselves. For Aristotle, human beings require a politikon bion, a public life, in order to flourish in their humanity. Neuroscience is now revealing that human beings are essentially cooperators and that cooperating is deeply pleasurable. Mark Pagels book Wired for Culture gives the evidence for this view. The cooperators are the most happy and fulfilled human beings. Anthropologists give the evidence which shows that human beings are shares and givers.  Michael Gurven, anthropologist at UCLA, argues that ‘reciprocity is arguably the foundational basis of cooperation in humans.’ Atomistic and instrumental relations that separate individuals from each other and turn each other against each other violate the human ontology and can be repudiated as a dehumanisation. It is here, at the heart of our social organisation, where the real problem lies. It is here, in these dehumanised social relations, that the reason why our technology and our power misfires is to be found. Social justice, morality, an ethic of fairness and a theology of enough are not optional extras that can wait upon economic growth and technological intervention. On the contrary, the case for social and environmental justice stems from an innate human need. Plato conceives of thymos as the part of the human soul that demanded justice and which generates the human desire for recognition. Human beings are essentially social beings, so that individuals gain a sense of their own self-worth only through recognition by others. This is to recognise that our flourishing depends upon community and that injustice turns individuals against each other and tears community apart. 
And recognition and flourishing and justice requires power. Not power over others or power over things. This is not real power but a neurotic compensation for its absence. Power here may be defined in terms of its original Latin meaning: the capacity to act, to effect. To make a change, make a difference, for the better. The philosopher-psychologist Erich Fromm argued that we should abandon Descartes’ dictum ‘I think therefore I am’ and replace it with ‘I am, because I effect.’ This makes the point that human beings realise and experience their essence in action. It was in this sense that Aristotle argued that you are what you repeatedly do. What do is who we are. If we do nothing, we are nothing. To be, or not to be? Choose life. What Heidegger called Being.
It is not power that corrupts but the lack of power. This reveals the real reason behind the death and destruction of late modernity. The violence and the murder and the death dealing is born not of power but of its absence. Death and destruction have their breeding ground in impotence and apathy. Powerlessness generates apathy and a neurotic compulsion to overcompensate. This is the source of violence. The rage that many feel in the modern world is the result of a pervasive feeling of powerlessness. Acts of violence are performed by those who lack the social means to establish their self-esteem and satisfy the human need for thymos. Human beings have an innate need to prove their worth and demonstrate to the world that they, too, matter. Human beings need to show that their lives are significant. This desire can be derailed and wrongly expressed. The extent to which death and destruction are conveyed in the solemn language of sacrifice is significant is significant in this respect. We need to find more positive manifestations of these interpersonal needs. The point is that the processes of destruction can be turned around and that, no matter how difficult this redirection may be, these needs are always potentially constructive. It is a case of choosing life over against death, and this requires power. Death and destruction arise not out of a surfeit of power but out of powerlessness. As Hannah Arendt put it, violence is the expression of impotence. The connection between powerlessness and psychopathology is expressed in the words of Edgar Z. Friedenberg: "All weakness tends to corrupt, and impotence corrupts absolutely."
So the challenge is not to change human nature – an impossible task – but to find ways of which enable human nature to be expressed in more positive and creative ways. This would be to creatively live up to our powers. This is the condition of achieving the transformations required to build civilisation on principles of social and environmental justice. These deep capacities have been ignored, denied and distorted within an iniquitous and exploitative order more concerned with accumulating material quantity than with the quality of human life. Tapping into our desire for thymos, and coming to cooperate, share and contribute, allows our essential humanity to flourish. In this sense, virtuous behaviour does indeed become its own reward. It is easy to focus solely on new technologies and rely on expertise. This is not the radical, new, bold thinking it is portrayed as but the same old Promethean promise. The last words of Kenneth Clarke’s Civilisation, written in 1969, are worth pondering here. ‘The moral and intellectual failure of Marxism has left us with no alternative to heroic materialism, and that isn't enough. One may be optimistic, but one can't exactly be joyful at the prospect before us.’ All around us, communist or capitalist, we see gods that have failed. More fool us for believing in such gods in the first place. This was in 1969. Marxism has been and gone but heroic materialism is still with us. It wasn’t enough in 1969 and it won’t do now. Much more important is to re-value some very deep needs and old capacities and express these in new patterns of living.

The Flourishing of the Most Loving

I believe that the stresses of the increasing environmental pressures will be responsible for pushing the human species up another rung on the evolutionary ladder. Certainly, this applies in the sense of our institutions and communications as more and more people are drawn together in a truly global community. But there is also a moral and indeed anthropological dimension to this ascent. Human beings will come to find the place that humanity occupies within Nature, not above or against Nature. Further, this integration of human possibilities within ecological limits will entail a recognition of mutual dependence. The members of this enlightened community practising a global planetary ethic will recognize that we are made in the image of God and Nature, that is, that we are divine and express our divinity by living in a way that supports everyone and everything within an interconnected web of life. The old predatory understanding of the survival of the fittest is finally left behind as a new concept of environmental security within planetary boundaries replaces the old concept of military security within political boundaries. Human beings come to recognise that their health and well-being depends upon biodiversity, climate, nitrogen, the ozone layer, ocean acidification, land use, water use.
In his Ethics, the philosopher Spinoza argued for a concept of Deus sive Natura, the idea that God and Nature are interchangeable and refer to the one self-regulating, self-subsistent whole. Spinoza’s concept is half true. This is God/Nature as a physical creation and entity, accessible by science and reason. Spinoza thus writes of the amor intellectualis Dei – the intellectual love of God/Nature. But this is too dry and abstract a conception of love to be truly satisfying. It is the kind of love that a mathematician has of a model, an engineer of a machine, but it doesn’t speak to the whole person. We need a God/Nature that loves in return, an entity with which a relationship and a partnership is possible. This is what we achieve when we identify divinity with the moral law within each and all, creating a universal realm of ends and collective consciousness that unites everyone and everything within a living whole. With the universal moral law as reason within nature, the survival of the fittest thus gives way to the flourishing of the most loving.

The growing influence of neo-Darwinian ideas within the public culture and the way that these chime with an increasingly competitive economics and militaristic politics would appear to contradict the ethic of love. Precisely. That is why we need the ethic of love as something more than the intellectual appreciation of God/Nature but as an empathy, a recognition of mutual dependence.

Certainly, in these troubled times, the simplicities of the survival of the fittest may seem more in order. It seems self-evident that violence and competition are at the core of life. And it becomes easy to read that violence and competition back into the natural world. This whole reductive process soon becomes a self-fulfilling, self-justifying and self-serving prophecy. Human beings, it is claimed, are killer apes who possess an inborn inclination to violence. Human beings are ‘just animals’, animals are violent, and therefore humans are violent. It has all the beautiful symmetry of formal logic conceived on impeccably Aristotelian lines. But it makes no sense of the human ascent through apprehending nature through the eyes of reason and morality. Human beings are not biologically determined machines whose genes saddle them with an innate, viciously competitive nature. Human beings are not genetically mandated to be violent. Moreover, nature is mediated by reason, morality and culture, giving human beings a range of options which far exceed natural instinct and impulse. Human beings may well be the most efficient predators evolved by nature, planetary killer apes, as Lovelock and Lynas state, but there is no necessary reason why even the fiercest primates have to stay this way forever. In his last book, Matt Ridley caused controversy with his claim that the human race is getting more peaceful and less violent. The scale of death and destruction in the modern world would appear to contradict that claim. However, what is remarkable is how abstract that violence is, how mediated it is via institutions, systems and technology. Death and destruction on the modern scale is more the product of human power escaping human moral control and taking on a live of its own. Alien power. In everyday life, human beings seem to be settling their affairs in an increasingly less violent way, when one looks at the long run perspective. The real task is how we can regain control of our abstract powers and dissolve them into morally and socially responsible systems. On an interpersonal basis, there is no dog-eat-dog imperative for human beings. Human beings stand at the top of the predator/prey food chain, meaning that whilst we eat organisms lower in the hierarchy, we are not subject to being eaten by higher organisms. Lacking natural predators, human beings are spared from becoming "prey" and can therefore escape all the violence that this implies. We can break the chain of violence. The only ‘prey’ to which human beings are subject is each other. Human beings are their own worst enemy, turning on each other in a competition for resources. This is why we need to be cautious with respect to any argument or ‘pragmatic’ programme for action which makes constant reference to ‘survival’ and the need to survive but which glides over ethics. Driven by survival, human beings very easily turn against each other and against their own better natures. More than any other animal, human beings turn on themselves. To do better than this, there is a need to develop an ethic that presents a vision of hope that is more than survival. ‘Man does not live by bread alone’. Too often, the question is reduced to one of bread, survival, and this is the very thing that invites violence, competition, murder.

James Lovelock writes of the creative intelligence as being deadly. There is no more deadly an ideology than the notion of biological and ecological necessity impelling the survival of the fittest. Lovelock sails far too close to that kind of thinking for comfort. That is a relapse to primitive instincts whereas what is required is a vision that takes us beyond necessity. Human violence is the product of more than natural necessity. In Power and Innocence, the psychologist Rollo May argues that human beings are advanced animals in being animals that kill on account of principles. Ideological control and political power involves a particularly invidious form of human violence, so too the violence associated with the acquisition of material possessions to feed wants far beyond what is required for sustenance. Throughout history, human organisations have repeatedly provoked their members into aggression and violence in some cause or other. The loftier the ideal, the more base the purpose it seems. And now, in the modern world, we have by our ingenuity erected a vast impersonal institutional-systemic apparatus way above our heads and beyond our control. There is little that is natural about the scale of modern death and destruction, all around are artificial imperatives targeting and activating our worst instincts and appetites. This violence is not the product of an innate, genetic, "animal" trait necessary for survival. It is not necessary and we would survive far better without it. 
Human beings are born with a moral grammar, what Kant calls the moral law within. This gives human beings the moral capacity to transcend natural necessity and constitute freedom as a universe of moral choice. To make sense of the claim that human beings are the God species, we need to identify evolution as a co-evolution between God/Nature on the one hand and human beings as moral beings who are able to identify the divinity within themselves and see that same divinity in others in an interconnected web of life. This is to read evolution as a moral mandate, to replace violence with peace and necessity with freedom. This is to read the relation of the God species to Gaia as an evolutionary mandate. To fulfil this mandate requires that human beings see themselves as spiritual beings who need to give and receive love above and beyond food and material sustenance. However, ascending the evolutionary ladder requires more than Spinoza’s amor intellectualis Dei. Knowledge is important. ‘The more man is guided by reason, the more he is free’ affirmed Spinoza. But there is more to freedom than reason in its intellectual sense alone. We need reason accompanied by its moral component. We need Elohim the impersonal God of Creation and Hashem the personal God of Love. And we need to practise what we preach within communities of like-minded individuals who come together to advance human civilization beyond the survival of the fittest to the end point of the Flourishing of the Most Loving. This ethic ensures that the health and well-being that each and all obtain within personal life is also at the same time the health and well-being of the planet. It is a global planetary ethic. At the height of the evolutionary ladder, the most loving do more than merely eat and survive, they flourish. It’s all in Aristotle. ‘The philosopher’ told us all along.


9 BACK TO THE DAYS BEFORE TOMORROW COMES

The shadow of primeval nature

The urge to go ‘back to nature’ takes many forms. The easiest to identify lies in the utopias of escape, the arcadian fantasies and bucolic myths. They can be reactionary, they can be nostalgic for a time that never was, a psychic memory of the primordial past that can never be again. 
Human beings are ontologically nostalgic, Martin Heidegger argued. The sense of yearning for a lost past and a lost innocence is expressed most beautifully in the Hauseman poem A Shropshire Lad:.

Into my heart an air that kills
from yon far country flows.
What are those blue remembered hills
what spires, what farms are those?
That is the land of lost content,
I see it shining plain.
The happy highways where I went
and cannot come again.

But nature returns in far more vicious forms than nostalgia for youth, innocence and simplicity. In a very real sense, primal nature is with us always. Richard Dawkins’ comment in the preface to the 30th anniversary edition of The Selfish Gene bears close scrutiny:

a human society based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live… Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.

Looking back to a lost innocence fulfils a psychic need for a Golden Age, a place where we can be at home. In looking backwards, we are really looking forwards, trying to find a future where we can be at peace.
In the phoney war between science and religion, the crucial point at issue has tended to be overlooked. Dawkins himself has spent more time attacking religious attempts to teach generosity and altruism rather than teaching his own. But underline that line ‘we are born selfish’. Being ‘born selfish’ doesn’t mean that human beings cannot build a cooperative society. On the contrary, as Mark Pagels has recently argued in Wired for Culture, the cooperative instinct of human beings runs deep. But it has to be developed. Running against cooperation is an innate egoism that has to be tempered by altruism, relationships, networks, connections, social ties, all of which cultivate other regarding behaviour in the individual. We live in a society which is dominated by atomistic relationships which separate individuals from each other and set individuals against each other as competitors for scarce resources. 

With the expansion of the capital system, a procession of thinkers, politicians, business leaders, and advertisers have deliberately conflated liberty and licence and encouraged individuals to abandon moral, psychic and communal restraint to yield to desire, act on impulse, and satisfy appetite. If human beings were wholly rational and wholly good by nature, then this crude psychology could deliver on the promise of freedom and happiness. Instead, this shedding of moral, socio-relational and institutional constraint puts individuals in the strongest chains of all, those of natural necessity. This licence masquerading under the name of liberty implies a moral and institutional nihilism which unleashes not the complete good but the demonic innate in untutored human nature.

Morality is an innate part of human nature, the part which guides human beings towards good behaviour. Human beings are born with an innate moral grammar. (Hauser 2006). This moral grammar is developed by being used. Systems which appeal to an innate egoism silence the moral law within. Morality is an integral part of the conscious control that humanity requires in order to assume responsibility for its creative praxis with respect to nature. Morality as embodied in institutions, ingrained in habit and custom, and socialised as norms and values makes it possible for human beings to practise the highest forms of human inventiveness and creativity. The moral law within is therefore the rational restraint which canalises short term impulse and desire to the long term health and well being. This is to reaffirm the natural law tradition in philosophy and ethics. The natural law is not the same as a law of nature, a physical law. It is a moral law. Further, the natural law is not the same thing as a natural response to a particular situation or circumstance, a reaction that reflects the nature that human beings share with nonhuman animals. Rather, the natural law refers to nature as seen through the eyes of reason. This is what Plato – referring to beauty - in the Symposium called beholding nature with the eye of the mind. This is more than what is immediately given to the senses but access a deeper, truer reality.





The idea of a ‘true’ ‘divine’ beauty which is beheld with the eye of the mind is a very different notion to that of beauty being in the eye of the beholder, a beauty generated at the level of immediacy by the senses. Plato is aiming for a deeper beauty. That divine beauty is the complete human good. Indeed, for many, the natural law argument is the world seen as the purposeful creation by God.

This moral restraint for a more complete fulfilment comes hard to those individuals who have been taught to mistake licence for liberty, conflate needs with wants and seek pleasure rather than happiness. The economic system, and the political system which serves it, functions as a regime promoting endless gratification. It is a system in which individuals are encouraged to indulge their egos, a system in which depravation and deprivation walk hand in hand. The individual is caught within a cycle of endless insatiable satisfaction. The margin of freedom won by technique and organisation, rather than being used for a greater expansion of human creativity, is dissipated in indulgence of appetite, impulse, instinct. 
This is the true face of the fantasy of going ‘back to nature’ in the modern world. The central aspect of the human journey to a fulfilled, flourishing life involves individuals transcending the natural inclinations that keep them chained to natural necessity and ascending to their higher rational nature. Resolving this question entails humanity moving beyond the limitations of innate egoism so as to apprehend a higher good. Natural law, therefore, is constituted in the sphere of reason, and enables human beings to act as moral beings and legislate to the empirical world of natural necessity. That is what human freedom involves. Against this, we have the ‘back to nature’ systems of egoistic economics and politics. The economics and politics of self-interest. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma in games theory demonstrates how individuals pursuing self-interest generate the least optimal outcome whereas individuals adhering to the common good generate the most optimal outcome for all individuals. There are various ways of expressing. There are two prisoners who are held in separate cells, with no possibility of contact. The police lack sufficient evidence to convict and so are dependent on what each prisoner says. The two prisoners are offered deals. If A rats on B, then A is let off and B gets 8 years, and vice versa. If both remain silent, they will get 2 years each. If both rat on each other, they both go down for 5 years each. Remember, there is no contact and no communication between the prisoners. The reasoning is symmetrical. What one thinks, the other thinks, What one does, the other does. This is self-interest in its purest form. The best deal facing each individual is the one ratting on the other, who remains silent, and therefore going free. The best deal for both individuals together is to remain silent, adhere to the common good and behave as moral beings rather than self-interested rats. Separated from each other and hence having to reason as individuals, each prisoner rats on the other. Rather than obey the common good and therefore benefit each other together, each rats on the other and both go down for 5 years each. Self-interest brings about the least optimal outcome.
The predicament of the modern world is that we live in a market society which promotes self-interest, as consumers and as voters be behave as individuals. Those at the top are willing and the masses at the bottom are prepared to sacrifice the whole planet for their private profit and immediate gain. We are encouraged to be rats.

Primeval rat spreads plague among us: 
thought not thought through to the end. 
It gnaws into everything we cooked 
and runs from one man into the other. 
This is why the drunkard ignores 
that drowning his mood in champagne 
he is gulping down the empty broth 
of the horrified poor.

And since reason fails to press
fertile rights from the nations 
new infamy rises up to set 
against one another the races. 
Oppression croaks in squadrons, 
it lands on living heart, as on carrion — 
and misery dribbles all over the world, 
as saliva on the face of idiots.
Attila Jozsef

Rats and idiots. The word idiot comes from the ancient Greek, idiotes, those interested only in private affairs. The idiots are the self-interested. The rat and the idiot is the face that nature presents to us in the modern world. Our problem is not how to get back to nature but how to overcome the egoistic nature that modern systems of politics and economics have brought back. To become more than primeval rats human beings have to transcend egoistic nature. Human beings are capable of being more than rats in relation to each other, they can come to learn to see how the common good enhances the good of each individual in serving the good of all individuals.

Standing in the way is egoism. I’ve seen the enemy, said Woody Allen, it’s us. The God Species? Humanity is its own worst enemy. In pursuing egoistic self-interest, species is eliminating itself. But it’s causing a whole lot of collateral damage to the planet.

One of the strongest statements against egoism as a natural necessity has come from the Pope. 

'Today, a particularly insidious obstacle to the task of educating is the massive presence in our society and culture of that relativism which, recognizing nothing as definitive, leaves as the ultimate criterion only the self with its desires. And under the semblance of freedom it becomes a prison for each one, for it separates people from one another, locking each person into his or her own "ego".' 

Pope Benedict XVI, June 2005

‘Only the self with its desires’ is the nature we have returned to. The self and sensuous desires separate individuals from one another, lock each into his or her own ego and turn liberty into a licence so that our society becomes a prison for each and all. Chained to empirical desire, we have become the prisoners in the prisoners dilemma. We live in conditions that encourage us to be rats. 

This is the thinking that Jimmy Reid challenged in 1972. 

The picture it conjures up is one where we are scurrying around scrambling for position, trampling on others, back-stabbing, all in pursuit of personal success. 
To the students I address this appeal. Reject these attitudes. Reject the values and false morality that underlie these attitudes. A rat race is for rats. We're not rats. We're human beings. Reject the insidious pressures in society that would blunt your critical faculties to all that is happening around you, that would caution silence in the face of injustice lest you jeopardise your chances of promotion and self-advancement. This is how it starts and, before you know where you are, you're a fully paid-up member of the rat-pack. The price is too high. It entails the loss of your dignity and human spirit. Or as Christ puts it, 'What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his soul ?' Profit is the sole criterion used by the establishment to evaluate economic activity. From the rat race to lame ducks. The vocabulary in vogue is a give-away. It is more reminiscent of a human menagerie than human society. (Rectorial Address. Delivered by Jimmy Reid at the University of Glasgow, April 1972, at his installation as Rector.)

Throughout history, utopia has functioned to encourage human beings to question existing society by means of comparison with an ideal standard. Utopia retains its value in the sense of shedding light on current problems and projecting possibilities with respect to alternative futures. This is to argue the continued legitimacy of utopia modes of thinking in the current world, avoiding a tendency to degenerate into a blinkered pragmatism. A viable social order requires standards other than ‘what works’. Utopia offer a global, or holistic, conception of social organization, as distinct from more partial, schematic views proffered by a piecemeal social engineering and pragmatism that makes no fundamental changes.

Utopia and happiness
The defining goal of the technocratic utopianism of scientists and engineers is survival. Technical powers are organised and utilised in the cause of human survival, and some human beings rather than all. The defining goal of utopianism as such is the creation of the conditions enabling human happiness, or ‘flourishing’ in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia. A transformation in human nature is central to a genuine utopianism. Again, such utopianism is grounded in a philosophical anthropology that goes back to Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle defines the human being as a zoon politikon, a political and social animal, requiring a politikon bion, or public life, in order to actualise human potentialities and thus achieve happiness as flourishing. Utopia aims at creating the conditions for human flourishing that does not set the individual over against the community or the community over against the individual, but sees the social and the individual as two integral aspects of human nature. 
It is in this light that the political philosopher Finnis argues that individual rights need to be considered as 'fundamental components in the way of life of a community', a community which is committed to certain  forms  of  human  flourishing  for  all  (Finnis 1980:222). This implies a conception of the good life.





This conception of happiness as human flourishing contrasts markedly with the utilitarian definition of happiness as pleasure. Utilitarianism has resorted to the hypothetical device of 'average utility'. This is an attempt to avoid problems with individualism whilst giving the impression of universalism, but it’s a dodge. An average is not a genuine universalism and is perfectly compatible with a plethora of asymmetries in power and resources. (Rawls 1971: 27-8).There is no doubt that happiness as utilitarian pleasure within a market society would simply be a case of sauve qui peut, a rat race in which it is every rat for himself. As against utilitarianism, the universal ethic of utopianism proceeds from the notion of a minimum of welfare for all and proceeds from there to delineate the conditions of a fuller realisation of human well being. The universalist orientation enables utopianism to prescribe the communal sources of complete human happiness, the greater happiness which issues as a result of living in a society of happy people. One should recall here the origins of the political. The word ‘politics’ derives from the ancient Greek polites, meaning those interested in public affairs. The antonym idiotes refers to those interested only in private affairs. As zoon politikons, human beings achieve the complete human happiness only in relation to each other in a public community. A private happiness is an incomplete happiness. To argue for human happiness in a communal and relational context is to recover the ancient conception of politics as creative human self-realisation.
The repudiation of utopianism as unrealistic almost always involves the assertion that ‘you can’t change human nature’. That history is the record of human nature manifested in an immense variety of ways should have laid this old saw to rest. Such an assertion amounts to a frank denial of the possibility of change. Things are as they are and always will be as they are because human nature is at it is and always will be. Those who make such assertions in the name of pragmatism – Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline, for instance – cannot even justify their reforms with reference to any point or principle. Survival is not an argument. The purpose of life, as Aristotle argued, is not just to live, but to live well. ‘Grub first, then ethics’, Brand quotes, as though the relation of living and living well is one of cause and effect. Get the ethics right, and the questions of existence will be resolved. The point of riding a bike is to go somewhere, not to just keep riding. 

The whole point of utopian thinking is to show the immense variability of human nature within different social institutions and structures. The assertion that human nature doesn’t change or doesn’t change much is really an attempt to deny an alternate future. This is what Brand asserts in Whole Earth Discipline. But without any change with respect to human nature, any project lacks meaning. Any proposed changes beyond existing society are therefore ruled out on account of an anthropological fixity. The very problems that utopia seeks to address and resolve are rendered permanent features of the human condition on account of the fixity of human nature. Hence the dismissal of notions of cultural, moral and psychological change on the part of human beings. The historical illiteracy is breathtaking, given the evidence of the extent to which human beings have progressively expanded the moral circle throughout history. This is how both Stewart Brand and Mark Lynas reason in order to place the sole emphasis on the application of technology. But nothing is changed as a result of technology. Human beings remain within instrumental and exploitative relations, meaning that human nature is expressed in terms of aggression, egoism, violence, acquisitiveness, and so on, all the attributes of the primeval rat. Utopian thinking, in contrast, takes ideas and ethics seriously, thus giving us a series of counterfactuals which encourage criticism of the false fixities and necessities of any given society, showing how that society is subject to political controversy, intervention and alteration. 
This demonstrates the necessity of utopia. Utopian modes of thought are able to reintegrate parts of human life that have been rent asunder and subject to piecemeal social engineering. In conceiving society as a functioning whole, utopian modes enable us to overcome complexity and fragmentation and thus reintegrate the parts composing society within the whole. This makes it possible to orient action towards a fundamental transformation, getting to the root of the problems instead of targeting isolated problems on the surface. The value of utopianism lies in this global conception of the transformation of society, as opposed to an emphasis on particular problems. In our current state of ongoing economic crisis and ever looming environmental crisis, the adoption of a holistic or global approach in politics is imperative in order to go beyond the ‘free-for-all’ libertarianism which is no more than the anarchy of the rich and the powerful. As economic and environmental pressures intensify, there will be an increasing need for an authoritative allocation of resources by just criteria which people agree to be fair, as against a distribution determined by vested interests and entrenched power. This imperative is all the more compelling with respect to the threat of runaway climate change, in light of which the refusal to exercise conscious common control would amount to collective suicide. 

Planning for the future need not be an idealistic enterprise, utopian in the sense of being detached from the conditions of its realisation. We are in the realm here of the feasible utopia, devising a Good with respect to resource use and social institutions and arrangements. Here, utopia ceases to be a 'a perfect society' – as infinitely superior as that is to the ‘perfect system’, but identifies the best of all possible worlds in the circumstances and sets out in its attainment.

Cellphone World, Cellophane Utopia

Gandhi spoke disparagingly of 'dreaming systems so perfect that no one will need to be good'. Only the most credulous rationalist could be optimistic enough to believe that technique and know-how would be sufficient to create a society with no need for morality. If the technical ability to create the perfect system is all that matters, then there is no point in human beings learning to be good. ‘Human nature doesn't change much’, opines the engineer Stewart Brand, ‘science does’ (Brand ch 7 2009). ‘Science proposes, society disposes’ he asserts (Brand ch 7 2009). ‘Science is the only news’. Brand thus thinks it is possible to dispense with ideas and ethics.

When roles shift, ideologies have to shift, and ideologies hate to shift. The workaround is pragmatism—"a practical way of thinking concerned with results rather than with theories and principles." The shift is deeper than moving from one ideology to another; the shift is to discard ideology entirely. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

By ‘ideology’, the scientist and engineer Brand means morality, culture, ideas, norms and values. It seems that human beings will no longer need to be good, or even need to think. Science and technology are all that matter. Lynas joins in: ‘Our culture and politics languishes decades behind our science.’ (Lynas 2011 Intro). 

‘I often receive emails telling me that fixing the climate will need a worldwide change in values, a programme of mass education to reduce people's desires to consume, a more equitable distribution of global wealth, 'smashing the power' of transnational corporations or even the abolition of capitalism itself. After having struggled with this for over a decade myself, I am now convinced that these viewpoints - which are subscribed to by perhaps a majority of environmentalists - are wrong. Instead, we can completely deal with climate change within the prevailing economic system. In fact, any other approach is likely doomed to failure. (Lynas ch 3 2011).

Human nature doesn’t change, therefore, and doesn’t need to change. We just need to change the system. Our technique and know-how can create a system so perfect that human beings have no need to change, no need to be good. Behind all this rational optimism lies the shadow of the primeval rat. Human beings are the problem for these utopians, not the solution. Even if such a perfect system could be engineering, it would deprive life of meaning. That meaning is only invested into the world of fact and technique and means by human beings. That such credulous rationalism is even tolerated shows the damaging effects of positivist and empiricist philosophy, instrumental rationality being exalted so high that our technocratic utopians think that they can discard morality and substitute pragmatism and 'objectivity' in its place.

In the past, writers like More, Campanella, and Bacon up to Morris had a singular vision of Utopia. In the manner of Plato’s world of forms, the perfect society is the perfect society, and everything else is mere approximation. Such utopias offered a vision of a possible world for human beings to aspire to and act and change themselves so as to bring about. Things change in the modern era. Science and technology open up such boundless possibilities that human beings need do nothing more than fit the perfect system. There is no change in human nature required, no moral agency. And it shows. Behind and beneath the scientific utopia, the primeval rat scurries around, casting its shadow over all the shiny, smooth, clean and cold surfaces of the perfect system. The scientific utopia is morally rotten, hollow; it lacks anthropological content and moral meaning and it shows. As a result, the utopia is transformed into a dystopia. Where once, the utopia shed light on future possibilities, the technocratic utopia comes express the inability of technique and knowledge to transcend rat-like human nature. Of course. Human beings as moral beings require meaning and need to learn to be good.

The Utopian impulse in twentieth-century politics

H. G. Wells’ Search for Utopia
It is interesting to look at the ways in which technocratic utopians characterize the features of the society they are aiming to create, and also at precisely how they expect to bring about this society. The first thing that is abundantly clear is that the future society is not a new society at all. The goal is survival, the preservation of the present against the threats to its functioning and existence. That, of course, is not a utopia at all. The emphasis is on the machinery and the technology at the centre of the functioning society, that is, the organizational forms and technical means perceived to be necessary to the survival of existing society. Thus there is a great deal of discussion concerning various new technologies and their application. There is nothing with respect to ideas, values, culture, psychology, other than to assert that human beings will need to fit the imperatives of science and technology. However, this emphasis on means to the exclusion of ends results in the failure to connect proposals for reform with the need for a radical change in the attitudes and behaviour of the individual members of society, whose need for happiness and well-being and for a fundamental transformation of society to this end has to be nurtured and canalised. The result is that technocratic utopians emphasise the machinery of the future society, but, lacking faith in the possibility of a change for the better in human nature, do not succeed in permeating the fabric of society with their ideas. The result is that there is a democratic deficit at the heart of any change that occurs.
The prophet of the new age of the technocratic utopia is H. G. Wells. It is as though every other book that Wells wrote offers a utopia. The most significant books expounding Wells’ technological utopia are When the Sleeper Wakes (1899, republished 1921 as The Sleeper Awakes), The First Men in the Moon (1901), A Modern Utopia (1905), The New Machiavelli (1911), The World Set Free (1914), Men Like Gods (1922), Things to Come (1935, film treatment of The Shape of Things to Come, 1933) and Mind at the End of Its Tether (1945). These books may be taken as a fair sample of the work of forty years.
Wells’ Men Like Gods (1922) spells it out loud and clear, the imperative that we must get good at living as gods is a long running theme throughout the modern world. The question is, does the extent of human technical power afford human beings divine like status? Contemporary scientists and engineers like Stewart Brand answer clearly in the affirmative. It seems that Wells, for all of his worship of technology, was never so sure from the start. Why did he feel the need to write so many books? Why did Wells have to write so many Utopias? It is as though Wells was trying to convince himself as much as others. Wells had no sooner proposed one utopia or another than he was overcome with second thoughts. And no wonder. The ills that beset the modern world are not amenable to technological resolution. If they were, modernity would have been at peace decades ago. The idea that human beings are gods and must get good at being gods is not a new idea at all. It was the vain hope of Wells himself. Men as Gods (1922) was written four years after end of the First World War. It was Wells who thought the war so bad, so much like the last days, that he also wrote in the imperative, of 'The War That Will End War', noting how 'in the hour of victory' Britain would 'save the liberated Germans from vindictive treatment'. (Daily News, 14 August 1914. Daily Chronicle, 8 August 1914.) The phrase was remembered but the message was lost. So no wonder Wells kept having second thoughts. For all of the precision and predictability that his science and technology made possible, the world just refused to conform to the norms of rationality. 
Wells’ constant swings between certainty and doubt should come as a warning against a visionless pragmatism and hoary old empiricism allied to technology. Lacking any genuine understanding of society, thinking that history has been brought to an end and having no respect for values, a prophet is always in danger of replacing principles with prejudices, isolating, and thereby distorting, some discrete fact, example, trend or another, giving it a 'progressive' slant and then proceeding full tilt up a blind alley. Lacking first principles and deprecating philosophy, the prophet of the new world falls back on some piece of pseudo-science — the ghost of Malthus is never far away, but ‘survival of the fittest’ or a ‘constant battles’ view of history fit just as well – when it comes to having to make sense of scattered observations. Nuclear, GE food, biotechnology, geoengineering in themselves are all ‘real science’. When possibilities are extrapolated from the science and turned into guesses about the future, we enter another realm entirely. It seems like science but it is anything but – it is utopianism of the worst kind, a utopianism of things, of powers detached from visions, of fact divorced from value, a realm that proceeds ‘without regard for persons’. Each guess has the appearance of science. Nuclear energy will power the world, GE crops will feed the world, biotechnology will give us new human beings, geoengineering will give us a new world entirely… We save ourselves and save our world by eliminating the old and making way for the new. Finally, after all the wild claims made for the new technologies, Stewart Brand recommends nothing less than one big gamble. So many projections and so many possibilities, because there is little likelihood that any of them will turn out well. It is guesswork based on idolatry and the patchwork quilt of recommendations expose the pretensions to science.

Wells is a fascinating case study of a progressive who sought the key to the future in science and technology rather than politics, philosophy and religion. Whilst he considered himself a socialist, Wells’ socialism derived from the technocratic managerialism of Saint-Simon and Comte as opposed to the democratic socialism of Marx. An eminently rational man, something as disturbing and disruptive as class struggle had no place in Wells’ ‘socialism’. Of course, Wells could see the faults of the old capitalism, as could any empiricist. But he didn’t locate these faults in asymmetrical class relations, in exploitation, in the separation of producers from the productive means. On the contrary, it was all a question of rational technique and organisation, with Wells trusting in the power of reason. Capitalism could be persuaded to reform itself, rid itself of its inefficiencies and irrationalities and become orderly, predictable, professional. It wasn’t capitalism as such that was at fault but the feudal survivals that remained, the imperfections and corruptions that were left over from the past. Wells calls for the modern world to free itself from these historical fetters.

The hero of Wells’ The New Machiavelli declared:
"'Muddle,' said I, 'is the enemy.' That remains my belief to this day. Clearness and order, light and foresight, these things I know for Good. It was muddle had just given us the still freshly painful disasters and humiliations of the war, muddle that gives us the visibly sprawling disorder of our cities and industrial countryside, muddle that gives us the waste of life, the limitations, wretchedness and unemployment of the poor. Muddle! I remember myself quoting Kipling — "'All along o' dirtiness, all along o' mess, All along o' doin' things rather-more-or-less.' "'We build the state', we said over and over again. 'That is what we are for — servants of the new reorganisation!' "

This was set in the period around 1902. Over a century later and the same call is being made. Science and technology, efficiency and order through impersonal reason, will resolve all the muddle associated with change. The world is a machine and its problems call for mechanistic solutions. From environmental crisis to economic crisis to urban sprawl to overpopulation, all is muddle requiring the clearness and order, light and foresight of science and technology. But note, far from becoming gods, we are no more than ‘servants of the new reorganisation’, ‘that is what we are for’. There is nothing beyond survival in the arguments of Brand, Lovelock and Lynas, nothing of human flourishing, nothing that even hints at the moral dignity of human beings as lying in choice, let alone of human beings as gods.

No wonder Wells called the book The New Machiavelli – a politics detached from values, a rule over the people rather than of the people. Later, the hero speaks up for order again:

"I had one constant desire ruling my thoughts. I meant to leave England and the empire better ordered than I found it, to organise and discipline, to build up a constructive and controlling State out of my world's confusions."
 
So, science and technology were to be employed to deliver a more efficient capitalism, as though class division, social injustice and inequality, periodic crises were mere infantile diseases caused by a lack of reason. The people, it is clear, are to be organised from above, disciplined, controlled. The ‘confusions’ of class struggle are brought to an end. It’s a peace of sorts. The technocratic utopia is a sterilised, sanitized, anaesthetised, plastic world where all stains and marks have been polished clean by all the most advertised brands. It is a disinfected world which loses sight of the fact that it was the germs that came to the rescue of the planet in The War of the Worlds. 

Wells was not alone in this conception of ‘socialism’. The fight for ‘Green’ identity mirrors the struggle for the mind and soul of socialism beginning in the nineteenth century. There are two contrasting conceptions of socialism, socialism from above and socialism from below. Emile Durkheim defined these antithetical conceptions concisely:





Like the Webbs, Bernard Shaw, all the Fabians, Webb was a state socialist for whom the concern was not the end of class division and exploitation but bureaucratic order. Wells was concerned with social hygiene, not social justice. The world needed tidying up. The Fabians targeted the waste and absurdity of capitalism, not its exploitative class relations. The Fabians would point to situations where there were a dozen workers when one worker could do the job more efficiently. Possibly true, but how would that leave the unemployed better off? Chesterton wrote sardonically of

"Mr. Sidney Webb, also, who said that the future would see a continuously increasing order and neatness in the life of the people, and his poor friend Fipps, who went mad and ran about the country with an axe, hacking branches off the trees whenever there were not the same number on both sides."

Wells, like the Fabians, was impressed by the power of imperialism, the veneer of order, smooth functioning, the triumph of science and bureaucracy over traditions, customs and cultures. This is the ideal of a world subdued and organised by technique. Wells wanted the Kings to call in the Philosophers or, if that couldn’t be done, for the Philosophers to take hold of the controls when the Kings were looking the other way. Wells was full of conspiracies by which the scientists took over behind the backs of the slow and the stupid.

Wells gave Fabianism a fervour, a charisma and an imagination that this most bureaucratic of political creeds singularly lacked. It was the Webbs who asked whether Soviet Russia was a New Civilisation? They were hostile to the Soviet Union when it still seemed as though it could deliver its promise of proletarian government. When the Webbs saw Stalin and his top-down modernisation, they removed the question mark and answered in the affirmative – Stalin’s Soviet Union was indeed a New Civilisation..
Set against this dull creed for managers and bureaucrats and accountants, all production statistics and blue books, Wells stood out for his having the appearance of imaginative depth. In truth, Wells only succeeded in exposing the inhumane, pointless character of bureaucratic politics and technocratic utopianism. In Whole Earth Discipline, Stewart Brand contrasts science with what he calls ‘sentiment’. By sentiment he plainly means the world of values, sympathy, empathy, ideas, theories, all that he wants to ‘discard’ as ideology. This is science and technology as a form of hygiene and it has no place for ‘sentiment’, what the rest of us call emotions, feelings, what Hume calls the passions, what Smith calls sympathy. These are the things that make us human. They are also the qualities which psychopaths lack. Without these qualities, the greatest, most powerful, most efficient utopias in the world are left without justification. What is utopia for if it is not for people to live well and flourish as human beings? This is nihilism, power for the sake of power, with no end and no purpose greater than the mere mechanics of self-perpetuation. This is imperialism at home and abroad. From an imperialism bringing order on distant places and peoples, subjugating the whole world to discipline and control, so the technocratic mind accepts no limits in time and space, proceeding to the conquest of the universe. In a fit of supreme rapture, the Samurai of Wells’ A Modern Utopia recalls: "I remember that one night I sat up and told the rascal stars very earnestly how they should not escape me in the end."

The starry skies above filled Kant with awe and wonder. The technocratic mind wants to capture and control the heavens. That would be the ultimate proof that men are as gods. Time and again in his books Wells returns to this idea of inter-planetary or inter-stellar navigation. And not in a spirit of scientific curiosity and discovery, either. It is all about conquest and control, subjugation of the planet, the ordering of its resources. 

Whilst the British Empire and Stalin’s Russia impressed the Fabians, the working-class movement which was the heart and soul of socialism brought nothing but condescension at best, outright contempt at worst. The workers’ socialism was confused, untidy, emotional – sentimental even. 

If we are to be given the task of getting good at being as gods, we could do worse than consult ‘God’s Englishman’ himself, Oliver Cromwell. Here is a quote from Cromwell’s Letters:

I can say this of Naseby, That when I saw the Enemy draw up and march in gallant order towards us, and we a company of poor ignorant men, to seek how to order our battle: the General having commanded me to order all the Horse, I could not (riding alone about my business), but smile out to God in praises, in assurance of victory, because God would, by things that are not, bring to naught things that are. Of which I had great assurance; and God did it.

Cromwell here affirmed the radical indeterminacy of the future as against the determined facts of present, the capacity of morally free human beings to triumph over necessity. Cromwell had faith in his God and in his ‘company of poor ignorant men’ as moral beings with the root of the matter in them. That is the company most of us are in. The scientists who ‘know the most’ in Stewart Brand’s words are few and far between. From Wells and the Fabians to Hawkings and Dawkins, the scientists are very clever men, one and all. But science without sentiment, without conscience, without vision, without faith is impotent. Such science is hollow.

It was said that Cromwell’s officers were ‘not such as were soldiers or men of estate’, but ‘common men, poor and of mean parentage’, ‘such as have filled dung carts long before they were captains and since’ (The Quarrel between  Manchester and Cromwell pp 72 74). Cromwell’s response is famous and makes a strong social point with respect to human potentiality and the class system:

I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for and loves what he knows than what you call a gentleman and is nothing else’.

The quote is famous but the distinction Cromwell made is not. The Elizabethan Homilies contrasted those who 'wear a russet coat' with the man who 'ruffieth in silk and velvets'. William Kempe on his famous dance to Norwich in  1600 was accompanied part of the way by a village maiden in 'her russet petticoat'. The jester Richard Tarleton wore russet on the stage to establish his links with the groundlings. The poets Samuel Rowlands and George Wither sang of rustics  'in homespun russet', 'plain in russet clad'. In Cheshire in the 1620s the richest yeomen 'went but in russet coats' (S. Clarke, The Lives of sundry Eminent Persons, 1683, p. 4). At Newcastle 'thick grey russets' were provided as 'the most suitable and warm kind of wearing for the poor', though after 1646 they were given better clothes (R. Howell, Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution, 1967, p. 316). 
Women, maidens, jesters, groundlings, rustics, yeomen, the poor, in sum, the marginal, the subaltern, the salt of the earth, the backbone of the country. Cromwell got them to change themselves in changing change their world. 

It takes a God-fearing Cromwellian eye to see that future lies with the ‘company of poor ignorant men’ who keep faith with their essential humanity. ‘God would have no lording over his people’ Cromwell was heard to say. (The Quarrel between  Manchester and Cromwell p75). That is why, although the scientists and technicians and engineers are far smarter than the rest of us, poor ignoramuses as we are, they win no victories to compare with Oliver’s army. 

Cromwell's greatness as a soldier lay in his development of 'the free way' as against 'the formal'; this was based on a recognition that free men consciously motivated by a belief in their cause could overcome the professionals on account of superior morale and discipline. Whilst Royalist Rupert's horse could charge once with devastating effect, they would lose cohesion in the search for plunder. Cromwell's troopers, whether they prevailed, or thought they were beaten and presently routed, would rally again and stand in good order waiting for new orders.

So the question to ask is, on which side would you have stood at Naseby? With or against Cromwell and his ‘company of poor ignorant men’? And answering that question begs another, on which side would you have stood at Burford? The Fabians were against the Bolshevik Revolution at first, with its promise of rule by the workers’ councils, coming later to describe Stalinism as a ‘new civilisation’, once working class organisations had been subordinated to state rule.

Beatrice Webb sneered at electoral democracy as a ‘foolometer’. Wells encapsulates this lack of faith in the people. In The New Machiavelli he portrays the working class socialist leader Chris Robinson (Keir Hardie) in poor light:

"I looked at Chris Robinson, bright-eyed and his hair a little ruffled and his whole being rhetorical, and measured him against the huge machine of government muddled and mysterious. Oh! but I was perplexed!"

Wells would never understand. His view was that socialism could never be the achievement of rough, uneducated, emotional workers. They were simply incapable of any intellectual appreciation of the logical beauty of the Wellsian machine world. Indeed, the workers were a positive menace to the order of such a world.

In The World Set Free Frederick Barnet meets unemployed workers and can get no sense out of them:

"I tried to talk to these discontented men, but it was hard for them to see things as I saw them. When I talked of patience and the larger scheme, they answered, 'But we shall all be dead' — and I could not make them see, what is so simple to my own mind, that that did not affect the question. Men who think in lifetimes are of no use to statesmanship."

The scientific mind does indeed lack sentiment, it lacks the ability to relate, to empathise. The scientific mind sees only Elohim, the God of Creation, the world of fact. It cannot see Hashem, the personal God of Love, the world of interpersonal relations in which each sees the divinity within others as well as themselves. That is all that being good at being gods can ever mean, and that is a world which science dismisses as ‘sentiment’, a world of mere value judgements, which ‘has no basis in science’ pronounces Lovelock. Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine, a world of fact devoid of point and purpose. Human beings cannot empathise with a machine, only venerate it like the Golden Calf. That’s not God, that Moloch. Chesterton comments well here that the worshippers of Moloch were not primitives and barbarians:

They were members of a mature and polished civilization, abounding in refinements and luxuries . . . And Moloch was not a myth; or at any rate his meal was not a myth. These highly civilized people really met together to invoke the blessing of heaven on their empire by throwing hundreds of their infants into a large furnace' (G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man (Hodder & Stoughton: London 1925), p. 169). We do things differently now, more efficiently, more orderly, more rational. It is the same old murder magnified by science and technology. It is the same old worship, only under a different guise.

Life is/frightened out of its highly enlightened wits by the return of ancient nightmares: the tales of the sorcerer's apprentice, of dwarfs with magic powers. The promise of Heaven for the poor in spirit is understood to mean that, on earth at least, they should be educated into clever people able to manipulate and let loose the technical installations of Hell. (Erich Heller The Disinherited Mind).

Yes, Hell, Gehenna, the valley beside Jerusalem associated with the idolatrous rites of Moloch, involving fires for child immolation until abolished by Josiah (2 Kg 23 : 10). Here, the corpses of outcasts were burned, the fires burning continuously to prevent infection. Hygiene is all important, social hygiene most of all. Social justice has no part of this vision. The company of poor ignorant men is not good company to keep in the world of the clever. Those who cannot be educated into clever people, gods, become outcasts. There is no room for ‘sentiment’, asserts Stewart Brand, only science. ‘Ecological balance is too important for sentiment. It requires science’, Brand concludes. 'Close your hearts to pity,' Hitler told his generals a few days before the Polish campaign began. 'Act brutally. Eighty million people must obtain what is their right. Their existence must be made secure. The strongest man is right.'  (Lt Gen. F.Von Rabenau, Seeckt: Aus seinem Lcben (Leipzig 1940), II, p. 341.See also Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, p. 108, and F.L.Carsten, The Reichmehr and Politics, ch. 4.). 

Hitler won no victories to compare with Cromwell, and neither will any science and technology detached from ethics and ‘the company of poor ignorant men.’ Bronowski understood this and called for a democracy of the intellect. The aristocracy of the intellect will bring civilisation down, Bronowski argued. The aristocracy of the intellect cannot build a new world. The Fabians did not achieve socialism, only its opposite.

Wells’ utopia will not be achieved by working people, that much is clear. Instead, in The World Set Free, the Utopian world state is established in the aftermath of a devastating war by an international conference presided over by Kings and Presidents, with scientists and writers also playing a role. The very people who can be found causing the wars in the first place are the ones who bring about the end of all wars. 

Wells' repudiation of the workers as ignorant, muddled, and emotional distorts his perspectives from beginning to end. He has no sense of the working class as a change agent in the historical process, this much is clear. But much worse is his ill-disguised contempt, even fear and hatred of the working people. The workers of Wells’ books they are uncouth, rude, stunted. One could say uncivilised, subhuman. That should be born in mind in light of the way the Nazis portrayed the races and peoples they persecuted and murdered. The Selenites in The First Men in the Moon live underground, away from the sun and air. The same dehumanisation of the workers occurs in The Time Machine and When the Sleeper Wakes. They are a bourgeois nightmare, the threat of a workers’ revolt from below, the eruption of all that is crude and beastly from within the dark repressed nether world of class society. In Kipps, there is the scene which involves working men crawling along a drainpipe until they die. It is in this light we need to remember the enthusiasm for eugenics expressed in educated circles before the Second World War. Wells was a supporter, as was Bernard Shaw. Here was a ‘socialism’ designed to eliminate the working class, the poor ignorant men. This is utopia as a form of social hygiene set in complete antithesis to social justice. Wells selected the most brutal stereotypes with which to portray the working class. In the end, he had them crawling to their death.

It goes without saying that Wells hated Marx and feared Marxist socialism every bit as much as he feared and hated the working class. The Fabians never missed an opportunity to emphasise that Marx was wrong, wrong on all things it seems. So often did they repeat this assertion that it is clear they were out to convince themselves as much as anyone else. Read Lovelock, read Brand, read many of the new scientific utopians, and count how frequently they snipe at socialism, ‘leftists’, ‘extremists’, the political left in general. It isn’t casual. This hatred of political effectiveness is inherent to the technocratic mind.

Wells wanted a socialism with working class drones but without working class socialists. In A Modern Utopia, Wells presented his most feasible proposals for future society. All that imagination and flair and cleverness issues in … a mixed economy. In large part Wells’ views derive from Hertzka's Freeland, an economy in which private enterprise still operates in a framework of the public ownership of land, transport and essential services. Where have we heard this before? Why do we keep hearing this over and again? After yet more lather and blather with respect to new technologies, the mountain heaves and brings forth – a more rational capitalism, organised, orderly, efficient. Sorry, but we would be better returning to Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and proceeding from there to see how ‘the system of needs’ could be brought under democratic control.

The repudiation of political economy entails an inability to locate the failure of reason in an alienated system of production, with all that that entails in terms of class struggle, contradictory dynamics and periodic crises. That lack of political economy forces the scientific utopians to become ever more distanced from reality. In place of a clear awareness of production relationships, we get all manner of technological solutions to social problems. Since the approach is completely unrelated to actual material life processes as they operate within the social metabolism, it is perfectly easy to present this or that new technology as the solution. The problem has been misstated and misdiagnosed as a technological problem, so it stands to reason that the solution is technological. But with respect to deeper social problems, the approach is meaningless.

Further, there is no conception of social transformation as being the product of the self-movement and self-organisation of human agents within actual society. It begs the question of how Wells and other technocratic utopians conceived the attainment of future society. For Marx, what counted was structural capacity and material futurity – which social class was epistemologically and structurally equipped to see through and break through existing relations? Since capital was the power of labour in alien form, that class was the working class as the value creating class. There is nothing of this in Wells, nothing of this in the world of our technocrats. Marx defined utopianism as pertaining to proposals for the ideal future society which are detached from the means of realisation. Wells supplied any number of answers, each as implausible as the other. How the Change Came is the optimistic title of one of Wells’ books. Wells had many views on how the change would come. In The World Set Free change came about due to Princes whose eyes had been opened. In Things to Come to it was the result of a conspiracy of airmen and technicians, 'Wings across the World'. We now have unmanned drones bringing death and destruction at the push of a button. In A Modern Utopia it was a conspiracy of a self-selected aristocracy, the Samurai, what Wells understood by 'priests'. In Men Like Gods there is a process of general and gradual enlightenment:

"The impression given Mr. Barnstaple was not of one of those violent changes which our world has learned to call revolutions, but of an increase of light, a dawn of new ideas, in which the things of the old order went on for a time with diminishing vigour until people began as a matter of common sense to do the new things in the place of the old."

There are many roads to the Wellsian Utopia, all of them cul-de-sacs. Time and again, Wells’ Utopia ended with an enlightened elite ruling an ignorant mass. The elite is recruited from the ranks of scientists, engineers, technicians and administrators, the same professional, educated, trained men and women who were already in the pay of monopoly capital at the time that Wells wrote. Wells was the kind of socialist who could easily ignore the workers and turn his attention to 'enlightened' capitalists like Fords, Rockefeller, Morris and Mond. Wells cheered on the boom in the roaring twenties and learned nothing from the crash of 1929.

The fear and hatred of the workers also entailed a dislike of democracy. Stewart Brand writes ‘because the findings of science are not just matters of opinion, they sweep past systems of thought based only on opinion. (Brand ch 7 2009). The assertion of knowledge over opinion can also sweep past systems of political representation based upon the opinions of the demos very easily. Technocratic utopias of all kinds are profoundly anti-democratic. Such utopias are established by an elite of knowledge and continue to operate in elitist fashion. At no point is there any suggestion that the gap between the active elite and passive mass is to be closed, except perhaps by an indoctrination which induces the masses to identify with the purposes of the elite.

Wells gives us a crude statement of Plato's concept of a specialised society, in which everyone performs the task to which they are best fitted by nature and training. In The First Men in the Moon Wells writes:

"In the moon every citizen knows his place. He is born to that place, and the elaborate discipline of training and education and surgery he undergoes fits him at last so completely to it that he has neither ideas nor organs for any purpose beyond it. 'Why should he?' Phi-oo would ask. If, for example, a Selenite is destined to be a mathematician, his teachers and trainers set out at once to that end. They check any incipient disposition to other pursuits, they encourage his mathematical bias with a perfect psychological skill. His brain grows, or at least the mathematical faculties of his brain grow, and the rest of him only so much as is necessary to sustain this essential part of him."

In this specialist society, each person knows his or her place. Government is a job for the specialist. The principle of functional representation could serve as the basis of a democratic society in which individuals work together towards a common good they themselves determine. In Wells’ hands, however, functional representation is hierarchal and ordered from the top down, each having to accept the authority of those who know best what is good for each and for the whole. 

Of course, such elitism is justified by reference to the good of the whole. The problem is that the elites are separated from the masses on which they impose their will, whereas a leadership concerned with the common good retains an organic connection with the class which they lead.
The technocratic utopia is the very antithesis of democracy, which regards human beings as capable of learning, choosing, acting, a knowledgeable being capable of gaining a full understanding of the world and of changing it. 
Stewart Brand asserts this technocratic utopianism strongly in the contemporary world. ‘Science is the only news’ he claims. ‘Human nature doesn't change much; science does. (Brand ch 7 2009).

And there, in a sentence, is the reason why technocratic utopians achieve nothing. For all of their top talk, they achieve nothing because they have ruled change out from the start. If human beings do not change themselves, then they change nothing. 

Engineers are being hired in droves. They don't know or care much about environmental traditions, causes, or romantic attitudes. Because they are interested in solving problems, not in changing behavior, technology is the first thing they reach for when looking for a solution. (Brand ch 7 2009). 

If human behaviour doesn’t change, then nothing changes. All we get are the same problems on a scale magnified by new technology. 

Technocracy in the service of capital
With the emphasis overwhelmingly placed on the machinery of survival at the expense of changed modalities and mentalities, it is clear that the technocrats, in their approach to the socio-economic arrangements of society, do not seek to make fundamental alterations. Survival as the central goal puts the accent on preservation. In this respect, then, the criticism of ‘greens’ and ‘environmentalists’ is part of a moral and political disarmament designed to entrench the general capitalist framework. The technocratic utopia, then, is not a utopia at all, in that there is no intention whatsoever of replacing the existing social order by another. On the contrary, the point is to preserve the current social order. There is no change whatsoever in either human nature or human society. The future as no more than the present enlarged by technology amounts to the end of utopia. Human nature changes only to catch up with the science and technology. As Brand asserts: ‘Human nature doesn't change much; science does, and the change accrues, altering the world irreversibly.’ (Brand ch 7 2009). ‘Our culture and politics languishes decades behind our science.’ (Lynas 2011 Intro). The conclusion is obvious, human beings must catch up with the mechanics.

Some clarification of the word 'technocracy', as in the technocratic utopia, is called for. Technocracy refers to a form of social organization in which technicians – those with specialist expertise in science and technology - occupy the dominant positions. That some such view is at least implicit in the words of the technocratic utopians is clear when Brand writes that ‘science proposes, society disposes’ (Brand ch 7 2009).
Brand is an engineer. It may be no coincidence that the term technocracy was first used in the early 1930s in America by the engineer, Howard Scott, who founded the Technocracy movement in the hope of raising technicians to become a new ruling elite. (Wagar 1979: 38-54.). Scott was a follower of the economic Thorstein Veblen who, in the early years of the twentieth century had called for the revolt of the engineers. Veblen conceived the economic process itself as being mechanical in character. Economics meant production, and production was the machinelike preserve of the engineers controlling inputs and outputs. Such an economic machine requires technicians and engineers to make the adjustments that are necessary to ensure the most efficient co-operation of the parts. Conceiving society as a vast but purely matter-of-fact mechanism, a highly specialized human clockwork, Veblen proposed the rule of the technicians and the engineers. In The Engineers and the Price System and Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise, Veblen went into great detail concerning the future 'revolution', showing how a corps of engineers would be recruited from society to assume control of the  business system and end the chaos and waste associated with  profit making. 

Veblen’s obsession with the machine should be cause for concern. Engineering may elaborate the principles for ‘getting things done’, but what are these things? Engineering may encourage us to think in a matter-of-fact way, but about what? Even the claim that a corps of engineers would run society more efficiently is highly questionable, given the tendency to overlook the human factor. Nazi engineering efficiency was ultimately no match for a democratic mobilisation around a just cause. 

That said, Veblen was at least proposing ‘revolution’, albeit a revolution in which technicians and engineers replaced the working class. And Veblen did identify a central process of change, the emergence of science and technology as central components of society. Like other pioneer thinkers, Veblen was far too impatient, expecting immediate results and ignoring the fact that processes of enduring change unfold over generations. Such haste ignores real possibilities for change in the immediate environment for the sake of the one big change. There is a danger that such impatience leads to imprudent action that short-circuits the processes of change.

To be fair to Thorstein Veblen, and as testimony to his critical mind, he briefly entertained hopes that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 might institute the rule of the engineers, but very quickly abandoned them. 'When the thing failed to come off’, writes Horace Kallen, ‘he gave signs of a certain relaxation of will and interest, of a kind of turning towards death ...’ He was seventy now and he wrote no more, 'I have decided not to break the Sabbath,' he declared. 'It is such a nice Sabbath.' Veblen realised from the first that the Bolshevik Revolution promised neither the rule of the workers or the engineers, but of the bureaucrats.
Human beings, argued Veblen, cannot be comprehended in terms of sophisticated 'economic laws' which suffocate the innate human ferocity and creativity underneath a cloak of rationalization. Human beings are better understood in the language of anthropology or psychology, as a creature of powerful and irrational drives, credulous, untutored, ritualistic, all of which need tempering and canalising. The great religions have understood this, but it is less than clear that our greatest scientific minds do. For all of the study of genes and memes, for all of the assertions that human beings as survival machines, some scientists seem remarkably naïve with respect to human nature, dangerously so. Thus Sam Harris, neuroscientist, sneers at religions for treating human beings as ‘dangerous children’ whereas he, along with his fellow ‘new atheists’, assume that ‘our fellow Homo sapiens possess the requisite intelligence and emotional maturity to respond to rational argument’ (Harris 2011). The great strength of a man such as Thorstein Veblen is that he sees right through such flattering fictions, demanding that we go beyond the rationalisations to see human beings as they are. Children? The great religions have had the nerve to grapple with human reality in the raw. The same cannot be said of scientists who still proclaim the ideal self-image of homo sapiens but pay little regard to the extent to which human beings fall short of that ideal. 

Since Veblen, technocracy has become less and less revolutionary, being restricted to doctrines and movements which expound the supremacy of technical efficiency over and above other criteria in decision-making. Such an attitude is not conducive to democracy and tends naturally to elitism. From Francis Bacon to Saint-Simon and Comte, the rule of the experts has been asserted over against the ‘poor ignorant men’ that Oliver Cromwell spoke of. But, given the disparity in resources, given how much the expert elites have had to work with, given how little Cromwell had to work with – just men and women with the ‘root of the matter’ in them – the world changing achievements of the technocrats are meagre. The same goes for H. G. Wells and the Fabians, B. F. Skinner and the behaviourists, the scientists who are today proposing any number of determinisms, Darwinist, genetic, neural. 
Since Veblen, technocracy has moved steadily away from liberal, democratic and socialist goals, precisely because it shows more interest in the machinery of the social order than its human members, replacing the people or the proletariat with the savants (as in Saint-Simon and Comte), the experts, the technical intelligentsia. When Stewart Brand asserts that the scientists are the ones who ‘know the most’ we see this technical intelligentsia developing a sense of self-identity vis-a-vis the rest of society, those who know less. It is no small step from here to the development of a technocratic doctrine designed to promote the interests of the technical intelligentsia, and none at all from there to the rule of the technocrats. But this would no longer be utopian in the sense of creating an ideal alternative future. Rather, to the vast majority who know less than the scientists, this is a dystopia.

It may well be significant that the best known technocratic utopias are actually the dystopian visions presented in such books as Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-four and Huxley’s Brave New World. There is no doubt that, in these versions of the technological future, the connection between science and technology on the one hand and values of universal progress, good and happiness has been well and truly sundered. Here, technocracy moves not beyond liberalism, democracy and socialism but against them. 

Technocrats do not seek to change existing arrangements and institutions, only rationalise them, make them efficient, make them ‘work’. Human beings become more efficient tools, specialised instruments, working towards ends which are external to them, feeding the monster. It’s Moloch, however smooth and clean and anti-septic the surface. As the quote from the scientist and engineer Brand makes clear, the technocratic utopians entertain few hopes with respect to what human beings could become. Nothing changes but science. Human beings are thus denied politics as politikon bion and as a result are swindled of their future.
There is nothing in such a scientistic approach of the Aristotelian distinction between man as he happens to be and 'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos' (MacIntyre 1983:52). Aristotle can close the gap between fact and value precisely because he derives concepts of purpose and intention from factual premises. The fact/value gap can be bridged, but not by science understood on mechanistic or utilitarian lines but by understanding nature along teleological lines. And this entails an emphasis of the potentiality and purpose inherent in each human being. It means that all real change involves the transformation of human nature as a self-transformation, human beings changing the world and changing themselves in the process. 
In the technocratic utopia, everything changes except human beings — human beings are surrounded by mechanical marvels of every description but continue to think, talk and act like apes. That this deprives change driven by science of any point escapes the attention of our technocratic utopians. If science changes but human beings do not, doesn’t that invite a very dangerous disparity between moral and technical capacities, stone age mentalities wielding the powers of gods, moral dwarves with the technical capacities of giants?

For the scientistic mind there is something permanent and unalterable in human nature, and that unchanging element renders human beings poor material with which to realise utopia. The principle of change is removed from human agency and invested in things. Utopian man, Wells argues,

"would have different habits, different traditions, different knowledge, different ideas, different clothing and different appliances, but, except for all that (my italics) he would be the same man. We very distinctly provided at the outset that the modern Utopia must have people inherently the same as those in the world."

Wells adds ‘whatever we do, man will remain a competitive creature.’ However clean and shiny and disinfected our machine world, human beings will remain primeval rats.

Therefore,
"it is our business to ask what Utopia will do with its drunkards and men of vicious mind, its cruel and furtive souls, its stupid people, too stupid to be of use to the community, its lumpish, unteachable and unimaginative people? And what will it do with the man who is 'poor' all round, the rather spiritless, rather incompetent low-grade man who on earth sits in the den of the sweater, tramps the streets under the banner of the unemployed, or trembles — in another man's cast-off clothing, and with an infinity of hat touching — on the verge of rural unemployment?"

Compare those statements to Brand’s denial that human beings ever change much. What hasn’t changed at all is the scientific mind’s denigration of working people. It follows that such people would also populate the technocratic utopia as primeval rats. The Malthusian menace is never far from the scientific mind. The solution of surplus population is eugenics. Wells was not alone in arguing for eugenics, far from it. Until it was given a bad name by its association with Nazism, eugenics was the religion of the bourgeoisie. 
In A Modern Utopia Wells complains about the extent to which the poor breed, and proposes a whole machinery to prevent the 'inferior types' from reproducing themselves:

"here one may insist that Utopia will control the increase of its population. Without the determination and ability to limit that increase, as well as to stimulate it whenever it is necessary, no Utopia is possible. That was clearly demonstrated by Malthus for all time."

That certainly marked the bourgeois mind for all time. Many are misled into believing that constant references to ‘progress’ is sufficient to make a proposal or a course of action progressive. Wells certainly thought himself to be an advocate of progress, and his books are well known to be packed with all manner of technological possibilities that are identified with progress. But look again at those statements that human nature does not change and it becomes clear that any such progress proposed is entirely quantitative and lacking in a qualitative dimension. There is no progress at all in the moral or philosophical anthropology of humankind. Human beings remain ignorant, stunted, rude, uncouth – beings to fear and loathe, beings to eliminate. Wells was not alone in advocating eugenics. He didn’t like the company of ‘poor ignorant men’ and clearly thought the unwashed, uneducated masses worthless. Progress without persons is wholly quantitative, something external to real human beings. Beyond that, the scientists and technicians and engineers cannot go and that is why, for all of the cleverness, for all of the intelligence, for all of the technological power on display, the technocrats never change history for the better and never record any victory to compare with Cromwell and his ‘poor ignorant men’. The Fabians took socialism, divorced it from its social roots, distanced it from working people, emptied it of content, and left nothing but a hollow shell that collapsed in on its own emptiness. A human void.

The technocrats talk big. Wells spoke of Men as Gods, and it seems we are due another chapter in that long running tragedy.

"Science is no longer our servant. We know it for something greater than our little individual selves. It is the awakening mind of the race, and in a little while — In a little while — I wish indeed I could watch for that little while, now that the curtain has risen. . . ."

The curtain is still rising but the play never begins. The real actors are never allowed onto the stage. The play is one of class struggle concerning the supply of social labour. That is the dynamo of historical change, but the scientists and technicians cannot see it. Hence the vagueness when the critical points in the analysis are reached, the curiously empty optimism that is little more than guess work and generalities.
No wonder that Wells’ constant second thoughts in time started to give way to pessimism. The pessimism was there from the start, in the rejection of the possibilities of human change. Wells backed science and technology and, in time, it became apparent that this was not enough. In A Modern Utopia, the hero admits:


"At present we seem to have lost heart altogether, and now there are no new religions, no new orders, no new cults — no beginnings any more."

And this was in 1905, before the First World War shattered the illusions of International Socialism. Wells, it is clear, never entertained any hope that the workers of all lands would unite. A workers’ socialism was not the new beginning and new social order that Wells sought or could even understand. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the prospect of international socialism terrified Wells as much as it did the ruling classes. He shared the anti-Bolshevism which fed Fascism and Nazism. Wells could never quite understand why his advice, eminently rational, was never taken as the world set on a course to unreason. In Men Like Gods, Wells extended Utopia so far into the future that it lost any link to the current world. There is no longer any discernible link between the present and the future. In Mind at the End of Its Tether, Wells abandons even this distant hope: "The end of everything we call life is close at hand and cannot be evaded."
This was Wells’ last book. It was a fitting ending. Without human beings as change agents, without the creative praxis of individuals, there is no change. All that there is, at best, is an extension of quantity, but it is a quantity without quality. Human beings are the qualitative dimension.

Marx put the point best in Thesis III on Feuerbach:

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

With all that we have come to know, after having suffered all manner of depravities and inanities owing to elitism in politics, it beggars belief that we have scientists and technologists who are still locating the principle of change in circumstances and things rather than in people, thereby dividing society into two, an active elite above and a passive mass below. Stewart Brand claims that human beings do not change much. Well, it seems that the technocratic mind never changes at all.

The ignominious end to which Wells’ utopianism came is actually implicit in the premises. Wells had many qualities, imagination, energy, a can-do spirit, a faith that things could be different. But in turning his back on the essential human nature of ‘ordinary’ working people, Wells denied himself the possibility of a future. Lacking a faith in human nature, it is inevitable that the concern to survive and to serve should be invested in the machine. The scientistic mind can no longer recognise man and woman.
After Wells, the technocratic utopia ought to have come to an end. It had reached a dead-end. Such a utopia could function from this moment on only as satire or warning, a degeneration of the scientific mind unable to break free from a decadent capitalism. Having fought consistently against the workers’ socialism from below, having called the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the biggest tragedy suffered by socialism, the Webbs in 1937 published Soviet Communism: a New Civilisation. For some, that could be seen as the Fabians seeing the error of their ways and breaking with the elitism of their past. For others, it confirmed the tragedy of marxism and socialism in that it sanctioned a top-down state socialism in which the workers remained as subordinate and as exploited as ever they were. 

The Reaction against ‘The Machine’

‘Rather than lashing out, Luddite-fashion, against the machine, those who genuinely wish to break the prison-hold of the past and present would do well to hasten the controlled - selective - arrival of tomorrow's technologies. To accomplish this, however, intuition and 'mystical insights' are hardly enough. It will take exact scientific knowledge, expertly applied to the crucial, most sensitive points of social control.’ (Toffler 1971: 292).

Every time I read that old trop of Luddism being trotted out – for the umpteenth time - I take great delight in pointing out that the abusers of old Ned Ludd and his followers haven’t got a clue what they are talking about. To repeat - for the umpteenth time - the Luddites were not against machinery, they were against the way it was used in socially destructive ways. The Luddite point is that machinery should serve the common human good. Toffler claims to want this when he argues in favour of the controlled and selective use of tomorrow’s technologies. That’s what the Luddites wanted and that means politics. Instead, like all technocrats, Toffler slides over the politics and focuses firmly on technical powers. Nothing could be more likely to deliver us into the embrace of ‘the machine’. Toffler’s last line would be chilling if it wasn’t so funny: ‘It will take exact scientific knowledge, expertly applied to the crucial, most sensitive points of social control.’ (Toffler 1971: 292). Exact expert application and control. Toffler writes as though reality really was some objective external datum with inexorable laws of its own accessible only by scientists. That’s a myth, a technocratic lie. Toffler is right to write of the need a controlled and selective use of new technologies. The problem is that there is nothing more likely to deliver us into the hands of ‘the machine’ than the overweening confidence that Toffler invests in exact and expert scientific knowledge. What role the rest of us, poor, inexpert men and women we are?

‘It is obstinate nonsense to insist … that the machines of tomorrow will turn us into robots, steal our individuality, eliminate cultural variety, etc, etc. Because primitive mass production imposed certain uniformities, does not mean that super-industrial machines will do the same.’ (Toffler 1971: 258).

Well, nothing is inevitable. I maintain the radical indeterminacy of the future. The machines of tomorrow may or may not turn us into robots, steal our individuality, eliminate cultural variety, etc, etc, if we let them. It’s all in the social application and purpose. But if we transfer our moral and political responsibility as citizens to exact and expert scientific knowledge, then there will be no way of avoiding becoming functionaries of the machine. It is the end of history.

G.K. Chesterton's The Napoleon of Notting Hill a Fabian England of 1984, an England which drab, uniform and routine. History had ended:

"And some things did change. Things that were not much thought of dropped out of sight. Things that had not often happened did not happen at all. Thus, for instance, the actual physical force ruling the country, the soldiers and police, grew smaller and smaller, and at last vanished almost to a point. The people could have swept the few remaining policemen away in ten minutes: they did not do so because they did not believe it would do them the least good. They had lost faith in revolutions.

"Democracy was dead; for no one minded the governing class governing. England was now practically a despotism, but not an hereditary one. Some one of the official class was made King. No one cared how: no one cared who. He was merely an universal secretary.”

‘The world is going your way at present,’, William Morris told Sydney Webb, ‘but it is not the right way in the end.’ (William Morris to Sydney Webb in 1895, quoted in R Page Arnot 1964.) But here, in the 1984 imagined by Chesterton, the methods of Fabianism had triumphed and England had been dulled into passivity. Chesterton was pointing to a result that contradicted the bright, shiny, swift-moving Utopia envisaged by Wells and the technocrats. The idea of a world rationally controlled must necessarily fail. Chesterton had seen the connection between the bright mechanical Utopia of Wells and the dull bureaucratic Utopia of the Fabians, and exposed the contradiction between ideal and real. The condemnation of things for being inefficient and out-of-date involved a commitment to the efficient and the modern. It sounds radical enough but the end results in a world of drabness and routine. A genuine revolution addresses qualitative change alongside quantitative advance. And that is what disappoints most about technocratic utopias, lacking a sense of human possibilities, human beings as change agents, they miss the revolutionary possibilities that exist under their own noses. To opt for quantitative changes in abstraction from qualitative changes is fall far short of real possibilities. As Adam Wayne puts it in Chesterton’s The Napoleon of Notting Hill:

"When I was young I remember in the old dreary days, wiseacres used to write books about how trains would go faster, and all the world would be one empire, and tramcars go to the moon. And even as a child I used to say to myself, 'Far more likely that we shall go on the crusades again or worship the gods of the city.' And so it has been."

This savours a great deal of Weber’s renascent gods, the old gods rising from the grave and taking the form of impersonal idols demanding sacrifice. The technocratic utopias deliver the same world on a greater scale. History is abolished as the future become merely the present enlarged. 

Wells’ technocratic utopia is a rational, efficient capitalism that has somehow overcome its internal contradictions, crisis tendencies and class antagonism. A capitalism without conflict and contradiction implies a totally bureaucratised world populated by automatons. Even if such a world is technically possible, it is morally repugnant. It is a world in which human beings are less than human in coming to accept their chains.

The anaesthetised, plastic world of Wells is inhumane, insensitive and uncivilised. In The Machine Stops, E.M. Forster took the Wellsian technocratic utopia and turned it inside out. In this book Forster describes a future world state in which the surface of the earth has been abandoned and humanity lives underground. Individuals live alone in identical rooms, each in connection with all through television contact. ‘The Machine’ supplies every need at the push of a button. It is a world of synthetic food, synthetic clothing, synthetic culture … of synthetic human beings who do no work. On the odd occasion when individuals leave their rooms, they are conveyed on moving platforms and airships. The minds of these individuals have become passive and receptive, their bodies have become torpid and feeble. It is a world which is all quantity and which is wholly lacking in the qualitative dimension supplied by the human factor. The earth unified by 'the Machine', which has long escaped human control and comprehension and has come to be venerated as a supra-human force:

"The Machine," they exclaimed, "feeds us and clothes us and houses us; through it we speak to one another, through it we see one another, in it we have our being. The Machine is the friend of ideas and the enemy of superstition: the Machine is omnipotent, eternal; blessed is the Machine."

Wells simply could not understand the inversion at work when he has one the characters in The World Set Free boast that "Science is no longer our servant." In much the same spirit, our modern utopians of science cannot see how they are exalting the power of things over the human subjects. The human subjects simply do not exist, they are just passively dependent upon and determined by scientific and technological advance. The truly depressing thing is, dressed up as a radical new vision, it has long since been exposed as tired and hollow and inhuman. Brand condemns Greens for being ‘outdated’, which, for scientism, is the deadliest of all the deadly sins. In truth, it is Brand’s proselytising for new technologies which is outdated. We are already in Brand’s brave new world of technology and have been for some time now. The mechanistic world view has left us stranded in Flatland, a one dimensional world of dead, atomistic matter in motion. We are already where Brand wants us to be. Of course, his utopia is not a utopia at all, it isn’t the future. It is an ever more inflated, bloated present. It’s survival, certainly, but nothing more.

We are already in the Flatland. In The Machine Stops, Vashti, on a flight across the world to visit her son Kuno, can find nothing of interest on the surface of the earth:

"At midday she took a second glance at the earth. The air-ship was crossing another range of mountains, but she could see little, owing to clouds. Masses of black rock hovered below her, and merged indistinctly into grey. Their shapes were fantastic; one of them resembled a prostrate man.
"'No ideas here,' murmured Vashti, and hid the Caucasus behind a metal blind.
"In the evening she looked again. They were crossing a golden sea, in which lay many small islands and one peninsula.
"She repeated, 'No ideas here,' and hid Greece behind a metal blind."

The essential difference between an organicism and a machine is that an organicism replenishes itself and is self-healing and self-regulating whereas a machine has to be fixed, its parts replaced, from the outside. A machine is prone to breakdown. The inevitable end comes and ‘the Machine’ fails, resulting in rapid and total collapse, "as it was in days of Noe". The Machine stops, food, light and air fail and the entombed millions die. Vashti and Kuno meet in the darkness and he tells her of his visit to the upper air, where he discovered a remnant upon the earth who could make a new beginning. The end is a new beginning if the moment of truth is faced with courage and conviction. Understanding the truth about a failing civilisation is a form of revelation in terms of disclosing the truth about humanity and the human condition:

"They wept for humanity, those two, not for themselves. They could not bear that this should be the end. Ere silence was completed their hearts were opened, and they knew what had been important on the earth. Man, the flower of all flesh, the noblest of all creatures visible, man who had once made god in his image, and had mirrored his strength on the constellations, beautiful naked man was dying, strangled in the garments that he had woven. Century after century had he toiled, and here was his reward."

I don’t think it is without significance that the two principle actors in these scene at the end of the world is mother and son, given the centrality of this dyad in ancient religions. 

This passage should be carried in all books written by scientists, technologists and engineers who think science and technology alone are our salvation and that power is quantity and that human beings can be as gods through the possession of technical capacity. From being in the image of god, we turn, in thrall to our instrumental power, and make god in our image. Technology, however, is a mirror of ourselves. Absorbed in our narcissism, we expect technology to do it all whilst doing nothing ourselves. Increasingly entangled within powers which have long since escaped our control and comprehension, we worship ourselves in alien form and can no longer transcend our condition. In time, we suffocate. We are entombed within the Machine and in that cataleptic condition we slowly die. We have allowed ourselves to be buried alive and so go to a premature death.

It is time to heed the warning that many writers have delivered since the nineteenth century. The suffocation of human beings by the structures they have built derives from an alienated system of production which turns human creations against human creators and invests them with existential significance. That suffocating alienation is incorporated into the things of the built environment. It is Poe’s Fall of the House of Usher, where the building lives, moves and slowly closes in on the doomed family, the dead weight as demons bringing a murderous intent to the stone. It is the Frankenstein tale of creations running wild against the creators. 
In ‘The Machine’ we finally see the eventual autonomy of the built structure from its inhabitants. Worse, the walls are no longer demonic as in Poe, but benevolent, ‘the Machine’ supplying all the material comforts human beings could want. The monster is no longer in human form, but is the thing itself, the Machine, ready to destroy its master through service. Human beings become dependent not on themselves but upon their alienated powers.

The proud achievements of modern technology conceal a deadly inversion. Alienation disempowers human beings and, worse, induces them to venerate their powers the more they are autonomous of human control. Human creation ceases to expand human power and ceases to enhance human nature but becomes ever more remote from nature. Human beings build a tomb around themselves and in time all the air is squeezed out. Franz Kafka's The Great Wall of China (1946) addresses the modern predicament, 'the art of architecture, and especially that of masonry, had been proclaimed as the most important branch of knowledge throughout the whole area of a China that was to be walled around . . .' (Kafka 1946:150-1). Stewart Brand claims that far from agriculture being the cause of the rise of cities, it is the city which is instrumental in the invention of agriculture. He takes his stand on the ‘constant battles’ view of history and writes: ‘The first urban invention, I'll bet, was a defendable wall, followed by rectangular buildings that allowed close packing of maximum residents within a minimum amount of wall.’ (Brand ch 2 2009). 
But from being a protective device, the wall in time becomes the integument of the social body. When the people saw the great wall, a surge of pride swept through them. Kafka writes here: ‘Every fellow countryman was a brother for whom one was building -a wall of protection and who would return lifelong thanks for it with all he had and did. Unity! Unity! Shoulder to shoulder, a ring of brothers, a current of blood no longer confined within the narrow circulation of one body, but sweetly rolling and yet ever returning throughout the endless leagues of China.’ (Kafka 1946:154)

However, the truth is darker. In time the protective shell hardens on the back and slowly starts to close in, suffocating the life enclosed within. In time, the wall dwarfs those who have built it. Contact is lost with outsiders, the attackers with their 'half-shut eyes that already seem to be seeking out the victim which their jaws will rend and devour' (Kafka 1946: 160); those attackers live inside the defensive walls as bogy-men instilling fear and paralysing independent thought and action. The wall becomes unfathomable and unreachable, like the enemy without and the enemy within, like the ruling power itself, maybe a myth, a phantom, a spectre. The villagers live in safety, but there is a pervasive anxiety born of a loss of contact with human nature within and the natural environment without.

Read Brand’s chapters ‘City Planet’ and ‘Urban Promise’ and ask what happened to the countryside. All Brand offers is an enclosed environment of synthetic food and synthetic pleasures. City Planet is the world of ‘The Machine’. The scientistic mind, it is plain, despairs of humanity. That is why it invests so much faith in machines. 

Ironically, the basic nomenclature employed by the technological fixers is itself of fairly ancient vintage, at least in their own terms. There is little in what Brand, Lynas et al say that hasn’t already been said a hundred years or more ago. By the likes of Wells, certainly, but also by the likes of the Italian futurists. Take this passionate advocacy of modernity in the years before the First World War: "Comrades, we tell you now that the triumphant progress of science makes changes in humanity inevitable, changes that are hacking an abyss between those docile slaves of tradition and us free moderns who are confident in the radiant splendor of our future." ("Manifesto of the Futurist Painters, 1910," by Umberto Boccioni et al. Translated by Robert Brain, in Umbro Apollonio, editor, Futurist Manifestos (Viking, 1973), 25.) Compare this with statements made by Brand et al. The claims made for science and technology are the same, only the specific character of the technologies involved will be different.
The world is split crudely between future and past and it is technology which is change agent and driver. The veneration of technology generates progress and brings freedom, a retention of ‘outdated’ modes amounts to an abject slavery. More subtle thinkers well know that the destruction of traditional social structures and values could be liberating but would also have human costs that would take time and effort to repair. Technology as such is not this resolution. To the Futurists, however, technology was both necessary and sufficient to fill the gap in moral and cultural resources created by modernity. 

We will sing of great crowds excited by work, by pleasure and by riot; we will sing of the multicolored, polyphonic tides of revolu​tion in the modern capitals; we will sing of the nightly fervor of arsenals and shipyards blazing with violent electric moons; greedy railway stations that devour smoke-plumed serpents; factories hung on clouds by the crooked lines of their smoke; bridges that stride the rivers like giant gymnasts, flashing in the sun with a glitter of knives; adventurous steamers . . . deep-chested locomotives . . . and the sleek light of planes [etc., etc.] (F. T. Marinetti, "The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism, 1909," translated by R. W. Flint, in Futurist Manifestos, 22.)

Over one hundred years on, we ought to be older and wiser, having learned that it takes more than youthful verve and enthusiasm with respect to technology to create the world anew. Technology creates a world in its own image, but misses much that is human out. Brand refers to Greens as ‘outdated’. The language is revealing. The implication is that the only things that are of value are those that have a place in the future. It begs the question of what happens not merely to those things that get swept away by technological change, but to all the people who are likewise ‘outdated’. Their experience is nowhere to be found in the technologists view, other than bland statements of what is necessary for survival. It seems that as machines are coming to life, some essential qualities of human emotion, feeling, and sensibility are dying. George Orwell referred to ‘the crystal spirit’ of human beings but it seems that this spirit is in retreat. Far from being a source of regret, the futurists celebrate this as an achievement, "we look for the creation of a nonhuman type in whom moral suffering, goodness of heart, affection, and love, those corrosive poisons of vital energy, interrupters of our powerful bodily electricity, will be abolished." (Marinetti, "Multiplied Man and the Reign of the Machine," from War, the World's Only Hygiene, 1911-15, in R. W. Flint, editor and translator, Marinetti: Selected Writings (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972), 90—91. For a spirited (if partisan) treatment of futurism in the context of the evolution of modernity, see Reyner Banham, Theory and Design in the First Machine Age (Praeger, 1967) 99-137.)

It’s that word ‘hygiene’ again. It crops up time and again in the concerns of the technocratic utopians. The Futurists openly proclaimed "war, the world's only hygiene," and threw themselves into the 1914-18 war with youthful enthusiasm. Within two years, the two most creative spirits of Futurism — the painter-sculptor Umberto Boccioni and the architect Antonio Sant'Elia— were killed by the machines they loved. A form of modern human sacrifice to the new idols of state, science and technology. The other Futurists survived to become cultural hacks in Mussolini's state machine.

And that is the supreme irony of the whole thing. For all of the talk of the future, of progress and freedom, of all the claims made for the possibilities opened up by technology, the technocrats are ‘working for the man’ more than anybody, hidebound, time-serving, bureaucratic dullards whose humanity has been sterilised and anaestheticised by the dead hand of the future.
The Fascists and the Nazis employed the new technologies to the nth degree, in promoting their murderous message and in executing their murderous designs. In radio and communication, architecture and engineering, technology was promoted to full, way beyond and to the neglect of morality. It was a grotesque realisation of scientific and technological potential and imploded morally and socially. One would have thought that such extravagances would not be repeated and caution would prevent science and technology from being asserted over against politics and ethics to any great extent ever again. But no, technologists remain ardent sentimentalists in their dew-eyed romantic vision of machines, along with their utter remoteness from real people, to find the "machine aesthetic" proposed time and again. The words of Brand are really the fag end of an era of technocratic pastorals dating back to Bauhaus, Gropius and Mies van der Rohe, to Le Corbusier and his description of the home as a ‘machine for living in’, to Leger, the Ballet Mecanique. Time and again, the ideal human being is conceived as a machine, better able to fit the machine the technocrats are busy designing around him and her.

The technocratic utopia is an updating of the "pastoral" for the modern age of science and technology. To all intents and purposes, Mephistopheles has kept his side of the bargain and delivered an economy of material abundance, which millions have proceeded to enjoy. The problem is that, in delivering the goods, many question the value of science and technology. The point is that, by their very achievement, science and technology render the world meaningless and their role obsolete. In The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of Progress, scientist Gunther Stent referred to breakthroughs in his field of molecular biology, particularly the discovery of DNA, to argue that the very achievements of science both fulfilled and exhausted culture, leaving us with nowhere to go and nothing more to do. Historical development had created a society in which "economic well-being [is] taken for granted."

And here we can perceive an internal contradiction of progress. Progress depends on the exertion of Faustian Man, whose motivational mainspring is the idea of the will to power. But when progress has proceeded far enough to provide an ambiance of economic security for Everyman, the resulting social ethos works against the transmission of the will to power in childrearing, and hence aborts the development of Faustian Man.

The world is disenchanted, denuded of meaning, subject to instrumental rationalisation. Through a process of natural selection, self-made ‘Faustian Man’ is being progressively eliminated from the machine world he has created.
The generations who grow up in this new world lack the drive for action or achievement, but become like Wells’ butterfly people in the Time Machine, happily lazing by the river, watching life go by. Stent used Lucas Cranach's the Golden Age as his frontispiece, claiming that it was "nothing other than a prophetic vision of a hippie Be-In in Golden Gate State Park." Stent predicted that the consummation of history would be "a period of general stasis", in which all the great human excellences, art, science, philosophy, would involve no more than marking time and enjoying the moment. "The Faustian Man of the Iron Age will view with distaste the prospect of his affluent successors devoting their abundance of leisure time to sensual pleasures. . . . But Faustian Man had better face up to the fact that it is precisely this Golden Age that is the fruit of all his frantic efforts, and that it does no good now to wish it otherwise." Such a conclusion amounts to pronouncing on the futility of progress. Progress achieves nothing and goes nowhere. And perhaps that’s the real point. Science and technology are not supposed to triumph, only spur us to keep making the effort in the pursuit of progress, not its attainment. Progress may be an illusion, but it is a necessary illusion. Success only serves to expose the hollowness that lies within. "Millennia of doing arts and sciences will finally transform the tragicomedy of life into a happening." (Stent 1969: 83-87, 134-38.) At some point, science and technology themselves become ‘outdated’.

The big promise of scientific and technological progress is also, therefore, a warning. The attainment of the Golden Age is effectively the end of progress, a dissipation of effort, a realisation that life is pointless. Of course, it is easy to respond that the prophecies of the technocratic pastoral made in the 1960s have been falsified by history and that economic and environmental crisis make scientific and technological advance more relevant than ever. But that is to dodge the issue, since material abundance, even during this time of crisis, far exceeds the levels attained when those projections were first made. To repeat, science and technology have delivered in a material sense. The same period has been a golden age for science and technology. The failure is existential, moral, cultural. To argue that the optimism of the 1960s has given way to pessimism as a result of political failure, international instability, ecological constraints and economic crisis simply begs the question, whatever happened to progress? 
For many sensitive critics, going back to Thomas More and his observation that ‘sheep do eat up men’, on to the likes of William Blake, industrialisation has long appeared to be an act of cosmic hubris inviting nemesis. The new idols of money, commodities, bureaucracy, technology appears as a diabolic force which has wrenched humankind out of its primal unity with nature and driven us on the road to disaster. Anthropologist Bernard James wrote in 1973 that "there is a sense of desperation in the air, a sense that . . . man has been pitchforked by science and technology into a new and precarious age." In this age, "the final period of decay of our Western world, the predicament is clear. We live on an overcrowded and pillaged planet, and we must stop the pillage or perish." If science and technology have been instrumental to the industrialisation that has brought us to this impasse, the question is just how exactly can technology resolve our social and environmental crisis? This is where there is a need for political economy, setting technology within specific social relations of production.

In The Death of Progress, Bernard James targeted "the modern progress culture" as the key problem, with "the need to know, as we understand it today” identified as “a lethal cultural sport." James is worth emphasising since the very things which Brand and Lynas present as solutions to our predicament, James warned about back in 1973 as the shape of the monstrous world to come. Thus James warns of nuclear disasters, biological warfare and genetic engineering, monstrosities which issue inexorably from "the laboratory-born lust to commit the sin of Faust." (James 1973: xiii, 3, 10, 55, 61.) 

It is astonishing to see the extent to which 1960s promises of a technocratic pastoral and 1970s warnings of eco-catastrophe merge seamlessly in the books of Brand and Lynas, so that the warnings of a world governed by nuclear power, biotechnology and geo-engineering are turned into the only promises that science and technology can make in light of the destruction of previous hopes. Where once the technocratic pastoral promised the good life, now it contents itself with the mere survival of life. We may pretend we are god-like but this assumption of divinity is merely to cover the fact that we are now dealing openly with Mephistopheles. It has become common to refer to Faustian bargains. Derek Sayer writes:

The history of socialism … has confirmed Weber's worst forebodings; its proponents have proved all too willing to strike Faustian bargains with his modern devils, notably the machines of industry and state. I do not draw the conclusion that improvement of the human condition is impossible; but I would insist that it is no longer capitalism alone, but the monstrously abstracted progeny it has engendered, that is our problem. The modern world is in one respect at least different from all of its predecessors. Only now is the survival of the human race itself in jeopardy. What earlier century had even a presentiment that such destructive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?  (Sayer ch 2 Without Regard For Persons)

This is fine, except there is a need to point out that we have no option but to strike Faustian bargains. The important point is that we are conscious of playing the Faustian part in this bargaining, attempting to assume moral responsibility for the mind and magic that we, like Faust, possess. The problem is that too often we forget which side of the bargaining we are on and come to identify with Mephistophelian diabolic power. And that’s the point when we stop aiming for the good life and instead are involved in an increasingly desperate struggle to hang on to life as such.

Environmentalism in the 1970s emphasised the ‘limits to growth’ and started to project the ‘no-growth’ society in order to conserve energy and resources. The target was an economic system which despoiled the planet for the sake of unlimited material expansion, regardless of the human and natural costs of such unlimited growth. 
Strictly speaking, however, this is a crude misunderstanding of Faust. Faust as such is not the villain of the piece. Goethe’s tale is a call for each one of us to develop a Faustian awareness of the powers that govern the world, including our own powers. Targeting and opposing Faust as the enemy has the ironic consequence of leaving the terrain to Mephistopheles himself, bringing about the very diabolism of power that we have sought to avoid. When Faust is eliminated, a vacuum is created that is soon filled by irresponsible, unrestrained, amoral power. 

The battle between ‘small is beautiful’ and ‘big is beautiful’ has been going on since the 1960s. Those in favour of nuclear, biotechnology, geo-engineering, GE food are on the side of large-scale planning, centralisation, big science, corporations. These are authoritarian technics. Then there are those in favour of the decentralized sources of energy such as solar, wind and water power, "intermediate technologies" and democratic technics (Schumacher 1973; Stavrianos 1976; Kohr 1977; Illich 1977).

There would appear to be a clear split between authoritarian and democratic, centralised and decentralised, large and small technics. The problem is that the either/or reasoning is crude, abstracted from social relations of production, ignores appropriacy and scale in relation to the way that technics are organised and to what ends. It is a form of shadow boxing which makes it appear as though technics themselves are the creative agency. The human role is much more significant than choosing between given technics but pertains to the moral, social and institutional matrix which shapes the character of technics and determines the way in which they are utilised. This is a question for human beings in the role of Faust. They are not questions for those who simply take the power that Mephistopheles gives.
What matters is not size but scale, and that is something that human beings decide. For any of the projections or plans associated with a particular technology to be realised, there is a need for a substantial restructuring of social power. This entails the practical reappropriation of the social power alienated to the state and capital and its reorganisation and exercise as social power. This entails the dissolution of the transnational corporations and the redistribution of all their social power and resources to the self-organising people. In other words, the realisation of the vision of a democratic technics implies a fundamental reorganization of the social fabric. The point is not that an environmentalism which points to the ‘limits to growth’ is wrong in itself (there can be growth that is socially and environmentally beneficial as well as harmful) but that there is little recognition of the scale of the political challenge that this undertaking implies. There is a disabingly wide gap between the magnitude of the political task and the urge to "think small". Terry Eagleton writes well on this point:

There is, however, a much deeper irony. At just the point that we have begun to think small, history has begun to act big. 'Act locally, think globally' has become a familiar leftist slogan; but we live in a world where the political right acts globally and the postmodern left thinks locally. As the grand narrative of capitalist globalization, and the destructive reaction which it brings in its wake, unfurls across the planet, it catches these intellectuals at a time when many of them have almost ceased to think in political terms at all. Confronted with an implacable political enemy, and a fundamentalist one at that, the West will no doubt be forced more and more to reflect on the foundations of its own civilization. (Eagleton 2003 ch 3).

Eagleton is criticising postmodernists here, but his criticism applies to environmentalism in so far as it fails to connect the local and the global, thus ensuring that "thinking small" and “thinking big" proceed hand in hand. The question is all about scale and appropriateness. It is about developing, not rejecting, a Faustian awareness of the moral aspects of power. The irony is that so many misread the bargaining process between knowledge and power. Critics of the human and ecological costs of modernisation scorn Faust, and so leave the world to Mephistopheles. Advocates of modernisation as progress claim to be playing Faust’s part, whereas in truth they are allies of Mephistopheles. And so the tragedy is re-enacted, with neither side quite aware of which part they are playing. Goethe's Faust is not just a critique of knowledge as power, it is also a challenge to us to assume responsibility for that knowledge. This challenge is remains timely as a demand that we create new mentalities and modalities so that human beings will cease to exist for the ends of power, but ensure that power exists for the ends of human beings. The Faustian bargain is an always unfinished process which calls upon us to play our part as moral beings, choosing the moral foundation upon which to build our lives as human beings.

For Aldous Huxley, proceeding from the premises of a mechanistic materialism, happiness consists in everyone being conditioned to work within the system and being drugged with amusements fill the hours of leisure. The only alternative is a reversion to barbarism. The human being can become a drone or a savage. Wells, too, seems to think that these are the only two choices available to humankind. In Mind at the End of Its Tether he writes:

"Man must go steeply up or down, and the odds seem to be all in favour of his going down and out. If he comes up, then so great is the adaptation demanded of him that he must cease to be a man. Ordinary man is at the end of his tether."

In Ape and Essence, Huxley seems to look forward to the descent into barbarism. This aspect of the technocratic utopia is worth playing up since it crops up in the writing of both Lovelock and Brand. It cannot be without significance that William Golding, who wrote Lord of the Flies, is the friend who suggested that Lovelock name his thesis after Gaia. Of course, Lovelock and Brand claim to want to save civilisation from the descent into barbarism, but that barbarism is inherent in a constant battles view of history. It is present in Lovelock’s lifeboat ethics. It is the vision of human beings as primeval rats.

Technologists present the machine as the exemplary human being. For all of the claims to saving civilisation, the problem of all technocratic utopias is that, with sophisticated machines and mechanical systems in the leading creative role, there is nothing for men and women to do themselves, other than plug in. The inherent pessimism of mechanical materialism narrows human possibility and keeps human beings in the grip of natural necessity. Yet the assertion that human nature doesn’t change much only needs to be stated to be exposed as self-evidently false, with the sweep of human history demonstrating that human beings continuously change their societies and themselves through their practice.

The End of Utopia
The failure to integrate quantitative and qualitative change invites Nicholas Berdiaeff’s caution:

"Utopias seem very much more realisable than we had formerly supposed. And now we find ourselves face to face with a question which is painful in quite a new way: How can we avoid their actual realisation?
". . . Utopias are capable of realisation. Life moves towards Utopia. And perhaps a new age is beginning in which the intellectuals and the cultured class will dream of methods of avoiding Utopia and of returning to a society that is not Utopian, that is less 'perfect' and more free."

Well, it all depends what is meant by utopia and where we see human beings heading. The Aristotelian sense of 'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos' implies a future society which corresponds to and enhances the human ontology. This has been the promise of movements for political change such as socialism. To such movements, tomorrow is feasibly better than today and serves as an ideal to inspire hope and motivate effort. There are many, however, who want to arrest change, their efforts focusing upon saving the present from itself whilst blocking the emergence of a genuinely new world. Even ‘at the end of its tether’, today is preferable to a tomorrow which restructures power relations and redistributes resources to the detriment of some and to the benefit of others. This explains why the technologists put the new technologies in the service of existing power and advocate a change in quantity but not in quality. It is a change which changes the surface but not the fundamentals. A real change in terms of power, relations and resources so as to achieve a new way of life is simply unthinkable. Lovelock and Brand consistently denigrate Greens and ‘leftists’ and obviously fear and loathe the idea of a Green Socialism. That’s the kind of tomorrow they want to resist. And so, for all of the progressive rhetoric, the proposals offered simply arrest the present. This is justified in terms of ‘survival’, but human life is a journey. Without that sense of going somewhere worth going, human life becomes pointless. The spirit withers and dies. We serve the Machine and in time the Machine will suffocate us.

And so, for the bourgeois mind, we have come to the end of the history. The emphasis in the environmentalism of Lovelock and Brand is on the saving of civilisation. Brand writes of the imperative to save civilisation from a natural system, meaning nature’s backlash. There is the most cursory and dismissive approach to the task of building a new civilisation, one which corresponds to nature’s ways, human nature as much as nature’s cycles. It is this that makes it clear that scientists and technologists are not building tomorrow’s world, they are involved in a desperate rearguard action to protect a today that has long since had its day. Brand calls the Greens ‘outdated’. More than anything, though, that word applies to his approach. Brand cannot contemplate a future of civilisation other than the present in anything but the bleakest terms. He simply has no faith in human nature. 

The best books on utopia either put technology in its place as a means or make it secondary and ephemeral to the main point. One of the most interesting books is Orphan Island (1924) by Rose Macaulay, which depicts a community of orphan children shipwrecked on a Pacific island in 1855 and under the protective wing of pious and strong-minded maiden lady. In Self Made Man and his Undoing (1993), the anthropologist Jonathan Kingdom writes that ‘We have become orphans of our own technology… Left to its own dynamics technological and industrial innovation trashes products, places and people. It is for the children of technology to humanise their parent or, like Saturn, it will consume them. Self-made Man and his self-made society will be undone.’ As orphans we will have no option but to throw ourselves on nature’s mercy. Lovelock continually warns us here that Gaia is no doting mother. There is a relish in his words. Rather than create a new civilisation, he seems to look forward to the descent into barbarism, with a new species better fitted to Gaia emerging. Lovelock’s materialist premises turn Gaia into a machine. It is time to spring Gaia from the clutches of the materialists. It is interesting that, despite being named after the Earth Goddess, all the talk from the technologists is of god and gods. 

The anti-fascist negative Utopia Swastika Night (Murray Constantine 1937) envisages the world as divided between a German and a Japanese Empire. In the German Empire, fascism is developed with ruthless logic to its conclusion. It is a completely hierarchical society in which woman is placed second bottom, just above the worm:

"As a woman is above a worm,
So is a man above a woman.
As a man is above a woman,
So is a Nazi above any foreign Hitlerian.
As a Nazi is above a foreign Hitlerian,
So is a Knight above a Nazi.
As a Knight is above a Nazi,
So is Der Fuehrer (whom may Hitler Bless)
Above all Knights."

All relationships are characterised by violence and brutality and race superiority has been exalted to the highest principle. Women are thoroughly degraded. Alongside this, the most interesting aspect is the complete obliteration of the past. Aristotle’s Politics makes the point that the person who knows no history can bear tyranny easily, since s/he lacks a standard with which to compare the present. All history, memory, literature, all signposts to the past are swept away, so that no-one can access the civilised past that existed before the coming of fascism. Remembrance forms a culture and an identity, a history which forms a people. With the obliteration of remembrance, resistance goes too. 

Joseph O Neil’s Land Under England attacks the subject of fascism by way of allegory. The hero, discovers a way down into a dark underworld populated by descendants of Romans who took refuge there at the time of the Anglo-Saxon invasions. Confronted by a perpetual darkness which threatened madness and disintegration, a society had evolved in which individual consciousness and even speech had disappeared and the Roman qualities of discipline and obedience had been accentuated to the extreme. The individual functioned as an appendage of the state and had no independent life. Any thought or action superfluous to the state’s requirements not only disappeared but had become psychologically impossible. Individuals could no longer see themselves as beings independent of the state.

In the Foreword, A.E. makes the connection with fascism:

"The highest form satire can take is to assume the apotheosis of the policy satirised and make our shuddering humanity recoil from the spectacle of the complete realisation of its own ideals. And this is what Joseph O'Neill has done in imagining a State where the unity of obliterated individualism is complete, where the Master, or Hitler, of his Utopia, has a selfless humanity completely malleable to his will; and we recoil from the vision of that perfection of mechanised humanity, as if we had peered into one of the lowest of human hells."

The oddest thing about the scientistic utopia is the extent to which the authors are either given to wild flights of fantasy in which technology – not human beings – will be the saviour of civilisation or are prone to the utmost doom and gloom. Both envisage a society thoroughly subjugated by technological reason, one with hope, the other with fear. There is, in other words, a thoroughly unscientific exploration of the real possibilities of science with respect to actually building a new civilisation. The idea that a just and humane society is possible and an awareness of how it can be achieved is almost entirely absent. Lovelock turns on the Greens here:

By putting humanity first, and neglecting Gaia, too many greens have sown the seeds of their own destruction and, if they persist, ours as well; they could mitigate their error by dropping their delaying tactics against nuclear energy. More importantly, they would then be helping to power the lifeboat not, as now, sabotaging its engine. (Lovelock 2009). 

The problem is that there is no place for humanity as a whole on Lovelock’s lifeboat. How many will be left to drown? When Lovelock estimates 500 million survivors, that makes over 6 billion deaths. And he has the nerve to call the ‘urban green ideology’ as possibly the ‘deadliest’ ideology the world has yet seen.
Here, the plainly reactionary character of the technocratic utopia is laid bare. The accent is on saving the old civilisation rather than upon building the new civilisation. The new technologies are pressed into service to keep existing relations and institutions as unchanged as human beings. There will be no qualitative change, only an expansion of quantity. This evinces not new radical thinking but a determination to resist the coming of tomorrow’s world. The argument that we must save civilisation comes with the deep conviction that we must do all we can to preserve all existing institutions and arrangements, however deficient, since any change beyond existing power relations can only be for the worse.
In Brave New World, Huxley had shown how capitalism had evolved to the end state of servile prosperity. In Ape and Essence, Huxley changes tack and sees capitalism destroying itself in a third World War, fought with every sort of atomic and bacteriological weapon. The wasteland is populated by a handful of savages, degraded, disease-ridden beings, "as rude as barbarism, but lacking both the hope and the pleasure of barbarism". These eke out a parasitic existence on the dead civilisation, books are used for fuel, graves are looted for clothes. A ship from New Zealand, which alone had escaped destruction, appears off the coast, and a New Zealand biologist is captured by the barbarians. He finds that evil has finally triumphed and that Belial is now god. The Arch-Vicar of Belial explains to his visitor how it all happened:

"It began with machines and the first grain ships from the New World. Food for the hungry and a burden lifted from men's shoulders... .
"But Belial knew that feeding means breeding. In the old days when people made love they merely increased the infantile mortality rate and lowered the expectation of life.
"Yes, Belial foresaw it all — the passage from hunger to imported food, from imported food to booming population and from booming population back to hunger again. Back to hunger. The New Hunger, the Higher Hunger . . . the hunger that is the cause of total wars and the total wars that are the cause of yet more hunger. . . .
"Progress  and  Nationalism — those were the two great ideas He put into their heads. Progress — the theory that you can get something for nothing; the theory that you can gain in one field without paying for your gain in another. . . . Nationalism — the theory that the state you happen to be subject to is the only true god."

It is not that Huxley is wrong so much that his emphasis is so determinedly one-sided as to skew his argument in the wrong direction. The new religion of materialism, of capital and the state as the new gods, needs to be exposed and fought. Huxley doesn’t do that. But the identification of ‘progress’ as the theory that you can get something for nothing is surely correct. For Marx, there are only two sources of value, labour and nature. Capitalist accumulation –the ‘Moses and all the prophets!’ of modern society argued Marx – is an endless free lunch at the expense of nature and labour. This idea of progress as the unlimited accumulation of quantity will indeed bring about the future hunger. Attempts to cheat this necessity by technology will merely serve to reinforce the illusion that endless accumulation is possible. 

So Huxley is right to point out the new gods of modernity – state, capital, money, bureaucracy, commodities. It is all cargo cult, upon which we have become dependent. It is our own labour which we fail to recognise in the alien form it has taken.


The problem with Huxley's view is that there is no hope for redemption. Human beings are innately stupid and greedy, and there then there is the ever present ghost of Malthus: In Antic Hay Huxley had written about overpopulation in these terms:

"The way they breed. Like maggots, sir, like maggots. Millions of them creeping about the face of the country, spreading blight and dirt wherever they go, ruining everything. It's the people I object to. ...
"With populations that in Europe alone expand by millions every year, no political foresight is possible. A few years of this mere bestial propagation will suffice to make nonsense of the wisest schemes of today — or would suffice if any wise schemes were being matured at present."

That fear and hatred of the people makes it much more easy for problems to be located in human nature rather than in capitalism as an alienated system of production. The form by which social labour is supplied can be altered. But the ‘maggot’ like nature of human beings cannot. Huxley seems to relish nature’s backlash. Human beings seem to have merited their demise, for their presumption, since ‘these wretched slaves of wheels and ledgers began to congratulate themselves on being the Conquerors of Nature.’

The bitterness in the tone here is perhaps pardonable in a disillusioned idealist. Those who have been most vigorous in prosecuting their scientism and technologism may merit such treatment, but Huxley’s target is humanity in general. 

This is why Huxley’s words are misguided and indeed beg the question. The critique of capitalism as an alienated system of production is designed to put the supply of social labour on a democratic and indeed sustainable basis. This is to replace exchange value with use value so that the human interchange with nature is motivated by satisfying need rather than endless systemic imperatives.

Simon Clarke puts the point well:

Marx showed that the individual is only constituted as a private individual, and property as private property, on the basis of a mode of social production in which the co-ordination of social labour is achieved through the alienated form of the exchange of the products of labour as values. The apparent form of exchange as the exchange of things between private individual property owners is accordingly only the fetishised form of appearance of social relations between people. The exchange relation is therefore inexplicable in abstraction from the particular social relations it articulates: the form of exchange cannot be detached from its social content, a content which political economy only conceals by attributing social powers to things. Similarly, the technologistic conception of production is only the fetishised form of appearance of capitalist social relations of production, in which the production of things is subordinated to the production, appropriation and accumulation of surplus value, as the alienated form of surplus labour. (Clarke 1992 ch 4).

The thesis that the transition to such a technocracy is underway is controversial. James Burnham's The Managerial Revolution or J. K. Galbraith's The New Industrial State highlight the controversy. Rather than an elite technical intelligentsia taking over, it is more accurate to argue that science and technology are productive forces being subordinated to the narrow aim of accumulation within capitalist production relations. If the visions of Orwell and Huxley are realised this will not be the result of a revolution of technicians and engineers but their subordination within an accumulative logic generalised over the whole of society.

To pass from the realm of dystopian science fiction to real life, the technical intelligentsia needs to grow in size and in self-organisation and identity, developing a clear conception of its own social interest and how to achieve it. All those things Marx argued with respect to the moral, political, intellectual and organisational capacities of the proletariat. It seems more likely that this ‘new class’ will come of occupy a position of central importance within rather than against the capital system. The engineer Stewart Brand makes a revealing comment in this regard early on in his book.

When roles shift, ideologies have to shift, and ideologies hate to shift. The workaround is pragmatism—"a practical way of thinking concerned with results rather than with theories and principles." The shift is deeper than moving from one ideology to another; the shift is to discard ideology entirely. (Brand ch 1 2009). 

This is not new thinking at all, but is the old technocracy claiming that the political conflict between capitalism and communism has been dissolved within industrial civilisation. Such thinking can be traced to the 1960s, when Daniel Bell asserted technocracy to be the one-potential future of the post-industrial society he claimed already to be emerging. Bell declared this to be the 'end of ideology', in the sense of an end of the political clash between liberalism and socialism, capitalism and communism. The end of ideology is also, in this sense, an end of politics, always a highly suspect notion. The end of politics is always the assertion of a particular politics over all others, politics taken to extremes and thoroughly oppressive. What remains of democratic debate, decision, choice when there is no longer anything to argue about? 
Bell argued that technocracy is a possibility rather than a probability (Bell 1976, especially ch. 6; Bell 1962). For all of the top talk of the revolt of the engineers, political history shows scientists and technicians to be remarkably pliant and servile with respect to political power. The idea that a technocratic movement is likely to arise is fanciful. What is highly likely is that there will be a strong technocratic component within the existing capitalist system, in charge of the new productive forces and managing them with a view to facilitating the process of capital accumulation.

It is noticeable that the idea of progress as entailing a change in social relations is ruled out by the technocratic utopians. The result is that technology – the productive forces to employ Marx’s idiom – is subordinated to the production, appropriation and accumulation of surplus value. That kind of ‘progress’ is indeed damaging and destructive, but it doesn’t exhaust the full meaning of the word at all. To think that it does rules out all attempts at political action and social change, which is tantamount to accepting existing asymmetries in power and resources. It is not the 'equilibrium of Nature' which works here to bring about mass famine and death, but specific social relations. When Lovelock attacks Greens for their concern with all of humanity, then speculates that some 6 billion human beings will die as a result of Gaia’s backlash, the idea of saving civilisation takes on an ugly aspect. It may be worth counting the sneers and sideswipes against Greens and socialists specifically and socialism in general in Lovelock’s and Brand’s books. Each single reference seems casual, in that there is no systematic treatment, but the one-off remarks build to form a consistent thread.

The inherent pessimism with respect to changing human nature reveal the hollowness at the heart of the technocratic utopia. Such a perspective cannot even explain why civilisation should be saved if all that there is is science and technology. No room for ‘sentiment’ asserts Brand. Adam Smith rested all civilised on the moral sentiments. Without sentiment, sympathy, morality, what is there? Only ‘The Machine’. The moral emptiness of the technocratic utopia is a tacit acknowledgement that the defenders of bourgeois civilisation now nothing left to defend, let alone promote. Brand argues that ‘Greens are no longer strictly the defenders of natural systems against the incursions of civilization; now they're the defenders of civilization as well.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). He then proceeds to argue that the Greens are ‘outdated’ and need to embrace the new technologies of nuclear, biotechnology, GE and geoengineering. The technologists claim that their concern is to save civilisation but this is disingenuous in that civilisation is conflated with specific social relations. Greens want to not only save civilisation but rebuild it anew, on sustainable foundations. It is Brand and his ilk who are outdated. He relies on technology rather than politics in order to rule out hope of any genuine progress. To this extent, the technologists are offering anti-utopias rather than Utopias. Utopia holds a vision of the future to the present in order to encourage people to change the world. In this, utopia plays a positive part in stimulating thought and action, encouraging individuals to protest power and fight abuse. Most of all, utopia taught individuals that poverty, exploitation and injustice are not a part of a natural order of things which must be endured but the product of social relations which are subject to human intervention and alteration.
The realisation of Utopia through the power of the working class was anathema to the bourgeois, and a century of continuous slander, vilification and outright repression served to remove socialism from the public agenda. Now it is not so much ‘Reds under the beds’ as Greens on the roofs with their solar panels who terrify the bourgeois. The sneer is repeated that Greens are melons, green on the outside and red on the inside. They are really socialists under the skin. Stewart Brand, by some tortuous illogic, even manages to link the German Greens, as left wingers, to Nazism. It merely confirms that the lickspittles of capitalism have nothing left to defend in the present and nothing to offer for the future. They are running on empty and it is beginning to show.
So Oliver Cromwell and his ‘poor ignorant men’ may well still be riding, not on horses to defeat the divine right of kings, but on the spirit of the age as it continues to seek the better world. I concur wholly with Christopher Hill’s assessment of Cromwell.





Those great issues of liberty and equality remain unresolved and Cromwell’s pungent, earthy truths are still echoing. So we still need those men and women ‘with the root of the matter in them’, those who are not so ignorant as not to understand when their common humanity is being threatened, and no so cowardly as not to advance that humanity against those who would deny it. 

Andrew Marvell wrote well on the enduring legacy of Cromwell here: 

And well he therefore does, and well has guessed, Who in his age has always forward pressed: . And, knowing not where heaven's choice may light, Girds yet his sword, and ready stands to fight.. .. If these the times, then this must be the man.
(The First Anniversary of the Government under O.C.)

If these the times, then these must be the men and the women – the company of poor ignorant men – and women – with fire in their belly and God in their soul. There are many clever men who ‘know the most’ (in the words of the engineer Stewart Brand), but without the ‘root of the matter in them’, all their knowledge comes to naught. They achieve nothing, they win no victories, they lack the company of men and women.

It is the vindication of the belief in human beings, that sense of ‘man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos' that has lain at the root of all the great and enduring human advances. It affirms the capacity of human beings themselves to bring about the future of all humankind as something splendid. This is more than survival, this is about flourishing. 

It is interesting how many utopias involve people living underground. It is that separation from an existing society that sharpens the critical edge. Today the subterranean movement towards the better society is feeding an environmentalism in politics that continues the fight for justice. We now appreciate that social and environmental justice are one and the same fight. Today, increasing numbers of people around the world are convinced that a flourishing society is within reach if only men and women with the root of the matter in them are prepared to stand up and fight for it. Science and technology most certainly have a positive role to play in this task. But this is science and technology in the service of the people, not the economic and political monopolists, the waste makers and the war makers. Human knowledge, human thought, human action – the new productive forces – promise a world which, while it may not correspond to the ideas of More, Bacon, Marx and Engels, Kropotkin, Gramsci and Luxemburg in all its details, it will have been informed and enriched by all, and continually added to, deepened and extended by all who act now and follow after. This is to define tomorrow’s world as a living and growing reality which men and women continually feed by their activity and thought.

In The Dream of John Ball William Morris spoke of 'How men fight and lose the battle, and the thing they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name.' 
It’s all about those great issues of liberty and equality that Cromwell raised.

One reason why the movement towards socialism stalled can be attributed to the passivity that was induced by the belief that the objective socialisation of the capital system would be sufficient to bring about the socialist order. A similar passivity was induced by waiting upon the contradictions and crises of capitalism finally bursting the capitalist social relations asunder. The biggest tragedy of socialism, however, lies in the abandonment of Marx's view that the emancipation of the working class  can be achieved only by the working class themselves. This abandonment of the company of men and women as being too ‘poor’ and ‘ignorant’ to emancipate themselves blunts the liberatory potential of any critique. This is obvious in the case of Wells and the Fabians, also with respect to the party and state socialism of the Communists. The foundations of real change are to be located in the socialisation of material life processes, in the collective organisations of real people as the agents of social change, not in the alienated forms within which social labour and popular sovereignty is encased. Socialism entails the transformation of social relations of production as a self-transformation, new fangled men and women in charge of new fangled power, not the nationalisation of the means of production.
The collapse of party-state socialism, in both its Communist and Social Democratic forms, heralds the end of alienated forms of labour representation which characterised the twentieth century. This does not necessarily mean that socialism will be reborn, but certainly the conditions for such a rebirth will continue to exist in the social nature of the human ontology, in the social ties that constitute human society and in the growing interconnections of the global economy. Certainly, the collapse of party-state socialism does nothing to remove the contradictory dynamics and crisis tendencies of the capital system, far from it. As Jules Townshend argues: ‘This movement is a constant reminder that the theory and practice of human freedom are always unfinished business. As long as capitalism remains in business, , Marxism as a movement and doctrine, in whatever form, is likely to remain obstinately relevant.’ (Townshend 1996).
Certainly, the supposed death of socialism does nothing to arrest the capital system’s destruction of the ecology of the planet. The gap between rich and poor continues to grow, whilst the insulation of power from popular control is opening up a democratic deficit at the heart of every major state. Capital’s tendencies to uneven development threaten a revanchism from below across the world. Ultimately, the problem is one of the removal of human power from any form of human control and comprehension, a separation from the means of life which has characterised modernity from the first and which now has been developed to an unprecedented degree with the globalisation of economic relations. Morally, socially and ecologically, the capital system is denying human beings a future. All talk of saving civilisation is meaningless when it is precisely the current form of social existence which is denying human beings the possibility of a future life in the first place. The twin threats of economic and ecological crisis have merged to demand that human beings develop new social forms. Books advocating change are fine but, ultimately, it is people who stand up to be counted who make the difference. Theory is emancipatory only to the extent that it is linked to an emancipatory social practice. 

Reclaiming the Future
The question of humanity's relationship to the natural and built environments is assuming increasing importance as urban industrial civilisation seeks to sustain and even expand high levels of production and consumption. This exponential expansion of ‘the economy’ combines with escalating energy requirements and world population growth to threaten the global economic, social and ecological foundations. Pessimists point to current trends and tendencies and make gloomy predictions about the future of the planet, the industrial societies in particular. James Lovelock is on record as saying that the human race has not evolved the long range strategic thinking capacity necessary to ensure survival. We also lack the time necessary for its development. This is where technocratic optimists like Brand intervene and propose technological solutions. In fact, for all of Brand’s optimism, the fact that he is gambling and guessing at the results betrays a certain pessimism. 
There is every reason for an optimistic mode of thought and action, one which promotes positive views about the possibility of achieving a new form of ecological society based on a balance between humanity and natural and built environments. (Bookchin The Ecological Society.) But that balance requires a humanised technological capacity that is subject to ends determined by human beings. What can be said with confidence is that ecology has the potential to concentrate minds and change behaviour among political and business leaders as well as among citizens all over the world. Whether ecology as politics punches its weight and issues in a fundamental social transformation depends on the extent to which ecological ideas of balance, harmony and proportion permeate the social and political fabric via democratic opinion and social practices.

The purpose of this argument has been to emphasise the key role that values, theories, ideas still play within political debate and political activity in the new century. This has been a response to claims that we can and should ‘discard’ ideology and focus upon a matter-of-fact pragmatism. Such a pragmatism is so bereft of principles that it cannot even justify itself. Survival? Survival for what? Survival for the sake of survival is a nihilism. Any life worth living has to be an examined life. For all of the talk of being in the twenty first century, politics remains what it always was since ancient times, an integral part of creative human self-realisation. And that process is infused with values and ideas, as well as with stupidities and hatred. Those ‘experts’ in science and technology who consider themselves to be the most 'modern', ' 'advanced', 'rational', 'scientific' and 'sensible' in ‘knowing the most’, must condemn those concerned with values and theories and ideas as naïve. However, those who ‘know the most’ actually overlook the movements and trends which point to an ineliminable persistence of the Utopian element in politics. Politics will exist for so long as human beings remain on nodding terms with their essential humanity. And for so long as politics exists, human beings will be debating and advancing and defending ideas, values and theories of one kind or another. True, modern capitalist societies have become absorbed in a consumer materialism that has encouraged a private idiocy over public interest. So much so that the politics which concerns the question of creating the good society has continually been put on the back burner. In the aftermath of depressions and wars, current materialistic society actually seems like the good society to many people. History shows, however, that this question of the good society tends to come back whenever dissatisfaction at the level of human needs becomes a powerful feeling among specific groups.


We are a couple of decades on now from when Francis Fukuyama declared that we had reached ‘the end of history’. His thesis that there is no going beyond liberal democracy and capitalist economics would seem confirmed to the extent that there is still no political movement for going beyond those forms that commands widespread support. What there is is an erosion of the social roots of liberal democracy and increasing public intervention in and support of the private economy. It is as though we have reached the peak and are now in retreat. It is, however, surely unreasonable to think that humankind has now reached a stage of development from which no further advance is possible, only decline. Yet that seems to be the scenario being offered to us by those who argue that since human nature doesn’t change much, only science and technology are the real change agents. Not that change is proposed, only survival. It is interesting that Fukuyama, having argued for the ‘end of history’, is now arguing with respect to Our Posthuman Future Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002). It seems that the end of history is also the end of humanity.

The real case against the technocratic utopians is that, in ruling out politics and ethics as forces for changing the world, see the present as the final stage of development in human history, upon which humankind will forever out a drama in which all the lines have been written, whether by technology or biology, and in which, having discarded norms and values, ideas and theories, visions and dreams, there is no space at all for transcendent images and ideals of an alternative society to grow. Having lost the sense of the indeterminate future, human beings remain forever the prisoners of a determinate past. 
The technocratic ‘vision’ is plainly inhumane in that it dispenses with the very things which constitute human dignity, moral choice, spontaneity, autonomy. Insofar as any change is allowed, it proceeds in a piecemeal fashion that pays no attention to a fundamental, overall transformation. However, as argued with respect to economic and ecological crisis in the context of emerging productive forces, there are strong reasons for arguing that society is actually changing in a profound way and that the emphasis on technological fixes is actually highly conservative in light of emerging democratic possibilities. Respect for values, ideas, theories and visions in this respect is merely a reasonable call for human beings to be sufficiently bold and imaginative to reclaim the sense of the indeterminate future and to act together for its achievement. Conceiving the good and orienting action towards its attainment is the hallmark of human life, an integral part of human beings coming to assume some conscious control over circumstances. To do anything less than this is to be less than human. Human beings fall short of their possibilities when they transfer the imperative to assume moral responsibility to external forces. And they fall far short of their own humanity when they do so. To discard morality is to shed an essential part of what it is to be a human being. It leaves us bereft and dependent in a world that has become no more than biological, technological and systemic imperatives.
As social beings, human beings are moral beings. Real social involvement in relation to others is also a moral involvement. Whilst the problems facing the world demand resolution, involving political intervention and the application of technology, such action gains meaning only to the extent to which each individual's contribution is a moral act denoting responsibility on the part of that individual. Each individual has moral responsibility, however much individual participation forms only a part of the social process. The consequences of an individual act with respect to the social whole are less important than the consequences of the act with respect to the particular individual. The fact that virtue is its own reward, as Plato argued, demonstrates the true importance of moral responsibility, the way that it defines the human character against the anonymity and amorality of institutions, systems and imperatives of all kinds.
This is to proclaim the moral responsibility of the individual over against biological, technological and economic imperatives, false conceptions of nature and necessity which deny the individual human being an active role in the historical process. Descartes wrote that ‘There is not a soul so weak that it cannot, with good guidance, gain an absolute mastery over its passions.’ Human beings cannot absolve themselves of responsibility for their actions on the grounds of biology, emotions and passions, or the inability to act otherwise given social circumstances or economic necessities. Human beings cannot transfer the responsibility for their acts to factors which are claimed to determine behaviour, whether these be genes and neurons, economic necessities and legal order, since in every instance human beings retain the capacity for free moral choice.

It needs to be emphasised that ideas, values, theories and dreams are crucial in identifying the good society, a desirable, realisable ideal as a goal worth striving for, which inspires effort towards its attainment and obligates those who participate in its attainment. A purely technocratic presentation of the feasible society can never suffice as a framework for formulating a practicable, imaginative picture of a desirable alternative society. Survival does not inspire and motivate to anything like the same extent as does desirability.

The recovery of the ancient Aristotelian conception of politics challenges the current definition of politics as an activity concerned predominantly with the ‘interests’ of individual voters and groups. In the older conception, politics involves more than choosing between necessarily evils but is an integral component of the 'the Good Life'. Politics as integral to the realisation of the human telos comprehends society as a common enterprise in which the collective good can be expressed meaningfully through individual action, and can be expressed in the attainment of human happiness, flourishing, and material and spiritual well-being. The quality of life is a central consideration in contrast to the obsession in contemporary politics with the accumulation of quantity in money and power.
Underlying this politics as human self-realisation is the conviction that thought and action motivated by values and ideas are capable of achieving more than just survival but can bring about a new and better social order. The origin of this inherent optimism of politics conceived in this sense are evolutionary. Human beings need a vision, a transcendental ideal which inspires hope and sustains effort in often difficult circumstances. That ideal encourages human beings to move boldly forwards and therefore exploit the radical indeterminacy of the future to their moral advantage. Without the creative, moral imagination, human beings would lack the hope that inspires them to take the future in their own hands and create the society they desire. Imagine what life would be like if this hope was removed and replaced by survival. Of course, survival is important. But it seems that survival is a consequence of the larger goal, the hope of creating a better society. To discard values, theories, ideals and dreams in favour of a survival dependent on technology is designed to destroy the moral imagination which inspires the transcendental striving that is crucial to survival. To remove ideals and values and visions from our attempts to comprehend and control the society in which we live is to invite disaster. Survival alone is not sufficient if it lacks the meaning supplied by ethics and imagination. The unexamined life is not worth living, wrote Plato, and life will indeed be worthless in a society that survives but does nothing more.
Throughout this argument I have tried to show that a certain kind transcendent idealism and imagination is a precondition of a life that is worth living. That applies to the individual as well as to the human community as a whole. Human beings are not just social beings but also moral beings. The capacity to identify the false, the bad, and the ugly impels the individual to seek to transcend the current state of affairs and seek the true, the good and the beautiful, in social relationships, in productive life, in spiritual activities and in public affairs. The practice of politics emerged in ancient Greece as integral to the good life as the realised society of realised human beings. The awareness of the difference between an existing reality and a morally desirable future, non-existent but immanent as material potentiality, and hence realisable, is one of the greatest legacies of ancient Greece to the modern world. The real case against the technocratic utopians is their lack of boldness in vision and lack of courage in politics, their over-reliance on technology denoting a lack of confidence in human capabilities and creativity. The elevation of ‘survival’ to be the central goal shows a failure of nous and of nerve. Survival is the bare minimum, that is what any organism is programmed to do. The notion that the future is no more than the present society enlarged by technology assumes that we have advanced to perfection already, at least at the level of our science and technology. One wonders if human beings are really being encouraged to catch up science and technology or are to be discarded along with ‘ideology’. For one thing is very clear, to discard values, ideas, theories and visions would be to forsake the very things which constitute the dignity of human beings as moral beings capable of choice, the very things which form the essence of a worthwhile life.

10 KNOWLEDGE, KNOW-HOW AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Over the years, socialist critics of capitalist society have tended to focus their political attention upon the ownership and control of the means of production, to the neglect of the deeper structures and mediations upon which the capital system as such rests. If private property is the problem, then the solution is relatively easy, the socialisation of ownership. 
In Capital III Marx writes of various forms of the objective socialisation of capital as 'the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself’

This is the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself, and hence a self-abolishing contradiction, which presents itself prima facie as a mere point of transition to a new form of production. It presents itself as such a contradiction even in appearance. It gives rise to monopoly in certain spheres and hence provokes state intervention. It reproduces a new financial aristocracy, a new kind of parasite in the guise of company promoters, speculators and merely nominal directors; an entire system of swindling and cheating with respect to the promotion of companies, issue of shares and share dealings. It is private production unchecked by private ownership. (Marx C3 1981 ch 27 p 569/70). 

Marx goes on to describe the joint-stock system as ‘an abolition of capitalist private industry on the basis of the capitalist system itself’ and credit as offering the individual capitalist ‘an absolute command over the capital and property of others’, and, through this, ‘command over other people's labour.’ ‘It is disposal over social capital, rather than his own, that gives him command over social labour.’ This disposal over social capital is more than ownership and points to an objective socialisation that presages the social control of the associated producers within the socialist economy but is not, in and of itself, that social control. 

Marx writes of this socialisation as a ‘mere phase of transition towards a new form of production’ (Capital III). By describing this objective socialisation of the capital system as a self-dissolving contradiction, Marx seems to presume that, with the self-organisation and self-activity of the working class, the socialist mode of production is, if not inevitable, then likely, and certainly necessary as the most appropriate form for the proper utilisation of the new productive forces.
Marx seems to have underestimated the possibility that the capital system could prolong its existence as a managerial or coordinator mode of production, possessing a new class structure, and a new collective or corporate form of property. Seen in this light, Marx's end of workers' self-management and social control is but a possible development, a necessary development, certainly, but not an inevitable development. Marx outlined the contours of a cooperative and self-governing mode of production emerging out of the abolition of the capitalist mode. Instead, the capital system has reproduced itself through the continuation of a hierarchical division of labour in which a managerial or a techno-bureaucratic class controls social labour through the development of collective property. 
In sum, one has seriously to question those who place a heavy stress upon the objective socialisation of the capitalist economy as not merely implying the transition to socialism but as somehow constituting socialism in itself. For the past century we have had a surrogate socialism in lieu of the real thing, in that state intervention and public expenditure allied to nationalisation has served to prop up capital as a private regime of accumulation, covering over the contradictions between social production and private appropriation. Even here, at this superficial level of property and ownership, socialist politics has badly fluffed its lines and accepted nationalisation as a form of socialism. Such a form of collectivisation does not alter the social relations of production, does not abolish the hierarchical division of labour and does not end the system of wage labour. The central pillars and mechanisms of the capital system remain firmly in place. The working class remain the working class, the creators of the value which is extracted by the exploiting class and goes to form capital, the means of labour’s enslavement.

The Capital System
Istvan Meszaros is at pains to insist on the distinction between capitalism and the capital system. ‘Marx wrote his Capital to help break the rule of capital, not just capitalism.’ The distinction gives us insight into the real nature of the problem at stake. Making this distinction puts into sharp relief the challenges that stand before those who would seek a socialist solution to the contradictory dynamics and crisis tendencies of capital.
Marx's emancipatory project is concerned with the conditions of production and reproduction of capital itself and not merely this or that phase of capital production. Marx is concerned with the creation and expansion of capital through to the way that its inherent contradictions foreshadow its transcendence as a result of a 'long and painful process of development'. Meszaros makes clear that the concept of capital is much more fundamental than that of capitalism. Whereas capitalism is limited to a relatively short historical period, ‘the capital-relation arises out of an economic soil that is the product of a long process of development. The existing productivity of labour, from which it proceeds as its basis, is a gift, not of nature, but of a history embracing thousands of centuries.’ (Marx CI 1976 ch 16 p 648). That shows the scale of the challenge lying before those who would seek social transformation in the direction of the socialist mode of production. The question is far deeper than questions of ownership and title deeds to property, and deeper than the power and use of technology.

The concept of capital refers to the whole mode of functioning within a given capitalist society, including conditions of origin and development of capital production. And it also concerns the forms and modalities in which the need for capital production survives for a long and painful historical period in post-capitalist society — until, that is, the hierarchical division of labour has been abolished and society has been completely restructured in accordance with the free association of social individuals who have brought their material life-activities under their conscious and planned control.

In a more advanced phase of communist society, when the enslaving subjugation of individuals to the division of labour, and thereby the antithesis between intellectual and physical labour, have disappeared; when labour is no longer just a means of keeping alive but has itself become a vital need; when the all-round development of individuals has also increased their productive powers and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly - only then can society wholly cross the narrow horizon of bourgeois right and inscribe on its banner: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!

Marx Critique of the Gotha Programme 1974: 348

The concept of capitalism immediately draws our attention to the ownership and control of the means of production. The concept of capital penetrates deeper into the roots of the system of social metabolic control to expose how the rule of capital is grounded in the exploitative and hierarchical system of division of labour. This system cannot be abolished by a political act alone, and aspects of it persist throughout even the transitional period leading to socialism. It is certainly immune from political actions which merely change the title deeds to property, as references to the old Soviet Union as ‘state capitalist’ make clear, where the state was instrumental in the extraction of surplus value from the working class. The old exploitative and hierarchical division of labour remained in place, the workers remained workers, the exploited value creating class. In the transitional period, these aspects of the rule of capital diminish in time. 

Meszaros identifies the essential defining characteristics of the capital system. The capitalist formation extends only over that particular phase of capital production in which:
*	(I)production for exchange (and thus the mediation and domination of use-
value by exchange-value) is all-pervasive;
*	(2) labour-power itself, just as much as anything else, is treated as a commodity;
*	(3) the drive for profit is the fundamental regulatory force of production;
*	(4) the vital mechanism of the extraction of surplus-value, the radical separation of the means of production from the producers, assumes an inherently economic form;
*	(5) the economically extracted surplus-value is privately appropriated by the members of the capitalist class; and
•	(6) following its own economic imperative of growth and expansion, capital
production tends towards a global integration, through the intermediary of the





Of these characteristics, only the extraction of surplus-value remains in the post-revolutionary society, in a radically altered form the extraction of surplus-labour is regulated politically rather than economically.

Meszaros details the various means and mechanisms by which capital maintains its rule, even in the post-revolutionary society:

*	(1) the material imperatives which circumscribe the possibilities of the totality of life-processes;
*	(2) the inherited social division of labour which, notwithstanding its significant modifications, contradicts 'the development of free individualities';
*	(3) the objective structure of the available production apparatus (including plant and machinery) and of the historically developed and restricted form of scientific knowledge, both originally produced in the framework of capital production and under the conditions of the social division of labour; and




Meszaros thus concludes that the issue is incomparably more complex and far-reaching than its conventional characterization as merely the imperative of capital accumulation. And, indeed, is much more complex than a struggle over the ownership of property, redistribution of wealth and application of technology.

Clarifying the complex nature of the question of social transformation by no means implies that social revolution is utopian or impossible. Indeed, the point is to expose the inadequacies of supposedly radical strategies to deal with problems which have their origins in the contradictions and crises of the capital system. Clarity is intended to steer radicals clear of political and technical ‘solutions’ that fall far short of the social transformation required. Nationalisation, the ‘mixed economy’, ‘social ownership’, diffused share ownership amongst the workers – none of this amounts to fundamental social transformation, all keep the fundamentals of the capital system in place.

Back in 1993, Michael Harrington argued for a visionary gradualism based upon the ‘slow apocalypse’ underway in the contemporary world. ‘It is not at all clear’, he argues, ‘that the crises of the next fifty years will be cataclysmic, on the model of 1929. There could be, as Alain Mine described the possibility, a "slow 1929," an uneven series of depressions and recoveries that decimate some regions of the national and international economy even as they stimulate growth in others.’ (Harrington 1993: 196). Well, we are living through that ‘slow 1929’, an economic crisis as profound as the Great Depression, but manifesting itself as a creeping stagnation rather than as one big crash. The "slow apocalypse" is upon us. But whether this is a transition to a new civilization based on social production and embodying freedom, justice and democracy or the evolution of a new regime which entrenches and extends the rule of capital depends upon us. The era of ‘social revolution’ is underway. If we passively allow the transition to make us in its own image, then we will be mired in alienation and dehumanisation. We will lose ourselves in a world that is our own creation. If we make that transition as self-conscious, self-acting beings, then we can entertain hopes for freedom as human self-determination. Well, we are now living through that ‘slow apocalypse’, and have been for some time. The question is whether we are going to continue with our passive stance and allow the transition to make us in its own image, or whether we are prepared to seize the initiative and actively make that transition, moving in the direction of freedom.

‘Can socialism learn from the defeats and betrayals that resulted from its flawed understanding of its own profound truths?’ Michael Harrington asks. He answers that if it doesn’t learn, then ‘socialism will turn out to have been humankind's most noble and useful political Illusion, and its demise may well be followed by a scientifically organised unfreedom. But if it can learn from its own past about how to create the future, then there is hope for freedom, solidarity and justice. And perhaps there will be a visionary gradualism equal to the challenge of the "slow apocalypse" in which we live.‘ (Harrington 1993:278).

In other words, there is a need not merely to demand or engage in social transformation but to understand what is entailed by social transformation. Failure to go beyond a superficial concern with capitalism, with demands for a more responsible capitalism, a more regulated capitalism, will do nothing to uproot the rule of capital within the social structure. The consequences of this failure will be historic. The ‘slow apocalypse’ is upon us, and we can hear the horses riding harder by the hour. And this shows the proposals for planetary engineering in its true colours. For all of the assertions of human beings constituting the ‘God species’, the eco-engineers deify the technologies and the tools and dehumanise the species. What is striking about the proposals for planetary engineering is just how conservative it is. The term ‘radical’ means to go to the roots. That is precisely what the planetary engineers fail to do. In decoupling the ecological crisis from the economic system, the eco-engineers end up offering technical solutions to what are social problems. Planetary engineering entails no social revolution. Instead of the socialist transformation that is necessary for a positive resolution of the twin ecological and economic crisis, all that planetary engineering will achieve is a scientifically organised unfreedom under the control of capital. 

“Marx wrote his Capital in order to help break the rule of capital under favourable conditions; that is to say: when 'total social capital' —in its relentless drive to subdue everything to itself on a global scale — cannot displace any longer its contradictions and is pushed to its untranscendable limits, thus foreshadowing what Marx called the 'realm of the new historic form'” (Meszaros 1995: 937).

Today, the evidence of capital's global breakdown is all around us, which begs the question of why the politics of fundamental social transformation, which Marx sought to identify with scientific rigour, is conspicuous by its absence. That capital may find new outlets for further expansion may well be possible but capitalist contradictions cannot be displaced in perpetuity. The state can only undertake so many commitments in support of the process of private accumulation before it is overloaded and resources are no longer available. We should be under no illusions that the capital system is mired in a long-term crisis of a very different quantitative and qualitative character than anything it has experienced before. 

Capital’s structural crisis is also the occasion for the exploration of new social potentialities. The intensity and depth of the unfolding crisis in the global economy, against the background of an ecological crisis that looms ever larger, the world-wide transition to socialism envisaged by Marx has acquired a renewed and more urgent significance. And, Meszaros argues, this demands an examination of the requirements and objective conditions of going ‘beyond capital’ in the spirit of the original socialist project. This idea of going beyond capital and not just capitalism designates the necessary objective and orienting perspective of fundamental social transformation. The failure to appreciate the nature of the rule of capital in the capital system led to the misidentification by socialists of the proper target of social transformation, derailing socialism for the best part of a century. 

Meszaros explains his concept of capital and what is entailed by going ‘beyond capital’. 
(1)	Marx wrote Capital in order to help break the rule of capital. And he called his main work ‘Capital’, not 'Capitalism', for a very good reason indeed…
(2)	'Capital' is a dynamic historical category and the social force to which it corresponds appears — in the form of 'monetary', 'mercantile' etc. capital — many centuries before the social formation of capitalism as such emerges and consolidates itself. Indeed, Marx is very greatly concerned about grasping the historical specificities of the various forms of capital and their transitions into one another, until eventually industrial capital becomes the dominant force of the social/economic metabolism and objectively defines the classical phase of the capitalist formation.
(3)	The same is true of 'commodity production', which should not be identified with capitalist commodity production. The former precedes the latter, again by many centuries, thus calling for a precise definition of the historical specificities of the capitalist mode of commodity production. For, as Marx insists, 'commodity production necessarily turns into capitalist commodity production at a certain point' (Marx, 'Marginal Notes on Wagner', p.228 of Value Studies by Marx, 1976, London: New Park Publications).
(4) The importance of (2) and (3) is not merely theoretical but more and more directly practical as well. For the historical dimension of capital and commodity production is not confined to the past, illuminating the dynamic transition from the precapitalist formations to capitalism, but asserts its necessary practical implications for the present and the future too, foreshadowing the objective constraints and unavoidable structural determinants of the postcapitalist phase of development. Just as capitalism itself is not intelligible without this historical dimension of its fundamental structural characteristics reaching back to a more or less distant past, in the same way the real problems of a socialist transformation cannot be grasped without fully acknowledging that capital and commodity production not only precede but also necessarily survive capitalism … as a matter of innermost structural determinations.
(5) All this has far-reaching implications for socialist strategies: for their necessary and feasible objectives within the setting of the prevalent structural and historical determinations. Given such parameters, the socialist project, paradoxically, cannot help defining itself in the first place as a radical disjuncture between its fundamental historical objective and its immediately feasible one. The former aims at the establishment of a socialist society which represents a qualitatively 'new historic form' (Marx) in that it succeeds in going beyond capital itself, thus effectively superseding the world of capital as such; whereas the latter is forced to define its target as attacking and overcoming the dominant forces of capitalism only, while necessarily remaining in a vitally important sense within the structural parameters of capital as such. By contrast, without a radical restructuring of capital's overall controlling framework as embedded not merely in the given economic mechanisms but in the inherited social metabolism in general — which is feasible only as a complex historical process, with all its contradictions and potential relapses or disruptions — it is inconceivable to bring the socialist project to its proper fruition.

It follows from this reasoning that the fundamental strategic objective of socialism is go beyond capital, something which is more radical and more far reaching an aim than the necessarily limited and immediately feasible objective of negating capitalism. The likes of Alec Nove write of a ‘feasible socialism’, The Economics of Feasible Socialism (Alec Nove 1983 Allen and Unwin). And the socialism which Nove adumbrates is indeed feasible. But it’s target is capitalism rather than the capital system. The problem with socialism as a halfway house is that not only do the old exigencies of the rule of capital soon make their presence felt, failure demoralises the movement towards socialism and induces a loss of purpose and direction.

So, against mere changes in forms of ownership, development of productive forces, applications of technology, one can identify the real strategic objective of socialist transformation as the radical supersession of capital and the uprooting of the rule of capital in the whole social metabolic order, something which goes much further than the negation of capitalism in any particular social setting. The process of social transformation can only be taken to successful conclusion if it ends in the radical transcendence of capital as such, deliberately and systematically uprooting capital's power of regulating the social metabolism and establishing new forms of social regulation. This ‘fundamental strategic aim of socialism’ should not be conflated with immediately feasible but necessarily limited objectives related to capitalism. Only the former will lead to the social transformation which is a condition of socialism. The latter is a half-way house that remains under the rule of capital.





The emphasis upon the ownership and control of the means of production thus comes at the expense of a thoroughgoing analysis of the capital system as a whole, setting the contradictory dynamics of production within a technologically advanced society within the social relations of production as a whole. This discrepancy cannot be attributed to Marx, who made the nature of the labour process, the division of labour and the "critical analysis of capitalist production" is central to Capital. Marx demonstrates through painstaking analysis how the processes of production are continuously transformed through the accumulation of capital, the central dynamic of the capital system. For the working class, this incessant transformation is manifested as a) an unremitting technological change within the labour process of each sector of the economy, and b) as a disruptive redistribution of labour among occupations and industries.

In the famous 1859 Preface A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx argued that at a certain stage the forces of production would advance to such a level that they would be constrained by and eventually break the relations of production within which they are organised and utilised.

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.

Marx EW 1975: 426

The problem is that whilst the new productive forces would seem to point to a new social order beyond the capital system, these forces have emerged within capitalist relations and hence bear the hallmarks of that system. With the integration of science and technology into the "productive forces", this question of the potentials for social revolution is of increasing import. But there is no inevitable evolution of socialism on the basis of the new and emerging productive forces. We are living in an era of techno-science in the service of capital. Not socialism, but the Megamachine evolves out of capitalist relations and the hierarchical division of labour. The achievement of socialism requires the creative intervention of the subjective factor – the self-organisation and self-activity of the working class, the value creating class.

In the transnational and multinational corporations that bestride the global economy, a substantial proportion of those employed are scientific, technical or administrative workers. A new proletariat. This development highlights, in the most practical way within the material life processes of human beings, the question of the relationships between science, technology and prevailing and alternative social arrangements.

Until recently, the question hardly arose. It seemed that science and technology were neutral forces. Such a view fitted the dialectic of relations and forces of production in that science and technology, whilst integral to the rise and operation of the capital system, would ultimately come to contradict capitalist relations as they advanced. Capitalist relations, according to this reading, would systematically frustrate the potentials of science and technology to be used for the human good. The productive forces would be constrained to the narrow end of accumulation when, in fact, they are capable of much more within alternative relations of production. Any problems generated by the application of science and technology could therefore be considered problems not of science and technology as such but as problems caused by capital's misuse of their potential. The contradictions between science and technology on the one hand and capital on the other could thus be viewed in the context of specific relations of production constraining new and emerging productive forces to a narrow and increasingly outmoded end. The socialist argument here points to the inability of the capital system to provide a rational framework for the effective organisation of the new productive forces so as to eliminate famine, disease, and poverty, to provide infrastructures for human health and happiness, and to ensure even development and plan for the future. 

In broad terms, that case remains valid. But there is a need for a closer look at science and technology as forces of production. The assumption that the transition to socialism would be facilitated in some uni-linear way by the development of the productive forces — technology, science, human skill and knowledge and abundant fixed capital is naïve. Such a view sees the forces of production, including science and technology, as neutral, their character and impact depending upon their use within specific social relations. On this reasoning, the development of the forces of production is considered inherently progressive and emancipatory, part of the progress of human reason. That fits the general picture of relations fettering forces of production, leading to an era of social revolution. In general terms, that view remains valid. But productive forces are not just against the relations within which they emerge – the fettering thesis – but in those relations, sharing something of their character.

The idea that science and technology are neutral forces fits the self-image of the scientists and the technologists. And it leads to a general statement of ‘progress’ that, in outline, is difficult to contest. The critical, rational knowledge of science had liberated humanity from the bondage of ignorance and superstition, undermined the belief system of the old social order. The earth-centred conception of the universe could no longer be sustained after Copernicus and Galileo, the idea that the Earth was made for the human species could not survive Darwin and his theory of evolution. 

This view is familiar. However, recent decades have seen a growing disillusionment with this simple identification of the advance of science with progress. For the simple reason that science is not neutral, technology is not neutral. The new productive forces are both in and against capitalist relations, whilst they may contradict those relations, they may just as easily serve them. Science and technology have emerged within those capitalist relations and have thus acquired some of the character of those relations. There has been a growing awareness that science and technology have embodied within them many of the characteristics, concerns and purposes of the relations within which they have emerged. The assumption of the neutrality of science and technology, as they are presently utilised in our current society, can no longer be sustained. The claims made for and against the use and the potentials of science and technology are thus of major political significance. The attempt to evade political questions by bland references to the potentials of science and technology is either extremely naïve or is a concealed politics that favours the status quo. Issues arising from GM food, biotechnology, geoengineering and nuclear energy are not ideologically and politically neutral and attempts to imply otherwise should be treated with scepticism.

The issue goes much further than scientific abuses and technological failures. These may be many, but are nothing compared to achievements and successes of science and technology. The pros and cons of science and technology can be set within a debate about human fallibility and hubris. However, the issue here goes deeper to examine the character of the scientific process itself. Science practised within particular social relations will reflect, reproduce and reinforce the norms and purposes of those social relations. The notion of contradiction between forces and relations of production is thus rendered problematic. Social revolution cannot rely passively upon the evolution of the forces of production. Science and technology cannot be considered autonomous and neutral forces but must instead be seen as part of a social metabolic order infused with systemic purposes and ideological assumptions which serve to shape the theories and the experimental designs of scientists and technicians. Where once we could entertain hopes for social revolution leading to socialism, now there is every prospect of a planetary engineering in the service of capital. Stewart Brand titles one of the chapters in his book ‘City Planet’. He could just as easily have written a chapter called ‘City Factory’. His book is called Whole Earth Discipline. The planet, like the people, is being subordinated to capital’s time and work discipline. 

Within the methodology of the natural sciences, qualities are rendered mathematically quantifiable. That includes human beings and their relationships as ‘human capital’ and ‘human resources’. There is a tendency to believe that if something cannot be quantified, it lacks value or doesn’t even exist. All there is is a scientific methodology that restricts reason to the measurement of quantities. This devaluation has political consequences. Most people are unable to give "scientific reasons" for their judgements, meaning that ruling elites armed with scientific methodology can legitimately override human concerns based upon lived experience. Attempts to use this quantitative approach in the much more complex and indeterminate areas of social and political activity sciences generates some very serious discrepancies and distortions. The abstracted nature of the scientific method is not appropriate to the world of law, obligation and sovereignty. The principle of self-assumed obligation holds that human beings are obligated only by those laws which they have themselves participated in making. This principle is denied if all that matters are scientific reasons, if all that is of value is quantity.

It should not need saying that these criticisms are not directed against science as such, only a particular method of science. The scientific method should be considered complementary to human experience, and should be open to a broader conception of knowledge. Narrowed to quantity, the scientific method invites degeneration into "scientism", something which we are increasingly seeing as science is pressed into the service of capital. Apologists of technoscience in the service of capital evade the question of scientific methodology by accusing critics of the scientism they promote of being against science as such. They have turned science into scientism and their cover has been blown.
A broad conception of knowledge implies a social metabolic order based upon social relations which are capable of fostering the coexistence of quantity and quality, objective and subjective factors, expressed knowledge gained through research, experiment and testing and tacit knowledge based on continuous interaction with the social and natural world: in fine, a society which re-unites hand and brain, and thus realises the integral personality, the fully human being. 
This vision contradicts the fundamental assumptions of the capital system. One of the most important factors currently shaping the emerging productive forces, giving rise to contradictions with prevailing relations, is the number of problems that increasing numbers of people the world over are experiencing with respect to science and technology. Far from enhancing the quality of life and easing necessity, many people are seeing science and technology as threats to their way of life. This is an example of how the productive forces are being constrained within the process of private accumulation. 
But there is another aspect to this contradiction, the proletarianisation of scientists and technologists as they are subjected in their work to the processes which confronted skilled manual workers at an earlier stage of industrialisation, the introduction of high capital equipment changing the nature of the work or eliminating it altogether.

Under the capital system, the method of work is transformed with respect to its use value so that it takes that form required by fixed capital, the machine. There is a separation of hand and brain here, a fragmentation of the human being, in that the scientific knowledge which determines the speeds and movements of the machine are external to the consciousness of the operator, acting upon the operator as an alien force. In the process, science itself comes, through fixed capital, to confront the workers as an alien and hostile force, subordinating them to the machine. Fixed capital is dead labour, alienated labour. Alienated labour in the form of fixed capital is thus expressed in the productive process as a dominating force opposed to living labour. In the same manner, science as manifested through fixed capital is alienated knowledge and skill, human knowledge and skill appropriated, accumulated and turned into a hostile, enslaving, exploitative force. 

This amounts to the inversion of subject and object. Human beings, the true subjects, become appendages of the object as the object acquires an existential significance. The product of the workers’ creative labour does not belong to the workers, but is appropriated by capital for purposes of accumulation. It follows that the workers' labour comes to confronts them as an alien and hostile force, a means for their further enslavement. This dehumanisation of labour articulates the fundamental contradiction at the base of capital’s social metabolic order. The relation between capital and labour is one of exploiter and exploited. It follows that the development of the productive forces at this historical stage, particularly the contrast between the liberatory promise and potential of science and technology and their current utilisation, is the embodiment of a contradiction arising from the subordination of human creative agents to autonomy-denying and impairing structures. This contradiction can only be resolved through a change not only in the ownership and control of the means of production – a surface level socialism that keeps the roots of alienation intact - but through a thoroughgoing transformation in social relations, comprising the division of labour, the wages system and other such mediations.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that this alienation is now extending rapidly into the fields of intellectual work, all the professions from health to architecture. The world of science and technology is not insulated from this proletarianisation, far from it. The changing organic composition of capital means that processes are becoming more capital and less labour intensive, with workers increasing subordinated to or replaced by machines, alienated knowledge and skill, fixed capital – what Marx called "dead labour". As a result, scientists and technologists have become workers, proletarians, value creators from whom surplus value is extracted by capital. They may or may not see themselves as proletarians, but, like other workers, they must sell their labour power to survive and should come to align themselves politically and socially with the working class if they are to secure their ends. Ultimately, the changes in the priorities currently being set by society requires a fundamental transformation in social relations.
Thus, the autonomy and the neutrality of science and technology, and of those who work in those fields, cannot be sustained as anything other than an ideological project. As ideology, notions of autonomy and neutrality serve to conceal the asymmetrical power relations that prevail to the advantage of the powerful. Not only do scientists and technologists alienate their knowledge and skill to capital, they also permit capital to pursue its accumulative imperative under the cover of neutral scientific and instrumental rationality. The reality is that the scientific and the technological worker is finding his or her knowledge and skill being increasingly subordinated by the capital system as it controls and organises creative human agency in all its aspects towards the end of accumulation. This is part of the general process by which the alien power of capital comes systemically and structurally to control society, determine its purposes and organise the supply of social labour. It is all of a piece with time and work discipline, scientific management, and notions of efficiency. The economic machine requires robots, workers who are appendages of machines. It is clear, then, that the organisation of production and the labour process, not just employment in the wages system but the technology necessary for such employment, is infused with profound ideological assumptions which arise from the prevailing social relations. In assuming the neutrality of science and technology, we have too easily presumed that the potential for social revolution contained in the contradiction between the forces and relations of production would be actualised in the course of development, and we have "failed to recognise as anti-human, and consequently to oppose the effects of values built into the apparatus, instruments and machines of their capitalist technological system. So machines have played the part of a Trojan Horse in their relation to the labour movement. Productivity becomes more important than fraternity. Discipline outweighs freedom. The product is in fact more important than the producer, even in countries struggling for socialism". (Robert Jungk, Qualitat des Lebens, EVA, Cologne, 1973.)
Socialism, if one follows Marx’s analysis, means an enlargement in the space for freedom as human self-determination and a corresponding diminution of systemic determinism. The problem used to be a Taylorism which constrained workers’ autonomy at the point of production. The problem now is the way that society as a whole is being turned into a factory. In Corporate Society, Class, Property and Contemporary Capitalism (1992), John McDermott writes of the rise of social Taylorism. The expression denotes the spread of Taylorite ideas about controlling workers from the factory to the wider society. McDermott theorises a complete alienation in such a society when he describes ‘social Taylorism’ as the ‘systematic social and cultural subordination of the worker, the working class, and its social reproduction to the various professions and professionals of the middle element. 

Accordingly, working-class life and culture is socially reproduced in a setting in which it is importantly shaped by the values and ideas, hence the social interests of the middle element. This is one of the striking ways in which the modern working class does not answer to the name "proletariat." The very point, almost the very definition, of the latter is of a class of workers so excluded from the economic, social, political, cultural, and even moral life of the wider society that they are truly—as the old Marxists believed—"alien in their own countries" or, as Marx said in The Communist Manifesto, that they "have no country." Social Taylorism, in its intent and effect, has changed proletarians into modern workers.
McDermott 1992: 155

But it also implies that the ‘middle element’, the intellectual workers, have become the modern proletarians.

Either way, the space for freedom diminishes. In such a condition of social Taylorism, workers, whether they work by brain or by hand, will fail to develop the initiative, the self-confidence and the range of skills, abilities and talents which will make it possible for them to play an active and creative part in society as a whole. Of course. That’s the whole point of fragmenting workers within, stripping them of control, separating their skill and knowledge from them. Freedom as self-determination implies that labour has autonomised itself from capital and its social supply is now delivered directly, through the associated producers rather than indirectly through the value form.

In sum, it is increasingly apparent that the range of contradictions which are emerging in the modern world demand not merely the continued application of science and technology, but a profound re-examination of how science and technology are used within prevailing social relations. That is the deeper aspect that is missing in all the literature in favour of planetary engineering. That absence of a concern with the relations within which science and technology are used reveals the extent to which these eco-engineers are engaged in an ideological project. The very thing to be questioned – the social relations of production – is precisely what is absent from the analysis. That means that all the claims made for GM food, geoengineering, biotechnology etc amount merely to an assertion of more technoscience in the service of capital – the very thing that has brought us to this impasse. The crucial question concerns not the application of knowledge and technique as such but how knowledge and technique should be applied so to extend human freedom and social development. And that is a question of social relations of production – how human powers are to be organised and to what end.
Those arguing for the transformation of the social order are frequently challenged to propose an alternative. As though, since Robert Owen, socialists have been short of alternatives. As though the capital system and its apologists are really interested in alternatives.

Back in 1943, economist Michal Kalecki explained that whilst it was perfectly possible for governments to use macroeconomic policy to obtain full employment, creating an expanding economy which would generate profits for business, this is unlikely to happen. The main purpose of government is to create and sustain the appropriate long-term conditions for business to flourish. And that requires a subordinate and desperate workforce, not the confident and assertive one that would follow full employment.

It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on the average under laissez-faire; and even a rise in wage rates resulting from stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices, and thus affects adversely only the rentier interests. But 'discipline in the factories' and 'political stability' are more appreciated by the business leaders than profits. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view and that unemployment is an integral part of the 'normal' capitalist system.

Michal Kalecki 1943:322-31, also Hunt and Schwartz 1972

And that is why capital and its apologists do not entertain any alternative when it is proposed. By asking for an alternative, they are simply implying that no alternative is possible. Whilst Marx focused upon the economic cycle as expressing the inherent contradictory dynamics of the capital system, Kalecki argued that this cycle is ultimately a political phenomenon, with the state consciously choosing deflationary policies over full employment strategies for political reasons. The control and subordination of labour is much more important than economic health and well-being. 

The workers have proposed alternatives along these lines. Facing the prospect of unemployment, the technologists and workers at Lucas Aerospace decided to use their experience and knowledge to propose production for socially useful products and purposes. In doing so, the Lucas workers exposed the gap between what their knowledge, expertise, skill and ability were capable of, and what these were actually producing. The workers were employed designing, developing and building equipment to be used in an aerospace system of high level sophistication. Yet there was real social need in society, people lacking basic amenities. Even more perplexing, the workers were being subjected to a gradual deskilling, a loss of control over their work, and the threat of losing their jobs.

The Corporate Plan written by the Lucas workers extended to six-volumes and contained proposals for using their skills and abilities to engage in socially useful production designed to meet a range of social needs. This was an explicit assertion of use value over exchange value, a direct challenge to the accumulative imperatives of the capital system. The proposals required the complete reorganisation of the labour process so as to re-unite hand and brain and allow workers to give full expression to their creative labour. The Lucas workers stated explicitly "that society's greatest asset is the skill, the ability, the ingenuity and the energy of its ordinary people." That denotes the power of labour. Capital is not all powerful but is parasitic on the power of labour. Labour can autonomise itself from capital but capital can never exist independently of labour. Capital is merely the power of labour in alien form, a power that labour can practically reappropriate and reorganise as a social power.

This practical restitution of the social power of labour is an integral part of the fundamental transformation of society away from its present exploitative and hierarchical social forms, to a new form of freely associated production. 

As a discipline, science is open to all those who learn and adhere to its prescribed rules and socially accepted principles. The common acceptance of the language and methods of science across time and space ensure the communicability of scientific knowledge. The procedures of science therefore contain the potentiality for unifying people in the most practical way. The problem, however, is that within prevailing social relations the potential for the creative use of science takes form in the destructive abuse of science. The $1.7 trillion global arms budget shows the extent to which the productive forces have become destructive forces. 

This inversion of science is a part of the inversion of means and ends which defines capitalist modernity, an inversion which itself derives from alienated relations. The inversion of subject and object is a condition of alienation in which the human creator is thingified as the human creation acquires existential significance. 

The Canalisation of Science and Technology by Social Relations

Stewart Brand refers to the ‘constant battles’ theory of human evolution. In his new book, Jarod Diamond has been accused of portraying tribal societies as engaged in constant war. In these conceptions, internecine human warfare is intelligible as part of a historical process. The reasoning is that scarce resources and niggardly natural conditions characterise the earliest stages in the formation of human society and, by implication, should diminish with progress. Except that these references to the ‘constant battles’ view of human history come with one eye on the looming ecological crisis. 

According to the progressive view, human aggression should be the period of human history in which resources are scarce and natural necessity prevails. It is easy to see how, in this context, a destructive cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal develops, with each victory generating a potential new enemy and thus creating the conditions of further conflict in the future. This unstable system of constant battles between warring groups cannot continue indefinitely. It makes for instability when the warring groups are small. With increasing trade and communication drawing nations into contact with each other, the arena of conflict widens to encompass the whole world, whilst the instruments of warfare become ever more powerful and sophisticated. The human race may have to move to the society of free and creative labour as a condition of avoiding universal destruction. A system of ‘constant battles’ does not fluctuate around containable levels of instability, but evinces a growing tendency to catastrophe. This is what Ronald Aronson calls the ‘dialectics of disaster’. This phrase captures the way that the system is always in transition, so that the future is either one of collapse, or of fundamental transformation in the social relationships by which social powers are organised. There is no other way to achieve stability and sustainability. Contemporary phenomena of overscale entities and units — the transnational and multinational corporations, supra-national military and political organisations, nation states, economic groupings and trading blocs, global communication networks, etc. — indicate that the ancient system of human aggression has reached an advanced stage, and that the choice between creation and destruction has to be made as a matter of conscious purpose and soon. Pursuit of "constant battles" objectives is becoming increasingly incompatible with the conditions of human survival. Increasing technical progress is speeding up the time available to us for reflection and action. This increasingly narrows the margin for error. Our mentalities are failing to keep pace with developments, something which could prove fatal.

Up to now, because of man's slow development, the human race has operated with a wide margin of error. Man has undoubtedly made many false starts, has handicapped himself with radical maladaptations, and has gone down many blind alleys; but none of these errors proved fatal to the human race as a whole, even though this or that culture may have suffered for its perversities. Today the margin of error has narrowed to a hair-line. If we make a succession of serious mistakes in the exploitation of atomic energy, or even if we make a single critical mistake, we may actually sentence the better part of mankind to extinction. Since all of man's custom's and attitudes have been formed under a regime that allowed him far more latitude for error, he is insufficiently prepared for this emergency; and must therefore take extra steps to correct for the current aberration that "everything will come out right in time." With the cosmic power man now commands, he can no longer afford to make mistakes, at least in this realm; for the first mistake may be the last one.

Russell in Mumford 1946: 4 Programme for Survival 

This is not beyond the human race. As members of the species homo sapiens, human beings are animals endowed with intellect and imagination. Human beings have foresight and ingenuity and the large brain to service them. It is remarkable that those who argue most for the application of technical power to solve social problems show so little by way of thought and imagination when it comes to the contexts within which these technologies are or ought to be applied. Through coded communication (speech, language, thought and so on), the human species has developed the social imagination to comprehend and assimilate the experience and knowledge of human beings, over time and space. The social imagination makes for social knowledge. Science is therefore an example of the exercise of the social imagination, a field which enables the application of social knowledge acquired over time and place. The power of science within the ‘constant battles’ system of human aggression and enmity accentuates the tendency to self-destruction and disaster enormously, hence the ambiguous experience of science in the modern world. A power with so much creative potential is actually instrumental in threatening destruction. To turn from destruction to creation requires that social knowledge be accompanied by social imagination in the cause of social transformation. The crucial challenge to canalise the creative energies from their at present sterile and even destructive channels, where isolated struggles for the survival of parts of the human species and parts of the global ecology ensure the destruction of the whole, to positive forms that pursue the survival of each individual through the survival of all individuals, the survival of the species through the survival of biodiversity, setting all the parts within the planetary conditions for life as a whole.

Defining knowledge and imagination as social makes clear the extent to which they proceed within specific social relationships, and are therefore functions of people acting within a social structure. It is through this social metabolic order as a whole that the character of human existence in relation to the environment is shaped. And it is within this system that the character of human powers, and how they are used and to what end, is also determined. In a general sense, the activities which human beings undertake within the material life processes of society are geared to some specific end or purpose within a well-defined structure which is socially and historically given and is only marginally subject to human intervention and alteration. Human beings produce and reproduce their environment socially and historically. They are socially organised to meet social needs for food, clothing, shelter and such life. Beyond the basics, forms of social organisation vary over time and place. 

The capital system is a complex of independent "capitals" integrated into a unified global capital by money, market, exchange relations and comprising vast processes of production, investment and employment. Agents of capital determine what is produced, how much is produced, what resources are used, who producers it and where, what technologies are developed and so on. The systemic effects of these interrelated capitals shape the character of the socio-economic organisation and determine the priorities by which human beings live their lives. The money, commodity, and market relations of the capital system have drawn all nations and all aspects of life into their orbit. The enclosure movement which began in earnest in the seventeenth century is now proceeding at the level of the global commons, even extending beyond the atmosphere to space itself. The capital system is the full extensive and intensive development of commodity-exchange relations. And it hinges on alienated social relations in which labour, the value creating power, is subordinated to capital, and, as labour-power, becomes a commodity which workers sell to capital in return for wages, and which comes to be organised by capital via interlocking processes of production, distribution, circulation and exchange.

To an increasing extent, human relations are taking the commodity form. 
The commodity form and exchange relations are crucial in explaining the economic priorities by which scientific knowledge and technological capacity are used in existing society. This means going beyond the general statement that human beings regulate their interchange with the environment via technique and organisation to examine specific social relationships of production.

The capital system based upon the competition of capitals and the supply of social labour through the value form is the most fundamental and entrenched source of power in the contemporary world. Competition, accumulation, commodification and money are the central determining facts of contemporary society.

References to ‘the economy’, ‘science’ and ‘technology’ as such lack social and historical context and implication; they are mere ahistorical abstractions that explain nothing in themselves. These terms only become meaningful when set within the context of social relations and social structures, which in the contemporary world mean capitalistically organised institutions and material life processes. With the accumulation of capital as the central dynamic, it is inevitable that all forms of social organisation are influenced or shaped by capitalist economic priorities, depending upon resources fed out from the private economy, or upon public bodies which support the commodity-based social form as a whole, conforming to the criteria of money and profit.

The central dynamic in the capital system that structures the whole socio-economic existence is always to expand values and thus accumulate capital. The capital economy structures society by the commodity form and exchange relations, measuring value in monetary terms and allocating productive resources accordingly. This applies to science and technology as much as it does to labour in general. Human skill, knowledge, ingenuity etc are all subordinated to the overarching dynamic of accumulation. Within this system, one is not free to choose between what William Morris called ‘useful labour’ and ‘useless toil’. The accumulative dynamic renders such distinctions irrelevant. What matters is that economic activity be profitable at pain of extinction. If useless toil pays more than useful labour, then that is precisely what prevails. Such a way of allocating resources is efficient only from the perspective of accumulation. It could easily mean that society’s assets – such as the skills and knowledge of the workers – are tied up in the most useless tasks when socially useful endeavours get ignored. The maldistribution of income further skews production decisions. Those lacking monetary resources lack the means to make their demand effective and, as far as the market is concerned, could just as easily be living on the moon as on planet Earth. Lack of money means a lack of recognition on the market. 
The accumulative dynamic organises the structure of economic life and sets the priorities to which scientific knowledge and technical capacity in the production process is subordinated. 

the relation of capitalists on the one hand, and wage-workers on the other, so reproduction on a progressive scale, i.e. accumulation, reproduces the capital-relation on a progressive scale, more capitalists or larger capitalists at this pole, more wage-workers at that. The reproduction of a mass of labour-power, which must incessantly re-incorporate itself with capital for that capital's self-expansion, which cannot get free from capital, and whose enslavement to capital is only concealed by the variety of individual capitalists to whom it sells itself, this reproduction of labour-power forms, in fact, an essential of the reproduction of capital itself. Accumulation of capital is, therefore, increase of the proletariat.

Marx quoted in Marx on Economics R Freedman ed 1961: 149/50

Capital’s self-expansion of values is the ultimate criterion of success and failure in the most practical of all possible senses. Capital either expands its values or it ceases to exist as capital; one accumulates or is accumulated. But, at some point, those whose labour adds value to the economy and who are the condition for the accumulation of capital – and that includes scientists and technologists – come to learn that the despotic power of capital is merely the power of labour in alien form, and come to organise and act to reclaim that originary power.

As soon, therefore, as the labourers learn the secret, how it comes to pass that in the same measure as they work more, as they produce more wealth for others, and as the productive power of their labour increases, so in the same measure even their function as a means of the self-expansion of capital becomes more and more precarious for them; as soon as they discover that the degree of intensity of the competition among themselves depends wholly on the pressure of the relative surplus-population; as soon as, by trade unions, etc., they try to organize a regular cooperation between employed and unemployed in order to destroy or to weaken the ruinous effects of this natural law of capitalistic production on their class, so soon capital and its sycophant, political economy, cry out at the infringement of the 'eternal' and so to say 'sacred' law of supply and demand.

Marx quoted in Marx on Economics R Freedman ed 1961: 161

Claims as to what science and technology can and can’t do have little meaning if they are not set in the context of the social relations which establish priorities, organise resources and set the parameters of utilisation. There is a need to be clear that within the capital system, society is organised around the central dynamic of accumulation. By all means let us consider how scientific knowledge and technological capacity may resolve the problems which beset society at any one moment. That is the old hope of the Enlightenment. However, these problems need to be properly analysed and identified if they are to be properly resolved. And it is when one considers this, it quickly becomes apparent how inadequate engineering solutions to social problems really are. Such engineering solutions are merely business as usual, another round of technoscience in the service of capital accumulation. Far from addressing the climate crisis, such solutions equip the ecologically destructive capital system with the power and the energy to pollute, poison and damage even more.

In going further, we need to uproot the dynamic of accumulation. But this makes it clear that the abolition of the capital system involves more than a change in the ownership and control of the means of production and instead requires that a whole new dynamic is put in place within the whole social metabolic order. 

Against the capital system and its endless pursuit of accumulation, there is a need to revalue the moral and social constraints on profit-making and uses of knowledge and technical know-how which are not motivated by expansion of the values of capital. 

The dynamic of accumulation drives the production of more and more exchangeable values simply for the sake of producing more and more values. The process is endless, a systemic nihilism, with means being continuously produced for the sake of further means. 

In its characteristically capitalist form it is concerned with production for the sake of further production, consumption for the sake of further consumption, and above all, profit for the sake of further profit. In other words, it is concerned not with ends in themselves, but with ends insofar as they may be used to pursue further ends.

Ross Poole Morality and Modernity ch 4

Ross Poole writes of the nihilism at the heart of modernity. That nihilism lies at the heart of capitalist relations and is to be found in the endless process of accumulation, the endless expansion of values which go to further accumulation as the condition of a further self-expansion of values. What could be more pointless? Yet we carry on subordinating our skill, knowledge, ingenuity and expertise to the same pointless process. The reason for this lies in the way that the social structure within which human activity is set is geared to this accumulative dynamic. This dynamic sets the conditions for human and social survival. Until we act to transform these capital-driven social structures from the roots upwards, we shall remain caught in this contradiction and our technics will continue to misfire. To apply our knowledge and know-how more beneficially to the environment requires that we put an alternative dynamic in place, so that social labour is supplied directly through the freely associated producers, and no longer indirectly through the value form. There appears to be a flat contradiction between the exponentially increasing power of scientific knowledge and technical capacity and the destruction of the environment. The contradiction is explained by the way that human labour – all skill, ingenuity, knowledge etc - is geared to serve the endless expansion of values for values’ sake, accumulation for accumulation’s sake, production for production's sake. Upon this nihilism is erected a whole range of inanities and insanities, trading rivalries between supra-national blocs, military rivalries between nation states, ecological rivalries over increasingly scarce resources, individual rivalries for employment and income. At a time when we should be moving in the direction of a universal planetary ethic, the people of the world are dividing within as a consequence of clinging to outmoded forms of political and economic organisation. The world evinces nothing so much as power growing beyond human comprehension and control. The globalisation of economic relations combined with the digital revolution has increased complexity and scale beyond human dimensions. The transnationals in charge of vast processes of production, investment and trade, global conglomerations of capital, stateless money and the symbolic economy, the worldwide interlinking of markets and the domination of global finance all serve to diminish the sense of human power and inflate the power of things. The immense efforts that have been made and continue to be made in the human struggle for free and full development are constantly dwarfed, with vast impersonal forces combining to subvert human striving, sending human efforts in the other direction of species destruction. 

With bitter irony, the planetary engineers who are currently lining up to tackle the looming ecological crisis fail to identify the root causes of this crisis and, as a result, have misdiagnosed the ecological problem as a technical problem rather than as a socio-economic problem. In consequence, the eco-engineers are boosting the technical power of the very capital system which, with its endless accumulative dynamic, is unleashing the eco-catastrophe.

Increasingly, the knowledge which exists in research institutes, universities, colleges, libraries, and in other parts of society, is not directly subordinate to the accumulative imperative of expanding exchange values. We are well into a process which is turning science and technology into a technoscience subordinate to capital. Clearly, those in controlling positions of power within the capital system, agents of capital’s priorities and purposes, exert a strong influence upon value judgements throughout society and upon public policy in politics. 


However, as the fundamental contradictions upon which capitalist society is founded – democracy and private property, social production and private appropriation, infinite economic expansion and finite ecological resources - are increasingly exposed, more and more social centres are forming from which counter-publics opposing existing policies, priorities and values and articulating alternatives are taking shape. In examining possibilities for social transformation there is a  need to evaluate transformatory agents according to their structural capacity and material futurity. 

Assertions of the power of science and technology require an examination of the way that social knowledge is structured within capital’s social metabolic order. The essential point about the application of knowledge and technical power within the material life processes of society is that these processes are shaped by capital’s accumulative dynamic. By setting this dynamic within the capital system as a social metabolic order goes a long way to unravelling the key contradictions of our times. The contradictory dynamics and crisis tendencies of capital, the contradictions between public life and private property, the economy/ecology contradiction are all rendered intelligible. It is for this reason that the philosopher Scott Meikle refers to Marx’s Capital as the greatest book of self-knowledge ever written. ‘With Marx, human self-understanding reached a point of attainment yet to be surpassed.’ (Meikle 1985). 
This allows us to resolve the paradox of why knowledge and know-how, science and technology, powerful creative forces capable of uniquely enlarging the powers of the human species, are presently instrumental in the problems that threaten to destroy the species. The truth is that knowledge and know-how are subordinated to the endless expansionary dynamic of commodity production, exchange value and capital accumulation, paying no regard to social and ecological consequences, whilst entrenching and extending relations of domination and hierarchy across the world, promoting the survival of certain social groupings at the expense of others. Within this social structure of competition within and between groupings, private aims are necessarily set in antagonism to the interests of the whole, the short term set above the long term. Applications and uses of knowledge and know-how outside of this fundamental economic structure are secondary and increasingly being extinguished. Far from being autonomous and neutral, science and technology are becoming part of the prevailing capitalist relations, whereas formerly they could be considered amongst the new productive forces pointing in the direction of socialism.

The Structuring of Social Knowledge and Know-How

As Marx argued, bourgeois society is the sphere of universal antagonism, egoism and competition. The ‘free individual’ is free to compete with other free individuals. The individual is a social or communal being only in the abstract political community of the state: ‘in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975: 220/1).





The argument of those who point to the human species as the God species is cheap, in that it avoids the hard questions of political action, social transformation and moral responsibility and simply engages in the crudest veneration of science and technology. There is no pretence whatsoever of economic analysis, merely a projection of carefully selected trends. This is poor. The power and potential of knowledge and know-how is not in doubt. What is in question is the use and the application of science and technology within specific social relations. 

The big question, the question which has occupied the biggest minds in history, is whether the course of historical development will continue to evade social control and human comprehension or whether human beings can come to subject their creative powers to conscious design and purpose. At risk of stating the obvious, that implies more than cloud-busting and the iron fertilisation of the seas. The exercise of technical capacity is the easy part. Determining to what end and to what purpose technologies are used is the difficult part. Clearly, as mounting economic and ecological crises make abundantly clear, conscious social control exists in only a piecemeal fashion, within organisations which themselves are subject to a bigger systemic dynamic. Government ministers experience the problems that beset them as due to forces so complex and abstract as to be beyond human control and comprehension, which they can only identify in the blandest of terms - "economic crisis" and “climate crisis”. The global economy is driven along a course of development which has the character of natural necessity, and is spoken of in such terms by politicians whose governments seem in the grip of extraneous forces – the market, competition etc are all spoken of as if they were external, objective datum, not social institutions whose origins lie in individual decisions, actions and choices. There is a need to go further to examine the nature of the economy which is in crisis, in terms of its imperatives and relations. The same with the crisis confronting the climate system, where governments exhibit the same impotence.
In unravelling these issues we come to the big question, whether conscious social control over the course of historical development is now a technical, institutional, moral and psychological possibility. And in answering this question the very last thing we need is the obscurantism of the old ‘men as gods’ theme, least of all when the crucial moral questions are evaded and replaced by a crude veneration of technical power.
With new technological and organisational forms emerging, we are increasingly capable of producing a whole range of socially useful products. This is the area that demands close attention; not what various technologies can do, but what social relations are most appropriate to the most socially and ecologically useful application of technical power. 

The religious reflections of the real world can, in any case, vanish only when the practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a transparent and rational form. The veil is not removed from the countenance of the social life-process, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and planned control.

Marx Capital I 1976: 173

What the proletariat has to do is to transform the present capitalist character of that organized labour and those centralized means of labour, to transform them from the means of class rule and class exploitation into forms of free associated labour and social means of production.

Marx FD-CWF FI 1974: 257

These passages make clear that a classless society is constituted on the basis of the free association of the producers managing productive resources together according to a conscious and rational plan. Social means of production implies use of productive capabilities with conscious control  and deliberation to satisfy social needs according to a rational plan. Such a plan is designed to overcome the subjection of human beings to determination by economic forces. The classless society therefore embodies freedom as self-determination within the whole social metabolism. 

Capital is a social metabolic order of control which is based on the commodity form and exchange relations. This means that productive resources are geared to the production of commodities for exchange value, not for use value, for the private accumulation of capital, not for the satisfaction of social need. The process is galvanised by the competitive pursuit of profit and expansion of exchange values and mediated by money. Nothing about science and technology as such, as neutral productive forces and potentials, alters these fundamentals of economic activity under the capital system. Science-based technology lies at the heart of capital’s social metabolism and has done so since the beginnings of the industrial revolution. Science and technology will be no more able, in themselves, to resolve an ecological crisis caused by capital’s expansionary dynamic that they have been able to overcome economic crises, class struggle, social inequality, alienation, dehumanisation and all the other problems inherent to the capital system.
Science and technology are part of the productive forces and, as such, either correspond to or contradict specific social relations. They could be part of the new productive forces pointing in the direction of freely associated and socially useful production. However, in the first instance, forces of production emerge within prevailing social relations and are stamped with the character of that social structure in which they are developed. This means that productive forces developed within capitalist relations are developed in such a way as to facilitate the process of private accumulation. However, technological innovation, whatever its advantages in the specific areas where it applies, may disadvantage the social structure as a whole. It is in this disjunction that the split between the interests of capital and the interests of society, both its collective and long-term interests, that one sees a contradiction within the capital system which possesses material futurity. That’s the contradiction that Marx highlighted between relations and forces of production. Such a contradiction possesses transformatory potential in that it has the potential to subvert the social relations that articulate the whole social metabolism. The power and potentialities of the new science based technologies are not in doubt – their character and the purposes by which they are organised within specific relations are the crucial questions. Generating contradictions with transformatory potential, the new science-based technologies are part of the new and emerging productive forces whose full development is utterly incompatible with capitalist social relations and social metabolic order and implies a transition towards the socially cooperative mode of production.

There is a very simple question which planetary engineers now advocating all manner of eco-technology need to answer. Science and technology have always contained the promise and potential to serve the noblest of human causes – from health, well-being, freedom, democracy, everything that Francis Bacon ever dreamed of. The question is why has the old Enlightenment promise not been fulfilled? Why don’t science and technology already serve human need directly? We know that they do not, given the range of problems that science and technology are continually called upon to resolve. Problems that technoscience in the service of capital continually generate. And that’s the answer to the question. Science and technology do not directly serve human social need because the primary objective within the structure of the commodity form and exchange relations is not the satisfaction of human need. That is a secondary concern, satisfied, if at all, only indirectly. Human need is secondary to the primary objective of the expansion of exchange values and accumulation of capital. Science and technology are mere instruments subordinated to the overriding imperative to accumulate exchange values. Their role within the commodity structure is to ensure productivity in exchange values. Whilst Marx praises the capital system for the way it revolutionised the social forces of production and spurred a continuous cycle of technological innovation, his central point is that at a certain stage new productive forces emerge which possess a potential that transcends the narrow limitations of capitalist relations and the primary objective of accumulation. If science and technology are as powerful as today’s planetary engineers say they are, then it is clear that we are now in an era in which the new productive forces make the capital system utterly incompatible with the social use of science and technology. And it is incompatible with ecological use too. It is significant how there is no coverage whatsoever of alternative and appropriately scaled technologies in the works of the planetary engineers. As against the democratic technics long advocated by ecologists, the engineers propose the authoritarian, elitist, centralising technics that alienate power and control from people. Under the pretext of addressing the ecological crisis facing humankind, the planetary engineers are equipping the very forces of ecological destruction with the latest and most powerful technoscience. 

Increasingly, the contradiction between relations and forces of production is being manifested in a whole range of second order contradictions. Marx argued that at this moment, the era of social revolution opens up. In the immediate term, it could just as easily bring about reaction. The crisis is becoming all-pervasive: economic stagnation, ecological catastrophe, war and terror, and moral and psychological disorientation, social collapse.

I have analysed this question in depth elsewhere (The Coming Ecological Revolution 2011), so I shall briefly discuss some aspects of this crisis. 

Ecological catastrophe. The central objective of capital is to produce and sell commodities so as to expand values through exchange and accumulate capital. Economists – people whom Marx calls ‘sycophants of the bourgeoisie’ in the service of capital (Marx Gr N3 1973: 273) – write of ‘externalities’. Behind the pseudo-scientific language is a highly political concern to privatise gains and socialise costs. Externalities are those unintended consequences of private economic actions, requiring collective intervention and inflicting public cost. With respect to the environment, the pollution of seas and rivers, the poisoning of workers, the destruction of habitats and of the earth's atmosphere are consequences which are considered apart from the central objective of expanding values and accumulating capital and do not enter into the calculations of efficiency with the capital economy. Instead, as externalities, they enter the public domain as the price society has to pay for its supposedly efficient capitalist economy. If these costs were factored into the true account and if price reflected true costs, the wastefulness and inefficiency of the capital system would become immediately apparent. This is difficult to achieve given the structural dependence of the state upon the process of private accumulation. The state must facilitate the process of accumulation as a condition of its own power, in terms of the resources it extracts from the private economy to pay for public goods, and in terms of its democratic legitimacy with an electorate that also relies on growth in the capital economy. In other words, all have a vested interest in endless expansion and, therefore, in keeping costs out of the account so that productivity in the competition of capitals remains artificially high. One sees how assertions of science-based technological solutions to ecological crisis simply miss their mark. Indeed, not only will the ecological crisis remain unaddressed, technocscience in the service of capital will simply accelerate it. The reason is because neither social nor environmental needs, nor the interests of future generations form a part of capital’s accumulative objectives within commodity-exchange relations. The assertion and satisfaction of social needs implies a social mode of production, and this has to be fought for politically in connection with social forces and agents outside of and against the central mechanisms of exchange and accumulation of the prevailing socio-economic structures. In fine, ecological crisis is a political question, not a technological one. Scientific knowledge and technical know-how are, of course, integral to the type of conscious social control that the cooperative mode of production for social need and use implies. However, without a political struggle leading to fundamental social transformation, the assertion of the power and potentials of science and technology will merely be engineering in the service of the very expansionary economy that is driving eco-catastrophe. Such technoscience has little relation to the task of ecological reconstruction; it will simply be a further step in the continuing process of economic expansion and ecological destruction, rather than a coherent response to those dialectics of disaster.

Contradiction between science and technology and the commodity form appears at other levels. It is worth highlighting the way that both Stewart Brand and Mark Lynas premise their eco-engineering upon a ‘constant battles’ conception of evolution and a ‘killer ape’ conception of human nature. ‘Our history to date shows us in a very singular role: that of serial killers. (Lynas ch 2 2011). 
James Lovelock argues for the suspension of democratic government as we ‘prepare ourselves to fight a barbarian warlord out to seize us and our territory.’ (Lovelock ch 1 2009). Surely, to defeat barbarian warlords requires that we, too, must become barbarians ruled by warlords. Lovelock urges that ‘not only must we survive but we must stay civilized and not degenerate into mob rule where gang leaders promote themselves as warlords.’ One sees here the deleterious consequences of moral and political evasion, the folly of believing that science and technology have the solutions to what are socio-economic problems rooted in our social metabolic system. The flakiness of Lovelock’s politics is apparent. After insisting in chapter one of The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning that ‘we must stay civilized and not degenerate into mob rule where gang leaders promote themselves as warlords’, he goes on in chapter three to argue that ‘we have no option but to make the best of national cohesion and accept that war and warlords are part of it.’ (Lovelock  ch 3 2009).

That’s the problem with turning moral and political questions into technical questions, it involves a political incoherence that falls far short of the requisite social transformation and instead collapses back onto prevailing arrangements. And the root causes of ecological crisis remain unaddressed. The result of this ‘constant battles’ conception is that real possibilities for transformation are missed and reaction intensifies. The world currently spends some $1.7 trillion on arms. Expenditure on that scale is not accidental but reflect a systematic purpose and deliberate choice in politics, production and in psychological preparation. This is evidence of a reactionary politics that takes the place of a transformatory politics.

The contribution that science-based technology makes to the instruments of warfare is so powerful that the human species could be exterminated several times over. And this is the problem with premising the argument upon the ‘constant battles’ theory of history. Such rivalry and competition ought to be considered infantile diseases, what Einstein called the measles of mankind. In ancient times, victors in war would raze cities to the ground. Those impulses remain. The human race has survived this long on account of its limited technological power. Now that the human race has achieved cosmic power through its technical power, it’s time for a universal planetary ethic based on cooperation. Instead, the capital system generates rivalry and competition between contending groupings. Indeed, the system may be defined as the competition of capitals. ‘One capitalist kills many’ wrote Marx. But there is also competition between individuals for scarce resources on the market, competition between classes, between nations, trading blocs, military organisations and so on. Rivalry and competition runs through the whole capitalist fabric and is wired into capital’s DNA. Add ever more powerful science based technology to the mix, and the human race is on the way to catastrophe. Those economic liberals who believed that the clash of arms would be replaced by peaceful contest in the trading arena have been proved wrong. Far from removing aggression and force from human relationships, the capital system instigates its own struggle between dominator and dominated. The philosopher Thomas Hobbes defined the capitalist psychology precisely when he argued that human beings must continue to strive to expand their power as a condition of survival. Under the capital system, one accumulates or is a accumulated. 

Since prehistory, social groupings have sought survival through the subjection of others, and the supposed conquest of natural necessity through technique and organisation has not altered this dynamic. Instead, natural necessity has been replaced by a new social necessity by which access to resources is rationed by the price system and market mechanism. Rivalry and competition continues to be generated by the accumulative dynamic of the capital system. It is constrained only by human motivations that continue to exist despite the psychic and social pressures generated by the antagonistic and egoistic socio-economic structure. Human beings remain what Aristotle called zoon politikons, social animals requiring each other in order to be themselves.






Social Knowledge and Know-How as Catalysts of Social Transformation 

The evasion of political and moral questions in the arguments of the planetary engineers is justified in terms of the assertion that human nature doesn’t change. It is here that the hollowness of the whole engineering argument becomes apparent. If human nature is aggressive and competitive and greedy and has brought us to the brink of ecological catastrophe, then it begs the question of how we can expect those in command of the new science based technology to be so enlightened as to use it wisely. How, in other words, has this elite managed to break the constraints of human nature and act according to reason? And if they can do it, why is a greater change in human nature ruled out?

Failure to see a change in circumstances as a self-change on the part of humanity is remiss here because the twin economic and ecological crisis is plainly a crisis of transformatory potential. An opportunity is likely to be missed through political evasion and moral cowardice. Whilst it is clear that up until now, social consciousness has not been the initiating cause of social change, the power and sophistication of the new productive forces make the achievement of conscious social control possible for the first time in history. This control making for freedom as self-determination, is being ignored in favour of further equipping and powering the very capital system that works to prevent conscious control, that brings about economic and ecological crisis as a consequence of its blind, anarchic imperatives. And this denial of human comprehension and control is a dehumanisation, a denial of the rationality of the species homo sapiens. That definition comes with the moral imperative that human consciousness should come to control social activity. That possibility of social control now exists. Failure to achieve this social consciousness and control may well ensure that eco-catastrophe and the self-destruction of the species is unavoidable. In the name of ‘progress’, our eco-engineers are accelerating the regress initiated by expansionary capital as it enters its cancer stage.

In discerning a path beyond the current impasse, there is little point in seeking guidance from the ‘constant battles’ view of history. In his Universal History, the philosopher Immanuel Kant seeks to inspire moral action towards political peace by grounding hope for progressive political ends in the historical process. It is no use treating the past as a guide since it is the nature of freedom to transcend temporal limits. The future remains to be created. The true guide is the end of 'rational nature’ (GMM 1991:91).The role of the philosopher is to 'formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own' (UH 1991:42). Kant's philosophy is therefore praxis and future oriented, his primacy of pure practical reason asserting that the world is created by human praxis and that the future that is open to creation as a result of human praxis (Goldmann 1971:57). The future, in other words, is always more than the present enlarged. The past is merely a record of the human race on its way to the end state. 'Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason' (UH 1991:43). 

Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society. Kant's view that the moral society is something that humanity ought to realise makes his praxis moral as well as technical.





Taking this approach, some things are immediately apparent:

(a) human instincts for survival, the most deep rooted concern of the species, are in danger of becoming introverted. Whilst the globalisation of relations ought to have brought people closer together, this applies more at the level of abstracted processes of trade and communication. Within outmoded arrangements and mechanisms, the animosities and identities of the old social groupings are fostering conflict rather than cooperation. The result is that human beings will seek to their own survival through the destruction of other human beings; 
(b) the capital system achieves coordination only through its imperatives, exchange relations and market mechanisms. In the process, human beings, social animals, have been reduced to the status of atoms and automatons, subordinated to ends which are external to them. Such a condition is a denial of human rationality, the hallmark of the species; 
(c) the power of our social knowledge and know-how (science and technology) is expanding but is being perverted within the commodity-exchange social metabolism. The power of science and technology is developing exponentially but, subordinated to the objectives of expanded values and capital accumulation, its main direction is necessarily against rather than for humanity. Any progressive impact is a secondary consequence apart from the central objective of accumulation. For the progressive effects to be intended implies that humanity has, at last, achieved social control and is able to utilise its productive powers within a conscious and rational plan. 

This is to replace production for exchange value with production for use value. It is to place artificially inflated wants with the satisfaction of social needs, something which requires a new structuring of production relationships. In the current system, workers are prevented from using existing skills and plant if exchange value cannot be produced. Production for social need means that instead of lying idle, productive resources are utilised to make things that people need. For Marx, human emancipation requires that human beings come to organise their own forces as social forces so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force. (Marx EW OJQ 1975:234/5). Knowledge is a human power that needs to be reclaimed from the industrial, military and political apparatus and reorganised as social force under self-conscious control of the associated producers. The access to and control of social knowledge and know-how is to  be diffused as part of the emancipatory project of the practical restitution of social power and its investment in society.

The current situation evinces nothing so much as power spinning out of the control and comprehension of human beings. The process of social development is not under control of human consciousness and does not reveal the unfolding of human purposes. The problem is not one of persuading elites in politics and business to use their power differently, nor is it one of empowering these elites with new technologies and new source of energies. It is not even a question of challenging and overthrowing these elites. Marx makes a crucial point that within the capital system, ‘the characters who appear on the economic stage are merely personifications of economic relations; it is as the bearers of these economic relations that they come into contact with each other.’ (Marx Capital I 1976: 180). The apparent power of these characters derives from their relation to the power of capital within the whole social metabolism. As personifications of economic categories, ruling elites, political leaders, capitalists have no power to change the fundamental structure, even if they had the will to do so (extremely unlikely, since to do so would be to subvert the conditions of their own power).

The crucial question is what functional role can social knowledge and know-how play in social transformation. The forces making for a new metabolic order of social control will possess a structural capacity and material futurity that leads them beyond the categories of the capital system. Appeals to science and technology are as bland as appeals to reason. What reason? ‘Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form’ (Marx EW Letters 1975: 209). In themselves, science and technology connote nothing with respect to social forms. Before promoting scientific knowledge and technological innovation as solutions to given problems, we need to examine the specific forms that the socialisation of knowledge take within the prevailing social system, focusing not so much on techno-scientific capacity as to how this capacity is organised and used within specific social relations. To repeat, the capacity of science and technology is not in question, the utilisation of that capacity is – by whom?, to what end?, under whose control? For Marx, human emancipation requires that human beings come to organise their ‘own forces’ as ‘social forces’. This begs the question of to whom or to what does social knowledge and know-how belong. They are our own forces which have been appropriated by others in industry, politics and military and which, in turn, come to confront us as alien and hostile powers. It follows that in the truly human society, the true realisation of knowledge and know-how as social requires that the individuals who compose society are in control of that knowledge. 

Elites of all kinds – in politics and business especially – are right to fear the socialisation of knowledge and power threatens to subvert their power. The socialisation of intelligence breaks down all relations of subordination and superordination. The rich and powerful have a vested interest in insisting in the neutral conception of science and technology. So long as scientists and technologists are engaged in research and in practical tasks of engineering, they fail to seek to turn their knowledge and know-how into social power. But to assert the neutrality of science and technology is to adopt a de facto political position in support of the status quo. That is, it is to acquiesce in the current subservience of technoscience to capital and its imperatives. One can look long and hard in the arguments of the planetary engineers for any challenge to the way that productive resources are currently being misallocated or misused by transnationals, by governments, by the military. It’s not an issue for those who exchange politics for engineering. They are more critical of socialist and Green approaches to science and technology, that is, to the specific science-based technologies that are being promoted within capitalist relations. To be against GM food is not to be against science and technology, it is to raise issues of control and power and exploitation, the crucial questions that the planetary engineers evade.
At the moment, scientists and technologists know their place within the capital system’s technostructural support network. With knowledge and know-how neutralised and parcelled out within the division of labour, it is well-nigh impossible to generate the socialisation of intelligence required to tackle the ecological problems that face humanity. scientist and technologists are prevented from intervening in specialities outside of their own fields. Rather than pooling intelligence to form a social knowledge and know-how making for social control, the commodity based market structure separates scientists and technologists into specialist thinkers, isolates them, keeps them in their place within the whole.
This may be changing. The problems facing the world require holistic thinking. Increasingly, specialists and experts are coming to work together, developing an interdisciplinary approach out of which social knowledge is beginning to emerge. As a result, it is possible to envisage social knowledge and know-how coming to play a practical role in the fundamental transformation of society. If science and technology are to buttress human intelligence in politics and thus play a creative role in undertaking the challenge of social transformation, then the way that knowledge is co-ordinated and the objectives it serves must be examined. There is no such analysis in the works of planetary engineers. They uncritically assume the objectives of the prevailing system as given and just get on with getting things done. As engineers, their job is to obey their orders, not to determine these orders in the first place.
In general, the power of social knowledge and know-how is as good as the social order within which it is employed. Neither science nor technology are good in themselves, it depends upon how they are used within specific social relations. This awareness of the way that specific social relations shape the character of knowledge and know-how is lacking in those for whom science and technology are politically, ideologically and morally neutral, pure and simple. Science and technology are indeed neutral, but only in abstraction from social relations. But such abstraction is not the real world. Science and technology always exist and proceed in a social context. If we hide behind neutrality and act in political and moral indifference, then we risk being orphaned by our scientific and technical powers. We certainly risk falling back upon the status quo as the default position. This reveals the ideological character of claims to neutrality, the implicit politics at the heart of overtly apolitical stances. Recognition of this point is absolutely critical. Certainly, some scientists and technologists are serious about social transformation. However, the capitalist social metabolism that incorporates social knowledge and know-how cannot conceivably deploy even a fraction of the full power and potential of human intelligence. To do so would be to move beyond control by external systemic imperatives to a system of planned, conscious social production. Science and technology may well be crucial in resolving the economic and ecological problems facing humankind, but only within the appropriate social metabolic order enabling production for use. The metabolic order for applying human intelligence to social and ecological problems just does not exist. The capitalist social metabolic order of alien control is concerned primarily with the expansion of values and the accumulation of capital. All of the capital system’s mechanisms and mediations are geared to that objective. Social and ecological problems and requirements are merely secondary, conditional upon the overarching end of capital’s expansion of its values. To demand that human intelligence be applied to the resolution of the problems that face the planet is to require the transformation of the fundamental structure of socio-economic relations. Without that transformation, science and technology – however new – merely reproduce and reinforce the very dynamics driving current contradictions and crises. The planetary engineers write little on politics, and what they do write tends to be much more critical of those – Greens and socialists – who demand social transformation – than of those whose decisions and practices have been instrumental in bringing about economic and ecological crisis. In the main, they seem to presume that the status quo is a spaceship without a pilot. Rather than ask political questions concerning who or what is in charge, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the question of how the ship is to be powered. There is a presumption that the ship is fitted with automatic controls. This is the height of folly. This devaluation of politics not only amounts to a surrender to the de facto politics of the status quo, it acquiesces in the alienated conditions of a capital system in which human beings are mere personifications of economic categories and human powers are pressed into the service of exploitative and destructive forces. The ship is on automatic pilot and will go wherever it is driven by capital’s systemic imperatives. The destruction of the planet and the self-destruction of the species will be just another externality, an unintended consequence which follows our subservience to the overarching end to expand values and accumulate capital.
The problem of the capital system as an alienated system of production is that social intelligence and imagination have no control over the direction of social and historical development. The economic and the ecological crises are referred to as if they are natural events, beyond human comprehension and immune to human intervention and alteration. Yet, an examination of the causes of these crises reveals not external forces but the conscious decisions and actions of human beings, either as individuals or as members of social groupings. 

The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of individuals in production here appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals. The general exchange of activities and products, which has become a vital condition for each individual - their mutual interconnection - here appears as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing. In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth.

Marx Gr 1973: 158

The interactions of individuals and groups issues in a system outside conscious human control. Those who extol the virtue of the free markets point to Adam Smith’s invisible hand through which the pursuit of private gain issues in the public good. This was actually Mandeville’s view, not Smith’s. And it has produced not individual freedom but a collective unfreedom. Thus, Marx argues, the liberal assertion of 'independence' 'is at bottom merely an illusion': individuals are 'free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom'. This appears as independence only by abstracting from 'the conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact', ‘and these conditions, in turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created by society, appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable by individuals' (Gr 1973:163/4).
The key question is social control, whether human beings can assume control of their social activity in such a way as to become self-conscious makers of their own history. The capital system has achieved freedom as a universal atomism and as a result has instigated uncontrolled social processes that eclipse individual comprehension and choice and threaten human life and the environment. The capital system is an anarchy of production organised around a competition of capitals. There is a fundamental irresponsibility at the heart of the system. Even the ruling class do not actually rule but are merely the personifications of economic imperatives. The only safeguard against social, economic and ecological catastrophe is to achieve common conscious control over our material life processes so that the course taken by social development is governed by social thought and imagination. Only on the basis of such social control is it possible for science and technology to come to play a conscious role within the social metabolic order as social knowledge and know-how. Until that conscious social control is achieved, science and technology will be servants of ends and imperatives which are external to them and which are set within prevailing social relations.
The twin economic and ecological crisis shows the extent to which the capitalist social metabolic order based on the commodity form and exchange relations does not perform essential social functions well. Indeed, with state intervention and expenditure, the capital system would have collapsed a long time ago. At present, the system seems in imminent danger of complete collapse. This begs the question of why resources being used to prop up a moribund system are not being used to create a new social form. Hence the importance of debating the role of science and technology within politics and society. Scientific advance and technological innovation are integral components of the new productive forces pointing beyond prevailing social relations. If the power and potentiality of science and technology is as great as our planetary engineers claim, then, surely, we should be addressing social intelligence and imagination to the possibility of fundamental social transformation in the direction of an alternative social metabolic order, not to propping up a collapsing system. 

An alternative to a system based upon commodity production and capital accumulation is required, and social knowledge and know-how has a key role to play in the achievement of this plan-based metabolic order of social control. This would amount to human beings coming, finally, to live up to their billing as homo sapiens. A rational species is capable of organising its interchange with Nature through conscious planning by means of foresight:

An immense interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity from the situation when human labour had not yet cast off its first instinctive form. We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic. A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [ver-wirklicht] his own purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. This subordination is no mere momentary act. Apart from the exertion of the working organs, a purposeful will is required for the entire duration of the work. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work and the way in which it has to be accomplished, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as the free play of his own physical and mental powers, the closer his attention is forced to be. 





It is on this assumption of rationality that Marx is able to envisage the ‘conscious and planned control’ by ‘freely associated men’ of their social life-processes, i.e. the process of material production (Cl 1976:173). Social control is therefore constituted on the basis of 'an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force' (Marx Cl 1976:171). In the plan based structure, relationships will be determined and functions allocated by a conscious common purpose. Whereas, under the capital system, accumulation is the overriding determinant of social activity, under a system of conscious social control, social intelligence and planning will be the ultimate determinants. The restitution of alienated social power to the social body enables social organisms become self-sufficient from the base upwards, protecting against the re-alienation of power in avoiding external dependencies. The conception of social control presents a vision of the self-mediation of freely associated labour in charge of a consciously controlled  form of social planning. 

Such a view recovers human responsibility against capitalistically alienated forms, structures and imperatives (Meszaros 1995:17; Meszaros 1970:78/9 92 248/9 285). That is what is so disappointing about the arguments of the planetary engineers. For all of the talk of men becoming as gods, there is no debate whatsoever of conscious control of social power. On the contrary, there is an underlying assumption that human nature doesn’t change. There is nothing on social transformation and human self-transformation as associated processes, no real change is proposed at all. Instead, we are treated to the latest instalment of technoscience in the service of the very capital system who expansionary and contradictory dynamics are driving the economic and ecological crises. That the objectives to which the power and potential of science and technology are directed are threatening the survival of the human species is a bitter irony that bears repetition — the central argument throughout this long, long piece is concerned to unravel the paradox of why a force for human creation, freedom and rationality has come to be used destructively, repressively and irrationally. The point here, however, goes further to emphasis that scientific knowledge and technological innovation should be integral to social transformation as new productive forces which break the fetters of the old social relations. If those fetters remain in place, then the exponentially expanding power of science and technology will remain in the service of a systemically irresponsible power and will accelerate our self-destruction. Capital cares for nothing other than the expansion of its values, and it will employ any productive power to that narrow end, without regard of consequences. Economies can be bankrupted, resources exhausted, communities unravelled, ecosystems polluted and poisoned, nations destroyed – capital as an organised irresponsibility could care less. The cavalier way in which planetary engineers seek to equip an untransformed, unrepentant capital system with nuclear technology and genetic engineering underscores that capacity for self-destruction that the human race now possesses. Add the exponentially expanding power of science and technology to the expansionary dynamics of the capital economy and we have a nightmare vision of power continuing to spiral out of control. Subordinated within a system of conscious social control, and science and technology become social knowledge and know-how, new productive forces pointing to new social relations. Detailing the many things that scientific advance and technological innovation make possible within prevailing social relations spectacularly misses the point. Within capitalist imperatives, science and technology will be pressed into the service of capital accumulation and the political and military defence of that private regime, and no more. The really interesting question is to evaluate the potential within the new productive forces for social transformation to the self-managing society of freely associated individuals, a society which is freed from the constraints of systemic imperatives and dynamics, and which has overcome relationships of superordination and subordination. Rather than childish fantasies of becoming as gods, and rather than worshipping our technologies like small boys with their Christmas presents, the grown up thing to do is to come to rational and moral terms with the power of our knowledge and know-how. That’s the difficult part. And it requires a recovery of politics, an examination of questions of control, power, authority, human relations, distribution of resources, decision making, ends, purposes. In short, everything that the planetary engineers avoid.

‘An Oxford professor meets a former PhD student and courteously inquires what he’s working on these days. “I’m writing a book on the survival of the class system in America”.
“Really, how fascinating. I didn’t think they had a class system in America.”
“Nobody does. That’s how it survives.”

Left to the planetary engineers, the class system will last forever, judging by what passes for political economy in their analysis.

The fault-line running through the case for planetary engineering is apparent in Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline. The tone is set early on, when Brand argues ‘When roles shift, ideologies have to shift, and ideologies hate to shift. The workaround is pragmatism—"a practical way of thinking concerned with results rather than with theories and principles." The shift is deeper than moving from one ideology to another; the shift is to discard ideology entirely.’ (Brand ch 1 2009). 
So away goes theory. Brand gives short shrift to ethics, too. In proselytising for GM food, he quotes Bertolt Brecht: "Grub first, then ethics."’ This is risible and completely misses the source of the problem within capitalist modernity. The problem is not one of means, it is one of ends. As Einstein argued ‘the world shows a perfection of means, and a confusion of ends’. Brand’s solution to this modern crisis is a further perfection of means and the discarding of ends. As a result, we get the same problems on a larger scale.

The least said about what little Brand says about politics the better. Some inkling of Brand’s politics can be gleaned from remarks such as ‘the Green face of Nazism’ and ‘so much for the leftist dread of centralized corporate control’ (Brand ch 5 2009). It just goes to show how far we have let politics slip from our grasp and how much ground we need to recover that, faced with a crisis with transformatory potential, a neutralised, anaesthetised planetary engineering is being offered as a radical politics. It isn’t radical and it isn’t politics at all. It is plain evasion that denigrates the very forces we stand most in need of – theory, politics, ethics.
How Brand can promote science and scientific knowledge so aggressively and yet denigrate ‘theory’ displays a breathtaking ignorance of how real science actually proceeds. The important role that theory plays in science should not, surely, need to be restated. We have known this since Popper. The idea that all scientists do is collect facts and record results of experiments is surely a view that no-one believes in. Indeed, even more than theory directing scientists in their work, there is increasing recognition of the role of intuition and imagination in the work of the great scientists. Einstein certainly made this clear. Suffice to say, theory plays a crucial role in deciding what questions are significant, what evidence is to be sought, how research is to proceed.

I lack the patience to write any more on this. I have spent more time on Brand, Lynas and the planetary engineers than their arguments merit, so I shall wrap up and return to more substantial work. 
Suffice to say by way of conclusion here, theory, politics and ethics are essential factors in human living and it is towards the enlivenment of these factors in the issues that now confront the human species that this book has sought to emphasise. The age old aims of achieving freedom, human rights and democracy, of distributing life chances equitably and using resources for the human good, devolving power and control to social actors remain integral to the flourishing of the species. To discard these aims, or to make them conditional upon the advances of science and technology, is to renounce a substantial part of what it is to be human, the most important part. 

We need to ask ourselves what life would be like if theory, ethics and politics were eradicated from society and technical know-how and scientific knowledge were all that existed. Whilst our attempts to understand and shape the society in which we live would no doubt continue, these would lack the guidance of values. There would be what Einstein called ‘the confusion of ends’. In this book I have emphasised that a concern with ideas, politics, and ethics is a precondition for an earthly existence that is worthy of human beings. Of course, technologies play an important role in shaping this worthwhile existence. But technologies are shaped by the values that human beings hold, the purposes they consciously determine, the ends they set themselves and the relations within which they act. Alongside technical capacity there is moral capacity. How to achieve balance between our technical and moral powers remains the crucial question for the human race. The promotion of the one over against the other is to skew the character of both. It’s about determining the right relation between them. For so long as human beings remain on nodding terms with their essential humanity, they will respond to the yearning to achieve truth, goodness and beauty in social and personal relationships, in the products of social activity, in spiritual life and in political life.

Politics first emerged in the civilization of ancient Greece as creative human self-realisation, an integral component in the human quest for the good life. The desire for a fully human life was originally conceived by Plato as thymos, the demand for justice which exists within the human soul. For Plato, justice is the social virtue par excellence. For Aristotle, human beings were zoon politikons, social beings who required a politikon bion or public life in order be themselves. Human beings gain a sense of their own sell-worth only in relation with others. Karl Marx argued that ‘the production of too many useful things produces too many useless people.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975). And there is a real sense in which human beings, brought up under the capital system, have become these useless people, regarding politics and ethics, activities which demand something by way of character, as secondary to economic growth, human values as a function of things. The idea that scientific knowledge and technological innovation can do the work of politics and ethics is merely a culmination of the kind of instrumental mentality which characterises the capital system and the way it proceeds ‘without regard for persons’ (Weber). Personality, character, are central to politics and ethics. Indeed, with respect to intellectual curiosity and commitment to truth, one could say the same of science. The irony is that none of the planetary engineers seem to have noticed – or they deliberately ignore – the extent to which science and technology lack autonomy, but are instead subordinate to capital and its imperatives.

So I have no compunction in restoring ideas, values and politics to the centre of the human stage, from where they were expelled by capital and its pseudo-scientific language of efficiency, optimal allocation, maximisation of utility and so on. These are the terms with which the ‘rational’ justifications of the capital system begins – and very soon ends. Capital lacks a moral and political language. Instead, all the talk is of material power and money. Loren Lomasky notes the extent to which the language of socialism is different. 

Socialism is different. Its legitimation is overwhelmingly sought within a discourse proper to politics. Proper socialistic organization of the means of production will, one is told, banish exploitation and thereby transcend class conflict. Socialist society is fundamentally more democratic than whatever bourgeois society holds forth because it is a more egalitarian order. (And the contemporary identification of the bourgeoisie, whatever its origins, has become an act of political classification.) These entirely familiar locutions can hardly be misidentified: they advance political arguments. It is erroneous to view capitalism and socialism as theories in conflict. That cannot be so, because they occupy substantially different domains. The puzzle is why that should have come to be the case. 

Lomasky in Paul, Miller, Paul 1989

Socialism, in fine, is the recovery of the primacy of politics. Not the underhand politics of capitalist sleight of hand and manipulation, but the ancient Greek politics of creative human self-realisation. Recovering the centrality of ideas, values and politics is all about recovering the quest for the good life and once more setting the human race in the direction of conscious social control of the historical process.

The ancient Greeks are also credited with the invention of philosophy. Philosophy does its best work in the awareness of the disparity that exists between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’. This distinction has radical implications when applied to existing reality. Here, philosophy, integrating ideas, values and politics, identifies the potentially existent future which is immanent but repressed within a deficient existing reality, presenting a vision of a better, morally desirable future which is able to inspire human effort towards its realisation. In recovering the quest for the good life we move to an altogether more elevated plain than the use of new technologies to ensure survival. Meeting the ecological crisis is indeed a serious matter, but it is also an opportunity to recover essential elements of human living that have been lost under the economic determinism and instrumentalism of the capital system. The question is much bigger than mere survival. It is a sign of how much the modern world, intoxicated with its material power and progress, has so lost a sense of true value that mere survival in face of the ecological crisis has become the overarching goal. 2,400 years ago, the poor citizens of ancient Greece had a much more lofty goal – the good life. For Aristotle, the point is not just to live, but to live well. The polis is created naturally by individuals 'to secure the good life' (Aristotle Politics I.ii 1981:59). Succumbing to the idolatry of things, the veneration of our alien powers, we have lost a sense of the good life. Reading the proposals of the planetary engineers it is evident that many remain in thrall to their mechanical things and technical trappings. What is most revealing is the overweening confidence that our technical capacities define the extent of human power and that, through technical innovation, perfection is within our grasp. 
My argument is simple. To dispense with philosophy, ethics and politics is to renounce the very things by which human beings come to define themselves as truly human. Ideas, values and politics are essential components in the quest for the good life, the life which embodies justice, equality, democracy, freedom, and happiness as flourishing. Having dispensed with theory and ethics, what does Stewart Brand offer? GM food, nuclear power, iron fertilization, and an array of floating vertical pipes … It hardly seems a fair exchange.

The twin challenge of economic and ecological crisis calls for new mentalities and modalities, not new technologies. We need new modes of thought, organisation and action. We have lost the habit of engaging creatively in politics, and so cast around lamely in search of technical crutches. The problem is not a technical one, it is a political one. We need to recover that sense of politics as creative human self-realisation and start to organise and activate so as to turn essential aspirations for social justice, equality, freedom and democracy into practical reality. And that requires finding and inspiring and working with those social agents who are willing and able to undertake a profound social transformation which seeks to satisfy the universal aspirations of humanity. 

Immanuel Kant identifies 'the universal kingdom of ends' as a democratic realm which is open to 'every rational being’ (GMM 1991:100). 

I understand by a 'kingdom" a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws. Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we shall be able—if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends—to conceive a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also of the personal ends which each may set before himself); that is, we shall be able to conceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above principles.




It is to this end that the fullest powers of human beings - intellect, imagination, emotion - ought to be directed. From being forms of development of the productive forces, capitalist relations have turned into their fetters. ‘Then begins an era of social revolution’ Marx argued. But only if human beings engage in political struggle aiming at social transformation. Social revolution will remain a mere promise contained within our still yet uncontrolled and uncomprehended productive powers until it becomes part of the human consciousness as a result being learned continuously through the praxis of myriad individuals seeking to control and comprehend their social circumstances.

PART 3 THE GODDESS SPECIES

Mark Lynas writes of human beings as ‘the god species’.  Why not the Goddess species?
It is worth commenting on the fact that Brand and Lynas refer exclusively to god and gods. Lynas makes one reference to a goddess, and even then only in passing and in parenthesis: ‘Perhaps the best-known fire tale of all is that of Prometheus, the Titan of the ancient Greeks (and son of Gaia, goddess of the Earth), who stole fire from the supreme god Zeus and brought it back to people.’ So Gaia’s importance is merely the fact that she is the mother of Prometheus.
Brand makes no reference to goddesses at all. It’s all god and gods. Does it matter? It most certainly does. The association of science and technology with the masculinity and maleness of gods is no accident. This is no small point given the extent to which feminist historians have sought to correct such biases. The titles of the chapters in Carolyn Merchant’s Earthcare give a strong sense of the connection of nature as female with religious worship: ‘Gaia: Ecofeminism and the Earth’, ‘Eve: Nature and Narrative’, ‘Isis: Women and Science’, ‘The Death of Nature: Women and Ecology in the Scientific Revolution’, ‘From Corn Mothers to Moral Mothers’, ‘Preserving the Earth: Women and the Progressive Conservation Crusade’, ‘Peace with the Earth’, Women and the Environmental Movement’. 

Could God be a woman? It has been known. There’s the gag about the male chauvinist atheist who said ‘I’ve never believed in God, ever since I found out he was a woman’. In books that make a great deal of being as gods, it is significant that amongst all the excited talk about science and technology there is one single solitary passing reference to a goddess. That is significant. To become as gods, it is as well to know where we have come from. To have a future, we need to remember our origins.

11 THE RENASCENT GODDESS

One of the worst aspects of the eighteenth century war between science and religion that is being replayed today is that ‘myth’ is used as a term of abuse, meaning something wrong, superstitious and made-up. This is to contrast the myths of religion with the truths generated by science. It’s an old fashioned view, with mechanical materialism functioning as a pseudo-radical ideology for middle class liberals busy harrying the relics of the feudal past in an age of corporate power and environmental destruction. 

Well, myths come in many forms, some good, some bad, some giving us insight into deeper truths beyond the facts, others leading us astray entirely. The myth of Prometheus has always been something of a worry to scientists, being strapped to the rocks and having his liver plucked out for have stolen fire from the gods. That’s what happens when human beings steal the power of gods.





In the absence of an effective general mythology, each of us has his private, unrecognized, rudimentary, yet secretly potent pantheon of dream. The latest incarnation of Oedipus, the continued romance of Beauty and the Beast, stand this afternoon on the corner of Forty-second Street and Fifth Avenue, waiting for the traffic light to change. 

Joseph Campbell The Hero with a Thousand Faces).

For Campbell, the life forces that have shaped human beings in all times and places remain embedded in the modern psyche. The individual of the modern world is a variation of some ancient themes. The problem is that the modern individual has a much poorer mythological apparatus with which to deal with these processes. Science and technology have empowered us materially, but have weakened us spiritually. This leaves us exposed, unable to regulate ancient life forces, something that becomes all the more dangerous and destructive when allied to technological power.

Reading any of Joseph Campbell’s books makes it clear that Greek and Latin myths, Palestinian, Indian and Chinese myths, the Celtic myths before the Norman ascendancy were a record of customs or rituals, recollections of past events that form the character of a people, a living history. And then we move on to the moral truths and practical wisdom embodied in the great religions. 

Becoming as gods and getting good at being gods takes a whole lot more than science and technology and requires a more rounded and robust sense of truth. That’s the problem with overweening claims to power. 

A chapter in Richard Dawkins’ book Unweaving the Rainbow is entitled ‘Hoodwinked with Faery Fancy’. It begins with a quote from Charles Lamb, ‘Credulity is the man's weakness, but the child's strength.’ Few anthropologists, if any, take seriously the idea of progressive growth from mythology to religion to science anymore. The view now is that each perform legitimate functions and yield truths appropriate in their own sphere.

But there is little by way of ‘fancy’ in mythology. Fancy plays a very small and secondary role in any true mythology, which warned time and again of the adverse consequences which follow when human beings believe their power and knowledge make them gods. 

The problem is that 
Conquering gods their titles take 
From the foes they captive make,

We return again to Gaia. Goddesses are not what they used to be. The Gaia of James Lovelock’s is a machine. This is not Gaia the living Earth Goddess, nature as a living organism. To know the name of a deity is not the same thing as actually knowing the deity so named and living in accordance with it in time and place. 
Mythology performs a symbolic and expressive role in a culture. It is not so much scientific truth as a practical wisdom, a guide that facilitates the exercise of moral choice and the assumption of moral responsibility. Mythology is not bad science, as was once held, but science can certainly make for bad mythology.
Scientist and thinker Jacob Bronowski presents a contemporary mythology which sets science in its proper context:

It is said that science will dehumanise people and turn them into numbers. That is false, tragically false. Look for yourself. This is the concentration camp and crematorium at Auschwitz. This is where people were turned into numbers. Into this pond were flushed the ashes of some four million people. And that was not done by gas. It was done by arrogance. It was done by dogma. It was done by ignorance. When people believe that they have absolute knowledge, with no test in reality, this is how they behave. This is what men do when they aspire to the knowledge of gods. 
Science is a very human form of knowledge. We are always at the brink of the known, we always feel forward for what is to be hoped. Every judgment in science stands on the edge of error, and is personal. Science is a tribute to what we can know although we are fallible. In the end the words were said by Oliver Cromwell: 'I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken'. 
I owe it as a scientist to my friend Leo Szilard, I owe it as a human being to the many members of my family who died at Auschwitz, to stand here by the pond as a survivor and a witness. We have to cure ourselves of the itch for absolute knowledge and power. We have to close the distance between the push-button order and the human act. We have to touch people. (Bronowski 2011 ch 11 ). 

There is nothing here about scientists as being the ones ‘who know the most’. Instead, scientists know that they are fallible. Science is not god-like but all too human, standing at the brink of the known but always prone to error. The constant association of critics of particular technologies with ignorance, fear and prejudice and the assertion that scientists ‘know the most’ widens the gap between the scientific ‘push-button’ dystopia and the human act. And the itch for absolute control has scientists not simply aspiring to the power and knowledge of gods but to become as gods. At least, insofar as the technological fixers are representative. It sounds like a cover for other forces, really, not true science. It has the smell of money and power all over it. As William Morris wrote in the nineteenth century, science has spent too long in the counting-house. State power and money are new gods and science and technology are in their service.
So before embracing any new deity, we need to know the nature of the sacrifices that are being demanded of us. This is much more important than a name. The powers of the gods are redefined according to time, place and people. Whatever powers Gaia has, and what Gaia demands of us as her servants, may well reflect the false necessities of economic compulsion and political expediency. It wouldn’t be the first time that human beings have been called on to make sacrifices to false gods, and it won’t be the last. We need always to examine the social relations that lie behind the abstractions of science, technology, politics, knowledge and power in all forms. Knowledge and power are shaped by the way they are produced, owned, applied, used, exploited. 

What use is mythology these days? What use is science these days? And at what point does mythology stop and science begin? These may seem like stupid questions asked by people ignorant of science. As Richard Dawkins never ceases to point out, there are plenty of us about. Many people refuse to accept evolution and think it a myth. There are still people who thing human beings once fought with dinosaurs, as in the films. I have never believed in evolution since I saw Raquel Welch in One Million Years BC. I don’t think women have improved much since then. 

But ignorance is not the same thing as stupidity. Pointed questions answered by ignorant people is not the real cause for lament, but the fact that so many clever people would ask such stupid questions in the first place. 

The function of mythology with respect to Gaia is to invoke our natural virtues, drawing on the experience of the exaltation and awe that her presence excites. 
Is it awe or is it fear? Lovelock gives reasons enough to be very afraid. Gaia is no doting mother, he warns, and will eliminate any species that transgresses. Gaia is a warning to us that we must live in harmony with natural cycles and see ourselves as part of the family of living creatures. This harmony is achieved by obedience to the wishes of the lady of the house. This is, as in the Hammer film She, ‘She who must be obeyed’. As Francis Bacon in Novum Organum states: ‘We cannot command nature except by obeying her’. Is this freedom or is this determinism? It is both. We are free to choose to do the right thing or the wrong thing. But there is such a thing as the right thing and there is such a thing as the wrong thing. We need a sense of ‘knowing that’. We may choose life or we may choose death. We don’t have to obey ‘she who must be obeyed’; it’s just that we would be better off if we did. Of course, this freedom as the recognition of necessity is an affront to patriarchy and the pretensions of masculine power over nature. It seems that men busy themselves erecting and projecting their power all over the planet to avoid having to admit the primacy of the feminine in nature. The worship of nuclear power shows the extent to which we have disregarded Gaia’s warning and turned her house upside down by impious adventures in science, industry, and technology, bringing the whole building down on himself and the rest of the family of life. Today, the ancient wisdom is dishonoured. The serpent is confined to the zoo, the Goddess is paraded as a porn queen, and the Moon is a burned-out satellite of the Earth. Our money and power serves anything but the right thing. 

To those who will accuse me of being ‘anti-science’, I will say clearly ‘not so’. My point is that already have more than enough science and technology to solve our problems many times over. Science and technology are not the problem and therefore cannot be the solution. Stupidity, as Einstein said, is doing the same thing time and again and expecting a different result. We have tried to solve our problems by science and technology, and there have been successes. But the big problem evades such solution. It is not science and technology as such that matter but the ends to which we put them. 
You can call me, if you like, the ‘urban birder’ who wants you to look up at the wild animals soaring high above our heads, the ‘urban fox’ who is holding onto his brush. That’s achievement enough in this day and age, when someone or something out there forever in pursuit of some essential part of each and everyone of us, mind, body and soul. It is becoming more and more difficult to hang on to a bushy tail in this day and age, and that’s even if you manage to keep yourself out of the hen house.
I am nobody's servant, other than the god/dess without and the moral law within, which pretty much covers all bases. Why not the Lord above? I can’t see God up here, astronaut Yuri Gagarin is reputed to have said. (I don’t believe he did say it. I think it was the politicians, serving their own idols, who put their own words in his mouth.) Try looking down as well as up, all the life you need is around you down here. And up there too. God as a transcendent ideal, a vision of something better, something beyond, gives us hope and inspires moral effort and willing. We need that to see beyond the world of factual matter. Without the inspiration that the transcendent offers we very easily fall back into dead, purposeless, meaningless matter. The God who sat on a cloud is a metaphor so that simple people could understand a complex idea. Isn’t that how scientists conceive Gaia, as a metaphor that sells us nature as a machine? I look at Lovelock’s Gaia, and I see not a Goddess but a machine.
To claim that holding onto your brush in an urban civilization as a great achievement must strike those droning their lives away serving the industrial machine as irrelevant to the main business of living. It all depends on who you serve and what sacrifices you are prepared to make. You can feed the monster directly as a worker, a manager, a trader or a salesperson or indirectly as a bureaucrat, an official, a lawyer, a journalist, or a teacher. Whatever, all who serve the industrial monster are drones, talking heads and penny-a-liners of some stripe or another, masks rather than persons. It all depends on who or what you serve, and who or what you sacrifice.
Sigmund Freud conceived civilisation as a social coercion which requires a sacrifice of instinctual satisfaction. The price of the goods of civilisation is an increase of madness. In Madness and Civilisation, Michel Foucault shows that madness was originally considered not an illness but as a manifestation of animality, something which needed eradicating since it robbed human beings of their distinguishing marks of humanity. Madness is not animality as such but its repression and suppression to create thoroughly rationalised human beings for a routinised, bureaucratised, robotised civilisation. Freud was clear that civilisation entails a repressive social coercion which demands the sacrifice of instinctual satisfaction. Society trains its members to want to do what society must have them do. Instead of freedom in terms of moral choice, spontaneity, creativity, there is a repressive rationalisation as the growing regulation of the body and institutional incarceration of the individual. You can always spot a free person by the bright eyes and bushy tails. Children enter school bright eyed and bushy tailed, with a natural curiosity and eagerness to discover. Somewhere along the way they lose it all, but at least they don’t grow up to be social misfits. They ‘fit’, they survive. But in a certain sense, they have already died.

The old gods and the goddesses have not gone away. They will remain for so long as the divine spark within human nature continues to glow. The problem is that in this crazy mixed up inverted world where means are ends and ends are worshipped in their absence, the Freudian sublimation of the instincts turns vicious. Weber expressed his point in the manner of an Old Testament prophet: 'many old gods, demystified and thus in the shape of impersonal forces, are rising up from their graves. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another.’ (Weber 1970: 149). The divinities have taken on new monstrous forms and are taking revenge against ‘men as gods’. In external forms, this repression takes shape as the tyranny of abstraction, our prostration before the new idols of the state, the economy, money, bureaucracy, commodities. These alien powers are renascent gods – old gods rising from the grave in the form of impersonal forces and systemic imperatives, and demanding sacrificial victims by the million. Here, in internal forms, human beings repress and suppress themselves, and day in day out, sell themselves to the monster, piece by piece, until the day comes when nothing remains of a real person. The bushy tails and bright eyes were the first things to go.
In a world which has lost the sense of moral truth as something objective, written into the fabric of the universe without and the soul of each within, the individual is alone and 'has to decide which is God for him and which is the devil' (Weber 1970: 148). This is an impossible predicament, for without the transcendental bases of decision, there can be no rational criteria for choosing between ultimate ends. The choice between God and devil no longer matters. In a world where nothing is absolutely good, nothing can be absolutely evil either. The very moral choice which alone gives human life its point and purpose is thus rendered irremediably contingent. We become fugitives in the world we have created.

What Weber called the 'struggle between the gods of various orders and values' may have been 'demystified' and divested of its mythical dimensions as a result of the ‘process of disenchantment’ within civilisation, but it carries on in exactly the same way as it as ever done. Weber referred to the old gods rising from their graves and warring with each other as the modern gods of impersonal forces. These new idols of state, money and instrumental power control human life with inexorable force and demand regular human sacrifice. The scale of the power of these new gods can be counted in terms of the millions of corpses which the twentieth century bequeathed as its memorial and in the trillions of dollars spent on war and arms. War might not be the invention of the modern world, but modern states have waged it with ruthless efficiency, under the sign of new mythologies, totalizing abstractions which name and claim the lives of all. – communism, fascism, the war to end all wars, the war on terror, peace, freedom and democracy. And God is on all sides. But it could be the devil. In a thoroughly rationalised world, it could be either or neither, it no longer matters.

Me, I don’t believe any of the pious phrases and ambitious promises. And I don’t believe that science or technology or any power or technique divorced from wisdom will save us. Weber makes it clear that the progressive disenchantment of the world through the extension of scientific rationality is the very thing responsible for bringing the conflicts between alternative value-positions or world-views into ever sharper relief, and yet making any final resolution of this conflict possible. This is the inversion of means and ends, the extension of means to take the place of ends. The progressive expansion of rationality throughout modern society has provoked a revanchism of mythological thinking in new, more murderous forms. Two millennia of rational emancipation from mythical forms of ontological validation has so emptied human life of meaning that human beings have reverted to its original state. Only without their gods, goddesses and mythologies. And we don’t even have a talking snake to lead us out of the wasteland. 

This is the enchantment of science. Behind all the rational, scientific and technical terms, modern society is engaging in mythological modes of thought and action, with the old divinities now worshipped in alien form as technical power. In other words, the universal 'process of rationalization and socialization' has issued in a pervasive irrationality. Human beings are in thrall to their own powers in the form of new mythical forces demanding sacrifice. In this respect, Weber refers to 'many ancient gods', 'demystified and thus in the shape of impersonal forces', coming to recommence their 'eternal struggle'. The modern world gives the appearance of massive power but it is an illusion. The individual stands powerless before a multiplicity of supra-individual forces. In earlier times, people could make sense of such power by recourse to mythology, but rational civilised man is far too clever for that. So we rationalise our impotence by sacrificing our lives to the power the modern state, bureaucratic organisation, the economy and its accumulative imperatives. Scientific rationality, identified with means only, is silent on ends. Human beings have been technically empowered but morally disarmed. This argument captures well the idea of the desacralization of nature, a narrative that is central to our understanding of the modern world. ‘The world’, Einstein argued, ‘shows a perfection of means, and a confusion of ends’. Quite. 
So we can exchange nature for culture and escape ‘she who must be obeyed’ for the ‘it which must be obeyed’. We can exchange a personal identification with deity for an impersonal dependence upon a thing. If you are drones, fitted to your world, you will understand that the acceptance of my thesis commits you to take a stand which you will be loath to make. We have put ourselves in the iron cage. But it’s a gilded cage. We believe the promises and, indeed, we see the material benefits: food, drink, shelter, hygiene and medical care are provided. It pays to be on the inside. And with an essentially inventive brain, human beings organize and create more elaborate activities and produce ever more sophisticated rationalisations to incarcerate themselves ever more totally within their cages. To recognise other options is to risk an existential crisis. You can’t run with the foxes if you’ve lost your brush. People choose their jobs because they prefer the illusion of freedom to the difficulty of having to fight for it. And a position within the monstrous industrial machine gives sufficient income and leisure time to be able to worship ‘the Goddess’, at least on a part-time basis. It makes us feel better. There is a vague awareness that She who must be obeyed is still around. So it is as well to render some service. For appearance’s sake and for salving our consciences. But it is bad faith. Read about Cybele, Kubaba, Myrene or Hepat; the triple moon goddess Danae, Belet-Ili (as in the Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic), Anath and Ishtar; Neith, Isis and Hathor; Astarte and Asherah; Hera, or Rhea, also, in aspects, Demeter, Artemis, or Athene; Ceres, Diana, or Aphrodite; Inanna and/or Innin, the Sumerian ‘Queen of Heaven’ (Ninanna), a goddess associated—in terms of symbology— with the moon and the serpent, a goddess of sexuality and fertility responsible for birth, sex and death - and for rebirth as well.
What kind of fool thinks a Goddess such as this would be satisfied with the offer of part-time service? The Goddess wants it all or nothing at all. 

It’s all about that moral choice again, the thing that defines human beings as human. You can choose life or you can choose death. It’s about service and sacrifice. It is for each person to decide for themselves. But it is as well to be clear about the choices on offer. If you choose to serve the Goddess, you choose life, but on Nature’s ruthless terms. Be clear that ‘she who must be obeyed’ wants complete service. It’s a form of dependence. The industrial machine also demands complete service and it imposes a thoroughgoing determinism. The question is which, if either, nourishes mind, body and soul, and which diminishes mind, body and soul. One side stands a natural necessity, on the other a social necessity. On one side there are biological imperatives, on the other socio-economic imperatives. Where does the balance lie with moral freedom?
The more the world of things are, the less human beings become. But who am I to demand that people give up their jobs, stop spending and buying, give up their cars and mobile phones? That’s a demand only Gaia can make and it is for each to choose for themselves. That is what moral choice is all about, that’s why it defines one’s humanity. I have made my choice and have kept a good firm grip on my bushy tail in an urban environment. From my position as an urban fox, I can only clarify the nature of the choice that lies before people. How individuals come to terms with the questions of service and sacrifice is a matter for them. Only they can decide whether to live or die. I have chosen life. But the industrial machine seems to be much more powerful than the Goddess. In the short run it pays to choose death. 

The Witches Ride Again

We are in conversation with the Earth all the time — She is, after all, our Mother, and there is a silver astral umbilical cord that joins us to Her — whether or not we are aware of this. She speaks through our bodies and what we do to Her we do to ourselves. Within Earth — in Her internal fires, ores, minerals, crystals and waters — there are mysterious life-creating powers that we no longer understand.
Since we are of Her great mind and being, we can know what must be done now to heal Her and ourselves. We have reached a time when the 'ring of fire' — the active volcanoes of the Pacific basin — is awakening within the Earth. Within the Earth, there is an enormous and sometimes dormant coiled serpent/dragon of electromagnetic powers. She is Kundalini, the rainbow serpent, the fiery she-serpent that also dwells within the etheric chakra system of our subtle bodies. She is now awakening and rising within us, shifting our consciousness to a new and faster level of transformative energies. The Goddess is returning ... as Brigid of the sacred internal fires, serpent and mother of wells and springs — as Hawaiian Pele of the active volcanoes — as White Buffalo Woman of the Native American peoples bringing vision quests — as the African Goddess Oya of the wild winds, tornadoes and uncontrollable forces of nature.
We now have to channel these fierce energies or be destroyed. 
The time has come when all of us, who in past ages were burned as witches because we loved and cherished the lunar (sometimes solar) Mother and magically communicated with our Mother Earth, have to fight anew on life's behalf.
Now is the time for all visionaries — women and men — to come to the aid of our ancient Earth Mother. We must struggle to make far-reaching changes politically and economically if we are to survive, and we must indeed also meditate worldwide and dream Her alive.
It is only through Her that we have our being and are reborn. It is into Her magical otherworld that we enter at death. 






The false religions are dying as the false promises of idolatry are revealed. The new idols of science and technology look increasingly impotent. We have worshipped their power but now appreciate how little they can do. We have exalted false idols and in so doing have diminished ourselves. We have worshipped power in its absence. The new religion of the future will be based on a creative, constructive power, and we will once again find the magic that is in the garden. Human power as a genuine power, not an ersatz substitute or idol, will be involved in communication with Nature, its life support systems and with the changing seasons and the elements of life. Such power is opposed to avarice and egoism, cruelty and violence, social and environmental injustice. It will help every man and woman to live as gods through no false divinity and idolatrous power but through the realisation of his and her own capacities and their flourishing together in the eudaimonistic society. The word eudaimonia comes from Aristotle and is usually translated as ‘happiness’. It means that but entails so much more. It is conceived better as ‘flourishing’, human beings actualising their essential potentialities and exercising them as capacities and talents. Eudaimonia itself is made up of two words, eu meaning ‘good’ and daimon meaning ‘spirit’ or ‘god’. Aristotle’s conception of flourishing therefore entails a notion of living well as gods, a good spirit. It is a conception of human well-being.

Urban writer and anarchist Colin Ward refers to ‘The Happy Habitat’ when arguing that the function of the city is the promotion of happiness over and above business, entertainment and public safety (Ward 1990:9). The extent to which this notion is considered striking in the contemporary world shows how far we have distanced ourselves from our roots, not only the nature without but most especially our own natures. The case for the ‘happy habitat’ would have seemed perfectly sane and sober in ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle were clear that whilst the city arises for the sake of life, it continues for the sake of the good life. If we are serious in arguing that human beings had better get good at being gods, then the concept of eudaimonia is the place to start. 

The notion of ‘good spirit’ or ‘good god’ predicates human happiness and flourishing upon the recovery of creative human subjectivity from within the alien and objective forms within which it they have come to be encased. The ‘happy habitat’, in embedding justice in everyday social relations and practices, offers more than a mastery of nature by means of technique and organisation but identifies and explores possibilities for alternative social forms more internally related to the capacities and needs of human beings living at one together and at one with nature. This actualises true individuality, community and democracy, and realises the good life as the ‘happy habitat’. 

This is the case for social and environmental justice, creating an environment that satisfies the essential human need for what Plato called thymos, that part of the soul that thirsts for justice and which forms the basis for individual identity and recognition. A genuine individuality is realised as a communal liberty, autonomy as conditional upon the relation of each individual and all individuals. This is a politics restored to its origins as creative self-realisation. Flourishing, human fulfilment, is seen from this eudaimonistic perspective to be the endowment not of the monadic, autonomous, self-moving agent of modern individualism and mechanistic materialism but of the individual open to and realising personal aims within relationships with others. Justice is crucial to recognition and requires reciprocity within a politikon bion that has come to be invested with the power formerly alienated to the external forms of institutional and systemic control – the state and capital. That practical reappropriation of social powers alienated to external forms of control is the condition of living well, of getting good at being gods.

Here, we go into the heart of human nature to rediscover the soul that has been buried beneath the physical, external manifestations of power. Contrary to the caricature, ‘environmentalists’ and ‘Greens’ are not anti-science New Agers dancing naked under the moonlight. James Lovelock employed the word Gaia and then turned white at the sight of New Age hippies and mystics worshipping the Goddess. 

James Lovelock is, for obvious reasons, most associated with the Gaia hypothesis. He, therefore, feels entitled to expatiate at length on Gaia. At times, he comes across as a spokesman for Gaia, a high priest in a new religion. Lovelock has earned the right, of course, having developed the theory that the various systems of the planet—the biosphere, the hydrosphere, the atmosphere, everything that comprises the Earth — exhibits such interconnection in its behaviour that the Earth could be said to constitute a single living, self-regulating organism, alive, Lovelock claims, if not in the strict scientific sense. As Lovelock wrote in New Scientist:

It appeared to us that the Earth's biosphere is able to control at least the temperature of the Earth's surface and the composition of the atmosphere. Prima facie, the atmosphere looked like a contrivance put together cooperatively by the totality of living systems to carry out certain necessary control functions. This led to the formulation of the proposition that living matter, the air, the oceans, the land surface, were parts of a giant system which was able to control temperature, the composition of the air and sea, the pH of the soil and so on as to be optimal for survival of the biosphere. The system seemed to exhibit the behaviour of a single organism, even a living creature.

James Lovelock thus employed the term ‘Gaia’ as a metaphor for his view of Nature as a self-regulating machine. I’m not sure how far Lovelock really does believe that Nature is a machine, given the extent to which he notes the many features which point to a truth obvious to all who live on and by the land, that nature is alive, a living organism. It’s just that he cannot prove the point by means of mechanistic science. Scientists claim that the planet does not meet the criteria for life, which must say something about the limitations of science. As a scientific theory, then, Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine.

But that is not the Gaia of ancient myth, and not the Earth Goddess that those living on and by the land are familiar with. Kirkpatrick Sale points out that Lovelock is guilty of a misspelling when writing “Gaea” as "Gaia". Is it important? Lovelock is very precious about Gaia and expresses an intense dislike of ‘New Age’ associations and connotations. 
Lovelock makes the point that some people can misidentify or misinterpret Gaia as presented in his scientific conception, writing their own prejudices or fantasies into Gaia and thus presenting not the Gaia he presents but Gala. But how ironic it would be if Lovelock himself has failed to call the long ignored, suppressed, repressed, silenced, outraged and violated Earth Goddess’ by her true name. For Sale, Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis is a sophisticated, coherent, contemporary confirmation of an understanding that ancient cultures had evolved and which the early Greeks had named and embodied in the Western world. (Sale 1991 ch 12).





Gaea in this sense belongs to no-one, least of all possessive, meddling, controlling scientists, in the service of power and money. Gaea is the Earth in all its interconnection and interdependence. If Lovelock is claiming Gaea for science, the Earth and all its creatures are entitled to claim her back.

The wisdom of the Greeks was not theirs alone. In fact, among the earliest societies it appears with such regularity across every continent, no matter what the climate or geography, and in every preliterate culture, that we may fairly think of it as a basic, almost innate, human perception. In virtually every hunter-gatherer society that archeologists have discovered from the paleolithic past, in almost every rudimentary society that anthropologists have studied in recent centuries, one of the central deities—in many cases the primary god, worshipped before all others—was the earth.
There is no special mystery to it. In societies whose very existence depended upon knowing the earth and how to hunt its animals and forage for its foods—the way of life for 99 percent of human history—respect for the natural world and an appreciation of the land itself as sacred and inviolable was surely inevitable. That sensibility was literally so vital that it was embedded in some central place in each culture's myths and traditions and was embodied in each culture's supreme spirits and deities.




This may come as news to James Lovelock, but middle class drop outs using drugs and getting naked is pretty tame stuff compared to what went on in ancient goddess worship. Here, the Goddess was all embracing, all-pervasive deity. Whilst she has a different name in different times and places, her character is the same. The Goddess is responsible for birth, sex and death - and for rebirth as well. In Turkey, she was Cybele, Kubaba, Myrene or Hepat. To the Achaeans she was the triple moon goddess Danae. To the Sumerians she was Inanna. To other Mesopotamian peoples she was Belet-Ili (as in the Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic), then later Anath and Ishtar. To the early Egyptians she was Neith, then later Isis and Hathor. To the Canaanitic and Syrian peoples she was Astarte and Asherah. To the Greeks she could be Hera, or Rhea, also, in aspects, Demeter, Artemis, or Athene. To the Romans, she was Ceres, Diana, or Aphrodite. Inanna and/or Innin is the Sumerian ‘queen of heaven’ (Ninanna), a goddess associated—in terms of symbology— with the moon and the serpent, a goddess of sexuality and fertility whose worship included sacred prostitution. 
Let us take Cybele as an example. Cybele is a near Eastern goddess whose worship spread throughout Greece, Rome, and other neighbouring cultures. In the agora of Athens there is a temple dedicated to her, known as the Metroon, or "temple of the mother." Cybele was involved with sacred prostitution and fertility rites. And castration. Here, goddess worship involved castration in order to become like a woman. The priests of Cybele castrated themselves so as to become priest/eunuchs, almost priestesses, able to live in the temple and to serve the goddess.
Compared to this, the New Age implications of Lovelock’s Gaia are negligible. In fact, since Lovelock’s Gaia is a machine, it is completely lacking in spiritual qualities. The emasculation applies to the human race as a whole in respect of its blind devotion to technology.

If there is magic in the garden still, we will not see it through the blinkered vision of our technological lens. Technology will only see what we want it to see and this vision is restricted to fact. So Lovelock is indeed right to worry about any New Age appropriation of his Gaia, since mystical, numinous or xenophrenic experiences, in which gods are directly present or revealed, form no part of science. But the Goddess as Machine is an impoverished, enervated thing compared to the ancient Goddess. Lovelock expresses a little of the danger and fire of the old Goddess when he warns that Gaia is 'no doting mother tolerant of misdemeanours, nor is she some fragile and delicate damsel in danger from brutal mankind. She is stern and tough, always keeping the world warm and comfortable for those who obey her rules, but ruthless in her destruction of those who trangress.' This savours a great deal of the old Kali image of nature as a devouress. But Lovelock is not entitled to reason this way on the premises of mechanistic science. This is the ancient Goddess ascending from the early grave our technologies had put her in and taking revenge.

It doesn’t have to be this way. We can use a little of the old magic by appreciating the powers we retain on account of our essential humanity. We may become magic users again, but not for working mischief and then cursing the consequences, but primarily for the healing of people and planet. Power is a transformative magic which taps into and canalises our mental faculties and natural energies. Such practical magic has a positive effect on those who use it. They change their lives by discovering who they are, what they have, and who they could be.
It is not only the full moon that brings the witches out to worship. It can do. I’ve never seen it. I’ve never seen the hare parliament either, but I live in hope. Natural rituals are seasonal ones and fit the contours of the land. If Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura is correct, then to live as gods is to live at one with Nature. It follows that seasonal rituals reflecting natural life cycles and support systems refound rites of passage - initiations, hand-fastings (marriage ceremonies) and namings – on natural ground. The importance of these rituals lies in the social and emotional satisfaction they yield by bringing people together, creating and sustaining communities, and feeding the soul.

Of course, what matters is the mediation between Nature and humanity, not the assertion of the one over the other. And there is a role for human intelligence, skill and ingenuity here. We do not have to choose between the ancient Goddess and modern technology as gods. In the Georgics, Virgil points to a Golden Age achieved through a series of immediate practical goals undertaken by the government to repopulate the land and the rehabilitate of agriculture after a period of civil war. Place, life, reproduction. Georgics means ‘On working the Earth’. Virgil is an interesting character in that whilst he is the origin of the idea of Arcadia, his poems identify a creative role for human agency in realising the good life, rather than just passively live off Nature. Virgil’s Eclogues are ten pastoral poems which have world peace and tranquility as their goal. His Aeneid sees the civilisation of the world as a result of human effort. Virgil’s conception is at a remove from the world of the ancient goddess in that it highlights the creative role of human agency working with the Earth to attain human ends as distinct from a dependence upon nature’s processes and cycles alone.

So I am not sure those who the people are whom Lovelock disparages as New Agers. They sound more like the flotsam and jetsam of a materialist age bereft of spirit. What Jung called ‘Modern man in search of a soul’. 

Which brings us to Max Weber and the disenchantment of the world.

The Re-enchantment of the World
‘The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'.

Max Weber examined the nature and conditions of the modern world and characterized it as 'disenchanted'. The exact term that Weber used, 'the disenchantment of the world' (Entzauberung der Welt), was a conscious borrowing from the poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller. Weber was emphasising the loss of magic, both in nature but also in terms of our own loss of spirit. 

Weber's disenchantment articulates a broad range of interrelated phenomena, from the increasing instrumentalisation of relations, the routinization of everyday activity, and the bureaucratization of our lives. In general, disenchantment shows how the loss of a close relationship with the natural world involves also the degradation of human being itself.

For Weber, the disenchantment of the world is a rationalisation that lacks moral significance and content. It is a rationalisation that is instrumental in being limited to means and being silent on ends. The origin of the term is Friedrich Schiller and what he called die Entgotterung der Nature. This is the dedivinization or, more accurately, the dis-godding of nature (Herman, 1981: 57). Philosophers such as Toynbee (1974: 143-5) and Passmore (1980: 10) argue that this process made it possible for human beings to employ their technology to exploit nature with complete indifference to the qualities of natural objects. 
In the 4th century before Christ, Xenophon wrote that ‘Earth is a goddess and teaches justice to those who can learn.’ ‘The better she is served,’ Xenophon continued, ‘the more good things she gives in return.’ Indeed, yes. In addition to justice there are the other natural virtues: prudence, which is a knowledge of natural limits; fortitude, which is the appreciation of natural realities; and temperance, the awareness of natural restraints. 
To live well as gods requires a recognition of Gaia as a true Goddess, not a  machine, and Nature as a sacred home that cultivates the natural virtues, if we are only prepared to learn the right lessons. That takes reason and morality too, our innate gifts which nature has given us to use. However, stripped of its divinities, of its tutelary spirits, nature is made profane, and is regarded as being of only instrumental value. Reliant on our technology, we are no longer capable of learning, we do not acquire the good things that come from service, and so do not live well. Friedrich Schiller characterises this process as a ‘disgodding’, a dedivinization in which Nature becomes simply dead, factual matter, available for technological appropriation, and to be exploited and used according to human desires and projects. Science, it is claimed, studies Nature as objective, ‘dead matter’. The phrase is significant. The word matter comes from the Latin materia, which is linked etymologically to the Latin mater, meaning ‘mother’. In rendering Nature objective as ‘dead matter’, scientists study the corpse of the Goddess.
To see nature as being infused with divinity would check the technological exploitation of the environment. To live well as gods requires recognition of the divinity within nature. To relocate this divinity from nature and invest it in our technology is to further entrench the process of dis-godding that has brought us to this ecological impasse. We need to put divinity back where it belongs, in nature, both nature within and nature without.

At some point in history, with the technological assault on Nature, the ancient goddesses were repressed and women were turned into witches. The female was cast into the shadows as civilisation’s dirty secret, everything natural that did not conform to technological reason, everything real that stood in the way of the rational. Nature, women, animals, all became associated with witchcraft, the world of the shadows.

Carl Gustav Jung develops the concept of the shadow to describe those features of the human personality which lie repressed in the unconscious. The technological mastery of nature entailed the suppression of the human body, transforming the animal/natural aspect of human life into a shadow self, a lost world which continues to haunt the collective psyche of modern civilisation. The good point is that this nature is not beyond recall. 

The Animal Shadow
Jung’s concept of the shadow highlights those essential features of the human personality which lie repressed in the unconscious. The world of art has fully exposed this spectre which stalks civilisation. Whatever the suppression of the animal/natural world, this world reappears in art to remind us what we have lost and what we crave. Our ‘animal urges’ are an embarrassment to civilisation, a reflection of the instinctual drives and uncontrollable impulses in nature that need to be subdued. However, rather than go away, the suppression of nature within and nature nags away at the psyche of ‘civilised’ man and woman. The flight from the shadow expresses itself as the fear of freedom which prevents human beings from creating a home for itself here on Earth. It is worth spending some time examining the reasons for this. 
Eden represents home, security, food and shelter. It is a world we seek through technique and organisation. A repudiation of Gaia in favour of existence within a machine is an attempt to escape death but also to escape female clutches. The human body is fragile and unpredictable, it grows old, withers and dies. Such is the fate of nature’s children. New generations come and they, in turn, age, wither and die. So it is with organic matter. By way of contrast, the tools of analytical reasoning, mathematics and mechanics are invulnerable to earthly mortality. They are eternal, timeless, and can be applied forever. Distinctively human qualities like wildness, instinct, and sensuality, are closely associated with the fragile body, and serve as a powerful reminder of the cycle of human birth and death, sexuality and mortality. As such, a machine world has to disparage and repress them, their frailties as a denial of timeless power. 

The origins of this mechanistic materialism lie in the body-spirit dualism of the monotheistic religions. Christianity requires the faithful to raise their sights to the heavens and unite with Christ. The problem stems not from the spiritual as such, though, but from the way it was detached from the flesh. It was really a feare of the flesh and the way it could lead the mind astray. Sensuality, spontaneity, and lust were thus associated with base animal instincts and targeted by the Church doctrine. Animal worship, natural cycles and fertility rites had been at the centre of religious experience since the neolithic era and the Church was concerned to wean its new converts away from the ancient ways. In time, the lost world became a lost human nature.

Out of Eden, human beings sought a new security in mechanical logic, in the machines which were able to overcome the limitations of time and space. The assertion of mind over body, spirit over flesh was accompanied by the substitution of machines for human physicality. The process began in earnest during the Renaissance and has continued without respite to the present day. To the modern mind, material progress provides a new earthly surrogate for eternal salvation. This is to envisage the new Eden as Weber’s steel hard cage. Certainly, the machine has delivered material plenty. The machine functions to speed the flow of material resources, expand the production and consumption curve, and thus advance the course of unlimited material progress. But Eden promises much more than material abundance. 
The withdrawal from the human body and the withdrawal from all of nature are inseparably linked and need to be examined together as two dimensions of a single experience.

Rapid industrialisation went hand in hand with rapid urbanization from the eighteenth century onwards. The origins began in the enclosure movement which can be dated back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Taken together, the whole process severed the bonds between human beings and nature and led to the disconnection of human beings from their own animal nature. The thinkers of the Enlightenment joined with the church authorities of the past in condemning those aspects of human behaviour which, in being natural, could be considered bestial, brutelike, and wholly unworthy of the civilized man and woman. The Age of Reason was defined in opposition to Nature. The animal nature of human beings became something to be eliminated, a wild and unruly force to repress and suppress. The emphasis was as much upon the subduing of the wild forces of human nature within as the wild forces of the natural world without. To exercise rational, detached, objective power over the animal within human nature became as important as the control of animals in nature as such. The ruthless suppression of the human body transformed the animal side of human existence into a "shadow self" and inaugurated the modern era of rationalisation and civilisation.

Throughout the era of rational modernity, animals have served as a benchmark against which human beings measure their success in civilising themselves. The fear of and the flight from the animal shadow has shaped the human relationship to nature more than any other single force and lies behind the way that technology has been used against nature. In this respect, technological mastery is a physical manifestation of a mind-set which is antagonistic to nature.

The shadow is a recurring theme throughout the human story of ‘progress’. In myth and ritual, the shadow is seen as a person's spiritual double and has been considered to reflect the dark side of being. People in primitive societies are often afraid lest their shadow fall on certain objects. In other cultures, one's shadow ought never fall on pregnant women, or on a mother-in-law, or on the dead or on coffins. Most of all, the shadow is the ever-present reminder of the thing which people fear most of all, mortality. The psychologist Otto Rank describes the shadow as ‘the announcer of death.’ It is the thing that people run from but can never escape. A person takes his shadow with him, wherever he goes. The shadow follows every man and every woman. Some primitive cultures diagnose a person's health the size and tone of his or her shadow. A weak shadow denotes illness, a strong shadow denotes good health. According to Rank, in some tribes, ‘the sick are brought into the sunlight in order that their shadow may be recalled and with it the departing soul.
As the repressed animal side of human nature, the shadow flickers on the walls of the iron cave of modern civilization. Animal instincts are considered as embarrassing, unnerving evidence that the beast within cannot be suppressed. Church authorities and Enlightenment thinkers were most concerned to distance human beings from animal origins. The wild, unpredictable, and chaotic forces of nature need to be eliminated for the orderly and predictable world of mechanics and mathematics to function properly. Reason and calculation required the internal and external subjugation of nature. The old natural practices and relations were destroyed. The intimate relationship between farmers and their domestic animals was ended. The relationship with animals was once so close that the language used to describe human beings and human activity was often laced with animal images and symbols: Children were "kids" or "cubs"; a boy apprentice was a "colt", a woman was a "duck" or "hen". The enclosure and commercialization of nature radically separated human beings from nature and from animals. Animals were banished from the home and separated in stables and barns. The old living arrangements were regarded as an embarrassment, as "very beastly and rudely in respect of civility."
Historian Keith Thomas shows that the attitude people adopted toward animals reflected those things which people most despised and loathed in themselves and others. People projected what they most loathed and feared about their own natural impulses onto animals and indeed onto others - ferocity, greed, gluttony, stupidity, sexuality. Even though such attributes can only be found in excess in human beings, this abuse was based on the old Christian idea that animals and animal-like behaviour were sinful and evil. The Antichrist was depicted as a beast and the devil was often depicted as a human animal chimera. Evil spirits were also said to take up residence in the bodies of cats, dogs, rats, and other animals. The most popular god of ancient times, Pan, was identified with the devil.

The Protestant reformers carried on the work of the Church in emphasising the evils of a fallen animal world, of which man's fallen nature, as an animal nature, was a part. The natural functions of the body were a particular source of embarrassment for being the very things we share in common with non-human animals. Nakedness, which had never caused much of a stir when people lived close to nature, suddenly became a matter of public discomfort and concern. Only animals roamed naked. Human beings should cover up to distinguish themselves from the beasts. Hair became an issue. Bacon wrote that ‘beasts are more hairy than man . . . and savage man more than civil.’ 

From this time on, animals, domestic and wild, served as a constant reference point measuring humanity's progress towards civilisation. It takes no effort, then, to understand the psychological shock of Darwin’s theory which argued for the evolution of all life forms as a descent with modification from a common source. Darwin made it clear that human beings differ from animals only in degree, not in kind. That degree is important, but not so important as to justify our separation from nature.

The modern world evinces the unity of the technologies of intellect and organisation in the attempt to dominate nature. But there is another side to the domination of the male and the suppression of the female. The suppression of the ‘animal’ impulses and inclinations within human beings as well as of the external environment was also the suppression of the feminine as the creative and nurturing power within nature. Starting as monotheism and ending as mechanical order, civilisation established itself as the struggle of human beings to separate themselves from animals and nature but also from their own animal nature. The question about the missing feminine is also a question about the missing masculine, because if we lose access to one we skew relation to the other. Balance and harmony between reason, culture and nature is also a balance and harmony between the masculine and the feminine. That’s what would restore sanity to technology.

The Iron Cage 
Witches and Witchcraft are not what they once were, if indeed they ever were anything other than civilisation’s guilty conscience, repressed fantasy and wish-fulfilment. The only pacts with the Devil that the modern world knows are the ones we conclude with our own powers in alien form – the new idols of the state, capital, money, commodities, technologies, nuclear power, GM crops, biotechnology, geo-engineering  ….. all manner of technical installations invested with divine power unleashing hell on earth. 

If this is living as gods, then the witches need to be brought out of the shadows of history to teach us some of the old natural virtues that we loss through lack of use and misuse. Here is a vital religion practising spiritual justice and seeking the improvement of our lives within planetary cycles and rhythms. 

Weber was not an optimistic man. That doesn’t mean he was wrong. All of us within the iron cage of modernity still have to live, as did the ancients with their gods and goddesses all around. And the question we still have to answer is the question that Weber asked, 'which of the warring gods shall we serve?' (Weber 1970: 155). Technology can never answer that question. It can allow us to evade it, but that is easily seen for the moral cowardice it is. The question is taking on new urgency. Modern civilization destines us to confront those moral choices once more, after our eyes have been blinkered for a millennia by the grandiose claims of power and progress. And so today 'many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another'. What is so 'hard for modern man', Weber argues, is 'how to measure up to workaday existence' in this disenchanted world (1970: 149). Weber can only give us an ethic of responsibility, in which 'one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action' (Politics as a vocation 1970: 120). It is an ethic that fits the self-image of capitalist progress as an heroic materialism and, as Kenneth Clark argued in Civilisation, it isn’t enough. Weber knew it. His social prognosis was gloomy. 'Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but the proletarian has lost his rights' (Weber 1970: 128). Capitalism and Communism are just two sides of the same mechanistic and materialist coin. Whichever way the class war resolves itself, on the basis of the same dependence on the same technique and organisation, we remain within the iron cage. We are all modern men and women in search of a soul.

Weber’s words concluding The Protestant Ethic gain greater force with every passing year.

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment". But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. (Weber 1985 ch 5).

Note well that reference to our fate to be imprisoned within an economic mechanism until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. Our dependence on fossil fuels and upon our technologies and upon accumulative economic systems confine us to an iron cage. We think it is progress, which indeed it is when measured in terms of material quantity. But Weber understood that the price to be paid for this Faustian pact is ‘nullity’, the loss of mental, spiritual and moral significance, the very qualities that mark us as human. 

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.

You will find no gods and no goddesses here. The power of Weber’s argument stems from the belief, deep seated in human nature, that living in an ‘enchanted garden’ was the original condition of man. The Garden of Eden is not, first and foremost, a place of historical fact, but a psychic state of intimate connection with the natural world which human beings crave. Certainly, in his historical sociology, Weber draws upon ancient Judaic, Indian, Chinese and most especially Greek examples to present an idealized picture of this enchanted garden. In those 'ancient times', human beings lived in an ontologically superior condition compared to modern men and women. For Weber, ‘progress’ as this process of disenchantment was a decidedly ambivalent phenomenon. We lose at least as much as we gain, and the nature of the exchange ought to make us reconsider whether we are going forwards or backwards. The linearity of material progress seems to swindle human beings of any true fulfilment in mental, moral and spiritual dimensions. With the attainment of every goal, new problems and challenges emerge to set further goals. The ancient circularity of time and being, of all things in their place and all acts in their season, brings genuine fulfilment because it is a process which possesses natural ends. The spiritual and the temporal are fused together, so that life and labour is part of the cycles of the earth. Soil and soul go hand in hand. The meaning of life is found within the conditions of natural circularity. 
Compare this with the nihilistic condition of modernity, a conception of endless linear progress that never finishes. The most pervasive form of reason in the modern world is instrumental rationality: it is embedded in the market economy, in the capitalist organisation of production, in bureaucracy and in almost all other social activities and relationships. Instrumental rationality is concerned solely with means and takes ends as given. Instrumental rationality is concerned with calculating the most efficient way of achieving predetermined ends. In its characteristically modern form, instrumental rationality is infinite, endless, nihilistic – accumulation for the sake of further accumulation, profit for the sake of further profit, production for the sake of further production, consumption for the sake of further consumption. Instrumental rationality, in fine, is not concerned with ends in themselves, but only insofar as they be reduced to ends. Linear progress along instrumentally rational lines is without meaning and without purpose. What is the point of profit, accumulation, production, consumption. To say further accumulation, profit, production, consumption simply begs the same question. 
The process of disenchantment dissolves the original unity of humanity and the world, separating human beings not only from the natural world outside but even their own inner nature. Disenchantment is our condition once we are thrown out of Eden. Human beings are separated from the ideal primeval condition and come to be imprisoned within the 'iron cage' of rationalised modernity. Weber’s concept of modernity as an ‘iron cage’ entails a complete repression since this cage is not merely a physical but most of all a psychic prison, embracing not just the bodies but the subjectivities of its members. The bars on the cage are internal rather than external, meaning that the prisoners can’t see them and are therefore destined to a particular way of acting, thinking and being in the world. Weber identifies the key features of this disenchantment as rationalization; intellectualization; mastery through calculability; disempowerment; the diminution of human authenticity; the loss of creativity and spontaneity; the subjectivization of values; the elimination of magical salvation; the impersonalization of organisation; the instrumentalisation of relations; and disenchantment's resilience to efforts at re-enchantment.
For Weber, disenchantment is the epitome of the rationalization of the world. Rationalization disenchants by reducing all things to the logic of efficient means. Disenchantment exalts the intellect as being the only means to knowledge. Such intellectualization closes our eyes to the enchanted garden, within and without, where the old magic still works and all natural things are within our reach. Disenchantment seeks the mastery of the world through calculation, reducing the mysterious forces of a magical reality to numbers and equations. Moral choice is replaced by a calculation of mathematical probability. The world is reduced to mechanical expression. This reliance upon mechanical power disempowers human beings by replacing free choice with calculability. Human beings lose control of their lives, their work is undertaken ‘without regard for persons’ (Weber). The occupation exists, functions, regardless of the personal qualities of the individual. The human being is a mere occupant, a functionary. Human beings no longer know what their lives are for and in a depersonalised environment do not need to know. You are what you repeatedly do, argued Aristotle. The rationalised, bureaucratised structure of society determines what human beings do and therefore what human beings are. Disenchantment diminishes human authenticity because it destroys spontaneity, autonomy and creativity. Human beings are reduced to their rationalized roles within bureaucratic structures which are far removed from the 'natural' cycle of life. 

Disenchantment destroys community and the warm, affective ties that bind individuals together, it atomises society and subjectivizes culture until life is no more than egoistic experience driven by immediacy and necessity. The rationalisation of the spiritual world negates the radical possibilities of magical intervention in order to transcend physical and psycho-somatic suffering. Hilariously, scientific researchers congratulate themselves with ‘findings’ like the psychic and therapeutic benefits of walking! What kind of scientific amnesia are we suffering from that this comes as news! Practical magic as salvation is a natural gift we have lost by disuse and misuse. Disenchantment drives the divine out of nature and gives us an intellectualized abstraction in its place. Such a God does not speak directly to us and has to be mediated by all manner of false prophets, priests and powers. 

Most of all, Weber warned, disenchantment inoculates itself against demands for re-enchantment. There have been many who have sought to uproot modern modes of organisation and set them on another course. Weber entertained no such hope. For Weber, the 'objective indispensability' of modern bureaucratic forms of organisation becomes ever more entrenched, in public and private life, so that the idea of their abolition 'becomes more and more Utopian': 'such a machine makes "revolution", in the sense of a forcible creation of entirely new formations of authority, technically more and more impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication .. and also by virtue of its internal rationalised structure’ (Weber 1970:230). In fine, both the objective environment, thoroughly rationalized and bureaucratically administered, and the human condition determined by these structures, effectively resist re-enchantment. Not only are we condemned to live in an iron cage, we have become men and women wearing an iron mask. The cage is a psychic prison that embraces our subjectivities and blinds us to our true condition.

There are reasons to hope. The blinkers can be taken off, we can throw away the mask and step through the bars of the cage. Ultimately, as Lewis Mumford argued, we can see that the megamachine is not all powerful, it only seems to be. Its power rests on a bribe that we can refuse, if we have the nerve and the nous to live as human beings, as freely choosing, acting, moral beings. Re-enchantment is a real possibility. This is not a return to a nature that never was. This is the easy mistake that both friend and foe alike make. We need to go not back to nature but forwards to the full and free realisation of our natural potentialities. Re-enchantment transcends disenchantment by joining together the many-sidedness of human life so as to live in a spiritual world in which all things are interconnected in a web of life.


The interconnectedness of all things is the keystone of re-enchantment and the ground of our being in the original primordial human nature/natural world of the enchanted garden. The reunification of spirit and flesh entails the reanimation of matter and the resubjectification of the world. This is also the resubjectification of humanity through the return of creative agency to the world. Divinity is restored to the world through direct relationship with human beings, dissolving the notion of an intellectualised abstraction impersonally ordering the cosmos as a machine. We no longer need a ghost when the world is no longer a machine.
Whether or not we are able to return to some primordial existence in the 'enchanted garden' of ancient mythology is not the issue. Re-enchantment is a going forwards rather than backwards. We are able now to engage in a practical magic that produces enduring changes in the way that human beings experience and conduct their lives so that they come to live better lives. The mere fact that re-enchantment, even as the negative yearning to go back, keeps cropping up not only points to an innate human yearning for a qualitative dimension to life, but exposes the idea of the final triumph of disenchantment to be a false fixity. Disenchantment is not the final condition of humankind, just another false dawn. The real task is to identify possibilities for re-enchantment within the disenchanted social structures in which they are encased as future potentialities. We can never be so entirely disenchanted as not to have the possibility for re-enchantment. There is an enchanted garden beyond the iron cage, both within our own natures as well as in the world at large. There is still magic in the garden, if only we closed our eyes long enough to see.
So in providing a diagnosis of the moral failures of modernity, the point is not to advocate going back to nature. Nature is already here, all about and within us as potentiality pointing to an alternative future. Heidegger argued that human beings are ontologically nostalgic, but there is no need to adopt a nostalgic mode. I am not proposing a utopia of escape, something which seeks to evade the moral predicament of the present by looking back to an irrevocable past. There is hope, but it doesn’t lie in those isolated residues of a lost past but in those elements of re-enchantment within a disenchanted modernity which point towards an alternative future. 

So we have come full circle, from the ancient Goddess Gaia as the living earth to the modern conception of the planet as a self-regulating machine. Having ‘dis-godded’ the world, we are now being asked to be as gods. Perhaps the solution, after all, is not to wield our technical installations as if we are gods but to reinvest the world itself with divinity. As for the evidence that science and technology makes us gods, death and destruction as systematic and psychological purpose show that we have plumbed the depths of evil, not through deficiencies in reason but through an excess of a certain kind of rationality. Since the seventeenth century there has been a phoney war fought by science against religion, of the forces of knowledge against the forces of superstition and ignorance. We have bargained values for fact and abandoned ends for means. We have achieved not enlightenment but an enslavement to our own powers, which have taken alien forms against us. Ironically, Lovelock’s horror at the speed with which New Agers took to his Gaia thesis shows that the scientific animus against vitalism, organicism, and teleology is alive and well. Gaia does not belong to science, least of all to mechanistic science. Gaia is not a machine but a living organism. Centuries of repression and ridicule, falsification and ignominy, wilful distortion and patronising denigration, the old Pagan ideals of human beings living in harmony with Nature have ascended from their graves, like Weber’s renascent gods, as alive as the sun and the moon and shining clearly to light up the path we need to take to the future.
All the considerable powers of science and technology allied to the basest instincts of business and politics have proved incapable of extinguishing the divine spark that exists in all life.
As we limp on, clinging to technology as our crutch, we are still unaware of the extent to which we have been short-changed in the Faustian bargains we have made. We have exchanged our souls but cannot see that what we have been given in return are our own powers in alien form. As against self-made man and his technological crutches, I have more faith in the magic powers of the witches taking to the skies and riding high on their broomsticks again, showing us the way to the re-enchanted world. 

12 EARTH ENERGIES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF FERTILITY

The Vital Spirit of Nature

'The Earth is indeed a living being. If we relate to her harmoniously, respecting her etheric organs, she will speak to us, inspire us, nourish us, work and co-operate with us.' (Adam McLean).

The argument I have presented here is premised upon the notion that nature is an organism and is infused with life. I would call this the ancient wisdom, since belief in some such notion can be traced back to prehistory. It would be interesting to understand why the modern scientific world is so much in denial of this perennial nature wisdom. The historical record clearly shows that those who live closest to nature have always considered nature to be alive. They had to. They lived and died by the fertility of nature. Today, we are inclined to play around with the image of the Goddess as a sexual being. It was always the fertility of nature that was of paramount importance. The great change came when mechanistic materialism colonised the mind of modern man. Modern mechanistic science holds that the planet doesn’t meet the criteria for life. As against proper understanding and respect for the ancient fertility practices and the customs that went with them, we have the form divorced from content, ‘the Goddess’ as a pin-up for a repressed, deprived, depraved society. Max Weber wrote that sex is nature’s last gap, in which case the world in which there is a surfeit of commodified sexual images has long since gasped its last. What we have now is not the real Goddess but an image for modern titillation and modern consumption.

The evidence makes it clear that our ancestors living close to the land developed practices and rituals which identified and tapped into energies that are hidden to modern rational man. I call it practical magic producing a magic salvation, but not in any superstitious sense. It is simply a case of learning from nature and reading its cycles, rhythms and patterns. Those who lived on and by the land were not the primitives that the 'enlightened' were inclined to view them as. In the Manifesto of the Communist Part, Marx famously praised the bourgeoisie for rescuing the population from the idiocy of rural life. The word idiot derives from the Greek idiotes, meaning those interested only in private affairs. This is precisely what Marx castigated bourgeois relations for, atomisation, for separating individuals from each other and from the public community in general. Modern ‘enlightened’ man must be the most idiotic human beings to have ever existed in the ancient Greek sense. They do not live together but as isolated individuals separated from each other, separated from the public good and separated from nature.
In contrast, rural man and woman lived in harmony with their surroundings and were able to live contented and fulfilled lives untroubled by the many ills and ailments of the modern world, the illnesses and diseases that are exacting a heavy toll on the mind, bodies and souls of civilised humanity. Of course, natural societies suffered from exploitation, inequality, and injustice. So, too, does modern society, and on a global scale. But the pervasive dis-ease of modern civilisation is born of a psychic and emotional disorientation that is the true price of disconnection from nature within and nature without. The materialistic outlook on life is eating itself from within. It is becoming abundantly clear that the endless accumulation of material quantity is not filling us up and that there is a gaping hole at the heart of life where once the human soul was. The idea that humanity is progressing continuously towards some god-like perfection is a trap and an illusion. People in increasing numbers are seeing through the illusion, meaning that it is becoming more and more possible to spring the trap. We are now in the position to rediscover our forgotten potential and as a result give ourselves a real future beyond material progress.

Historians, particularly female historians, have long associated the increased persecution of witches with the scientific revolution and the masculine pretence to ‘master’ (feminine) nature. There does indeed to be some conscious awareness of nature as female. We are establishing clear links between earth energies and the phases of the moon. Did we need science to establish the role of the moon in fertility? Past societies already worked with this tacit knowledge: 'We find the symbolism of spirals, snakes and lightning - all of them growing out of the notion of the moon as the measure of rhythmic change and fertility - in the Siberian cultures of the Ice Age.' The fertility cycle of the human female seems clearly to be linked to the phases of the moon, and there are many other connections between the moon and the fertility of living things. This sense of nature as female entailed that women became targets of violence and cruelty the more that instrumental ‘progress’ demanded the exploitation and use of nature. There are a whole host of quotes from Francis Bacon which could be cited here to prove that the scientific assault upon nature was a form of misogyny. I actually think this misreads Bacon and fails to do justice to his ambitions, although it certainly applies to the way Baconian science was applied by lesser lights. As much as Bacon demanded that Nature be wracked to yield her secrets, he also insisted that we learn more from Nature the more we serve her.

Bacon has been criticised as origin of masculine science's denigration and destruction of feminine, with animal testing, pollution, extraction of fossil fuels, mass deforestation etc considered evidence of an arrogant male contempt for 'Mother Nature'. The ultimate abomination may well be to have turned the Earth Goddess Gaia into a purposeless machine, nature as a machine to tinker with as we like.

If we focus purely upon the language Bacon employed, it would be easily to conclude that he is guilty as charged: nature must be 'hounded as a slave', 'put on the rack', 'raped', her secrets revealed by 'torture':

'you have but to hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able when you like to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering and penetrating into those holes and corners when the inquisition of truth is his whole object.'

This passage would appear clearly to convict Bacon. There are, however, strong reasons that Bacon has been misread and that it is this misreading that is more important as evidence of a masculine scientific assault upon female nature. Bacon was not the one who wrote 'Nature on the rack' but Leibniz writing about Bacon. The idea of nature as machine was not proposed by Bacon but by Descartes. Bacon believed nature contained vital force or spirit. 

So why is Bacon so radically misinterpreted? For the simple reason that the distortion fits the attitude of mechanistic science towards nature and because it gives feminists an easy target when they come to criticise mechanistic science. 

Here is a quote from Novum Organum which places Bacon alongside Xenophon: ‘We cannot command nature except by obeying her’. Bacon demonstrated a respect for nature which the mechanistic scientists who followed did not. Bacon argues that man is nature's 'servant and interpreter', that nature’s subtlety 'is far greater than that of the sense of the understanding', and, crucially, that using force is pointless since it 'maketh nature more violent' as a result. I couldn’t state the case against modern scientific hubris better than Bacon. True, Bacon does occasionally employ predatory language like 'pursuing', winning 'victories' over, or 'dissecting' nature, but the words 'slave' 'rape', or 'torture' never occur in this context. Whilst feminists have powerful criticisms to make of modern science, both sides of this divide have got Bacon wrong. Properly understood, Bacon puts hubris in its place. To repeat: ‘We cannot command nature except by obeying her’ (Novum Organum.)

Women, of course, have been associated with the snake or serpent, long before Eve. The snake or serpent is a lunar symbol, connected with woman and fertility. The serpent also symbolizes energy (see, in this respect, Ken Wilbur’s Up from Eden (1983), particularly chapter 2 ‘The Mysterious Serpent’. Wilbur writes: 

According to the discipline of kundalini yoga (and entirely independently of Western psychological corroboration), mankind does indeed contain all the higher levels of consciousness as a true potential, a potential known in general terms as "kundalini energy," which is said to lie dormant, asleep, in the unconscious (the ground unconscious) of all men and women. And the lowest state of kundalini—the state wherein it initially slumbers, waiting to rise upward toward higher levels—is represented always as a serpent (and is actually called "the serpent power"), which is said to lie coiled at the base of the human spine, the lowest "chakra." This simply means that man's potential for higher consciousness starts out at the lowest base of his being, at the first chakra, the center of material, pleromatic, alimentary, visceral-food impulses (the first chakra is said to represent food and physical matter). From this lowest state (or chakra), the serpent power (consciousness itself) is said to evolve or awaken to successively higher centers of awareness, moving precisely through the levels of the Great Chain of Being, from the lowest material or natural state (level 1) toward the brain-mind center (level 4), and then into truly superconscious states (especially level 5, but also beyond).166 From this viewpoint, the evolution of consciousness is the evolution upward of the serpent power, and, according to kundalini texts, this power, in its earliest, lowest, and initial starting point, is precisely represented by the uroboros, the serpent of Eden.’

The serpent rears his head many times throughout history. Although he has been chased out of the garden many times, he has a knack of reappearing all over the landscapes and townscapes we have layered over nature. 




I have an affinity with the old snake, and a soft spot for women who listen to talking snakes. So long as such women are open to seduction, the snake can find a way back. Sigmund Freud lamented the fact that, ultimately, human beings tend to believe what they want to believe. My Chinese birth sign is ‘wood snake’, the key characteristics of which are ‘sophisticated’, ‘subversive’, ‘seductive’ and ‘sensuous’. Now whether or not that is true, I certainly want to believe it. Certainly, the world stands in need of a little of the old serpent energy. It seems a much better bet than nuclear. It all depends on what you want out of life. The point – and there is a point – is that simply because the ancient system of energy production and utilization has been forgotten for long does not mean that it is beyond recall. There’s nothing new, argued Aristotle, just a lot of things we have forgotten. We can draw upon this natural energy. 
The earth continues to live despite modern humanity's abandonment and neglect of its supporting role. ‘Enlightened’ man has not absorbed Bacon’s lesson and has proved a disobedient child. There is an abundance of energy around which, if correctly accessed and channelled, could be used for the benefit of all life on the planet.
What has led us to abandon the earth and ignore our supporting role, of course, is our belief that we can live by our technology alone. We have been living as gods for some time now, and haven’t made much of a fist of it. In abandoning our earthly home, we should be careful not to become orphans of our own technology. 

Drawn further and further out of our biological matrix we have become more and more dependent on an all-embracing but ethically indifferent technology to see us through. We have become orphans of our own technology. Although it is a neutral and neutered parent, technology has warded off starvation, disease and the rigours of climate. Technology is an extension of what we are. If we are greedy and selfish technology will be a faithful mirror. Left to its own dynamics technological and industrial innovation trashes products, places and people. It is for the children of technology to humanise their parent or, like Saturn, it will consume them. Self-made Man and his self-made society will be undone. If the twenty-first century sets out to build a new sense of family it has powerful tools to help in the task. If it doesn't, its antithesis - increasing conflicts between haves and have-nots - is inevitable. This cannot be a mere technical fix but will involve a social and spiritual revolution.

Jonathan Kingdom Self Made Man and his Undoing (1993).

We have been so seduced by technology and its promise of unlimited material power and progress that we have ventured further and further from our earthly home. We have lost our moorings. We have removed infinity from the transcendental sphere, the religions pointing upwards, vertically, and horizontalized it within our planet of finite resources. We seek immortality in the mortal realm. In this respect, the expansion of material power does not denote power at all but is a neurotic attempt to escape reality and evade facing finitude and finality. We are still doing it. What else is the attraction to nuclear power? The problem is that the further and further away we venture from our natural origins and ends, the more vulnerable we become. We exchange dependence upon natural power for dependence upon an all-pervasive but ethically blind technology. We live in a world in which means have been enlarged to fill the void left by discarded ends. 
Science and technology cannot create the home we crave, for reasons that become apparent when reading this famous passage from Bertrand Russell:

That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins - all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's salvation henceforth be safely built.

That is all that mechanistic science reveals. Mechanistic science removes life, vitalism, purpose, meaning, gods and goddesses of all kinds, and then concludes that life is meaningless. The mathematician and philosopher A.N. Whitehead spotted how feeble an attitude of ‘unyielding despair’ is when pitched against the crushing indifference of nature revealed by science. Man may not live by bread alone, said Whitehead, but neither does he live by disinfectants. 
When asked if he believed in God, Einstein declared: 'I believe in Spinoza's God, who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings'.
There is no distance at all separating a Nature which is indifferent to the fates and actions of human beings from a God that is also indifferent. Which begs the question of just who does care? Because somebody has to. At some point, on the basis of such science and theology, human beings start being indifferent to nature, to other life forms, then to each other, and finally to themselves. The science which reveals nature’s indifference is hardly likely to issue in a technology which has our interests at heart. Einstein himself had the sense of this. ‘The world’, Einstein argued, ‘shows a perfection of means, and a confusion of ends’. Precisely. This was Weber’s point concerning rationalisation as a disenchantment which dis-gods the world and empties it of meaning. Einstein again: ‘To know an answer to the question, 'What is the meaning of human life?' means to be religious.’ Or Francis Bacon: ‘A little philosophy inclines man’s mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy brings men’s minds about to religion’ (Bacon Of Atheism.) 
We need to identify and discard the false gods and start about the process of re-godding the world. We have invested all our hopes and ambitions in the power of technology, but technology has made no promises in return. To think that it has is merely wishful thinking on our part. Technology is indifferent, which is why we are in serious danger of being abandoned the very same way we have abandoned nature. And having done so much destruction to nature, having been so wasteful of natural resources, having seen our natural powers atrophy through misuse and disuse, we will be orphans with no place to go. There’s no going back home. We will be cast out of the civilisation we have built but will find the way back to the garden barred. 
We have done it to ourselves. Technology has served us well, delivering a greater material good for the greatest numbers in history. However, technology is a good servant but a bad master. As means, technology serves us well so long as we act as moral agents and therefore determine the ends by which we live. It is this moral agency which we have abandoned to the imperatives of accumulation, material power, bureaucracy and instrumental reason. Technology is our own product. It is when we fail to see it as a human product and invest it with an existential significance in its own right that the problems begin. Technology is an extension of who and what we are. The adage ‘garbage in, garbage out’ is apposite here. Our technologies hold a mirror to ourselves and will reflect who we are perfectly. If we are violent, cruel, murderous, avaricious, perverted, crude, vain, stupid, then technology will reflect our character. Technology doesn’t make us any better than who or what we are. We are still as stupid, vain, greedy, and lustful as the characters in the Hogarth paintings, only now we have mobile phones, plasma screen TVs and Internet porn. We can refer here to the tendencies to see Elvis as some god-like figure. Elvis didn’t die for our sins, he died of our sins magnified by power and money. And so will we, in our techno-industrial civilisation, if we fail to take moral responsibility for our technological power. Abraham Lincoln declared that anyone can withstand poverty, it is what a person does when given money and power that reveals the real character. Ask yourself what our technology reveals about our character.
Science concerns fact and is silent on values. Technology cannot supply ends. It is a mere means. Hence the central predicament of disenchanted modernity lies in the all-pervasiveness of instrumental rationality, a world reduced to means and bereft of ends. Proceeding according to its own imperatives, technology destroys persons and places. We have become, in Marx’s words, appendages of machines. This is an inverted world in which creative human subjects have become passively dependent upon the objects they have created as those objects have come to acquire existential significance. From being the parents of technology we have become its children. And there is every prospect that the old myth of Saturn eating his own children will become a reality. We need to humanise our technology and at the same time naturalise ourselves. The re-connection with nature within and without is the condition of reacquainting ourselves with the human and moral dimension of reason and power. Only then will our technology serve human ends. This, as anthropologist Jonathan Kingdom argues, requires a social and spiritual revolution which goes much further than a ‘mere technical fix’ (Jonathan Kingdom Self Made Man and his Undoing (1993).

Technological power is not real power but compensation for its absence. Natural power restores and reinvigorates a person. One is struck by how enervating the use of modern technology is. Far from reducing stress, it increases it, far from saving time, it uses it up. Technology is at the centre of the energy-draining activities of the modern world. Stress, speed, traffic, communication – is everyone attached to an electronic chord? - noise, the inane prattle of the talking heads on TV and radio – why is it that those who have nothing to say spend an awful long time saying it? – alarms, loud music. Music? Whatever happened to music? It’s still there but is being drowned out.
I referred earlier to Max Weber’s quote that sex is nature’s last gasp. Our technology allows us to re-enact our natural practices, but as passive entertainment, as repressed and denied fantasy available at a price. And whereas our old natural activities were life-affirming and life-enhancing, our ersatz paganism for mass consumption is soul destroying and energy-draining.

Here is Bob Stewart:





Only the wilfully blind can fail to see that the disparity between moral and technological capacities which has been at the heart of modernity from the start threatens to derail ‘progress’ and send civilisation spinning on another trajectory entirely. The materialism which reduces nature to a purposeless mechanism and life to the egoistic pursuit of wants is ill-balanced, sending the world to extremes and generating a deep-seated and spreading dis-ease in humanity. This critique of technology is not a call for us to abandon technology but for us to humanise technology before it abandons us. The technology which increasingly dominates our lives should be restored to its rightful place as means to ends which we, as the moral agents who created technology in the first place, determine ourselves. Then and only then can we be certain that technology can be used to solve the problems which we face. This is to realise our essential humanity through the exercise of moral choice rather than gamble on technological imperatives working out in our interest. Human beings, rather than becoming ever more dependent upon systems and imperatives and all manner of false fixities and necessities as is happening now, come to take control of their own lives and, within a system of social control, exercise moral responsibility and develop their own innate abilities. By thus harmonising our moral and technological powers, we will achieve a more balanced and holistic way of life. Voltaire did immense damage when he satirised Rousseau as wanting us back in nature crawling on all fours. Since then, critics of enlightened modernity have always faced the charge that they are simply shouting ‘back to nature’. Rousseau argued no such thing. On the contrary, Rousseau’s central argument concerned human beings exchanging their egoistic liberty in the natural state for a richer, more rounded liberty in the civil state. His point was that this transition had not yet been completed and that we need to go further than the artificial commercial society to realise our nature in full with a genuine authenticity. Rousseau looked forwards rather than backwards and this is what is proposed here. 

The argument presented here does not advocate a return to nature. It is not at all clear how that could be achieved. It is even less clear where this nature is. Rather than go back to nature, humanity is better served by seeking to rediscover the natural virtues – justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. There is no need to go back to nature when the solution to our problems is the better appreciation of the nature we have within ourselves as innate potential. These are the life-affirming and life-enhancing virtues which past societies lived and thrived by.

The Numinous




The sun rises over the Heel Stone at Stonehenge – but from which side should it be viewed? What does it signify about Nature being an organism which is infused with life? What is the connection between human nature and the built and natural environment?
This is architecture of the most compelling kind with respect to existential implications of the relation of the built environment to natural cycles and rhythms. It is an architecture that taps into earth energies whilst pondering the cosmic significance of life. 

Edmund Burke referred to the ‘terror of the sublime.’ The ‘wonder’ and ‘awe’ of philosophers from Plato to Kant seems more appropriate. Jung referred to the numinous. 

We see here the uncanny, numinous power of the transcendent realm, a power identified at bottom with the natural energy of the earth. Science can explain much but it cannot explain it all. The human soul thirsts for more than science. Human sustenance and nourishment needs more than knowledge. Numinous powers resonate throughout the landscape.

Place is more than fact, place is spirit. The German theologian Rudolf Otto examined the concept of spirit of place. For Otto, the first association of sacredness with place would have been the result of eerie feelings. In time, the belief developed that a 'sacred place' is characterized by its being inhabited by a numen loci, a non-material presence.







The first sentence gives plainly the mental impression itself in all its immediacy, before reflection has permeated it... It connotes solely the primal numinous awe, which has been undoubtedly sufficient in itself in many cases to mark out 'holy' or 'sacred' places ... There is no need ... for the experient to pass on to resolve his mere impression of the eerie and aweful into the idea of a 'numen’, a divine power, dwelling in the 'aweful’ place ... Worship is possible with out this farther explicative process. But Jacob's second statement gives this process of explication and interpretation. (Otto 1924).

Otto further remarked that the German expression Es spukt hier ('It haunts here') has no true subject and refers to no discrete entity, like a spirit or ghost. Rather, it is more an expression of the sense of a place as a whole, although perhaps 'just on the point of detaching and disengaging from itself a first vaguely intimated idea of a numinous something, an entity from beyond the border of "natural" experience'.

The psychologist Carl Gustav Jung created the noun 'numinosity' from Otto's 'numinous' and it is Jung's term that is more familiar today when it comes to expressing that indefinable quality that is the mysterious essence of many ancient sacred places. 

Mumbo-jumbo, the scientist wearing the factual blinkers shouts. There is more to the world than facts, there is a reality and a meaning beyond the facts. The greatest human achievements, going all the way back to Stonehenge, are motivated by the need to access and communicate with this transcendent dimension.

The metaphysical dimensions inherent in monuments like Stonehenge are persuasive proof that its builders saw the human experience of life as much more than a direct response to tangible evidence of connectedness in nature. This entails an awareness and even a veneration of cosmic forces, human beings recognising in built, symbolic form the totality of integrated systems. As such, Stonehenge is a microcosm of human civilisation, a monumental expression of eternal deference to the fearful unknown. The point is that the ecological experience is more than the scientific appreciation of fact. This is the spirit carried over into the way that human beings have built the world around them. ‘Architecture, properly understood, is civilisation itself’ (W.R. Lethaby).

Many people attach the word 'sacred' to architecture, forming the compound noun ‘sacred architecture’. This term is typically conceived as a building or monument which serves a religious purpose. However, I consider architecture as such to be sacred in that it has a common root in the life of the soul and spiritual vision. This vision pertains to the active, dynamic aspect of the psyche, independent of forms, yet expressed in and through the world by way of these forms. These forms, into which spiritual energy flow, express a sense of the divine. The term ‘sacred architecture’ is redundant. The word ‘architecture’ means sacred principle, so that architecture, properly understood, is sacred as such. 

The Intelligible Reality
But there is a further point to be made. An ecological sensibility does not necessarily entail as return to Nature. A veneration of cosmic forces does not necessarily imply some kind of Nature mysticism. Nature is accessible to human reason. Reality is not objective, an external force to be worshipped, but an intelligible reality. The sacred is in our works as well as Nature’s.

The Bible identifies the key to the interpretation of human life neither in Nature nor the universe, but in the human mind. Not in biological forces nor even in consciousness as such, which human beings share with other animals, but in a consciousness which emerges through the social gift of language, intelligence and understanding. The capacity to speak and communicate means that human beings can think, conceptualize, and envisage a world different from the one in which we currently exist. This is a creative power for transcendence and marks human beings out as unique. Darwin writes of the difference of human beings from nonhuman animals as one of degree rather than of kind. But it is a difference of a substantial degree. Human beings do not merely react to external stimuli, but contemplate circumstances, conceptualize alternative possibilities and choose between them. Human beings have the capacity to imagine and to act accordingly. It is in this sense of choice and action that human beings have a moral freedom in a way that no other life form has. 




A dualist who believes in the existence of immaterial souls might say that the entire field of neuroscience is beholden to the philosophy of physicalism (the view that mental events should be understood as physical events), and he would be right. The assumption that the mind is the product of the brain is integral to almost everything neuroscientists do. Is physicalism a matter of "philosophy" or "neuroscience"? The answer may depend upon where one happens to be standing on a university campus. Even if we grant that only philosophers tend to think about "physicalism" per se, it remains a fact that any argument or experiment that put this philosophical assumption in doubt would be a landmark finding for neuroscience—likely the most important in its history. So while there are surely some philosophical views that make no contact with science, science is often a matter of philosophy in practice. It is probably worth recalling that the original name for the physical sciences was, in fact, "natural philosophy."

Fine, but Harris is referring to the basis of mental events in physical events. Physicalism can say nothing about the quality of the thoughts. The mind may well be a product of the brain as a physical thing, but that reveals nothing about the quality of the thoughts produced by an individual thinker. As mental events, the ideas that went into Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are as much a product of physical processes as the ideas that went into Simon Cowell’s autobiography, but as intellectual propositions they are worlds apart. There is nothing, nothing, in neuroscience that determines the quality of ideas and thoughts. The science explains mental events, and has nothing to say about the thoughts as thoughts. Harris makes a big point of referring us back to the origins of philosophy as ‘natural philosophy’. Indeed yes. He means the philosophy that came before Socrates and moral philosophy. Socrates brought philosophy down to the world of human beings. Natural philosophy had concerned the physical world around, the stuff of which the world was made – fire, air, water. Socrates made human beings the moral centre of their own world. Sentenced to death, Socrates could have avoided his fate by fleeing Athens. Socrates chose to stay and make a stand according to a principle that formed no part of natural philosophy – moral principle. Above and beyond physical attributes, human freedom is constituted by moral principle and its exercise. If human beings were no more than sinew (neurons in the modern idiom), gristle, bone and blood, survival machines, then Socrates would have escaped death and survived. Human beings are more than physical machines, they are moral beings. It is that identification of human dignity with moral freedom and choice that Socrates distinguishes philosophy from natural philosophy. (I have written extensively on this in Philosophising through the Eye of the Mind, Peter Critchley 2010).

Harris seems to want to return to that pre-Socratic position of natural philosophy rather than explore the way that Aristotle sought to integrate the worlds of fact and value. It is revealing that Harris declares that ‘mental events should be understood as physical events’, as if this is what is at stake when, for instance, we compare and contrast the views of Leibniz, Spinoza and Descartes. Harris is simply at the level of fact, description and explanation. Fine, at this level of physical events there is no difference between Harris’ arguments and, for instance, Francis Collins’ arguments in The Language of God – a book which Harris loathes because it demonstrates the scientific grounds supporting the belief in the existence of God. Harris argues that Collins’ arguments are invalid. They may be. But to be able to argue this is to affirm norms of rationality, logic and evidence which go far beyond explanations of physical processes.
A scientific explanation applies at the level of mental events linked to physical events. This is most certainly the world of fact rather than value, of natural philosophy. This is a world of determinism in which events are the effects of causes. However, whilst mental effects are the product of physical events, human consciousness is the effect of past causes but is creative in itself, a cause rather than a consequence. Consciousness is future oriented and affirms the capacity of human beings to create their own future. Whereas the past is determinate because it is the effects of causes, the future is radically indeterminate since it is the product of choices made by human beings as moral agents. Any attempt to overcome the fact/value distinction has to recognise that moral agency on the part of human beings. If it doesn’t, we are simply dealing with the enlargement of scientific determinism at the expense of moral indeterminism. The future emerges from the creativity of the mind and the moral praxis of human agents. ‘Natural philosophy’ deals with the existing world as it is already physically constructed as the product of physical cause. There is a case for such a radical immanence if it retains a role for creative human agency in bringing immanent lines of development to fruition, the ‘ought-to-be’ as the ‘is’ in the process of becoming. But this is also a form of transcendence in that human beings, as moral beings, are active in bringing about alternative possibilities to bring about a future that is significantly different from the past. Whilst science deals with explanation and description at the level of determinate physical processes, the creations of the human consciousness and imagination are indeterminate. Above and beyond physical events, human beings are capable of projecting possibilities out of current conditions, engendering new possibilities for transformatory action. Whereas Harris, as a neuroscientist, focuses on the connection of the mental to the physical, it is the ability to contemplate and conceptualize alternative futures and the freedom to choose between them that defines the dignity of human beings as moral beings. That Harris ignores moral philosophy and instead emphasises natural philosophy indicates that he hasn’t really transcended the fact/value distinction, merely asserted one side of it – fact - over the other - value. That is to emphasise the determinate world of science over the indeterminate world of human praxis. The denial of the human power of transcendence means that the future becomes no more than the present enlarged. Such scientism brings about the end of history. 
It is this link between language, consciousness and imagination that frames the moral praxis and agency of human beings. It is here that one has to make the distinction between the two concepts of God given in the Bible. Elohim is the God of Creation, the factual world which is the province of science; Hashem is the personal God of Love, the world of human relations. It is interesting that Spinoza was a determinist who argued that every human action was the result of past causes. Human beings may imagine that they are choosing freely when they are acting, and that therefore they have control over their lives. This, however, is an illusion, the product of ‘inadequate ideas’. The appearance of freedom is the result of human beings lacking understanding of the way in which choices and actions have come about. For Spinoza, free will is an illusion. 




Spinoza focuses upon the one concept of God, the God of creation, the physical world of fact, of effects of causes. There is another concept, one that expresses the world of human meaning and interrelationship. This is the personal world, the world of human beings.

It is in this sense that Genesis marks a major turning point in history. Genesis is frequently targeted as the cause of the human assault on Nature and the masculine subordination of the feminine. The technological mastery of Nature is increasingly problematic and does merit close examination. But this mastery predates Genesis and misses the real contribution that the perspective that is laid out there can make to resolving our difficulties. Genesis marks a radical break with the creation myths of the ancient world. In Ancient Judaism (1952), Max Weber argued that this was the first time in history that the world was described without recourse to myth. Whereas ancient cosmogonies are packed with contending forces, capricious spirits, and battles between the gods. These are all absent in Genesis. God is no longer immanent in Nature but is above it. God transcends Nature. God speaks, and the universe comes into being and is ordered according to His word. Nature has no will of its own. Nature is ‘disenchanted’, demystified, secularized. 
There is a tendency now to claim that this is the source of the problem, the origin of the technological exploitation of Nature. In conquering natural necessity, human beings have come to be in thrall to their own powers and thus imprisoned themselves within a new social necessity. That is our modern predicament. But the assertion of reason over mystery is not just the origin of the problem, it is part of the solution. Genesis represents a vast intellectual leap with which we are still coming to terms. It made the world accessible to human reason. Since God created the world, the world is, in principle, intelligible. The problem is that reason does not always exist in rational form. A reason that emphasises technical and instrumental aspects at the expense of its moral component points to a lack of balance. The world remains intelligible but the mists of irrationality have still to be dispelled. This is why we should be careful to distinguish the determinate past from the indeterminate future and keep alive the role of moral choice and agency in transcending the present and constituting the future.

Co-evolution
So there is a need to keep the world of creation and the world of humanity together at all times, rather than splitting them apart and arguing as though they are competing visions. To focus exclusively upon the factual world is to assert the determinate world, already constituted by physical events and causes, over against the indeterminate world created by human moral praxis. This is to emphasise that those who would transcend the distinction between fact and value should do so by taking morality seriously in terms of moral choice and agency focused on future possibilities, and not merely extend a past determinism into the future. With respect to Genesis, this means going beyond physical events to focus on humanity engaged in the pursuit of a gracious social order. For those of a religious persuasion, this is a social order that honours the "image of God" that is present within human beings. To Harris this is anathema. As Richard Dawkins writes in praise of Harris’ book, ‘As for religion, and the preposterous idea that we need God to be good, nobody wields a sharper bayonet than Sam Harris’. OK, but this view ignores the historical achievement of the axial religions. But, so as not to frighten the brave soldiers of science, it would be easy to remove the religious terminology and rewrite the sentence thus: this means going beyond physical events to focus on humanity engaged in the pursuit of the flourishing social order of flourishing individuals. I still think that behind such scientistic language is a hidden God, a notion of the common good that depends upon an objective morality that affirms the moral worth of all human beings. Harris’ own position would seem to require and indeed affirm some such notion:

I am bolstered in this expectation by my view of the moral landscape: the belief that morality is a genuine sphere of human inquiry, and not a mere product of culture, suggests that progress is possible. If moral truths transcend the contingencies of culture, human beings should eventually converge in their moral judgments. I am painfully aware, however, that we are living at a time when Muslims riot by the hundreds of thousands over cartoons, Catholics oppose condom use in villages decimated by AIDS, and one of the few "moral" judgments guaranteed to unite the better part of humanity is that homosexuality is an abomination. And yet I can detect moral progress even while believing that most people are profoundly confused about good and evil. I may be a greater optimist than I thought. (Harris 2011:179).

That is a strong statement in favour of objective moral truth against cultural and ethical relativism and, as such, is perfectly consistent with traditional morality as first formulated by the axial religions. 

Life is God’s gift to human beings. What human beings do with that life is humanity’s gift to God. The Bible is concerned with the home that God made for humanity, but also with the home that humanity makes for God. This is to conceive life as a co-evolution. There is a Jewish tale in which Jehovah and Abraham are arguing as to which of them is more important with regard to the way the world is 'You would not even exist if it were not for me,' Jehovah reminds Abraham. 'Yes, Lord, that I know,' Abraham replies, 'but also you would not be known if it were not for me.' 

Co-evolution is therefore a progressive unfolding of self-knowledge. Fundamental to this process is not the worship of the natural world created by God but the social and moral world that human beings create out of this world of fact. That is the moral of Genesis. It is a call for human beings to assume moral responsibility for the world they have co-created. The conception of God as transcendent is crucial to the idea of human beings as moral and not merely animal beings. Only if God is conceived as apart from nature is it possible to conceive humankind as capable of transforming nature. Certainly, the fact that this capacity has been interpreted to refer to a technical capacity almost exclusively points to the imbalance which lies behind our exploitation of Nature, as well as of other human beings. But the Genesis account is much richer than this, emphasising above all a moral capacity on the part of human beings. The concept of God as transcendent creative will lies behind the concept of the human creative will. But this will is above all moral, the capacity for social transformation being guided by the end of the good society rather than by mere technical means. Genesis thus founds the mandate for human freedom in moral choice and moral responsibility. 

Ultimately, there is no escaping that moral choice which Socrates revealed to be our greatest power, the thing that defined our essential humanity. The environmental crisis is forcing us to rediscover our capacity for moral choice. Humanity now has to choose one of two paths. We can choose life or we can choose death. Deuteronomy is clear: ‘choose life’. If we continue to abdicate our responsibility and let technology determine the future, then we are complicit in the outcome. We will have chosen death by default. Our present mode of thought, action and organisation is generating increasing physical and psychological dis-ease. The more we are dependent on our technology, the more we disconnect ourselves from nature and are thereby destroy ourselves. 
To save ourselves we need to develop a planetary ethos which reconnects the human nature within with the natural world without. This implies a radical reawakening to natural powers, the realization that our own health and vitality is inextricably connected with that of planet earth as well the life forms that are interconnected in a seamless web of life. This may not make us gods and goddesses, since it entails a re-divinisation of nature, but it does entail that humanity comes at last to consciously appreciate its innate power to influence the environment not only by physical but also by mental means as well as by moral means and ends. 
If human beings recovered their capacity for moral choice and exercised it in their practical lives, there would be a revolutionary transformation in individual behaviour and social practices. Many of the concerns and activities which currently absorb the bulk of the time of human beings would be revealed as the pointless imperatives of things that they are. Individual men and women would at long last gain control over their lives and start to devote their energies to living with some real purpose.

It probably isn’t wise to make predictions. There are countless books from the past fifty years which end on predictions that the issue will be resolved one way or another by a certain date. 1970, 1975, 1984, 1990, 2000. That these dates have come and gone doesn’t necessarily mean that those predictions were wrong, just that we may already be past the point of no return. Well, after a century of mass war, Armageddon has come for hundreds of millions of human beings already, every day of every decade. So why do we think we will be any different or should be any different? We have carried on taking the megamachine bribe, conveniently absolving ourselves of responsibility for the death and destruction all around us. 
There is a Jewish curse which goes, ‘May he inherit a hotel of a hundred rooms, and be found dead in every one of them.’ To own a hotel with a hundred rooms is to be wealthy and privileged. This is our modern civilization, with the immense material resources it commands – and wastes. We are on the top few floors, with the most wealthy and the most powerful in the best rooms of all. Those to die first are the animals, the unlucky and the unloved. We see it happening and do nothing. Then it is those humans who occupy the cheaper rooms. And on and on the extinction goes, ever upwards. Well, it will be our turn one day.


In the end, we have to refuse the technological bluff and refuse the megamachine bribe and rediscover our capacity for moral choice. The greatest power that humanity possesses doesn’t lie in the production and application of technology, but incorporating our technological power within a freely chosen moral undertaking that enables us not only to extend the boundaries of what is possible but also to decide where and how we want to go. That is to establish technology within a democratic technics which affirms consciously determined human ends over instrumental means.






13 FROM EARTH GODDESS TO SKY GOD

The biologist Rupert Sheldrake refers to the scientific priesthood involved in the conquest of nature, establishing ‘man’s dominion over nature’. He also shows the implications of this dominion with respect to local cultures that respect Nature.





After creating the first man and woman, 'God blessed them and said to them, "Be fruitful, and increase, fill the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish in the sea, the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the earth.'" (Genesis 1, 28) This passage, along with other biblical texts on similar lines, have been understood to have lain the foundation of the environmental destruction inflicted by modern industrial civilization. The most well known thesis is that of Lynn White (White 1967).

The implication is that pre-modern peoples, before the male sky-god and before male science, respected nature as sacred and as alive. 

One thing that I, as a traditional African, angrily frown upon is that, in western civilization, God is removed from the orbit of human life to some faraway, never-never heaven. Expelling God from everyday life leaves the field clear for super-capitalists, colonialists and other plunderers to rape the Planet Earth, to destroy nature, to ravage priceless natural resources with cold impunity.

Traditional African beliefs, Credo Vusamazulu Mutwa

A God of the sky, therefore, leaves the earth without any divine or sacred significance. The realm of Gaia is therefore ‘dis-godded’ and made available to exploitation.
The claim is familiar, but begs the question as to why the systematic plundering of the earth had to wait until the middle of the second millennium AD.

The problem is much more complex than that given by those who place most of the blame on the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

The ancient Greeks may have had a conception of nature as organic, alive, but it was also anthropocentric. In his Politics, Aristotle gave a clear definition of possession and property, not as an assault upon nature, but as natural, as nature’s own way:

Property, in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up ... We may infer that after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, and the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practise against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.

Aristotle, Politics 1256b (trans. 1941).

War is the natural art of acquisition which ought to be practised against all those things, animals, human beings (usually women) and nature which refuse to submit to be governed.

Aristotle justifies the acquisition of property, including slaves, by making the connection between hunting and war explicit, a mode in which dominion over nature easily translates into dominion over other people and which recurs in different variations throughout history. From enclosure to the institution of slavery to the wage labour of the propertyless, always there is a claim to nature and to necessity and to acquisition and possession as development and improvement.

The Palaeolithic societies of hunter-gatherers have often been considered to have lived in greater harmony with nature than the agricultural societies and urban civilizations which followed. However, the explanation for this appearance seems to be limitations in technology. The human species is distinctive in changing the environment to fit its demands, not to fit itself to its environment. In developing technology to this end, the scale of the demands human beings make upon the environment change and increase. Palaeolithic peoples also made substantial changes in their environments, the significance can be underestimated simply on account of the relatively simple technology employed. There is evidence that Homo erectus hunted certain primate species to extinction in Southeast Asia, as well as altering for good the habitats and populations of species like the orangutan and panda. (Ciochon, Olsen and James (1990). Human beings are also considered to have been responsible for the extinction of many species of mammals in Europe and the Americas some 10,000 years ago, such as the giant armadillo in South America, mammoths in Northern Europe, and the pygmy hippopotamus on Cyprus. (Stuart 1986; Simmons 1988). Again, excessive hunting and the change/destruction of the environment were the causes. Human agency in prehistoric times wrought a number of large-scale ecological changes, which set up much of what was to follow. This includes the systematic burning of great tracts of forest and grassland, the control of the land through the technology of fire. It seems clear that the activities of prehistoric man were the cause of much of the desertification of the world.
All of which, if true, means that the case against Aristotle is not that his argument from ‘natural acquisition’ was wrong, but that it accurately describes something innate in human nature. The implications are immense. It means there can be no going back to some past Golden Age, some Green Paradise Lost, the peaceable queendom of the Goddess. There can only be a going forwards, through human beings assuming responsibility for and taking control of their technology so as to ensure their developing impulse and change agency fits the contours of nature rather than wages some war for possession against nature.

The developmental impulse to transform and manipulate the environment via technology would appear to be innate to human beings. Attempts to resist this impulse seem doomed to failure. Human beings seem naturally predisposed to rework nature into forms that mirror human cultures and myths. It is as pointless to resist this impulse, on account of its destructive consequences, as it is to think that human beings should and could abandon language, on account of the destructive power of words. The positive solution is to take this developmental impulse and divert it into creative, more benign channels. Human beings need to see themselves in a world that they have created. But that world is always embedded in the natural world, the ineliminable foundation of life on earth. At the same time as we create the built environment to reflect our cultures and myths, we should take steps to ensure that our building and design replicates nature and its sustainable processes. What Frank Lloyd-Wright called ‘organic architecture’ can be applied in other realms, from biology to work processes.

It is not strictly true to argue that the human species is the only species to change their environment to fit themselves, not fit themselves to their environment. All living organisms affect their environment to varying degrees: plants affect the oxygen in the atmosphere; forests affect the climate; trees shade the ground beneath them, thereby suppressing the growth of other plants; animals bring about significant changes in the environment, beavers build dams, or swarms of locusts with their all-consuming appetites.

The significant point refers to degree. The scale of human transformative activity is immense.

It can certainly be argued that cultures vary in the extent to which they further or restrain the developmental impulse. In differing times and places there has been a greater drive towards mastery or a greater awareness of kinship with the natural world. What matters most is not the innate developmental impulse but the social relations within which it is set. These relations shape the kind of technology used and how it is used. It follows that what is required is a transformation of social relations so as to ensure the ecologically benign use of technology, not a repudiation of technology as such.
The developmental impulse needs to be canalised in an ecologically sound way via appropriate social relations. Since fire was tamed and put to use as technology, since the making of tools, the domestication of animals and plants, and cities were built, human history has been the product of the manipulation of nature in one form or another. That manipulation does not have to take the form of domination, however much that has been the most salient characteristic up until now. 
The modern world is distinguished not on account of its domination of nature through human technical power but in the vast increase in the scale of that power. 

To target the (male) sky god religious revolution and the (male) scientific revolution and industrial revolution as most responsible for ecological destruction gains its plausibility from the environmental developments which followed in their wake. But the scope is far too narrow. Mythological, religious and philosophical justifications for human domination of the natural world are not a unique feature of the Judaeo-Christian tradition or of the modern scientific revolution or industrial civilization; assertions of the human power over nature reflect an innate developmental impulse which has been exercised everywhere where human beings have lived. 

From this broader perspective, it should come as no surprise that the spirit behind modern industry and technology is described as ‘Promethean’, as hubris which is destined to have its nemesis. These are ancient motifs, delivering morals of balance and harmony in an attempt to restrain the ancient developmental impulse. The imagery of man's heroic conquest of nature, so integral to modern notions of progress, is nowhere more apparent than in the tale of Odysseus, setting out in his tiny boat to navigate the vast (female) ocean. 

Odysseus is the archetype of the hero conquering wild nature. The archetype can be found in the Babylonian myth of Marduk triumphing over Tiamat, the monster of the deep; Perseus over the gorgon; Apollo over the Python; and St George over the dragon. Snake, dragon, gorgon and sea monster, wild nature as female. I have examined each of these figures as female designations elsewhere. The heroic literature celebrates the male conquest of female nature. It is the triumph of civilisation over the chthonic. In the Dictionary of Christian Lore and Legend (Metford 1983) it is said of the dragon: Usually it dwells in a cave or in a fetid marsh.’ The chthonic.

The modern expansion of technological power cannot be simply attributed to a uniquely Judaeo-Christian belief in man's right to subdue the Earth and have dominion over other living creatures. The belief is not uniquely Judaic or Christian. Further, as Jonathan Sacks argues brilliantly, despite putting creation on a rational and scientific basis, the Jews did not go on to make great scientific breakthroughs or build a technically advanced civilization. It was the moral point that mattered most of all to the Jews, a point concerning our moral responsibility, independent of physical causality and innate drives, to live up to our creative powers. It is in this sense that the Hebrew Bible is a liberation and not a repression, giving human beings a history independent of the imperatives of biological reproduction.

In terms of the ambition to dominate nature, the Egyptians, Sumerians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks and Romans achieved much more than the Jews in the ancient world. Yet the Jewish message of moral responsibility endures, long after the physical achievements of these greater civilisations have fallen back into the earth.

Further, Christian civilisation was not noted for its technical achievements, yielding much less power over nature than the contemporary civilizations of India or China, possessing very different religious and philosophical systems. It is well known that much scientific learning, mathematics, algebra, were Arab. Similarly, the rediscovery of ancient learning came through the Arab world.

The expansion of technological mastery comes more than a millennium after Christianity became the official religion of Rome. Crucial here is the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, which itself grew out of the ferment of the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation. The industrial revolution followed shortly after. The ambition to dominate and control nature had always been there. Now, this ambition was inflated by the increased power and scale of the technologies employed. The traditional restraints on human knowledge and power were overthrown. It is not strictly true that the Judaic-Christian tradition treated the natural world as if it had no inherent value or life of its own. That may, or may not, have been what sacred scripture said. But that’s not what was practised, with holy places and sacred wells dotting the landscape, sites of prayer, pilgrimage and worship. Pagan remnants they may have been, but they formed part of the traditional restraints upon the application of human knowledge and power. They went, not with Christianity, but with the Protestant Reformation, the Scientific revolution and industrial capitalism. Carboniferous capitalism, a capitalism that lived off the exploitation of ancient wastes which Mother Nature, in her wisdom, kept buried beneath her skin. No longer sacred, no longer alive, Gaia could be mined for commercial gain.

One of the remarkable things about the aftermath of the ‘rational’ revolutions in religion and science is the irrationalism that was provoked, as seen most of all in the widespread fear and persecution of witchcraft. (Yates 1964; Thomas 1973). It was as if modern, rational man was bent on extinguishing all traces of his natural origins and animalistic characteristics, assuaging his guilty conscience by destroying all evidence of a crime against nature and women.

The first appearance of Dr Faust, the figure who more than any other epitomized the quest for human power over nature, was in a book published in Germany in 1587. A century or so later Newton and Descartes began the mechanistic revolution in science.

Francis Bacon and the Scientific Priesthood
Francis Bacon is the greatest prophet unlimited human knowledge and power through the conquest of nature. Bacon made his ambition plain: 'to endeavour to establish the power and dominion of the human race itself over the universe'. A religious man, Bacon knew well the traditional prohibitions against overweening claims, he was well aware of the popular fear of witches and witchcraft, he knew the damnation of Dr Faustus. Bacon saw his task as that of stripping the ambition for unlimited power through knowledge from the fear, guilt and sense of evil which traditional morality associated with it.

A lawyer by training and profession, Bacon was ambitious and able enough to become Lord Chancellor, the highest legal official in the land. He possessed gifts of legal argument which proved invaluable in refuting the arguments of those who believed that ambitions to the mastery of nature were satanic. It is no wonder that William Blake singled out Bacon for criticism some two centuries later. Here were the best statements of the two rival visions.

Bacon rooted man’s dominion over nature in Adam's naming of the animals (Genesis 2, 19-20). Since this naming took place before the creation of Eve, woman had no part in establishing this dominion. As an aside, when women primatologists like Jane Goodall give human names to the apes, they are criticised for anthropomorphism. It must be significant that these female scientists have achieved far more, in far less time, than the male scientists who stuck to ‘scientific’ categorisation (Jahme 2000). Female naming, investing living forms and creatures with moral significance, shows the existence of a God of personal love to exist alongside the God of physical creation. (Elohim and Hashem are two aspects of the same God/Nature).

In taking his stand on the Bible, Bacon was careful to present the technological mastery of nature he was demanding not as something new, a radical break with the past, but as the recovery of power given to man by God himself. I am choosing the masculine terms deliberately. God’s a man and gives man the power to manipulate and order female nature. 
Bacon made the distinction between nature as amoral, as beyond good and evil, and morality, in which man submits to God's commands. This is the distinction between Elohim, the God of Creation, the God of physical causality, and Hashem, the God of love, the God of personal relationships. It’s the distinction between facts and values which Hume was to make a century later and which remains to this day a barrier to seeing moral significance in nature, the moral ought-to-be in nature’s ‘is’.





The distinction between 'natural knowledge' and 'moral knowledge' was something which occupied philosophers like Hume and Kant at a later date. In Bacon’s hands, the distinction robbed nature of moral content. Natural science would yield knowledge which human beings would put to practical effect. There is no reason to doubt that Bacon was sincere in his belief that human beings would the knowledge of nature wisely and well, for human betterment: 'Only let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine bequest; the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion'. (Leiss 1972: 50). To criticise Bacon as a tyrant of nature and as a sexist, woman hating witch hunter is too easy and doesn’t engage with the serious issues at stake. The crucial flaw in Bacon’s argument lies in the fact/value distinction. In robbing nature of sacred, moral significance, the irresistible temptation is to locate human morality in the technologies which embody knowledge as power. That is hubris, and that is idolatry.

It in this sense that we can see that Bacon was wrong, not because the project of technological mastery has failed to deliver knowledge and power, but that such instrumental power is hollow if nature is emptied of moral significance. What we do to nature, we do to ourselves. In instrumentalising nature, we have instrumentalised ourselves. The modern world evinces nothing less than the impotence of human beings within a wealth of technical power.
Think, for example, of the current melting of Arctic sea ice, the acidification of the oceans, the destruction of the Amazon rain forests, global warming, all the products of the application of technology in the manner of a Baconian right to master nature. Such science flies in the face of sound ecological reason and genuine religious stewardship.
Bacon also stripped classical myths of their moral, ignoring the critical warnings of hubris to re-imagine them as parables which urged man to take a thoroughly rational grasp of the natural world. (Lemmi 1971). The ancient gods were reinterpreted to mirror the new idols of science and technology. Thus, in the Wisdom of the Ancients (1609), Bacon presented Proteus as the personification of matter, whose power to change shape represented the capacity of matter 'to turn and transform itself into strange shapes' when force is brought to bear on it. Clearly, Bacon was inventing a scientific mythology of his own, in which the old gods were pressed into the service of the new gods. To Bacon, Pan represented 'the universal frame of things, or Nature'. Pan’s hairy body corresponded to the rays emitted by objects, and his divinity reflected his role as the god of hunters:

For every natural action, every motion and process of nature, is nothing else than a hunt. For the arts and sciences hunt after their works, human counsels hunt after their ends, and all things in nature hunt either after their food, which is like hunting for prey, or after their pleasures, which is like hunting for recreation.

Most significant of all was Bacon’s formation of a new church and a new priesthood of science. Organised scientific research would institutionalise and guarantee the new era of knowledge of nature as power over nature. In his New Atlantis (1624), Bacon described the future ideal as a technocratic Utopia governed by a scientific priesthood. We have here a modern day version of Plato’s philosopher-ruler, only science has displaced philosophy. Like Plato’s Guardians, this priesthood takes decisions for the good of the state as a whole. They also monopolise and control knowledge, deciding which of nature’s secrets are to be kept secret. In light of what we know of the twentieth century, would anyone be inclined to trust authority, however rational, with such power? 

The priesthood’s research institute, Salomon's House, comprises a series of laboratories and artificial environments which model nature with a view to controlling her. Bacon’s insight with respect to institutional science is remarkable. Contemporary claims made for biotechnology, GM food and geoengineering, far from constituting a radical break, are in direct line of descent from Bacon. In the New Atlantis, Bacon argues that artificial tempests could be created for study by using 'engines for multiplying and enforcing of winds'; that new forms of animal and plant life could be created, and existing ones manipulated by experiment; that birds and beasts could be maintained in parks and enclosures for experimental purposes:

By art likewise we make them greater or taller than their kind is, and contrariwise dwarf them and stay their growth; we make them more fruitful and bearing than their kind is, and contrariwise barren and not generative. Also we make them differ in colour, shape, activity, many ways.

It should come as no surprise to read Bacon arguing that animals should be maintained for vivisection and for medical research. 'We also try all poisons and other medicines upon them'.
Bacon’s basic claim is that knowledge as power will issue in the new Eden, bringing about a general betterment in the human condition. Bacon’s ends are not in question. What is in doubt is the extent to which his means are so narrowed, so stripped of ethical content, as to be almost certain to misfire. The general purpose of organised scientific research was 'the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible'. Here, Bacon anticipated the founding of the Royal Society of London some four decades later, and his vision provided the model for the range of scientific academies and research institutes which characterise science in the modern world.

The area in which Bacon has been most criticised is in his supposed sexual bias, the technical mastery of female nature. Man's conquest of nature seems plainly sexual, as Bacon’s makes abundantly clear. There are numerous feminist criticisms to this effect (Griffin 1978; Merchant 1982; Keller 1985). 

The language that Francis Bacon used would seem to prove the truth of the feminist charges. Bacon's language seems obviously chauvinistic: nature must be 'hounded as a slave', 'put on the rack', 'raped', her secrets revealed by 'torture'. Bacon employed metaphors which drew directly from contemporary techniques of interrogation and torture of witches. Thus he proclaimed that nature 'exhibits herself more clearly under the trials and vexations of art [mechanical devices] than when left to herself'. (Quoted in Merchant (1982: 169.) Bacon describes the investigation of Nature as an inquisition. Nature was to be 'bound into service' and made a 'slave' and 'put in constraint', her secret 'holes and corners' being entered and penetrated. 

'you have but to hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able when you like to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering and penetrating into those holes and corners when the inquisition of truth is his whole object.'

She would be 'dissected', and by the mechanical arts and the hand of man, she could be 'forced out of her natural state and squeezed and moulded', so that 'human knowledge and human power meet as one'. 


Bacon instructed natural philosophers to follow the example of miners and smiths in their interrogation and alteration of nature, 'the one searching into the bowels of nature, the other shaping nature as on an anvil'. (Merchant 1982: 168-71). 

A defence of Bacon is possible. There is a sense in which Bacon is being blamed for the way that science developed along mechanistic lines in the centuries after. It wasn’t Bacon who wrote of 'Nature on the rack' but Leibniz writing about Bacon. It isn’t clear, either, that 'rack' meant 'torture' to Bacon. The idea of nature as a machine originates with Newton and Descartes. Bacon himself believed that nature contained vital force or spirit. If Bacon is to be judged according to his writings, then it is only fair to balance the apparently chauvinist language with other quotes. Bacon demonstrates immense respect for Nature, and for Nature as female: ‘We cannot command nature except by obeying her’ (Bacon, Novum Organum) Bacon argues that ‘man’ is nature's 'servant and interpreter', whose subtlety 'is far greater than that of the sense of the understanding'. The use of force is pointless and self-defeating since it 'maketh nature more violent'. True, Bacon does write of 'pursuing', winning 'victories' over, and 'dissecting' nature, but he makes no reference to 'slave' 'rape', or 'torture' in this context.

A fuller understanding of Bacon reveals not an enemy of nature or of women but a much more rounded and grounded individual than the advocates of mechanistic science who came later. 

However, there is enough in Bacon to point to later errors and prejudices that ensures that reason could take more repressive forms. Bacon explicitly refers to the new science as a 'masculine birth' that will issue in a 'blessed race of Heroes and Supermen'. (Keller 1985: 53-4.)

The early Fellows of the Royal Society followed Bacon in sexist language, applying the epithet 'masculine' to privileged and productive knowledge gained as a result of subduing and dominating nature. The scientists who came after Bacon went further than he did in that they had no truck with Bacon’s idea of obeying Nature. Robert Boyle thus decried 'the veneration men commonly have for what they call nature', since such respect 'obstructed and confined the empire of man over the inferior creatures'. He proposed that 'instead of using the word nature, taken either for a goddess, or a kind of semi-deity, we wholly reject, or very seldom employ it'. (Keller 1985: 54.) By the time the scientific revolution had done its work, nature had ceased to be feminine at all, still less a Goddess; she became an ‘it’, an external, objective datum, inanimate matter in motion. The phrase ‘dead matter’ is apt. The word material shows the relation of the Latin materia, meaning matter, and mater, meaning mother. Gaia is no longer alive.

It should be emphasised that Bacon's ambition was not just knowledge as power, but the power to be used "for the benefit and use of life." There is a sense in which Bacon is being condemned in retrospect. The despoliation of the environment and the assault upon the peoples of various lands has resulted from the unrestricted application of the objective mode of scientific rationality to the whole of human experience. It is fairly easy to read that outcome back in Bacon’s language as intention. However, Bacon’s novum organum is quite distinct from the exploitation of nature by the modern megamachine.

From Cosmic Organism To World Machine
The philosophers of ancient Greece conceived nature to be a living organism. Animism was at the core of Greek thinking. The world of nature seemed to be alive in its ceaseless motion. This was not simply the common sense belief of ancient peoples who lived close to the land and its cycles. Since these motions were regular and orderly, the Greek philosophers developed the view that nature was not just alive but also intelligent. There was a purpose at work, a telos. Nature was a vast animal with a soul – anima - and a rational mind of its own. Every plant or every animal participated psychically in the life-process of the world's soul, materially in the physical organization of the world's body, intellectually in the activity of the world's mind. (Collingwood (1945).


Integrae Naturae Speculum Artisque Imago or The Soul of the World

Greek theories of nature as alive, pagan traditions and Christian worship and theology were brought together in a remarkable synthesis in medieval Europe. The great cathedrals were often built at ancient sacred sites, forming a part of a temple-building tradition that dates back the era of the megaliths. Whilst pointing to Heaven, the cathedrals are grounded in nature, its columns and vaults recalling the sacred groves. Vegetable nature is all around. As angels fly above, imps, demons, dragons and animals proliferate. The Green Man can often be found, a severed head entwined with vegetation, often sprouting branches. Sheela-na-gigs too, though more rare.

As Etienne Gilson makes clear, the charge that Christianity desacrilised nature cannot be upheld in terms of the practice. The orthodox philosophy of nature, as taught by the cathedral schools and medieval universities, was animistic. All living creatures possessed souls. Further, body was in the soul, not vice versa, permeating the whole body. (Gilson 1930: 215.) The soul caused the embryo to grow through its formative powers, with the result that the organism assumed the form of its species. (Gilson 1984). 

The word ‘anima’ is interesting. For Jung, it was the female voice within. Erwin Rousselle, ("Seelische Fiihrung im lebenden Taoismus," PI. I, pp. 150, 170.) refers to woman as the "animal soul. With Jung’s concept of the shadow, we can refer to the animal shadow haunting modern civilisation, referring to all those natural and feminine qualities which have been repressed and which we miss in their absence.






The word 'animal' derives from anima, the Latin word for soul. In human beings, the soul has a rational aspect, mind or intellect, in addition to the animal instincts. (Aristotle 1986). Human beings have qualities of thinking and free choice along with those aspects of the soul that are shared in common with animals and plants. There is no dualism here. The human intellect or mind is not separate from the animal and vegetative souls but is connected to animal and bodily aspects of the same soul, the conscious is linked to the unconscious. In fine, the human soul comprises both a person's conscious mind or spiritual essence, and the life of the body, senses, bodily activities and animal instincts. (Gilson (1930).

Conceiving the human soul this way serves to connect human life with the life of animate nature. Whilst plants, animals and human beings are differentiated, man is a microcosm of the entire cosmic organism, the macrocosm. 


Man as microcosm, wall painting, Anagni Cathedral  (Lazio) crypt c1230

Human society corresponded to the hierarchical order of the universe, with the movements and conjunctions of the planets connected with human lives. Order in the heavens meant order on Earth; disorder above meant disorder below.

... when the planets In evil mixture to disorder wander, What plagues and what portents, what mutiny, What raging of the sea, shaking of earth, Commotion in the winds, frights changes horrors, Divert and crack, rend and deracinate The unity and married calm of states Quite from their fixture.
(William Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida,   Act 1, Scene 3, 93-101)

Copernicus’ revolution in astronomy, showing that the sun, and not the Earth, was at the centre of the cosmos, was inspired by ancient – and Hermetic - idea of the cosmic organism. For Copernicus, the geometrical order of the planetary spheres expressed harmony. Copernicus’ astronomy expressed a mystical reverence for the sun


Who, in our most beautiful temple, could set this light in another or better place, than that from which it can at once illuminate the world? Not to speak of the fact that not unfittingly do some call it the light of the world, others the soul, still others the governor.

Quoted in Burtt (1932), p. 44

Kepler, too, considered the sun as the prime mover of the universe. He place the sun at the centre of the cosmos. For Kepler, the sun 'alone appears, by virtue of his dignity and power, suited for this motive duty and worthy to become the home of God himself'. (Quoted in Burtt (1932), p. 48). Kepler believed in the old Pythagorean notion of the music of the spheres, his laws of planetary motion were part of his attempt to express this harmony in musical notation. Like Copernicus, Kepler was not repudiating the idea of the cosmic organism, nor the idea of unseen connections between the heavens and the Earth. On the contrary, he was trying to establish these ideas affirming the living order of the universe in a more scientifically accurate way. (Lear 1965).
It was only later that the idea of the living cosmos came to be replaced by the idea of the universe as a machine. Perhaps this was an inevitable consequence, for psychological reasons as much as scientific. Oddly, although the revolutions in astronomy were seen as a threat to religious orthodoxy, seen from another angle they would appear to confirm the overthrow of the Earth Goddess by the Sky God. The Earth, Gaia, ceases to be the centre of the universe. The earlier assault upon the ancient Goddess by the masculine sky cult, as embodied in Judaeo-Christian belief, comes to be confirmed by science. The sun and not the earth is the centre of the universe, the source of all our power. The mechanistic revolution followed. The earth had lost its position at the centre of the universe, and had lost its psychic as much as its religious significance. Nature no longer had a life of her own; her power was secondary and derivative. Science had proved the truth of the sky cult. Nature was soulless, devoid of all originary power. Without the sun, the earth was barren. Mother Nature was no more than dead matter. The Goddess was no more.

But do we believe it? For psychic reasons, mother nature lives on. Human beings are geocentric beings, not heliocentric. We think that the sun rises and the sun sets whereas in scientific fact this is not true. We do not live by scientific fact, we live by psychic resonance. Hence our feeling that mechanistic science renders the world, and hence our lives, meaningless.

The mechanistic worldview was first articulated by Rene Descartes. There is some irony that a belief system which has so denuded life and the world of meaning should have been born of what can only be described as a visionary, even mystical, experience. On 10 November 1619 at Neuburg, Germany, on the Danube, Descartes 'was filled with enthusiasm, and discovered the foundations of a marvellous science'. (Trans. Wallace (1911), p. 80.) The word ‘enthusiasm’ is from the Greek and means to be filled, enthused, with God. An even greater irony is that Descartes believed his mystical vision was inspired by the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God. He vowed to undertake a pilgrimage of gratitude to the shrine of Our Lady of Loreto in Italy, fulfilling the promise three years later. 

There is nothing of divinity, God or Goddess, in Descartes mechanical universe. For Descartes, the universe is a vast mathematical system of matter in motion. All space was filled with matter, swirling around in vortices. Descartes thought that the Earth and all the other planets were carried around the sun a whirlpool, everything operating in a wholly mechanical fashion according to mathematical necessities. 
There is a beauty to Descartes vision, cool and abstract like mathematics. The application of this mechanical thinking to things other than the laws and regularities of the universe - plants, animals, human beings – seems cold and clinical, a petrification. As though everything is no more than physical causality. Descartes’ system was soon superseded by Newton’s universe of atomic matter moving in a void. However, it was Descartes who had laid the foundations for the mechanistic world view which came to dominate in both physics and biology.

In Descartes’ philosophy of nature, nature was inanimate rather than animate, dead rather than alive. Descartes removed souls from the whole of the natural world. He took the logical next step and removed the soul from the human body, which became a mechanical automaton. Descartes left human beings with just the rational soul, the conscious mind, which he located in a small region of the brain, the pineal gland. The precise location of the conscious mind has been debated at length since. But the idea that the mind interacts with the machinery of the brain remains, although how continues to evade neuroscience, for all of the grand claims.

Science deals with the mystery at the level of description and explanation, reducing consciousness to the firing of neurons. But this is the easy part. At no point do neuroscientists address the nonlinear dynamics of conscious experience as an emergent property of the brain as a whole. It is this, and not the firing of neurons, that is the hard problem of the conscious mind, and the neuroscientists have no more to offer here than did Descartes and all those who followed in his wake. The philosopher John Searle’s challenge to neuro-determinists and reductionists remains: 'How is it possible for physical, objective, quantitatively describable neuron firings to cause qualitative, private, subjective experiences?' (Searle 1995.) We still wait an answer.

Above and beyond the science, the mechanistic approach fails as a very mean and meagre psychology. It doesn’t ring true. Since Descartes, human beings have shown a tendency to embrace a broader conception of the human soul, mostly involving a recognition that most of the soul’s activity is unconscious. (Whyte (1979). Set against Freud and Jung, the mechanistic denial of the bodily and unconscious dimensions of the psyche are naïve, crude and one-dimensional.

In stating, in his Meditations, the first principle of his philosophy as ‘I am thinking, therefore I am', Descartes’ thinking mind is essentially disembodied:

I saw that while I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no place for me to be in, I could not for all that pretend that I did not exist.... From this I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly, this I - that is, the soul by which I am what I am - is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist.

Descartes (trans. 1985), Vol. 1, p. 127.

The human mind is therefore godlike and immortal. Through reason, human beings can know the laws of nature, and thereby participate in the mathematical mind of God himself. One sees a similar conception at work in Spinoza’s notion of amor intellectualis Dei, the intellectual love of God/Nature, Deus sive Natura.

"In some strange sense," declares theoretical physicist John Wheeler, "the universe is a participatory universe." (Wheeler 1973: 244; Capra 1975: 141).

It’s a remarkable idea. The universe responds to us as we relate to it. For Kant, the innate cognitive apparatus in the human mind shapes the world we see around us. The world is not an external, objective datum but is shot through with human intention, will, purpose and consciousness. 
But this is not the Cartesian view at all. Descartes sees the human self not as an embodied participant in a living world, but as a disembodied observer. This is the language of scientific detachment, not the participatory universe. 

For feminists, this Cartesian perspective is a typically male fantasy, in part explaining why so many scientists are men. (Keller 1985). However, this ideal of scientific detachment has extended further than the ranks of professional scientists and technocrats and become an all-pervasive influence on the social world. Hobbes and Locke in politics and Adam Smith in economics adopt mechanistic language. One hears of the market mechanism. Society is seen as a machine built on a series of dualisms between man and nature, mind and body, head and heart, reason and nature, objectivity and subjectivity, and quantity and quality.

So was Bacon right or wrong? For all of the criticisms that may be marshalled against mechanistic science, its advocates can point to practical successes and material benefits. However, the human world is more than quantity. It is certainly possible to abstract the quantitative aspects of life and model them mathematically, but this is a very partial way of knowing that ignores much that is essential to living experience. 

Not all questions of human life are decided by scientific fact. Alongside scientific truth, there is a moral truth. Human experience is earth-bound, geocentric rather than heliocentric. For most people, the sun rises and the sun sets. The scientists say this is false, yet it feels true. The arguments of feminist critics of science derive from and stay true to the geocentric. This is life as lived experience, a perspective expressed by common moral reason and ordinary language, as opposed to the heliocentric perspective and mathematical language of the scientists. On point of scientific fact, the scientists are right. But the world they describe exceeds human comprehension and control. Like the transcendental male sky God, scientific truth is too abstract and too remote, too unapproachable, to offer much by way of comfort. 

The scientist James Lovelock hit the nail smack on the head here:

Many, I suspect, have trodden this same path through the mind. Those millions of Christians who make a special place in their hearts for the Virgin Mary possibly respond as I do. The concept of Jahweh as remote, all-powerful, all seeing is either frightening or unapproachable. Even the sense of presence of a more contemporary God, a still, small voice within, may not be enough for those who need to communicate with someone outside. Mary is close and can be talked to. She is believable and manageable. It could be that the importance of the Virgin Mary in faith is something of this kind. (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

In sum, the mentality of dominion is part of an innate developmental impulse that, in certain social relations, could easily be expressed as the scientific and technological mastery of nature. The developmental impulse was certainly apparent in prehistory and in the ancient world, but was restrained by a combination of social relations, belief systems and the limitations of technological power. This impulse was substantially increased in its power by technology, in turn inspiring and being reinforced by the belief in unlimited material progress through knowledge and power. At the same time, the mechanistic theory of nature displaced and dispossessed all those who continued to hold that nature had meaning and was sacred. Just as divinity was thrown out of nature, so the divine spark within human beings was put out. The soul was thrown out of nature, both nature without and human nature within. Nature was rendered inanimate, preventing human beings from seeking an animistic relationship to the living world around them. Nothing can be allowed to stand in the way of unlimited material progress. And now, we look at desertification, acidification, the melting ice, the thawing of the tundra, the hole in the ozone layer, global warming, adverse weather, floods and famines, and see nothing but natural destruction.

No one meant this. No-one set out to hurt anyone. It was all done with some good purpose in mind.

Granted, the rape of the environment has not been carried out by scientists but by profiteering industrialists and myopic developers, with the eager support of a burgeoning population greedy to consume more than nature can provide and to waste more than nature can clear away. But to absolve the scientific community from complicity in the matter is quite simply to ignore that science has been the only natural philosophy the western world has known since the age of Newton. It is to ignore the key question: who provided us with the image of nature that invited the rape and with the sensibility that has licensed it? It is not, after all, the normal thing for people to ruin their environment. It is extraordinary and requires extraordinary incitement. (Roszak 1972: 232

14 GOD AND GAIA 

I would like to take a close look at chapter 9 God and Gaia in James Lovelock’s The Ages of Gaia 2000. When writing his first book on Gaia, Lovelock claimed to have ‘no inkling that it would be taken as a religious book.’ Whilst Lovelock’s focus was on science, many people were interested in the religious meaning of Gaia. ‘I was naive to think that a book about Gaia would be taken as science only.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). True, but Lovelock definitely spoke in religious terms about Gaia, only to insist that the concept is wholly scientific. It is a scientific concept, but only insofar as Gaia is a machine. However, the part that people respond to the most, the idea that the Earth is a living organism, Lovelock admits lacks a rational scientific foundation. Lovelock refers here to ‘intuition’. His work is clearly more than a science defined in terms of observation and measurement, but he has been reluctant to say more concerning his religious belief. ‘I have kept my doubts in a separate place for too long.’ Lovelock is agnostic. ‘I am happy with the thought that the Universe has properties that make the emergence of life and Gaia inevitable. But I react to the assertion that it was created with this purpose. It might have been; but how the Universe and life began are ineffable questions.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

Maybe, but Lovelock argues as though the Universe was created with the purpose of life. ‘Living itself is a religious experience’ he declares. For this reason, Lovelock argues, there can be no separation of life into sacred and secular parts. That implies that all life as such is sacred. That is a religious view, a matter of faith rather than scientific reason. Proving purpose is an ineffable question only for science. (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

So what is the basis of Lovelock’s religious faith on this matter? Well, there is his scientific discoveries concerning Gaia as a self-regulating system. It looks as though the universe was built for the emergence and the maintenance of life. However, it seems that the main factor behind Lovelock’s faith is intuition. 

When I first saw Gaia in my mind I felt as must an astronaut have done as he stood on the Moon, gazing back at our home, the Earth. The feeling strengthens as theory and evidence steadily confirm the thought that the Earth may be a larger state of life. Thinking of the Earth this way makes it seem, on happy days, in the right places, as if the whole planet were celebrating a sacred ceremony. Being on the Earth brings that same special feeling of comfort that attaches to the celebration of any religion when it is seemly and when one is fit to receive. It need not suspend the critical faculty. (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

This is ‘what I feel about Gaia’, Lovelock writes. I can look at and listen to Françoise Hardy and feel that there must be a Goddess behind it all. This is loose. The numinous is an important aspect of the human experience. However, plenty that happens in Nature is unpleasant, vicious, a case of eating or being eaten. A strictly scientific view – detached, dispassionate – can find a Darwinist ‘grandeur’ in this view of life, but if we throw in the insanities of human behaviour over the centuries, it is difficult to rest belief on a feeling. It has to be a feeling about something worth valuing as sacred. It is just as easy to argue that human beings have been equipped to find meaning in the universe for evolutionary purposes. It doesn’t mean that the universe is a sacred ceremony of life, just that makes us ‘happy’ to think so, and a happy species survives and even thrives.
James Lovelock is clear about the imperative to survive. He writes: ‘To survive in this new world we need a Gaian philosophy, and to prepare ourselves to fight a barbarian warlord out to seize us and our territory. (Lovelock ch 1 2009). He doesn’t entertain the possibility that a Gaian philosophy might itself be the very barbarism he is trying to resist. He calls it survival, but survival on Gaia’s terms demands massive sacrifice. ‘I think it is better if we accept and understand how poor is the chance of our personal survival, but take hope from the fact that our species is unusually tough, has survived seven major climate catastrophes in the last million years, and is unlikely to go extinct in the coming climate catastrophe.’ (Lovelock ch 3 2009). Nature does not know good and evil but, as survival, is all blind amoral indifference. Here is Lovelock again: ‘What is certain is that it is our duty to survive. Our greatest efforts therefore should go to learning how to live as well as is feasible on the soon-to-be-diminished hot Earth.’ (Lovelock ch 3 2009). 

Lovelock doesn’t realise it, but that is an invitation to barbarism. Learning how to fit Gaia, it turns out, amounts to a recognition of unalterable necessity. To those who argue for sustainability, Lovelock retorts: ‘The adjective 'renewable' is used as a human value judgement: it has no basis in science. But because we are not gods and goddesses who can produce energy or matter from nothing, we have to obey the laws of the universe, and surprisingly this implies that anything we make is natural. (Lovelock ch 4 2009).

Lovelock is really saying that the world of fact is all that matters and that is the realm of science not of morality. Physical law trumps moral law. Human beings are not moral beings and have no option but to obey the laws of Nature. Here we exit the realm of the numinous and the sense that human beings and Nature are at one. 

Lovelock is on the right lines, mind. For a scientist to be raising these questions seriously is quite rare. Many scientists are obsessed with the need to drive out life, purpose and meaning from the objects of their enquiries. To even hint that the universe is celebrating a ‘sacred ceremony’ is anathema to scientists. However, there is good work being done in this area, demonstrating that purpose is built into the fabric of the universe, and that human beings have an active role in realising this purpose (The Language of God F Collins 2006 Free Press; The Purposeful Universe Carl Johan Calleman 2009 Bear and Company; The Quantum Self Danah Zohar 1990 Bloomsbury; Life's Solution S Conway Morris 2003 Cambridge UP; Nature's Destiny How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose in the Universe Michael J Denton 1998 The Free Press; Science and the Akashic Field An Integral Theory of Everything Ervin Laszlo 2004 Inner Traditions; The Fabric of the Cosmos Brian Greene  2005 Penguin; The Field Lynne McTaggart; The Quest for the Secret Force of the Universe 2001 HarperCollins; The Holographic Universe Michael Talbot 1996 Harper Collins; The Science Delusion Rubert Sheldrake 2012 Coronet). 

So, the scientific aspects of Lovelock’s idea of the universe celebrating a ‘sacred ceremony’ is already being explored. It certainly fits with the old religious idea of the dance of creation. As Isaiah puts it:

For you shall go out in joy,
and be led forth in peace; 
the mountains and the hills before you
shall break forth into singing,
and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands.
(Isa. 55:12)

In the Middle Ages, the dance of creation was a common theme in popular piety. The carol 'Tomorrow shall be my dancing day' was sung in parish churches and cathedrals at Christmas. Sir John Davies’ sixteenth century poem 'Orchestra, or a Poem of Dancing' articulates this notion of nature’s dance very well:

Dancing, bright lady, then began to be
When the first seeds whereof the world did spring,
The fire air earth and water did agree
By Love's persuasion, nature's might king,
To leave their first discorded combating
And in a dance such measure to observe
And all the world their motion should preserve. 
Since when they still are carried in a round, And changing come one in another's place; Yet do they neither mingle nor confound, But every one doth keep the bounded space Wherein the dance doth bid it turn or trace. The wondrous miracle doth Love devise, For dancing is love's proper exercise. 
Or if this all, which round about we see,
As idle Morpheus some sick brains hath taught,
Of individual notes compacted be,
How was this goodly architecture wrought?
Or by what means were they together brought?
They err that say they did concur by chance;
Love made them meet in a well-ordered dance. 

The idea of nature’s dance as God’s dance is consistent with the way that quantum physics demonstrates that sub-atomic particles are in a state of constant motion, neither wholly random nor wholly determined but moving in a delicately and elegantly balanced interplay of chance and necessity. The idea of nature’s dance as a sacred ceremony also suggests the view of process theology which sees God as persuading his creatures by love rather than by force and cajolement. The idea of the dance of creation is goes right to the Green heart of God.

‘What about God?’ Lovelock asks. ‘I am a scientist and do not have faith, but neither am I the counterpart of those with faith, an atheist. I go along with E. O. Wilson who sees us as tribal carnivores who happened to have evolved to the point of forming civilizations. It takes a lot of hubris to imagine that we can ever reach the limits of our own intelligence; to think that we will ever be able to explain everything about the universe is absurd. For these reasons I am equally discomforted by religious faith and scientific atheism.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

The line that it is hubristic to imagine human beings could reach the limits of our intelligence suggests the position of Cardinal Newman, who was  led to suppose that the greatest knowledge which was possible for us in the visible world was of 'shadowy representations of realities which are incomprehensible to creatures such as ourselves'. For Newman, the real world beyond the senses was ultimately unknowable, though a deepening insight into it was possible. If the human mind could achieve little more than a knowledge of shadows, it could also grasp more than it could actually express. ‘The ideas which language sought to express were infinite, and capable of infinite modification and combination, whereas language was definite and limited, confined largely to an arbitrary selection of some part of this vast quantity: it was 'a sort of analysis of thought'.

Not only could the mind grasp more than it could express: it could grasp more than it was conscious of holding. This is the origin of that implicit reason, appearing later in the Grammar of Assent as the 'Illative Sense', which Newman contrasts with explicit reason. That all men commonly reason by some inward faculty, rather than by some explicit rule, seemed to him a plain psychological fact. (The Political Thought of John Henry Newman 1957).

Compare this idea that the mind can grasp more than it can express or can be conscious of holding with Lovelock’s notion of ‘intangible concepts’.

My instant answer was that the concept of the Earth, as Gaia, is manageable. We know that there is no other life in this Solar System, and the nearest star is utterly remote. There must be other Gaias circling other docile long-lived stars but, curious though I may be about them and about the Universe, these are intangible—concepts for the intellect not the senses. Until, if ever, we are visited from other parts of the Universe we are obliged to remain detached. (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

Lovelock’s view inverts Newman’s. Newman points to the limits of the intellect, and by implication to the limits of the expressed knowledge of science. There is a tacit knowledge which derives from human intuition, feeling and experience. In Newman this is a distinction between explicit reason and implicit reason.

Such was the process of implicit reason, while explicit reason arises from the mind's attempts to analyse and put in order this complex process. But, Newman insists, 'The exercise of analysis is not necessary to the integrity of the process analysed. The process of reasoning is complete in itself, and independent. The analysis is but an account of it; it does not make the conclusion correct; it does not make the inference rational.' It seems to follow from this that it is not possible, for instance, to dismiss myths merely after an examination of their precise historical truth. (The Political Thought of John Henry Newman 1957).

Lovelock is aware that curiosity on the part of a scientist is based upon intuition. The scientists’ relationship with the natural world ‘can be so deep that it cannot be articulated, but it is nonetheless good science. Creative scientists, when asked how they came upon some great discovery frequently state, "I knew it intuitively, but it took several years work to prove it to my colleagues."’

There is a sense in which this distinction between explicit and implicit reason is a distinction between intellect and intuition and this can involve the re-emergence of the old split between transcendence and immanence as a split between mind as male and matter as female, materia as mater. This comes out clearly in Lovelock’s speculations.

Many, I suspect, have trodden this same path through the mind. Those millions of Christians who make a special place in their hearts for the Virgin Mary possibly respond as I do. The concept of Jahweh as remote, all-powerful, all seeing is either frightening or unapproachable. Even the sense of presence of a more contemporary God, a still, small voice within, may not be enough for those who need to communicate with someone outside. Mary is close and can be talked to. She is believable and manageable. It could be that the importance of the Virgin Mary in faith is something of this kind. (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

The Mother Goddess is indeed always close, familiar. The earth goddesses keep calling us back to nature whereas the sky gods pull us away. God as an intellectual concept is remote, abstract, inaccessible, incomprehensible. What Lovelock writes here refers to the Virgin Mary as the ancient Mother Goddess. It seems that the scientific presentation of Gaia as a machine is a rationalisation of a more powerful intuition. ‘Belief in God is an act of faith and will remain so. In the same way, it is otiose to try to prove that Gaia is alive. Instead, Gaia should be a way to view the Earth, ourselves, and our relationships with living things.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

The danger lies in this, that science’s lack of nerve and lack of seriousness with respect to religion takes us to extremes of knowledge and faith, offering the purposeless, lifeless machine in the case of the former and an amoral Goddess/Nature in the case of the latter. The world of the Mother Goddess is not benign, as Lovelock well knows. 

How did we reach our present secular humanist world? In times that are ancient by human measure, as far back as the earliest artefacts can be found, it seems that the Earth was worshipped as a goddess and believed to be alive. The myth of the great Mother is part of most early religions. The Mother is a compassionate, feminine figure; spring of all life, of fecundity, of gentleness. She is also the stern and unforgiving bringer of death.

As Aldous Huxley argues in The Human Experience:

In Hinduism, Kali is at once the infinitely kind and loving mother and the terrifying Goddess of destruction, who has a necklace of skulls and drinks the blood of human beings from a skull. This picture is profoundly realistic; if you give life, you must necessarily give death, because life always ends in death and must be renewed through death.

That is the ancient Mother Goddess. Is this what Lovelock understands by Gaia? Is this what Lovelock wants us to return to and serve? He states: ‘Most importantly, we have to stop pretending that there is any possible way back to that lush, comfortable and beautiful Earth we left behind sometime in the twentieth century. The further we go along the path of business as usual the more we are lost.’ (Lovelock ch 2 2009). Lovelock condemns environmentalists who criticise various technologies as reactionary in wanting to go back to nature. Yet Lovelock contemplates going back to the harsh world of the Nature Goddess. This is a world that is before good and evil. There is a sense in which modern science is concealing its own amoral necessity behind the alluring figure of the Goddess. Look closely, and Gaia is a composite of social and neo-Darwinian nostrums, survival of the fittest, nature red in tooth and claw, eugenics, all those biological imperatives which pervaded the world before Hitler’s genocidal programme.

In Latin, the words ‘mother’ and ‘matter’ are etymologically connected, mater and materia. The world of modern science is said to be materialistic. Indeed it is, but it is a mechanical materialism that dominates, driving out life and purpose or telos from scientific explanation. Science studies a world of ‘dead matter’. The world of the Goddess is not a world of ‘dead’ matter. Which does not mean that the life of the organic world of the Goddess is necessarily benign. Lovelock’s Gaia as a self-regulating machine has nothing to do with conscious purpose, although Lovelock does defend himself against scientists who accuse him of ‘anthropomorphizing the Earth, talking of it as alive.' Lovelock asks them, 'If it is not alive then how can it die?' (Lovelock 2009 ch 3). The problem is that Lovelock himself accuses environmentalists and Greens of anthropomorphising the Earth. Lovelock plainly admits that he can offer no rational basis for arguing that the Earth is alive. 

Friendly scientists often ask me: Why do you keep on talking about the Earth as alive? This is a good question, and there is no rational answer; indeed to some of my friends my suggestion that the whole planet is alive is not only 'scientifically incorrect', it is absurd. (Lovelock ch 7 2009).

That physicists, chemists and biologists cannot supply a rational basis for the thesis that the Earth is alive and, worse, consider the notion not only scientifically incorrect but absurd reveals how far science has yet to travel before it is within touching distance of the human psyche. Lovelock considers that the Earth does not meet science’s criteria for life. This is worrying. This seems to be more a philosophical problem concerning the limitations of science than the true nature of reality. One wonders if human beings also meet science’s criteria of life. Lovelock is correct here that ‘instinct and intuition are powerful and cannot be denied’. Scientists may discount assertions of planet-sized life as an eccentricity, but it is science itself that is eccentric here. And dangerously so. Many look to the world of science for intellectual and even cultural leadership. With this comes a responsibility on the part of scientists to recognise that it takes more than fact based knowledge to build a civilisation. If science reduces all knowledge to its own rather rigorous criteria, the beliefs and ideals that support civilisation will dissolve into nothing. To denigrate statements that do not meet the limited criteria of science as incorrect or absurd is the surest way to destroy civilisation from within. Hence my scepticism with respect to the character of Gaia in the hands of science. It is the poor, the blessed in spirit, who are to inherit the earth, not those rich in knowledge. Without the instinct and intuition and imagination, science and the world of human beings will fall together. Civilisation will perish by the distance opened up between knowledge, power and people. 

So Lovelock’s words need to be treated with caution. He writes, correctly, that ‘at some time not more than a few thousand years ago the concept of a remote master God, an overseer of Gaia, took root.’ Indeed, yes, the sky god/s took over from the earth goddesses. ‘At first it may have been the Sun, but later it took on the form we have with us now of an utterly remote yet personally immanent ruler of the Universe.’ In The Spiritual Dimensions of Green Politics, Charlene Spretnak attributes the subversion of Gaia to the conquest of an earlier Earth-centered civilization by the Sun-worshipping warriors of the invading Indo-European tribes. 

Lovelock calls this a ‘decisive moment in history’. He refers to the peaceful, artful, Goddess-oriented culture in Old Europe, but cautions ‘don't think "matriarchy"! It may have been, but no one knows, and that is not the point.’ Well, it is related to the point, since many are concerned to realise the mythic and psychic aspects of Goddess worship as a peaceful, artful, Goddess-oriented culture. True, a Goddess-oriented culture is not the same thing at all as a woman-centred culture. The historical record doesn’t support this connection in any strong way, but that isn’t the point. Could the Goddess be reappropriated to create a future which is based on a peaceful co-existence within humanity and between humanity and nature?

Lovelock goes back into history, to 4,500 b.c. ‘You are walking along a high ridge, looking out across the plains to the east. In the distance you see a massive wave of horsemen galloping towards your world on strange, powerful animals. (The European ancestor of the horse had become extinct.) They brought few women, a chieftain system, and only a primitive stamping technique to impress their two symbols, the sun and a pine tree. They moved in waves first into southeastern Europe, later down into Greece, across all of Europe, also into the Middle and Near East, North Africa and India. They brought a sky god, a warrior cult, and patriarchal social order. And that is where we live today—in an Indo-European culture, albeit one that is very technologically advanced. (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

The tree pointing to the sun, pointing away from immanent Nature towards a transcendent God. A warrior culture that lives by conquest, conquest of nature, conquest of others, conquest of women. And it is this conquest upon which civilisation is built. The only difference between these apocalyptic horsemen bringing the Gaian world to a violent end and modern man is the scale of the technology. The machines now being ridden over Gaia are immeasurably more powerful, destroying the habitats of our partners in Gaia to such an extent that species are suffering extinction at a rate last seen 65 million years ago. There is a Jewish curse which goes, ‘May he inherit a hotel of a hundred rooms, and be found dead in every one of them.’ In taking possession of Earth by means of technique and organisation, human beings own a hotel with a hundred rooms. Yet they do not see that with such wealth and privilege comes responsibility. We think we are insulated in from extinction by being in possession of the best rooms, what Lovelock calls the ‘comfortable hell of urban life’. To be so removed from immediate natural consequences fosters an irresponsibility that means that human beings care little of ecological consequences, so long as the Earth continues to supply food, energy, and raw materials. 

In the ancient world, Heaven and Earth were united, the sky gods and the earth goddesses came together (in Egypt, unusually it was the female who was a sky deity and the male who was an earth deity, Nut and Geb. The reason being that the land was barren and was dependent upon rain and inundation from the fertile principle above.) Since a living Earth and a living cosmos were one and the same thing, Heaven and Earth were united in the one body. In time, mind started to break free from matter. We see this clearly in Plato’s Timaeus. Divinity departed Nature – ‘cursed be the ground thy walk upon’ as Genesis puts it – and came to be located in the universe. God is still up there, the Creation now being called the Big Bang. 
The heavens came to be invested with the divinity which formerly belonged to Nature. In an increasingly urban civilisation, what Stewart Brand aptly calls the ‘city planet’, human beings are leading increasingly artificial lives which are disconnected from Nature, from nature without but also from nature within. ‘In the past two centuries we have nearly all become city dwellers, and seem to have lost interest in the meaning of both God and Gaia.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000).

Lovelock is correct. The problem is not that the modern world is rejecting God and rejecting Gaia but that few people have little idea what God and Gaia mean in the first place. Lovelock quotes Keith Ward writing in The Times in 1984: 

It just has no sense or possible place in their lives. Instead they either invent some vague idea of a cosmic force with no practical implications at all; or they appeal to some half-forgotten picture of a bearded super-person constantly interfering with the mechanistic laws of Nature.

Doesn’t the same thing apply to Gaia? There is a vague idea of Mother Nature as being omnipotent, a notion that comes with no practical implications at all, since it doesn’t matter what we do, ‘you can’t beat Mother Nature’. Except that everyday, in production and consumption, human beings act as though they can beat Mother Nature and can forever help themselves to a free lunch. Human beings beat Mother Nature every day.

I wonder if this is the result of sensory deprivation. How can we revere the living world if we can no longer hear the bird song through the noise of traffic, or smell the sweetness of fresh air? How can we wonder about God and the Universe if we never see the stars because of the city lights? If you think this to be exaggeration, think back to when you last lay in a meadow in the sunshine and smelt the fragrant thyme and heard and saw the larks soaring and singing. Think back to the last night you looked up into the deep blue black of a sky clear enough to see the Milky Way, the congregation of stars, our Galaxy. (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

He’s right, you know.

Steward Brand in Whole Earth Discipline extols the virtues of the city and presents the concept of the ‘city planet’ as a green vision. Lovelock is sceptical of all such claims. The allure of the city is undeniable. Socrates said that nothing of interest happen outside city walls. Lovelock claims his vision is that of Blake’s New Jerusalem, but Blake had a notorious antipathy to the countryside. Blake loved the city. Guy Debord referred to the ‘society of the spectacle’, a phrase which sums up the modern city perfectly. ‘Most of us are trapped in this world of the city, an everlasting soap opera, and all too often as spectators, not players. It is something to have sensitive commentators like Sir David Attenborough bring the natural world with its visions of forests and wilderness to the television screens of our suburban rooms. But the television screen is only a window and only rarely clear enough to see the world outside; it can never bring us back into the real world of Gaia. (Lovelock ch 9 2000).’

For Lovelock, ‘city life reinforces and strengthens the heresy of humanism, that narcissistic devotion to human interests alone.’ But that heresy, surely, originates in the separation of the Creator from Creation via the sky god religions. The Irish missionary Sean McDonagh comments: ‘The 20 billion years of God's creative love is either seen simply as the stage on which the drama of human salvation is worked out, or as something radically sinful in itself and needing transformation.’ (To Care for the Earth). But it was the Judaeo-Christian tradition that identified Nature as sinful. Lovelock writes that ‘the heartlands of the great religions are now in the last bastions of rural existence, in the Third World of the tropics. Elsewhere God and Gaia that once were joined and respected are now divorced and of no account. We have, as a species, almost resigned from membership in Gaia and given to our cities and our nations the rights and responsibilities of environmental regulation. We struggle to enjoy the human interactions of city life yet still yearn to possess the natural world as well.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

That responsibility comes with being Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’ as Lovelock describes the human race (Lovelock 2009). It is a moral responsibility. Lovelock is worth quoting at length here, because he makes a criticism of technology as being ecologically destructive which elsewhere he condemns environmentalists for making. 





Elsewhere, Lovelock describes the concept of pollution as anthropocentric. Here, he says that we have to remind ourselves that ‘we, personally, are the polluters’. Lovelock’s argument calls for responsibility, something that requires the integration of moral and technological capacities.

Lovelock demand that we re-connect with Gaia, interacting in a spiritual manner through a sense of wonder about the natural world and from feeling a part of it. ‘In some ways this interaction is not unlike the tight coupling between the state of the mind and the body.’ 
Lovelock responds to the criticism that his vision of Gaia justifies complacence in the sense that feedback will always protect the environment from any serious harm done by human beings. Lovelock denies that his Gaia thesis gives industry the green light to pollute at will. ‘Gaia, as I see her, is no doting mother tolerant of misdemeanours, nor is she some fragile and delicate damsel in danger from brutal mankind. She is stern and tough, always keeping the world warm and comfortable for those who obey the rules, but ruthless in her destruction of those who transgress. Her unconscious goal is a planet fit for life. If humans stand in the way of this, we shall be eliminated with as little pity as would be shown by the micro-brain of an intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile in full flight to its target.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

In this sense, Lovelock’s Gaia should cause human beings to take the notion of planetary boundaries seriously and adjust their modes of thought, action and organisation accordingly. Unfortunately, Lovelock says little with respect to how human beings could and should mediate their interchange with Nature. Instead, he condemns Greens and environmentalists and regrets the extent to which ecology has been caught up with left wing politics. To become effective, criticism and anger has to get political. There is no other way. Well, given that the global economic system despoiling the planet is capitalist, any practical environmentalism would be ‘left wing’ in some way. To be radical is to go to the root of the problem, and the root of the environmental crisis lies in the expansionary dynamic of the capital system and its accumulative logic. Lovelock does not engage in such institutional and structural analysis, instead he threatens us with the ancient Goddess as destroyer and devouress. It is this that is the evasion. Lovelock might not be giving industry the green light to pollute at will, but he isn’t clear about just what responsibility entails at the level of social practices. To invoke the Goddess of ancient past to force us to see the error of our ways is a political and moral evasion. What errors? What ways? Lovelock, remember, has worked for industry and justifies nuclear power and geoengineering. Aren’t we also entitled to threaten him with the revenge of the Goddess? Will this cause him to see the error of his ways? No more than abstract threats persuade the rest of us.

Lovelock is correct to argue that Gaia justifies an holistic approach that integrates human knowledge and belief. ‘I have tried to show that God and Gaia, theology and science, even physics and biology are not separate but a single way of thought.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). Human beings have become disconnected from Nature without and, as a result, from their own nature. ‘We have lost the instinctive understanding of what life is and of our place within Gaia. Our attempts to define life are much in the stage of the drunkard's walk.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). Except we are not walkers, we are drunk-drivers putting the foot down hard on the pedal. And Lovelock wants to power this irresponsible transgression of planetary boundaries with nuclear energy.

In pointing forwards, Lovelock also looks backwards. Lovelock’s arguments are an uncomfortable combination of an impossible future and an amoral past. Our pursuit of a future beyond planetary boundaries will rebound on us and send us crashing back into the part of ancient necessity. Lovelock affirms the capacity of new technologies to save our souls, yet threatens us with a return to the world of the ancient goddess. He expresses an awareness that we carry the yearning for the ancient within us: ‘In our guts and in those of other animals, the ancient world of the Archean lives on. In Gaia also the ancient chaotic world of dissipating structures that preceded life still lives on.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 
This indicates absorption into chthonic nature, a subjugation to natural necessity which entails crucifixion and dismemberment as a condition of salvation. Lovelock sees this ancient chaotic world of the Goddess in the new science: ‘A recent and relatively unknown discovery of science is that the fluctuations at every scale from viscosity to weather can be chaotic. There is no complete determinism in the Universe; many things are as unpredictable as a perfect roulette wheel.’ Lovelock proceeds to note that the stability of large-scale ecosystems depends upon the existence of internal chaotic instabilities. ‘These pockets of chaos in the larger, stable Gaian system serve to probe the boundaries set by the physical constraints to life.’ This means that ‘the opportunism of life is insured and no new niche remains undiscovered.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). We can connect this to quantum physics and chaos theory and to the whole notion that we are living in a participatory universe. Erich Jantsch refers to The Self-Organizing Universe, arguing for the omnipresence of a self-organizing tendency within the universe so that life is an inevitable consequence rather than a chance event. Lovelock speculates that as ‘scientific evidence accumulates and theories are developed in this recondite topic, it may become possible to encompass the metaphor of a living Universe. The intuition of God could be rationalized; something of God could become as familiar as Gaia.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

Lovelock, however, is too much of a scientist to go any further and argues that his belief in God rests at the stage of a positive agnosticism. ‘I am too deeply committed to science for undiluted faith; equally unacceptable to me spiritually is the materialist world of undiluted fact. Art and science seem interconnected with each other and with religion, and to be mutually enlarging. That Gaia can be both spiritual and scientific is, for me, deeply satisfying.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000).
Lovelock believes that ‘a feeling for the superorganism, the Earth, has survived and that many feel a need to include those old faiths in their system of belief, both for themselves and because they feel that Earth of which they are a part is under threat. In no way do I see Gaia as a sentient being, a surrogate God.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). Isn’t that what a feeling for Nature as a superorganism entails? But if Gaia isn’t a sentient being, then what is it? If it is just amoral nature, a life-support system, then that is fine. The task then is to ensure that human praxis respects planetary boundaries. Is that an intellectual, an ethical or a psychic process or all three? We need knowledge of Nature and its boundaries, we need an environmental ethics that has practical import and we need to identify our nature within with Nature without. The problem with James Lovelock is that he equivocates. He argues that living as such is sacred, he argues for an integration of all the human disciplines, he expresses reverence for Gaia, but ultimately all of this is little more than feeling and intuition. First and foremost, Lovelock is a scientist. ‘As a scientist I believe that Nature is objective but also recognize that Nature is not predetermined. The famous uncertainty principle that the physicist Werner Heisenberg discovered was the first crack in the crystalline structure of determinism. Now chaos is revealed to have an orderly mathematical prescription.’ But quantum physics means that the old notion of objective reality apart from the subject no longer applies. Nature cannot be objective in the way the old science believed. The idea that Nature is objective is Lovelock’s own ‘undiluted faith’ with respect to outdated mechanistic science. The notion of a participatory universe in which knower and known, observer and observed are united in dialectical interplay offers us the best way to appreciate Nature as intelligent agents within Gaia. We are knowledgeable agents serving ourselves in the service of Gaia. As Lovelock writes: ‘We are the intelligent elite among animal life on Earth and, whatever our mistakes, Gaia needs us.’ (Lovelock ch 1 2009). This is to create an ecological identity within our social interchange with Nature such that we cannot act for the good of ourselves without acting for the good of others and the good of the Gaian whole. The knowledge is within our praxis as a cognitive praxis within Nature. 
Lovelock argues that ‘it is not necessary to know the intricate details of the origin of life itself to understand the evolution of Gaia and of ourselves.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). This is true, but it requires an end to seeing Nature as object and hence as somehow external to us. The old dualism of subject and object is dissolved once human beings are seen as knowledgeable parts of Gaia. ‘I like to think that Darwin dismissed enquiries about the origins of life not merely because, so sparse was the information available in his time, the search for life's origin would have had to remain speculative, but, more cogently, because he recognized that it was not necessary to know the details of the origin of life to formulate the evolution of the species by natural selection. This is what I have in mind when I talk of Gaia, as a concept, being manageable.’ (Lovelock ch 9 2000). 

For Gaia to be ‘manageable’ in this way, human beings need to step forwards as knowledgeable agents developing an ecological sensibility as they develop an awareness of being a part of Gaia. Evolution in this sense is the progress of human reason to the consciousness of Gaia. Human beings are Nature’s way of becoming known and becoming conscious.

In The Prelude, Wordsworth proceeds from the interconnectedness of all things to a political vision of universal affinity.

I mean to speak
Of that interminable building reared
By observation of affinities
In objects where no brotherhood exists
To common minds

Whilst Wordsworth would later revise certain lines, the invocation to the reader to come and participate in the endless building and drawing out of affinities remained his central message. 

15 NATURE ALIVE AND NATURE DEAD

The Death of Pan

Throughout late antiquity, the cry went out: "Great Pan is dead!" Plutarch reported it in his "On the Failure of the Oracles." 

Suddenly from the island of Paxi was heard the voice of someone loudly calling Thamus, so that all were amazed. Thamus was an Egyptian pilot, not known by name even to many on board. Twice he was called and made no reply, but the third time he answered; and the caller, raising his voice, said, 'When you come opposite to Palodes, announce that Great Pan is dead.' ... So, when he came opposite Palodes, and there was neither wind nor wave, Thamus from the stern, looking towards the land, said the words as he had heard them: 'Great Pan is dead.' Even before he had finished there was a great cry of lamentation, not of one person, but of many, mingled with exclamations of amazement. (Plutarch, 1936: 419)

The cry became oracular, meaning different things to different people over the ages. But the cry made on thing clear: nature had been deprived of its creative voice. Nature was no longer an independent living force of generation. As the world lost its soul, so human beings lost their psychic connection with nature. 

In the 4th century before Christ, Xenophon wrote that "Earth is a goddess, and teaches justice to those who can learn." Nature teaches justice, but all other natural virtues: prudence, fortitude, and temperance, all of which would give us an appreciation of natural limits, natural realities and natural restraints. A recognition of planetary boundaries. Xenophon proceeded to deliver the moral: "The better she is served, the more good things she gives in return." (quoted in Sale 1991: ch 1).

We no longer speak to Nature and Nature no longer speaks to us. If she did, could we hear? Removed from our biological matrix, we are no longer capable of listening and learning.

Pan the mediator, who invisibly enfolded all natural things with personal meaning, has vanished. There is no recognition of the herma, we have lost that connection with natural boundaries and landmarks. A stone is just a stone, a tree is just a tree — the world is just a meaningless realm of ‘things’. When Pan was alive, so too was the world of nature. The world was filled with gods. One can hear Athena in the hoot of the owl, one can see Aphrodite in the mollusc on the sea shore. These parts of nature are deities in their biological forms. They could be found in the things, places and animals that they dwelled within, all of which were tangible presences of archetypal significance. With the death of Pan, nature fell under the ‘mastery’ of the new God, ‘man’ as made in the image of Prometheus or Hercules or Odysseus, possessing, producing, exploiting, polluting without conscience. Pan’s world of living nature was brought to rational order, first by being clubbed to obey human will, finally by technological manipulation, the fire stolen from the gods.

And with the severing of the personal connection with personified nature, so Pan is rendered diabolical with his death. The identity of Pan and the identity of the devil are merged and the ancient gods are given demonic characters and shapes. But Pan never died, he was repressed. He never went away, though. Pan continued to live, not just in artistic representation and literary imagination, but in the unfulfilled fantasies, needs and desires of the people to whom these forms have spoken and continue to speak. Without positive and creative expression, these energies turn into the psychopathologies of instinct. The return of the repressed in the genocidal, nightmare fantasies of modern politics, with their erotic, demonic and panic qualities diverted into the service of the new idols of the state, bureaucracy, money and rationality and taking the form of a new barbarism.

This is the realm of Weber’s renascent gods taking the form of the new impersonal powers of the modern age. The old gods and goddesses never died, they were repressed, and take their revenge in their absence. The sleep of the heroic ego generates monsters in new form. Without the direct participation in the mystique of nature, we are denied the ontological experience of the world as alive and of ourselves as living beings. We invest objects of our own making with existential significance as we, the creative subjects, become predicates of our alienated powers. Our objects move with life whilst nature, our own nature included, is petrified. Max Weber wrote here of a ‘mechanized petrification’ and the phrase is apt. Human subjects are paralyzed with fear, rendered impotent as their own powers assume alien form, thoroughly subordinated to their own objects. As instinctual levels of desire, inclination, fear, aggression, hunger or sexuality are sublimated, so that existence is experienced through mediated forms, so objects take on a compelling life of their own. 

The idea of the natural world as alive is, of course, animism. The idea that this living world is filled with divinity denotes a polytheistic pantheism. Marx and Weber, in their conceptions of alienation, rationalisation and disenchantment are clear that this world of the old deities is beyond recall (Lowith 1993). Human beings are out of the garden and need to come to terms with, and assume moral responsibility for, their own powers. But those powers are, at bottom, natural powers, not merely technical powers. Technology is an extension of ourselves, it is not the human ontology as such. Destruction and repression follow from the conflation of the two, as tools are invested with a life and autonomy of their own and, in turn, come to colonise the human subject in mind, body and soul. 

Some have made the death of Great Pan coincident with the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. In this view, the moment when Jesus Christ declared 'it is finished', and ‘bowed his head and gave up his spirit’ (John 19:30) was the time when 'the natural world lost its numinosity, its sacredness'. From this point onwards, human beings were unencumbered from a recognition of natural limits and a respect for nature and were now free to exploit nature for their own ends (Hughes 1986: 21). 

The historian Lynn White junior has traced the ecological problems associated with modern technology to the birth of Christianity (White 1967; White 1968).

The thesis asserts that the displacement of archaic religion by the axial religions, most particularly Christianity, set human history on a path which led inexorably to the technological mastery and disenchantment of nature. For White, Christianity 'bears a huge burden of guilt' for the contemporary ecological crisis (White 1968: 90). According to this line of reasoning, Christianity’s triumph over and suppression of paganism in Europe is a psychic revolution, one with profound ontological and ecological consequences. For White, Christianity laid the psychic foundations for the systematic technological despoliation of nature which characterised the centuries which followed. Understanding nature to be full of spirits, to be sacred and invested with divinity generated a number of various taboos which restrained resource use (White 1968: 85). The problem is a transcendence which emancipates itself from immanence. In making God transcendent, wholly outside of nature, Christianity devalued nature and prepared the ground for its exploitation. In early Greek religion, Nature is 'the appearance of [a] god' (Foster 1973). 

For the neo-Platonists, Nature was an emanation from God. Montefiore (ed.) 1975: 24) In Western monotheistic religion, it is the spoken word of God which brings the world into being, something which establishes an absolute, ontological distinction between God and nature. As a result, Nature is reduced to dead matter, of no sacred significance and thus available for technological appropriation and exploitation, to be used according to human desires and projects as pursued by technical means and powers.
Max Weber calls this process of rationalisation as ‘the disenchantment of the world’. Weber is clear that the rational, scientific, intellectual instrumentalisation of the world implies not just an emancipation from magic and superstition, which could be presented as ‘progress’, but also an irretrievable loss. This makes it clear that what is at issue here is not any conservative nostalgia or futile longing for an idealized but irretrievable past. 
In one sense, rationalisation is an emancipation that has freed human beings from the enchanted world of the ancients. In place of mysterious, uncontrollable natural powers to be propitiated, human beings have conquered natural necessity through their own powers. However, these new technical powers have also escaped human control and comprehension and in turn also demand propitiation. As a result, the very same processes of rationalization which in one sense emancipation also threaten to repress the human ontology and imagination and subordinate human autonomy to the dictates of standardized routines and technical procedures. For all of the image of human power that machines and technologies projects, they threaten to encase human subjects within a new characterology of soulless, machine-like robots. The address that Weber gave in September 1919 is worth quoting at length:

The fate of our age, with its characteristic rationalization and intellectualization and above all the disenchantment of the world is that the ultimate, most sublime values have withdrawn from public life, either into the transcendental realm of mystical life or into the brotherhood of immediate personal relationships between individuals. It is no accident that our greatest art is intimate rather than monumental, nor is it fortuitous that today only in the smallest groups, between individuals, something pulsates in pianissmo which corresponds to the prophetic pneuma which formerly swept through great communities like fire and welded them together (Lassman and Velody 1989:30).

Friedrich Schiller describes this rationalisation, intellectualisation and disenchantment as die Entgotterung der Nature - the dedivinization or, more accurately, the dis-godding of nature (Herman 1981: 57). This process made it possible 'to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects' (White 1968: 86). Nature is stripped of its divinities, tutelary spirits and genius loci, and is thus rendered profane, of merely utilitarian and instrumental value, dead matter to exploit (Toynbee, 1974: 143-5; Passmore, 1980: 10; Starhawk, 1982: 7). 

Viewing nature as containing a divinity within served to restrain environmental exploitation in ancient Europe. Christianity’s triumph over paganism therefore had a disastrous effect on the environment. And the Great Pan himself was caught up at the very heart and soul of this transition. Pan contained the tension between the kosmos and the theos of Greek pantheism, and, as the bringer of panic, discouraged tendencies to the misuse of wilderness (Hughes 1986). 

Identified with nature, indeed with matter itself, Pan was pictured as a hybrid of goat and man, expressing the beastly, animal, diabolic side of human nature, that part of human nature to be repressed and suppressed. With the death of Pan, nature was left defenceless, the old taboos and restraints gone.

The narrative is plausible, certainly in a psychic sense, but question begging in an historical sense. As the researches of the likes of Diamond and others make clear, ancient societies did not in fact protect nature or restrain exploitation to any great extent. It seems that the limits to exploitation and misuse were limits of the available technology rather than the restraining influence of beliefs (Lewis 1992). 

Whilst Christianity certainly uprooted animistic understandings of nature, a series of other transformations in the sacred were required before nature could be presented clearly as merely dead matter entirely lacking in sacral significance. Both Weber and Durkheim single out the Protestant ethic as being crucial in this development, which comes with the corollary that over a thousand years of Catholic Christianity considered nature to be sacred, alive, numinous. 

There is a need, then, to set the death of Pan within a larger social and historical frame, something much more than belief systems. Beliefs have a history. Anthropological and historical research supports the view that nature, both before and after the modern process of rationalisation, is best conceived as social rather than as divine (Kelson 1946; Descola 1994; Descola and Palsson 1996). 

From this perspective, the idea that it was the perception of nature as sacred that restrained environmental despoliation becomes less plausible than the view that it was – and still is - 'social nature' that matters. The point is important in light of both Marx’s and Weber’s clear warnings that the past is irretrievable. There is a need to avoid the critique of modern technological instrumentalism and exploitation being diverted into the blind alley of nostalgia, a futile yearning for a past that is beyond recall. No amount of re-divination and re-enchantment will succeed without a concomitant transformation of prevailing social relations. If existing technologies are misfiring, there is a need to set them within an appropriate social framework as against engaging in a powerless rejection.

Hughes himself presents Pan as emerging as a guardian deity of wild animals, whose goodwill is required for a successful hunt. Such deities as Pan, also Artemis, became helpers of the hunt, and then 'quintessential hunters' themselves. The ambiguity in these deities is there all along. Pan protects certain species, and protects the young and weak of all species, but he is also a hunter himself. He is eremonomos, the 'lawgiver of the wilderness', to whom certain trees are consecrated, serious penalties following their felling (Hughes, 1986: 12-15). Pan is not understood pantheistically, as identical with the physical universe, but as a powerful and terrifying deity who must be propitiated by all those who seek to make use of the wilderness. So Pan is not identified with nature as such, as was thought by the Stoics. This pantheistic conception is an idea which came later in the 'axial' era of Greek philosophy. In the archaic sacred understanding, Pan is the guardian of nature, a deity to be propitiated, not nature as such. This Pan is neither transcendent nor immanent; he holds the two twin poles together as the guardian of nature. 
The ambiguity in the conception was always vulnerable to technological innovation and development. That is, with an expansion in the scale and power of technology, the old balance held by Pan could be upset and the new gods to be propitiated were those of human hands. Again, that is not a matter of belief systems but of social relations.

In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt (1958) distinguishes between 'earth' and 'world', and between 'labour', 'work' and 'action' in ways that allow us to emphasise that it is the way we organise our relation to and undertake our interchange with nature that matters. 'Earth' refers to the physical and biological environment, the foundation of our animal nature, grounded in the constant, cyclical processes of nature, such as birth and death, growth and decay. This is the realm of the ancient Goddess, the giver and taker of life. But there is more to human existence than this originary Nature.

Human beings are labouring and consuming animals, animal laborans, engaging with earth, changing it and changing themselves in the process. Human beings are active in the realm of biology, intervening in and altering the realm of natural necessity as part of the ongoing process of satisfying physical needs. Human action begins in this realm, but it doesn’t stay there. Human beings are not just labouring animals but have the technical and cultural capacity to create a 'world', an arrangement of human artefacts that establishes an enduring framework for the conduct of human affairs. Thus, in Arendt’s view, the ‘world’ in which human beings live is created by human beings, not merely through ‘labour’, which pertains to meeting natural needs, but through 'work', a goal-directed activity that produces enduring artefacts. Human beings create the ‘world’ out of the earth. This entails taking materials out of the natural cycle of growth and decay and converting them into something that endures through useful and meaningful tools and objects. Arendt's 'world' is thus an enduring social space which enables human life that is lived at some degree of autonomy from nature, a world that requires a continuous repair in order to prevent a dissolution back into the cycles of nature (Arendt 1958: 139). Action completes the vita active, by which is meant speech and meaningful gesture, self-disclosure, recognition and remembrance. Unlike labour, action is not transitory and repetitive, and, unlike work, action doesn’t leave behind an enduring physical product modelled on the blueprint that guided it. Action, by virtue of the nature of human beings and relations, initiates a sequence of effects that can neither be predicted nor managed, and which run away from the actor's comprehension and control.

Arendt leaves us with a three-layered conception of human existence: through ‘labour’ we engage with and participate in the rhythms of ‘earth’, the biophysical foundation of all life; through ‘work’ we produce a second ‘world’ out of nature; through action, we constitute the shared, public life that enables us to mediate our exchange with nature and negotiate our relations in a conscious sense. The human world is thus progressively layered over or carved out from primary biophysical nature. The problems of technology are therefore problems in the way we relate to each other within the ‘world’ and the way in which the ‘world’ relates to the ‘earth’. The solution is not to repudiate technology and seek unthinking, unconscious reunion with ‘earth’ but to eliminate relations of exploitation and domination within the ‘world’ we have created. 

16 GAIA  ECOFEMINISM   AND THE   EARTH

Gaia (also known as Ge) is the ancient earth-mother who brought forth the world and the human race from 'the gaping void, Chaos.'.. ‘Long before she herself was regarded as the mother of the powerful deities, she herself was the powerful deity.’ This is how Charlene Spretnak began her 1978 Lost Goddesses of Early Greece. Charlene Sptretnak’s work came before James Lovelock’s Gaia was popularised, and yet her version of Gaia has been almost completely overlooked in favour of the scientific conception, a variant of the old male conception of Nature as a machine. 
This is ironic since Spretnak’s main concern, dating from a summer seminar on "Women and Mythology" in 1975, had been to reclaim the pre-Hellenic goddess myths that existed before the invasions of Ionians, Achaeans, and Dorians had transformed ancient Greece, a transformation which received their patriarchal codification in the seventh century B.C. by Hesiod and Homer. Spretnak’s attempt to reclaim Gaia as an earth-mother formed part of an attempt to define an eco-feminism organised around an earth-based spirituality which was rooted in ancient traditions that revered both the earth and female deities. It’s the Goddess as Nature, Nature in the guise of the Goddess. The project is well intended, but the search for the Goddess of the imagination and the psyche is unlikely to withstand her unveiling as harsh, amoral, niggardly Nature.
Spretnak explains her motivations: "The seeds for this book were planted several years ago when I began reading of certain archaeological and anthropological discoveries. In the summer of 1975, I attended a weekend gathering on 'Women and Mythology' conducted by Hallie Inglehart. She showed slides of ancient goddess statues and artifacts from the Mediterranean area and the Near East...." (Spretnak 1978: 23.)

The image isn’t the same thing as the reality. The Goddess isn’t always what she appears to be. The appearance of bountiful female nature is the ideal of poor men living close to Nature and existing precariously on the margins of survival.

Spretnak drew on the work of women pioneers such as Jane Ellen Harrison (1903), Helen Diner (1929), and Esther Harding (1955), as well as men such as Johann Jacob Bachofen (1854) and Robert Briffault (1927). (Jane Ellen Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion 1922 (originally published 1903); The Religion of Ancient Greece (1905); Myths of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (1912); Mythology (1963; originally published 1924); Helen Diner, (1973; originally published 1929); M. Esther Harding, Women's Mysteries, Ancient and Modern (1971; originally published 1955). Other feminists whose work in the 1970s focused on a reclaiming of ancient female earth deities included: Elizabeth Gould Davis, The First Sex (1972; originally published 1971); Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born (1976); Merlin Stone, When God Was a Woman (1976); Maria Gimbutas, The Gods and Goddesses of Old Europe, 7000-3500 BC (1974; second edition as The Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe, 1982).

Spretnak indulged in a little myth making of her own, writing about Gaia:

From the eternal Void, Gaia danced forth and rolled Herself into a spinning ball. She molded mountains along Her spine, valleys in the hollows of Her flesh. A rhythm of hills and stretching plains followed Her contours. From Her warm moisture She bore a flow of gentle rain that fed Her surface and brought life. (Spretnak 1978: 33.)

Developed as an ecofeminism, the Gaia creation myth affirmed the liberation of both Nature and women through the recognition of Gaia as both the earth and the female aspect of the godhead. This liberation requires the abolition of patriarchal constructions of ‘women as Other and men as godlike and inherently superior.’ (Spretnak 1986: 63; Spretnak in Diamond and Orenstein, eds. 1990: 3—14, Spretnak 1991: 112—13, 127—49.)

It is in light of this literature that Stewart Brand’s claim that we have become as gods needs to be read. For all of the recovery of Gaia as Earth Goddess, the uprooting of patriarchal constructions and mentalities has a long way to go. 

At the same time that Spretnak was developing Gaia as a feminist and ecological ethic, James Lovelock was approaching Gaia with the eyes of a scientist. In 1979 Lovelock published Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. The words ‘a new look’ should have told us that this was not the old Gaia, at least not in intention and not on the surface. Lovelock had previously published the paper "Gaia as Seen Through the Atmosphere" in 1972 and the "Gaia Hypothesis" in 1973 (with Lynn Margulis). Lovelock’s ‘Gaia hypothesis’ proposed that ‘the entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the earth's atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts.’ Lovelock was therefore advancing the concept of the earth as a living organism.

The tendency to write of Nature as having ‘needs’, ‘faculties’ and ‘powers’ above and beyond its constituent parts should have indicated that Nature was being invested with an existential significance denied to the human species, but the incestuous wishful thinking that runs deep in human nature drew us to the vision of the living planet as benevolent and bountiful. Lovelock, like Spretnak, saw Gaia as part of a religious reverence for the earth: "The concept of Mother Earth, or, as the Greeks called her long ago, Gaia, has been widely held throughout history and has been the basis of a belief which still coexists with the great religions." (Lovelock 1979: 9; Lovelock 1972: 579; Lovelock and Margulis 1973: 2; Margulis and Lovelock 1974: 471; Lovelock and Epton 1975: 304; Lovelock 1988; Chui 1988 1C, 2C.) 


It is indeed true that ancient societies venerated the Mother Goddess and that her worship has carried on in concealed forms within the ‘sky god’ religions. But that begs the big questions as to who, exactly, that Mother Goddess was and why she was subjected to such a concerted and systematic assault in the first place. Human history as distinct from blind necessity was only possible with the break from Nature and the development of a moral sense independent of biological imperatives and natural cycles.
Spretnak was happy enough with Lovelock’s work. In 1985, she wrote, "I remember exactly the moment when I first heard about the Gaia hypothesis. It was in 1978 that a friend told me about this scientific theory. I was quite delighted because at that time I was steeped in my research into the pre-Hellenic goddesses; the pre-Indo European religion of Europe," in Spretnak, "The Concept of Earth as Bountiful Goddess in Pre-Indo-European Cultures of Old Europe," Conference Proceedings, National Audubon Society Expedition.)
Spretnak seemed to be happy enough with the rediscovery of Gaia as a name. As Kirsty Macoll sang, ‘there’s a guy works down the chip shop who swears he’s Elvis….’ Well, he wasn’t Elvis and I’m not sure that Lovelock’s ‘new look’ at Gaia is the original Earth Goddess at all. It’s even less clear that a return to the original Gaia is even desirable, let alone possible. We have worked and reworked Nature so much over so many thousands of years that it is barely possible to separate the natural from the artificial. Sticking with Elvis, I have a book called Graceland: Going Home with Elvis by Karal Ann Marling (1996 Harvard University Press). Of course, we can never go home. Elvis? He’s long gone from Graceland. Whatever it is we see at Graceland now, it won’t be Elvis. ‘In some essential way, he’s gone from here. Graceland is our house now, bought and paid for with the price of a ticket. Elvis has left the building’ (Marling 1996:5). And so, I suspect, has Gaia, insofar as we limit our vision to the rational constructions of the scientists and technologists. The Gaia that Lovelock seems to want us to return to is not so much a ghost of a lost past as an expression of the bad conscience of ‘the machine’ within which we are presently confined. We are in danger of being orphaned by our technology, turning and blaming Gaia as the Goddess that failed when Nature returns demanding that the price for techno-industrial ‘progress’ be paid. We condemn Gaia for abandoning us, long after we have abandoned her in the first place. We didn’t leave home, we razed it to the ground and built our own world on the ashes. The world we have built is a necropolis with lives on dead matter, the fossil fuels, oil, coal, gas. The machine is now sinking back into the swamp, like the buildings in Edgar Allen Poe’s tales of terror. All the veneration of Nature as Goddess in the world will not suffice, although dancing naked in the moonlight might raise the spirits for a while. And I may get to see the hare parliament yet.

Certainly, ecofeminism and scientific theory have combined here to recast Gaia as an icon fostering a new understanding of and reverence for earth as a living organism capable of uniting broad sections of the global population.

Yet, as both science and myth, Gaia is problematical. The ability of Gaia’s power to inspire depends upon the extent to which an ethic of planetary responsibility is separated from wishful thinking and scientific laws of necessity. The idea of Gaia as an overall organism that itself acts undercuts notions of human agency. As a self-regulating homeostatic system, Gaia is more than capable of correcting imbalances within the whole, eliminating or disciplining any species that fails to fit her ‘needs’. As Lovelock asks, "[Which] regions of the earth are vital to Gaia's well being? Which ones could she do without?" Lovelock is quite open in his belief that the human population could be reduced to 500 million. That amounts to some 6 billion plus deaths. So it is certainly worth our looking more closely at the Goddess and what her ‘needs’ are.

The implications of the Goddess as factual Nature, all physical processes and biological imperatives, undermine the integration of environmental stewardship and social justice with a view to maintaining civilisation as we know it. 

Ecofeminism sees the liberation of both Nature and women as part of the same process, based on an awareness of the connections between both of them. The term "ecofeminisme" dates from 1974 and the work of Françoise d'Eaubonne, who urged an ecological revolution led by women to save the planet and create new relations between women and men and between humans and nature. (d'Eaubonne in Marks and de Courtivron, eds. 1980: 64—67, especially p. 25; d'Eaubonne 1974: 213—52. (For a translation see d 'Eaubonne in Merchant, ed. 1994: 174-97).

The prospects for such a revolution certainly seemed to be rosy for a while, with a major conference on "Women and Life on Earth" held in Amherst, Massachusetts followed up by the Women's Pentagon Action to campaign against nuclear war and weapons development. (King 1983: 118-29; Biehl 1988).

Since the domination of women and nature have the same origin, the liberation of women and of nature are therefore part of the same single process. It follows that an environmental ethic can be developed out women's cultural and social experiences and the way that these generate an ethic of care and nurture. Karen Warren puts the point this way:

An ecofeminist ethic is both a critique of male domination of both women and nature and an attempt to frame an ethic free of male-gender bias about women and nature. It not only recognizes the multiple voices of women, located differently by race, class, age, [and] ethnic considerations, it centralizes those voices. Ecofeminism builds on die multiple perspectives of those whose perspectives are typically omitted or undervalued in dominant discourses, for example Chipko women, in developing a global perspective on the role of male domination in the exploitation of women and nature. An ecofeminist perspective is thereby...structurally pluralistic, inclusivist, and contextualist, emphasizing through concrete example die crucial role context plays in understanding sexist and naturist practice. (Warren 1988: 151).

A global planetary ethic as a partnership ethic conceives men and women as equals in personal, household, and political relations and the human species as equal partners with nonhuman nature. In developing an environmental ethic, Achterberg affirms the notion of human beings as ‘partners in nature’ (Achterberg 1986).

The idea of Gaia as a living organism implies a respect for boundaries, space to grow and develop within supportive nondominating, nonexploitative relationships. As one species of many, humans must learn to give nonhuman nature the space, time, and care it requires to enable it to reproduce. Spinoza argued that God and Nature are interchangeable, Deus sive Natura. Infusing this intellectual conception of a self-subsistent reality with a planetary ethic enables us to see evolution as a co-evolution involving creative human agency and moral choice. In practice, this means curtailing those human activities which treat nature as a free lunch, looking after nature’s life support mechanisms and asserting ethical restraint with respect to the tendency to introduce new technologies into ecosystems. Stewart Brand titles his book Whole Earth Discipline, arguing for a freedom of science from the precautionary principle. His call is misplaced. It is science that should be subject to discipline, the ecological discipline which comes with respect for planetary boundaries, and the moral discipline which comes with human self-realisation and self-determination. Brand’s call for nuclear energy, biotechnology and genetically modified organisms is lacking in ecological respect and in ethical and social restraint. Constructing nature as a partner in a co-evolution enables a personal or intimate relationship with nature to emerge, something which fosters feelings of compassion and empathy for others, humans and nonhumans. This is to take us away from the pitfalls of gendering nature as a nurturing mother or concealing amoral biological imperatives behind the image of the Goddess. By creating a space for the moral agency of human beings in shaping the world, the ecocentric trap that sees humans as merely one of many equal parts of an ecological web, all subordinate to Gaia/Nature, is sprung.

Social Ecofeminism
As a social form, ecofeminism outlines the contours of an ecological society as organised on the basis of decentralized communities scaled to human proportion within natural limits. "Social ecofeminism accepts the basic tenet of social ecology, that the idea of dominating nature stems from the domination of human by human. Only ending all systems of domination makes possible an ecological society, in which no states or capitalist economies attempt to subjugate nature, in which all aspects of human nature—including sexuality and the passions as well as rationality—are freed." (Biehl 1988). 

In its social aspect, ecofeminism distances itself from goddess-worship and focus upon the social mediation of the human interchange with nature. The assertion of a special connection between women and (female) nature is seen as a partial truth at best, a cul-de-sac that diverts us from the real problem and solution. A social materialism seeks to restructure the social relations which organise human society, targeting social institutions, economic arrangements and cultural practices. This approach seeks the liberation of nature alongside the liberation of men as well as women through the abolition of iniquitous relations of superordination and subordination within market society, relations which commodify and instrumentalise all aspects of life, including the genetic structure of humanity itself. This social conception of ecology envisages a society of decentralized self-organising communities which federate upwards to transcend the institutional separation of public and private realms into the alienated domains of bureaucratic state power and capitalist production. 

A crucial part of social ecofeminism lies in its distancing itself from the biological determinism inherent in Goddess/Nature worship. Whilst that determinism can be concealed well, it is certainly the basis of the ancient Goddess, the necessity that all species obey the imperative to reproduce and survive. Social ecofeminism recognise this necessity as subordinating women to the functioning of their sex organs, and rejects it. It is possible to recognise differences in male and female reproductive capacities, whilst rejecting the implication that these differences impose gender hierarchies and domination. To put the same point in reverse, it is possible to uproot those gender hierarchies and domination without rejecting biological differences. This is to affirm that both men and women are capable of an ecological ethic based on looking after the Earth. 
Janet Biehl argues that in an accountable face-to-face society, biology and society interact in such a way that human beings have the ability to choose and build the kinds of societies in which they wish to live. (Biehl 1988: 1-8, quotation on p. 7.) However, in Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics (1991) Biehl criticised social ecofeminism as a concept that had become so fraught with irrational, mythical, and self-contradictory meanings that it undermined women's hopes for a liberatory, ecologically-sane society. That, surely, is a demand that the concept is invested with greater clarity and rigour. James Lovelock didn’t abandon his scientific concept of Gaia on account of the different meanings people read into it.
Biehl’s main worry seems to have been the way that Goddess worship entails the rejection of rationality in favour of mythic and poetic conceptions, biologizing and essentializing social relations and rejecting scientific and cultural advances as necessarily patriarchal on account of being led by men. (Biehl 1991: 1-7, 9-19).
Socialising the problem of women and nature holds that it is possible to develop a critique of patriarchal society, hierarchy, and domination without thereby rejecting civilisation as such in favour of going ‘back to nature’.

In the marxist conception, there is no nature and human nature as such. Marx is an essentialist in that he affirms the existence of essences which develop and flourish in history according to social practices and arrangements. This is to say that nature and human nature exist as essential potentialities which are socially constructed in time and place, continuously being transformed through human praxis. Although it is not a developed part of his argument, Marx insists that the only sources of wealth are nature and labour. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875, Marx takes his socialist followers to task for asserting that labour is the source of all wealth. He writes: ‘Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use-values (and surely these are what make up material wealth!) as labour. Labour is itself only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labour power.’ Nature is an active subject and not merely an external, passive object to be dominated by technique and organisation. It follows that human beings must develop sustainable relations with Nature. Again, this is a very different notion from going ‘back to nature’, in that it entails a going forward to achieve a balance in the interchange between humanity and Nature. In terms of ecofeminism, this entails a harmonious relationships between production and reproduction, and between production and ecology.

Such a conception offers a standpoint concerning the sustainability of life and a just society which serves as an evaluative tool with which to critically examine social and ecological transformations. In this approach the emphasis is upon social transformation in the direction of an ecological society that would enable the health and well-being of all women and men as well as for nature. Ecologists are still criticised for proposing an end to growth or a zero-growth economy, but this criticism applies only to certain viewpoints. There is a distinction to be made between that kind of growth which is the accumulation of quantity within the capital system and the growth which defines wealth in a qualitative sense. Growth as such is necessary to the capital economy with its accumulative logic – capital must expand its values or there is economic crisis. Freed from that systemic imperative, it is possible to develop sustainable relations with nature. Rejecting a growth-oriented industrialization which wastes resources and pollutes land, sea and atmosphere, a social ecology seeks to achieve balance between production and reproduction in both natural and human worlds. Ecology and economy thus enter into a form of co-existence, a co-evolution in which the flourishing of the one is conditional upon the flourishing of the other. The transition to a sustainable environment and a just society that fulfils needs is based on a balanced relationship between production and reproduction within and between economy and ecology. In the capital system this relationship is wholly subordinate to accumulative imperatives and hence commodification. That is the true idolatry of the modern world. Nigel Lawson condemns Green philosophy as a ‘new religion’, but it is the veneration of the new idols of capital, commodities, money, profit that forms the basis of the new, false, religion of materialism in the modern world. Camille Paglia writes that ‘The ancient cult-followers of Dionysus knew that subordination to nature is a crucifixion and dismemberment.’ (Paglia ch 8 2001). The modern cult-followers of capital know that subordination to economics is also a crucifixion and dismemberment. These modern idols of money, commodities, capital demand human sacrifice every day of the week as the condition of a future salvation achieved through economic growth. A social ecology rejects the priorities of the capital system and restores the balance between ecology and economy, thus subordinating human production and praxis to reproduction and ecology.
A social ecology navigates a course which stays clear of the twin reefs of the Machine civilisation, which is totally detached from nature, and the yearning to go ‘back to nature’, the siren call that threatens to absorb civilisation into the primal swamp. In between, human beings have plenty of leeway to construct their societies in such a way as to achieve a social and environmental justice that ensures the continued biological and social reproduction of human life and the sustainability of life on earth. 

This is to read Gaia as implying a planetary ethic, a global social-ecological compact which envisions the human community and the biotic community as thriving in a mutual relationship with each other. This ethic affirms that the flourishing of the human and the nonhuman community is to be found in their living interdependence. This is more than biology and points to a moral ecology which emphasises the human capacity to exercise moral choice. The survival of the fittest is replaced by the flourishing of the most loving. The affirmation of that capacity is what lies behind the attempts of the great religions to distance humanity from Nature, not Nature as such, but Nature as biological imperatives and necessity. There is more to life than survival. This is all that reference to human beings as ‘the God species’ could mean. To identify divinity with technological powers is as dehumanising an idolatry as is the veneration of blind, amoral Nature.

A global planetary compact has the capacity to integrate the anthropocentric social ethic and the biocentric ecological ethic and eliminate the parasitic-exploitative ethic associated with capital. By avoiding equating Nature with the Goddess, we spring the trap that would have us choose between the social and natural necessity. To reject ‘the Machine’ on the one hand does not mean that we have to run back into the arms of Nature. The notion of co-evolution between Nature and Humanity feeds into the sense of a partnership between male and female. Refusing to gender nature as female avoids having to endow males and females with particular attributes with relation to nature and to each other. In this context, reference to Nature as a Mother Goddess not only sex-types the planet but also women. This is woman as no more than biological function. Are women who are not mothers any less valuable? A compact ethic without a gender implication allows both women and men to play an ecological role, entering into mutual relationships with each other and with the planet.

A planetary ethic transcends an exploitative and utilitarian conception in which the human good is achieved at the expense of the biotic community. It also avoids the pitfalls of a deep ecology that is always in danger of arguing that the good of the biotic community takes precedence over the good of the human community. Instead, a social ecology recognises the interconnection between humans and nonhuman nature but raises this beyond physical laws to highlight human praxis as a moral praxis. Human beings are indeed, in some way, ‘the God species’ – and the Goddess species – in that we have both the technical capacity and the moral capacity to shape our social life world as we see fit. It makes sense to subordinate the technical capacity to moral capacity so as to create an environment which allows both the human ontology and the planet’s ecology to flourish. Human beings have the knowledge, the power and the technology to enhance life or to destroy life. That is the responsibility that comes with the innate moral law. As Aristotle argues in the tenth book of the Ethics, this is to cultivate the divine spark that is within each and all. 

But beware, according to the Orphism that so influenced Pythagoras, the soul, the divine spark of Dionysus, is bound to the body (soma) as to a tomb (sema). Always, at the origin of life is the circularity of Nature. Humankind is in a state of forgetfulness of its true, spiritual nature. The soul may be immortal, but, bound to the "hard and deeply-grievous circle" of incarnations, it continually descends into the realm of generation, until it regains its true nature as a divine being through being released through a series of purifications and rites.

Hence the need to be wary of the Goddess. ‘Sex is daemonic’ states Paglia. (Paglia ch 1 2001). Nature is amoral. ‘The Great daemons were not evil—or rather they were both good and evil, like nature itself, in which they dwelled. Freud's unconscious is a daemonic realm. In the day we are social creatures, but at night we descend to the dream world where nature reigns, where there is no law but sex, cruelty, and metamorphosis.’ (Paglia ch 1 2001). Nature is not beyond good and evil, but before good and evil, before morality.

Plato, in The Laws, seeks to transcend the daemonic. The 'divine spark' in us is reason (nous), which 'dispenses' (dianome) law (nomos) in place of the spirits (daimones) of Cronus' age. (Plato 1970 Bk 4).

But of course we can never transcend Nature, no more than the mind can ever be free of the body. ‘I think, therefore I am’ claimed Descartes, and mechanistic materialism has floundered within a mind and body dualism ever since. Nature was turned into a machine. It makes more sense to state that ‘I am, therefore I think’. It all depends on where the accent falls between immanence and transcendence. We can sink so far back into Nature that Reason (nous) no longer exists. We can push so far with Reason that Nature is extinguished.

In the beginning, human beings were dependent upon Nature. Reason took us beyond necessity. Since the seventeenth century, the balance of power has tilted the balance from Nature to Reason. Through the scientific and industrial revolution, human beings have gained a technological mastery over Nature. The problem is that we have become in thrall to the means of this mastery and, as a result, have replaced natural necessity with a new social necessity. The environmental crisis is now calling into question the hubris that the human race should have dominion over the whole universe. 

A planetary ethic considers human beings and nonhuman nature to be equal partners, in balance and cooperating with each other. This ethic conceives both human beings and nature to be active agents in a co-evolution. As George Perkins Marsh put it in 1864, humanity should ‘become a co-worker with nature in the reconstruction of the damaged fabric,’ by restoring the waters, forests, and bogs ‘laid waste by human improvidence or malice.’ Whilst Nature has the power to reorder basic matter by means of thunderstorms, tornados, volcanoes, and earthquakes, human beings have the power ‘irreparably to derange the combinations of inorganic matter and of organic life, which through the night of aeons she had been proportioning and balancing... .' (Marsh 1864: 35, 36.) 

In similar fashion, Herbert Marcuse conceived Nature as ‘an ally’, as a ‘life force in its own right,’ so that the whole is ‘subject-object.’ Nature as subject ‘may well be hostile to man, in which case the relation would be one of struggle; but the struggle may also subside and make room for peace, tranquility, fulfillment." A nonexploitative relation entails a "surrender, 'letting-be,' acceptance." (Marcuse 1972: 59, 65, 69.)








The Women's Action Agenda 21 and its Code of Environmental Ethics and Accountability states that:
*	Fulfillment of needs takes precedence over profit.
*	Environmental audits and impact assessments must be made for all proposals before funding.
*	Resources should be replenished, environments restored, and biodiversity maintained by all industries and businesses, particularly the transnational corporations.
*	Air, water, and soil should be kept clean and healthy.
*	Corporations, institutions, organizations, states, and nations should be accountable to the public.
*	Depletion and pollution should be part of individual and corporate accounts and costs should be paid by the producer and polluter.

The new science is breaking with the old mechanistic paradigm in which nature is divided into discrete parts and change comes from the outside (the billiard ball model). Against this, ecology stresses nature as continuous change and process coming from within nature’s web of interconnected life. Chaos theory suggests that the human ability to predict the outcome of these processes is limited. The old subject-object dualism is being replaced by the notion of what theoretical physicist John Wheeler called the ‘participatory universe’, a world in which everything is the observer and everything is the observed. Wheeler develops a remarkable vision of the role of the mind in the universe. From the view that observers influence what they observe, Wheeler concludes that we should be thinking in terms of participants rather than observers. The difference between observation and participation is 'the most important clue we have to the genesis of the universe' (Wheeler, from his foreword to Barrow and Tipler, p. 6.)
 
The phenomena called into being by these decisions reach backward in time in their consequences ... back even to the earliest days of the universe .... Useful as it is under everyday circumstances to say that the world exists 'out there' independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld. There is a strange sense in which this is a 'participatory universe'. (Wheeler, 'Law Without Law', in Wheeler and Zurek (eds.),p.l94.

Beyond particles, beyond fields of force, beyond geometry, beyond space and time themselves, is the ultimate constituent (of all there is), the still more ethereal act of observer-participancy? (John Archibald Wheeler and Wojcieck Hubert Zurek, Quantum Theory and Measurement, p. 199.)

Disorderly order in which human agency plays an active role emphasises the scientific basis of the partnership ethic. Nature and human beings are in active relationship, a view which entails a new consciousness which reconstructs the relationship between humans and nature. 





It is worth mentioning in passing here the condescending attitude from some scientists with respect to these points. Donna Haraway destroys the pretensions of science to perform the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere (Haraway 1991: 183-20 l,esp. pp. 189, 191, 193, 195.) This makes her the subject of sneering attack and ridicule on the part of some scientists. Thus, Robin Dunbar tries to give the impression that Haraway’s arguments are mere discursive tricks which, reduced to plain English, are meaningless. Haraway writes this on the book Primate Societies:

an examplar of a widespread groping in the 1980s western biopolitical and other cultural discourse for ways to narrate difference that are as deeply enmeshed in feminism, anti-colonialism, and searches for non-antagonistic and non-organicist forms of individual and collective life, as by the hyper-real worlds of late capitalism, neo-imperialism, and the technocratic actualization of masculinist nuclear fantasies. (Haraway, p.373)

Intelligent, sophisticated and reasonable, but Dunbar quotes primatologist Meredith Small’s review of Haraway's book, 'Gee ... .[and] we thought it was just a text book.' What a pair of prats! Dunbar makes a number of cheap remarks on these lines against other critics of the old outdated mechanistic science, but it is not structuralism, deconstructivism, post-structuralism or other easy targets he needs to worry about. The new physics is undermining the old mechanistic science and destroying the old idea of a stable world. A postclassical conception of science is in the process of emerging, and the idea of a participatory universe emphasises the primacy of process over parts, and of imbedded contexts within complex, open ecological systems. There is also a greater role for social construction in this new science.

The new science is one which accepts that knowledge is limited. The old subject-object dualism is no more. Alongside creative human agency, the disorderly, ordered world of nonhuman nature also plays an active role. Science can predict that an event such as a hurricane, earthquake, flood, or fire is likely to happen in a certain locale, but since nature is fundamentally chaotic, it cannot say when these events will happen. 

In the end, it is all about asserting use values over exchange values. Under the capital system, the production and reproduction of human and non-human life are subordinated to the need to produce and reproduce exchange value. If the goals of economic production were reorganised around use value, the forces which promote unlimited economic growth, wasteful consumption, exponential population growth and environmental destruction would fall away. This entails an ecological revolution which realizes the planetary ethic of sustainability of life and social justice. 

Gaia is the beginning of life but not its end. The story starts with Gaia but it doesn’t end there. With an innate moral capacity, allied to technological skill, human beings are charged with the responsibility for ensuring an harmonious co-evolution.

Carolyn Merchant argues for an ‘ecological revolution’ which implements a ‘partnership ethic of earthcare’ and moves toward ‘a sustainable world for the new millennium.’ It sounds good. Merchant certainly seems well aware of the identification of Nature with ‘the Goddess’ as a trap which confines women to certain roles, men to others. 
Merchant advances ‘an ethic of earthcare based on the concept of a partnership between people and nature.’ She refuses to see nature (whether as goddess or witch) as more powerful than and dominant over human beings, which was the case in premodern societies. She likewise rejects the view that human beings, through science and technology, are dominant over nature, which is the view of most modern societies. Instead, Merchant proposes a dynamic balance between humanity and nature via a partnership ethic. 
Nature, as once represented by Gaia, Eve, and Isis, remains real, active, and alive. Human beings, especially women and minorities, are also real, active, autonomous beings, as amply illustrated by their actions on behalf of the earth,. A partnership relationship means that a human community is in a dynamic relationship with a nonhuman biotic community. Each maximises their power in relation to the other; each diminishes their power against the other. 

‘Nature, as a powerful, uncontrollable force, has the potential to destroy human lives and to continue to evolve and develop with or without human beings. Humans, who have the power to destroy nonhuman nature and potentially themselves through science and technology, must exercise care and restraint by allowing nature's beings the freedom to continue to exist, while still acting to fulfill basic human material and spiritual needs. An earthcare ethic, which is premised on this dynamic relationship, is generated by humans, but is enacted by listening to, hearing, and responding to the voice of nature. A partnership ethic thus emerges as a guide to practice.’ (Merchant 1996 Introduction).





The dynamic balance between humanity and nature through a partnership relationship and ethic is surely the way forward and springs the trap of embracing ‘the Machine’ on the side or reverting to Nature on the other. But some indication of how difficult it is to steer past these twin reefs is given in Merchant’s claim that the earthcare ethic is ‘enacted by listening to, hearing, and responding to the voice of nature.’ The ‘voice of nature’? Which voice is this? In the 4th century before Christ, Xenophon wrote that ‘Earth is a goddess and teaches justice to those who can learn.’ We listen, we hear, we respond to the Earth goddess. But we also serve. ‘The better she is served,’ Xenophon went on to teach, ‘the more good things she gives in return.’ 

We can only tell what voice we are listening to and what goddess we are serving if we use our innate rationality and morality. That’s Nature’s voice within, no doubt, but that’s what we have to listen to in order to avoid relapsing into dependence on Nature as an external object. Insofar as we serve Nature as external object, we revert back to being crucified and dismembered in the service of Nature’s imperatives. In a moral sense, Nature as object is deaf, dumb and blind. What is innate to human beings is the moral law. And this is the law that we assert over against biological imperatives to ensure that we actually moral agents in the partnership ethic, not merely slaves of our biological natures, individuals with identities and personalities and not merely members of a species.

I am focusing on Carolyn Merchant here not because her book Earthcare is deficient in this respect. On the contrary, Merchant is well aware of the difficulties of gendering Nature and seeks to avoid them with her partnership ethic of earthcare. Merchant’s last words underline the difficulties of escaping Mother Nature’s clutches. Merchant explicitly argues that the cultural baggage associated with images of nature as female, ‘however inspirational’, mean that gendering nature is too problematical to be of use by emancipatory social movements. Instead, she offers a view of nature as a process as the basis for earthcare ethic in which both women and men can participate.

And yet Merchant concludes her book Earthcare with these lines:

Perhaps ‘the gaping void, chaos,’ Gaia, ‘the ancient earth-mother,’ and their offspring, ‘the world and the human race’ could once again be reunited. (Earthcare Carolyn Merchant 1995 Routledge).
(Merchant refers us to Charlene Spretnak, Lost Goddesses of Early Greece: A Collection of Pre-Hellenic Mythology (1978: 30-1).

The conclusions seems innocent enough. Who could disagree with such a vision of harmony? Yet examine the language expressing this blissful peace and unity. ‘Reunited’? ‘Once again’? We are back where we began. We have not escaped the circularity of Nature. This is the siren voice of Mother Nature. 

Merchant’s book began with chapters on Gaia, Isis and Eve, but she argues that notions of gendering Nature are problematical. ‘Taking care of the earth, however, is a human concern, not just a women's issue’ Merchant argues in the Introduction. Yet, although she thinks she has escaped Gaia in the first chapter, there is a danger that her conclusion leads us straight back to home. Merchant’s last words bear repetition: ‘Perhaps ‘the gaping void, chaos,’ Gaia, ‘the ancient earth-mother,’ and their offspring, ‘the world and the human race’ could once again be reunited. (Merchant 1995).’ 
The difficulty of escaping these incestuous ties to Nature underlines the grim truth of Paglia’s argument that ‘Action is the route of escape from nature, but all action circles back to origins, the womb-tomb of nature. Oedipus, trying to escape his mother, runs straight into her arms. Western narrative is a mystery story, a process of detection. But since what is detected is unbearable, every revelation leads to another repression.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1).

Merchant’s argument as a whole implies not reunion as a return to primal Nature but reunion at a higher level of consciousness. Such a conclusion is warranted. Taken out of context, however, notions of reunion are loose, and dangerously so. Such a view could very easily be read as yet another insurgence of modernity’s periodic flirtation with ‘back to nature’ Romanticism. It seldom ends well. Those blue remembered hills can never come again. We are on modernity’s high road to the consciousness of freedom as self-determination and it is better to keep going forward rather than keep looking back when the going gets tough. 

Action? This worldchanging, worldcreating praxis is more than action. Action which is blind circles back in on itself.

The last word in Merchant’s chapter on Eve in Earthcare is ‘action’, as though action offers a new idea of escape. It’s the oldest escape route in the book.

A partnership ethic implies a remythicizing of the Edenic recovery narrative or the writing of a new narrative altogether. The new myth would not accept the patriarchal sequence of creation, or even the milder phrase "male and female, created he them," but might instead emphasize simultaneous creation, cooperative male/female evolution, or even an emergence out of chaos or the earth. It would not accept the idea of subduing the earth, or even dressing and keeping the garden, since both entail total domestication and control by human beings. Instead, each earthly place would be a home, or community, to be shared with other living and nonliving things. The needs of both humans and nonhumans would be dynamically balanced. If such a story can be rewritten or experienced, it would be the product of many new voices and would have a complex plot and a different ending. As in the corn mother origin story, women and the earth, along with men, would be active agents. The new ending, however, will not come about if we simply read and reread the story into which we were born. The new story can be rewritten only through action. (Merchant 1996 ch 2).

Reading Merchant’s final lines in the conclusion to her book, I couldn’t help but think of J.W. Allen’s conclusion to his chapter on Thomas More in his History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (1960). ‘His Utopia is a reductio ad absurdum of their very and true commonweal. He had written the last word first.’ (Allen 1960 Pt 2 Ch 3). Allen plainly has no time for utopia. His cynical view can be rejected. Lewis Mumford distinguished between utopias of escape, which looked backwards to a lost time and place, and utopias of reconstruction, which refer to the futures we imagine and build. Time and again it seems that Gaia is not only the first word, she is also the last. That is the trap we need to spring by committing to a utopia of reconstruction. It all depends on what kind of action we engage in. In changing the world, we come to understand it. A reflexive action is a form of self-knowledge.

For all of the criticism of ‘goddess worship’, it only applies to a certain strand of eco-feminism, and, in general, the attempts to revalue women, Nature and the connection between the two is benign and beneficial, if a reconstruction of the human interchange with Nature is proposed, as against a return to Nature. Throughout this long, long discourse I have sought to emphasise the need to balance immanence and transcendence, to realise natural potentialities for growth and development in such a way as to remain in touch with the ground of our being, as a spring to creative self-realisation, not a swamp drawing us back down. Nature is also a nurturer. 

A return to Nature is an easy, idealistic escape that avoids real political questions for a dream, an idyll. When the world seems too difficult to change, this utopia of psychic memory gives succour, the heart of a heartless society, the soul of soulless conditions. But at least heart and soul are in the right place.

I reserve the strongest condemnation for the craven lackeys of state and business power, most prominent amongst whom are not only politicians and lawyers but also scientists, engineers and technologists of various kinds. Also the economists and journalists, peddlers of rationalistions and fictions, false myths of no more substance than the shadows on the wall of Plato’s cave. Many are coy, hypocritical or even self-delusional about their role in taking the world to market, still seducing us with the old promise of ‘progress’. ‘Progress’? It is as though the human race were permanent children at the back of the car during a long journey, forever calling out ‘are we there yet?’ We should have been there a long, long time ago. But, of course, we are not meant to arrive, only to keep travelling, treading the treadmill generating value for the expropriators. The hardball politics at the various climate conferences reveal the other side to this ‘progress’, politicians, lawyers and lobbyists who are no more than a gang of predatory, semi-clever philistines whose words and deeds make it increasingly clear that they don't give a damn for much in the cosmos beyond profit. People, places and planet are mere resources to be exploited, robbed, pillaged.

The words of St Augustine in The City of God describe the contemporary enclosure of the global commons perfectly. 

Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile possessions of the sea, he answered with bold pride, "What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who doest it with a great fleet are styled emperor." . . . 

State politics and capitalist economics is taking possession of the whole earth and nothing less. Only the wilfully blind, incurably credulous and congenitally cretinous can believe that science and technology in the service of such predatory politics and economics will actually yield the promised peace, freedom and democracy. Science has a rather grand and elevated image of itself; a little more self-criticism and humility would work wonders for its spiritual health. The very hubristic impulse which drives science and technology to a demented denial of limit and finitude will bring its downfall, but not before it has damaged the world, maybe irreparably so. The idolatrous belief that technology makes it possible for human beings to be gods and, as gods, to be able do anything they like so long as they put their mind to it, does not signify strength at all, only weakness. Individuals, groups, nations which are unable to recognise the realities of human frailty, failure and finitude are shallow, superficial, with only the appearance of power on the outside to conceal the feebleness contained within. Intoxicated by the self-image of technology as the deliverer of progress as eternal life, such people can perceive nothing beyond things and means and mechanisms, and will thereby place the world and its people in the most dreadful danger. In the very act of seeking to preserve civilisation, the technological fixers and planetary engineers will destroy it. When they pore scorn on ethics and politics, on theories and principles, they reveal themselves to be the enemies of the very civilisation they seek to protect. Like the protagonists in some Greek tragedy, they are unaware of the diabolic role they are playing, even though it is quite obvious to all watching. The only difference is is that as they proceed towards their inexorable self-undoing, their power coming to prove to be their fatal defect, these technological utopians will take everyone else with them.
There is nothing more admirable in this respect than the millions of people the world over who, in the face of this thoughtless, irresponsible, world-hating hubris, engage in a worldchanging and peoplechanging praxis which embodies and expresses humane values. It is these people who demonstrate the moral purpose, intellectual weight and political courage required to defend and promote peace, freedom and democracy as principles to be practised. Such worldchanging and peoplechanging challenges the ruthless exploitation, greed, and power that lies behind the despoliation of the planet and, in so doing, exposes ‘progress’ as a pitiful fraud. It is this authentic human voice that is our best hope for the future, for civilisation. If the human race is to have a future, it will be due in large part to the dedication and devotion of those who continued to reflect upon the human condition and determined to act to change cultures and psychologies. In the difficult times that undoubtedly lie ahead, it is these friends of genuine peace, freedom and democracy who will be the custodians of civilisation. The pragmatists will do as they always have done, they will serve power, with no questions asked. In the Politics of Experience, RD Laing challenged the language of pragmatism. ‘Adaptation to what ? To society ? To a world gone mad?’ 
The human predicament is founded on the fact that we have lost our original home, pristine, nature to which we can never return. There is no going home to that primal, unconscious blissful union. We can never become young again, never be just animal. There is only one direction we can take, and that is to create a home for ourselves through our praxis. But humanisation is also a naturalisation and naturalisation is also a humanisation. Not all human creations are good, beautiful and true. In humanising nature, we need also to humanise ourselves. In making a human home out of, but not against, our natural home, we become truly human. We need to humanise rather than idolise our technologies. Deifying our creations is not humanisation, it is alienation.

Erich Fromm writes well here:

I believe that man must get rid of illusions that enslave and paralyse him; that he must become aware of the reality inside and outside of him in order to create a world which needs no illusions. Freedom and independence can be achieved only when the chains of illusion are broken.
I believe that today there is only one main concern: the question of war and peace. Man is likely to destroy all life on earth, or to destroy all civilized life and the values among those that remain, and to build a barbaric, totalitarian organization which will rule what is left of mankind. To wake up to this danger, to look through the double talk on all sides which is used to prevent men from seeing the abyss toards which they are moving is the one obligation, the one moral and intellectual command which man must respect today. If he does not, we all will be doomed.
If we should all perish in the nuclear holocaust, it will not be because man was not capable of becoming human, or that he was inherently evil; it would be because the consensus of stupidity has prevented him from seeing reality and acting upon the truth.

Fromm Chains of Illusion

In the Biblical legend, civilisation began with an act of disobedience. It may well be an act of disobedience which is a condition of its – and our - survival. The failure to think, reflect, and act will doom us all.

If the capacity for disobedience constituted the beginning of human history, obedience might cause the end of human history. I am not speaking symbolically or poetically. There is the possibility that the human race will destroy itself and all life on earth within the next ten to fifteen years. There is no rationality or sense in it. But the fact is that while we are living technically in the atomic age, the majority of men live emotionally still in the stone age, including most of those who are in power. If mankind commits suicide, it will be because people will obey those who command them to push the deadly buttons, because they will obey the archaic passions of fear, hate, and greed; because they will obey obsolete cliches of state sovereignty and national honour. … I believe that we are in great danger of being converted into complete organization men, and that means, eventually, into political totalitarianism, unless we regain the capacity to be disobedient and to learn how to doubt. 

Fromm Chains of Illusion ch 10







17 WHERE ON EARTH ARE WE GOING?

Progress – are we there yet?

What is to be done? One can just join the long line of prophets, poets and philosophers who impart to us many wise words that the human race seems congenitally incapable of heeding. 

Ignored by all but the few, the words keep returning. Perhaps that’s the nature of a certain kind of prophecy, the one’s that come true by being ignored by the people to whom they are addressed as a warning.


The technological proposals which, from one angle, seem to be a register of myriad human powers look, from another, like dire execrations of humankind's copious fatal follies. No sooner do human beings acquire and develop the capacity by which to resolve the problems that confront them that, intoxicated by dreams of mechanical power, they venerate the means and neglect the ends. We end up facing the same problems magnified by technical power.


It is the paradox of the human condition. In his Letter to the Labour Parliament in 1854, Marx wrote ‘the labouring classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man.’ (Marx AB SE 1973: 278). What he meant was that human beings have become enslaved to the very means by which they have ‘conquered’ nature. Those possessing a greater ecological sensibility could point out that, of course, whatever we do to nature we do to ourselves. If we ‘conquer’ nature by means of our technique and organisation then, of course, we end up in subjection to instrumental and bureaucratic power. 
In conquering nature, human beings have replaced the old natural necessity with a new social necessity. As Marx wrote in the Speech at the Anniversary of the People’s Paper in 1856:

Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving-and overworking it. The new​fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force.

Marx AB SE 1973

Marx maintained the optimistic thesis that alienation is a progressive force, the precondition of a greater emancipation at the next stage. Capital is the power of labour in alien form. The solution seems clear, the self-emancipation of labour. ‘We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men - and such are the working men.’

But perhaps the whole idea of alienation and emancipation, the whole notion of salvation and redemption by human power, is a delusion, a myth of progress that fools human beings to keep striving to achieve some final resolution of an irresolvable condition. Human ‘progress’ appears to be nothing other than the finite in endless pursuit of the infinite. The basic delusion of this ‘progress’ is that through the expansion of human instrumental power we could have Heaven on Earth, from which all other delusions are spawned – ‘economic growth’, that obfuscating euphemism for capital accumulation, globalisation, big architecture, skyscrapers and the space race, technoscience. All of these are attempts to escape nature’s finitude and achieve immortality within the machine world. Human beings have built a surrogate nature over original nature and assert perfection over imperfection, over limits. With an irony worthy of Greek tragedy, the pursuit of such ‘progress’ systematically erodes the natural foundations of our happiness, our psyches as much as our Earthly abode and support system.
Set in this context, the whole notion of planetary engineering is merely another of the delusions of ‘progress’. Only this time, the scientism which was once merely in the service of ‘big’ government and ‘big’ business has taken millenarian form with assertions that, in the words of Stewart Brand, ‘we are as gods’, a notion which, if history is any guide, promises to unleash the follies of men and the furies of Hell upon the planet. 
To be wary of the delusions of progress is not to take the view that the world lacks meaning. There is a delusion in the apparently liberatory view that since the world is without meaning then we are confined only by the meaning we make. Human beings are meaning seeking animals. Remove meaning in one form, and we will put it back in another. Humankind has never been without meaning for long. It may seem liberatory to see nothing of substance in the world, but this disenchantment is what lies behind the delusion whereby human beings invest all meaning in their own powers and products and call the result ‘progress’. This is the meaning we make by our own efforts, with anything outside of ourselves mere material which is instrumental to our ends. To avoid the delusions of progress we need to see meaning as something innate in the natural world within and the human character within. If ‘progress’ has any meaning, then it can only refer to the eudaimonistic idea of flourishing, the idea that innate capacities and proclivities exist as potential and come to be actualised and exercised by a healthy, complete organism. The good society is therefore the society that establishes the conditions for such flourishing. Without that ground of being, meaning becomes something entirely arbitrary, something we have made up. If the world is without meaning, we lack the means by which to expose the delusions of progress. In what way is ‘economic growth’ and ‘technological mastery’ delusional? By what criteria? To identify something as delusional implies that there is a right and proper way of doing something, of living and being, and that ‘progress’ in certain forms pulls us away from that way, what Taoism calls ‘the way’. The Tao is the law of the immanence of the way. Lao Tse saw how the lives of human beings were part of the natural phenomena around them, concluding that there exists an Ultimate Reality behind all the manifold workings of Nature. This Ultimate Reality manifests itself in recurring laws of abiding regularity and yet is in its essence unfathomable and unknowable. The Tao is 'the reason or cause of everything that followed on from it'. In Hinduism, dharma refers to the law and order at the heart of things, virtue, duty, correct behaviour in accordance with the natural law. In Egyptian mythology, Maat is the goddess of truth who presides over the judgement of the dead, controlling entry to the Underworld. The goddess in charge of birth and rebirth.

Maat is good and its worth is lasting. It has not been disturbed since the day of its creator, whereas he who transgresses its ordinances is punished. It lies as a path in front even of him who knows nothing. Wrongdoing (?) has never yet brought its venture to port. It is true that evil may gain wealth but the strength of truth is that it lasts; a man can say: "It was the property of my father." (quoted in Frankfort 1961).

This "teaching" recognizes a divine order, established at the time of creation. Truth and justice are immanent in the natural order. Maat is this order, the essence of existence, whether an individual recognizes it or not. Hence Ptahhotep's remark: "It is as a path even in front of him who knows nothing." The natural order exists regardless of any meaning we make up for ourselves. This order is manifest in nature in the regularity of phenomena; it is manifest in society as justice; and it is manifest in an individual's life as truth. All manifestations are interlinked, part of the same order. Hence the sequence, without any transition, of Ptahhotep's statements that one must "strive after excellence," and that "Maat is good and its worth is lasting." A person must strive after every excellence; for whoever acts against Maat comes ultimately to grief. Excellence lies in agreement with Maat—justice, truth. Maat is of advantage and endures. Whatever one possesses by right gives the satisfaction of safety whereas ill-gotten gains rests on an insecure foundation. 
The so-called ‘progress’ of the modern world recognises no such natural order. The most salient characteristic of the modern world is disenchantment as a dis-godding, the stripping of meaning and value from nature and the pervasiveness of instrumental rationality in pursuit of goals abstracted from the natural order. A machine world in which there are no longer citizens, deliberating, evaluating and choosing ends, but mere mechanics and functionaries, serving ends which are external to us.

Many people associate the disenchantment and dis-godding of nature with secularisation, as though Enlightenment rationalism has triumphed over religious ignorance and superstition. This is probably the biggest delusion of all in that it has led to a belief in progress that is little more than a concealed or disguised religion, the worst and potentially most dangerous and destructive of all forms of religion. It means that human beings are pursuing salvation by way of profanity, exploiting their technical powers to indulge their old millenarian fantasies under the guise of ‘progress’.

Many people think themselves to be ‘modern’, to be living a secular existence divorced from religious belief and faith. The same people think that the war between science and religion has been decisively settled in favour of science. This is a superficial view which mistakes modernity’s smug self-satisfied, self-image for the reality. And dangerously so. Whereas religion is an organised and explicit attempt to address psychic realities, helping human beings to find meaning in a world that, ultimately, escapes human will and wanting, the ersatz secular religion projects the rational fantasy of the world under human control. In the process of disenchantment and dis-godding, the religious impetus has not been extinguished but has instead come to be relocated in the secular world to deliver the same tale of who we are, where we came from and where we are going. Where religion promises salvation, secular religion promises ‘progress’. It is to believe that the infinite is beyond the reach of the finite. The delusion is dangerous in that natural resources, human activities, technical means, the lot, are all pressed into service to deliver an end that is beyond reach. 

‘Progress’ is a myth of salvation which the secular world has acquired in ill-digested form from religion, which has come to be recycled into capital’s material life processes as a false God, and which inevitably rebounds on us the more clever, sophisticated and rational we become. The Heaven promised by economic growth never materialises, it is continually postponed as we engage in yet another round of capital accumulation. Hence the apparent paradox of modernity that the more we progress, the worse things get.

History is a slaughter-bench wrote Hegel. Progress, as salvation by secular means, most certainly is. Mounds and mounds of heaped-up corpses testify to the fact that the ancient practice of human sacrifice is alive and well in our modern, rational world, only this time the old gods remain in their graves, their place being taken by the new idols of money and power, commodities and bureaucracies, capital and the state.

When planetary engineers write of ‘men as gods’, they invoke an idea of progress that conflates two different myths: the Socratic myth of reason and the Christian myth of salvation. This does not resolve the dualism of science and religion at all, it merely means that we get bad science and bad religion in one. We get a bogus religion promising progress as salvation, with scientific knowledge and technological know-how pressed into the service of millenarian ends. We are promised that Heaven on Earth is within our material grasp but, instead, the veneration of the technical means towards this end keeps us in thrall to diabolic power. HG Wells started by writing of ‘men as gods’ but, by the end, was writing of ‘mind at the end of its tether’. The pursuit of Heaven on Earth by technical means had led to the return of ancient gods and nightmares, frightening the modern rational world out of its highly educated wits. The promise of Heaven for those blessed in spirit has come to be re-interpreted to mean that the poor should be trained to become adept at operating the technical installations and serving the functional mechanisms by which Hell is delivered. To be fair to Max Weber, he was under no illusion that progress would ever amount to more than the bureaucratisation of the world and of the people in it. The pessimistic conclusion is that such autonomy-impairing and denying structures would so dehumanise people as to invite a violent reaction. The ultimate measure of the elemental violence of an unfettered rationalism with religious intent is to be found in the countless millions of corpses which have accumulated at the same rate of capital and state power, human sacrifices to one or another of modernity’s alien, unrestrained, unrecognisable gods. There is nothing new about violent death and destruction. Modernity's genius is to have organised and executed devastation with conscious, psychic, purpose, and with its characteristic efficiency, all by reference to various totalizing abstractions which all fall under the sign of ‘progress’ – money, career goals and progression, targets, economic growth, competition, globalisation, you name it, all those external ‘purposes’ that are designed to make the human person something other than he or she is or ever could be. Marx wrote of an atomistic, egoistic market society in which the ‘individual regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx OJQ EW 1975: 221). The history of this subordination of real living individuals to powers and purposes which are external to them has been written in blood. The twentieth century was a charnel house, with tens of millions of human beings either killed directly as a result of war or indirectly by the famine and disease that have followed in its trail. There is little sign that the twenty first century is changing direction. The modern world is characterized by technology and death. Reference to ‘progress’ masks the death-dealing reality.

At this point one cannot help but refer back to scientist Robert Boyle’s ambition to set up the ‘empire of man’ over nature. We now know that such ambitions rest upon a fault-line, the arbitrary separation of human beings from nature. To the extent that human beings come to conquer nature without, they come to conquer their own nature within. What human beings do to nature, they do to themselves. In dis-godding and instrumentalising nature, human beings have desacralised and instrumentalised themselves. The exploitation of nature is integral to the creation of exploitative relations and practices within human society. Social ecologists therefore point to the connection between environmental and social justice. 

Advances in scientific knowledge and technical capacity has led to a peculiar kind of modern arrogance which supposes that at some point in the evolutionary process the human species has risen above nature and surpassed its animal state to become a ‘god species’ holding dominion not only over the Earth and all the species that live on it but over fate as well. That, ultimately, is the fatal deceit of modernity, the superstitious belief that machines and mechanical power can cheat nature’s cycles and deliver immortality. Even as the global heating brought about by human industrial activity throws such delusions of immortality in stark relief, the high priests and apostles of technical power become even more vocal in re-asserting the claims of technoscience. It’s as if the clear demonstration of natural limits and planetary boundaries induces a crisis of faith amongst those whose belief system is organised around notions of mechanical immortality. 
The tragedy of reason is that our increasing abstraction from nature and from our own animality feeds delusions of perfectibility, keeping us on the long march towards a progress that can never be attained. Instead a heaven on earth, we get catastrophe. 

Of course, ‘progress’ may well be akin to what Kant wrote about God, the immortal soul and freedom, necessary preconditions of morality inspiring moral behaviour amongst human agents. If progress is an illusion, it is a necessary illusion. Without such an illusion, where could hope be found. But – and this is a big but – there is a world of difference between journeying in a general direction, using one’s innate capacities and powers to their fullest, in the sense of flourishing, and identifying a single end point, to which everything, including one’s powers, is subordinated. In making such a distinction we are able to avoid gainsaying scientific knowledge and technical know-how, leaving one open to the lazy accusation of being anti-science and anti-technology. That’s not what exposing the delusions of progress is about at all. The point is that science and technology are progressed by men and women who are all too human and are therefore prone to the same faults, flaws, temptations, and biases as the rest of us. 
If ideas of progress and perfectibility have any meaning then it can only be in the sense of corresponding, however imperfectly, to the right and proper way of living and being according to the natural order. The problem is that this Ultimate Reality is always in some way beyond human agency. This is a very different notion to that of the self-made social world, a human creation which is capable of being comprehended and subordinated to complete human control. That might sound liberatory but behind such a notion is the vision of the technocratic utopia of the world rationally controlled. This refers to a bureaucratic and instrumental reason, a reason shorn of its ethical dimension. Reason has al

To be fully rational, reason must be based on a philosophical anthropology that is capable of identifying the conditions of human and planetary flourishing as mutual and inextricably linked.

Isaiah Berlin wrote of the ‘the prophets with armies at their backs’, politically motivated and organised individuals who have a precise conception of how the world should be and who pursue a zealous course of action to prove the truth of their vision by way of imposition, spilling the blood of millions along the way. Berlin was a well-known critic of Marx and Marxism. But this only flags up the extent to which Marxism is a Judaeo-Christian heresy, just one of modernity’s many bogus religions promising the realisation of Heaven on Earth by means of technical power. And to his lasting credit, Marx, with his critique of alienation and the inversion of subject and object, means and ends, offers the tools of criticism with which we can uproot the delusions of progress. Marx works with the grain of reality, not against it. His future is the vision of the immanent society. He notes that the task is to latch onto realities ‘as they are and not to oppose them with any ready-made system such as the Voyage en Icarie. (Etienne Cabet’s description of a communist utopia). ‘Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. Hence the critic can take his cue from every existing form of theoretical and practical consciousness and from this ideal and final goal implicit in the actual forms of existing reality he can deduce a true reality.’ (Marx EW Letters 1975: 209). The ideal is located within the real as emergent potentiality, a fine Hegelian notion.

Marx was concerned to emphasise that his socialism was ‘in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer’ but ‘merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.’ (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 79). Marx remained on the ground of historical and social reality. The tragedy is that whilst took pains to avoid communists setting up any ‘sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement’ and social reality in general. (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973:80/1), that is precisely the fate of the Communist politics that came to bear Marx’s name. My point, however, is this, that Berlin’s ‘prophets with armies at their backs’ sums up the global advance of the capital system, and is part and parcel of modernity’s delusion of progress. Communism has been and gone, but the prophecies of material progress have got bigger and so have the armies. The world now spends some $1.7 trillion on arms. In pursuit of Heaven on Earth, means of production have been turned into means of destruction.

The idea of ‘the God species’ is based upon the claim of human uniqueness. This abstraction of human beings from their natural context and from their own animal nature lies behind the delusion of progress. In Straw Dogs, the philosopher John Gray argues that ‘in the world shown to us by Darwin, there is nothing that can be called progress. To anyone reared on humanist hopes this is intolerable. As a result, Darwin's teaching has been stood on its head, and Christianity's cardinal error - that humans are different from all other animals - has been given a new lease on life.’ 

And that’s the point, the supposed triumph of science over religion has been no such thing. Instead, the religious impetus has been appropriated from its legitimate sphere, where it allows the human psyche to make sense of a supra-human reality, and recycled into the secular pursuit of knowledge and power. As a result, progress takes the millenarian form of the pursuit of salvation by technical means, something which is certain to misfire for the simple reason that the means cannot bear the weight of the responsibility placed upon them. So if human uniqueness has any meaning other than a delusion, it denotes the capacity of the human animal to advance scientific knowledge and technical know-how at a rate that keeps outstripping moral capacity. Human beings seem fated to know too much about reality whilst learning too little from experience. If this is so, then the incongruity between technical and moral capacities seems to be a congenital feature of the human condition. This conclusion is too hasty. 


John Gray may be right to denounce the tendency to divorce man from animal as lying behind the delusions of progress. But there remains Kant’s point that God, the immortal soul and freedom are necessary preconditions of morality, without which moral life could not exist. Illusory or not, human uniqueness lies in the very fact that we are capable of producing moral ideals and living up to them. It is that capacity for moral evaluation which is our best hope for being able to identify the delusions of progress and set ourselves on another course. Kant’s argument for moral categories as necessary preconditions of the moral life is enough to provide an answer to the likes of Gray, who see no meaning in the world. Fine, if God and freedom are illusions, then they are necessary illusions that motivate moral effort and obligate human beings in a moral order. For all of Gray’s concern to remove the distinction between human beings and other animals, it remains the case that human beings are meaning seeking creatures and that morality is an aspect of human life that engages our rational faculties as well as our feelings. ‘I cannot reason about whom to fall in love with, but I can reason about whether it would be right to cheat on the person I love.’ (Graham 2004 ch 1). Illusory or not, our distinction from other animals lies in the fact that we can generate moral ideals, act to bring them about and create a society that lives up to them. Now that would be progress of a real and enduring kind.

So I affirm strongly that the resolution of our predicament depends upon the creation of a social and moral matrix within which our technical and moral powers are embedded and re-integrated. 

The environmental crisis is the time to recover our sense of nature’s endless cycle of life, death and rebirth. 'Progress' has brought economic crisis, political conflict, ecological catastrophe, the destruction of the biosphere, desertification, acidification, the extinction of species. Apocalypse may well be a revelation if it encourages us to see the world with new eyes and make a fresh start. 


Those who advocate technological solutions to ecological problems need to answer why so much past ‘progress’ has issued in a crisis of such proportions. The environmental crisis calls for a new approach. There is a clear dividing line here between those who recognise and work within planetary boundaries and those who think that increasing technological power permits their transgression. Either way, the battle lines are drawn and it is time to decide.






Progress is not just at the heart of the belief systems of the world, it is integral to our own self-belief. The advance of science, economic growth, conquest of space, biological discoveries etc are not just a form of aggrandisement, they are also a self-aggrandisement. The biggest irony is that atheists see such progress in terms of an advance towards a secular utopia ruled by reason. The belief system is religious to the core. The monotheistic religions are all based on an eschatology, working towards that final end of the world, the ultimate destiny of humankind in which some will be saved and some will be damned. John Maynard Keynes stated that capitalism is irreligious. He meant that capitalism respects no value other than monetary value. But it invests money with religious reverence. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith told the joke about the man who had died and was stopped at the gates of Heaven. ‘And what did you do to increase the GNP?’ St Peter asks. Capitalism is religious. The rational utopia of the secularists and the atheists is a religious faith. ‘Progress’ is a belief system. The apostles of capitalism can be found proselytising the virtue of the free market and political democracy, seeing the advance of both as an indicator of "progress". The free enterprise economy is the true counterpart of democracy, the capitalist system as a whole giving everyone a say. Geoffrey Hodgson in The Democratic Economy (1984) calls this ‘the standard hymn of praise to the market mechanism’. It is for this reason that Enoch Powell would pray to God expressing his gratitude for the gift of capitalism. It’s religion, a false religious based on idolatry, for sure, but a religious faith nonetheless. Even the socialist left followed Marx in identifying the liberatory potential of capitalist development, seeking to liberate the productive forces from constraining social relations so as to ensure that all did indeed share in the material benefits of ‘progress’. 

Slowly but surely, however, we are coming to question the emancipatory claims being made for ‘progress’. If there was any substance to the claims made for this ‘progress’, then, surely, we wouldn’t have the problems that are accumulating in the world. Could it be that the monotheist promise of salvation is pure wishful thinking? A plausible myth that more and more people are seeing through and rejecting? The notion of a necessary relation between the free market and political democracy is manifestly absurd. Any number of empirical studies, such as Ralph Miliband’s The State in Capitalist Society, demonstrates beyond doubt that the capital system is concerned only with accumulation and is compatible with a number of political forms. And what remains of socialism’s claims of social equality and justice through material "progress"? These are the hard questions and vague promises of the future no longer satisfy. The future arrived a long time ago and it looks nothing like the ‘progress’ promised. The war on drugs is lost, human beings the world over have exchanged their freedom for any number of addictions. The international economic and banking system profits handsomely from narcotics, organised crime, people trafficking. These symptoms of a civilisation in crisis seem to be the only economic growth areas. For all of the warnings of the environmentalists, the rainforests are being cut down, the ice caps are melting, the Earth is being mined for every last drop of energy, endangered species are being hunted to extinction, elephants, rhinos, the lot. Where is this democracy that the system’s apostles/apologists celebrate? Marx describes the modern state as the committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie. If only it was, we might at least have a political and economic system that was functional, in however iniquitous a way. Instead, we have a mafia. All the world over we see government by the greedy on behalf of the greedier still, a widening gap between the rich and the poor. It’s not just that these levels of inequality were last seen in the nineteenth century, the trajectory is even more alarming. Whereas in the nineteenth century, the movement was forwards to narrowing differentials, the direction is now backwards in an ever widening direction.

Amidst a global economy of excess, famine still stalks the continent of Africa, even as much of the land is devoted to growing food for those in the developed world, where obesity is rife. Diseases of poverty like rickets are breaking out again in the developed world, taking their place alongside diseases of riches, gout, diabetes, good living, excessive consumption. Some western politicians see Asia as an economic model to follow, with its wage slavery, insecurity and poverty pay. And people are mystified why conflicts are spreading the world over. 

But ‘progress’ is a belief system that thrives on illusion, on the promise of better things to come. Riches are the ideal of the poor man. The worse the problems get, the more alluring become the promises of progress. There is no evidence of any letting up in the worship of technology. With ICT, we are supposed to be experiencing a greater connectivity. Yet individuals are increasingly separated from each other in a physical and social sense. There is war within and war without, the war of classes within nations, the war between nations. But here technology is the saviour again, delivering more sophisticated methods of control and surveillance within nations, producing ever-deadlier, ever more destructive weapons. Here again, the problems produced by ‘progress’ provide lucrative opportunities for further economic growth. It creates jobs, but at what point do the workers come to see themselves as producer-citizens rather than consumptive drones? Socialism thought that it could redeem the liberatory promise and potential of capitalism, but few act as thought they believe it any more.

It’s time to call time on ‘progress’. This is how it ends. It’s over. The environmental crisis is the day of reckoning.

When the alarm was first sounded, back in the sixties with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, denial was understandable. For a generation emerging from the war, the signs of progress were unmistakeable. The idea that these things came with an ecological price tag was not likely to be understood. But now the crises of climate change and global warming, of an infinitely expanding economy using up finite resources, of a growth economy that can no longer grow exposes the narrowness and hollowness of the profit system. In the face of growing calamity, politicians are looking increasingly feeble. They can no longer promise ‘business as usual’ and instead talk of the need to meet the growing international competition. Why? For what? Where do we thing we are going? We are still wedded to an eschatological thinking that lacks any rationale, any moral, it is progress for the sake of further progress, an endless circularity whose hollowness stands in complete contrast to the fulfilment that comes with nature’s cycle of birth, life, death and rebirth. It is time to abandon linear thinking, it denotes a progress that goes nowhere, just wastes time and life. If we remain stuck on that same trajectory then what awaits is a nihilistic "development", "growth", "progress" ever onwards and upwards until we lose all contact with reality. That’s a definition of madness. How else to explain our headlong rush to planetary, animal and human asphyxiation, suffocating in the gases produced by our burning of ancient wastes that Mother Nature, in her eternal-womanly wisdom, had kept buried beneath her skin. And now we are promised that fracking is perfectly safe. Even if it is, so what? More cheap energy to fuel a nihilistic progress that is in free-fall. 

To save critics the effort, I shall go through the usual terms of abuse. To question technology is to be a "Luddite". I doubt that those who make this accusation even know who the Luddites were. Anyone who seeks to protect nature from the ravages of development is guilty of "nostalgia" for a lost Edenic past. To question ‘progress’ is to advocate going ‘back to nature’. To argue for a fair and equal distribution of wealth is to be "communist", even though such communism is integral to Christian ethics and practice. To argue for justice is to be guilty of ‘the politics of envy’. Why shouldn’t the rich be rich? Where once the rich were considered to be parasites living off the efforts of the poor, now, in this topsy-turvy world, the rich have become the wealth creators who abuse the poor as parasites. To defend nature against despoliation is to be a "tree-hugger". To argue for ecology is to be ignorant of economic reality. It’s all been heard before and is now simply tedious. This is not the world of argument but of slogans, cliché ridden drivel. It is postmodernism’s pay off. There is no good and bad, no right and wrong any more, only what individuals can get away with. Power and wealth rule the world, and if the rich are rich and the powerful are powerful, who is anyone to criticise? They are only jealous, resentful. There is no justice, no right, no truth. The accusers simply don’t listen, don’t learn, don’t change. That’s a civilisation preparing to fall. These accusations have been firmly put to bed many times before. There is no need to waste any more time on them, suffice to say that those who persist in employing them either do so as a political strategy to label and libel environmentalists or as an expression of genuine intellectual cluelessness and poverty. 

Marx dealt very quickly with the kind of dualistic thinking at work here and moved on to more important work. In chapter 2 of the Grundrisse, Marx notes the clash between those who yearned for the unity of the world that had been lost and those bourgeois who thought the capital system was the pinnacle of individual freedom. The bourgeois are naturally inclined to think that history has ended with the prevailing bourgeois social relations and that any demand for an alternative was backward looking nostalgia. Marx gave the argument short shrift:





Yes, those accusations of nostalgia, romanticism, back to nature are still being made and will accompany the bourgeois system to its blessed end. 


That end may well be nigh, but it won’t be blessed. To the bourgeois, the goal of "progress" may well be written into the laws of history, given what little role creative human agency has in controlling the direction in which the current turbo-charged capitalism is taking us. Plato felt that the world’s problems would never end until philosophers ruled. The Enlightenment, through the likes of Rousseau and Kant, democratised this conception so that we could envisage the rule of philosophy. It’s not that we lack minds of this calibre, just that in this post-modern, post-political world where it is no longer possible to distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and bad, there is nothing for it but to let power decide. Justice is the interests of the strongest. We are back to Thrasymachus. But, in the new world of global finance and corporate order, it is difficult to see who is in control. Certainly not the political servants, lickspittles of power. Max Weber had an apposite phrase to sum up the new instrumentalised, bureaucratised world – ‘without regard for persons’. The personalities and characters of individuals do not matter, rich and poor, ruling class, working class, drones, everyone is a mere functionary, a time-server, a place-sitter. The position has the existential significance, the person is a mere appendage of the position. Kant’s categorical imperative states that human beings should be treated as ends and never merely as means. In this new world dronehood, everyone is a mere means, functionaries in government bureaucracies, corporate hierarchies, sweatshop assembly plants, armed forces, private "security" forces. So this is how progress pans out, the complete instrumentalisation, bureaucratisation and militarization of the world. The phrase ‘the march of progress’ has never seemed more apposite. There is a direct link between industrial autocracy and militarism and it stems from the confusion of might with right, power with morality. That corruption of values has been present in capitalism from the first as a system that inverts means and ends, that elevates means to the status of ends, that demoralises the world. The only values that the capital system is concerned with are exchange values. Militarism and industrialism share the same essence, the idea of progress as a march that proceeds without regard for persons. Materialism is a false philosophy which has spread from economic life to encroach upon all other aspects of social existence. Instead of being integrated as one aspect of life, embedded within a moral and social matrix, the endless accumulative drive of the capital economy has been expanded beyond its domain to dominate and define all other activities. This is a society of fetish worship, idolatry, alienation.

But the situation is not hopeless. There is an increasing number of people who are choosing, out of conviction rather than desperation, to repudiate ‘progress’. For all of those who are concerned with the quality of life on and within this planet, crisis is indeed an opportunity, the end of one era marking the beginning of another. One of the most familiar pieces of philosophy is Plato’s allegory of the cave, the prisoners who in their chains mistake the shadows on the wall for true reality. It is time to shed the chains of illusion. It is relatively easy for those outside of the cave to see illusion for what it is. The predicament, of course, is that people inside the cave lack that Archimedean vantage point. We are inside the cave of illusion. But the mere fact that the questions are now being asked is cause for hope. We can start our liberation by calling this "progress" for what it is: a mad, dangerous and destructive delusion. 


We are more than a decade into the 21st Century, and there is little sign of the changes promised by the new millennium. If anything, the old destructive and exploitative practices are being accelerated, the more desperate and financially straitened the situation of the capitalist economy becomes. The ecological crisis and the economic crisis stem from particular social relations, from the way that we relate to the world and to each other. There are no technical solutions to this crisis, and yet the fantasy persists that there is.
The challenge now facing us all is whether we are able to transform ourselves and our societies so as to ensure that our health and well-being is secured within planetary boundaries. Monica Sjoo writes of ‘emanations of the Great Mother, within whom all apparent contradictions and polarities dissolve.’ The problem is that Gaea is being so violated and polluted — from the acidification of the oceans and the poisoning of underground waters, deforestation, carbon emissions into the atmosphere — that she and we will die. Here is the real heretical suggestion, the human race is killing itself as a result of its own success and excess. ‘Progress’ is not to come, it is already here and has been here for some time now. Our predicament is that we are not aware of this and still act as if more of the same will deliver the promised Heaven on Earth. It won’t. It never has done. That is why we have to keep progressing, onwards and upwards. We risk self-destructing by our very achievements. If we destroy Gaea’s immune system, so too do we destroy our own. Human beings survive and thrive only within a planetary psycho-physical being.

A Gaean holism requires no fixed creeds or dogmas, no self-proclaimed gurus, no magic powers and no saviours. Nature is not a machine. We do not need some scientific priesthood, some secular religion of progress venerating technical powers in pursuit of a rational utopia. If the Gaea thesis has taught us anything, it has taught us that we are a part of a greater whole, that our claims to power are in large part illusory, that if we fail to recognise planetary limits we become destructive. The idea that Nature is a teacher speaks to our own natures within and issues in a desire to live in harmony with Earth and see and feel all Her manifestations, whether animal, vegetable or mineral as ensouled, things that are interconnected and to which we are related.
A Gaean holism affirms that the creative force of life is immanent in the Earth and does not originate from the extraneous force of a transcendent God. Any ‘higher’ spirit and consciousness are emanations from the Earth, from matter as mater and natura, not as inanimate machine. The power of transformation is inherent in the Earth. Nature is not the ‘dead matter’ of mechanistic science but a psychic and spiritual entity to which we relate, through which we become alive as spiritual and physical beings. The interweaving of physical and spiritual events shows just how one sided mechanical science is. It is not that the science is wrong but that it is right about so little, mistaking the small part of nature which is accessible to scientific method for the whole of life. Scientific knowledge of the ‘external’ world is scientific knowledge of the external world, not the world as such. Such thinking ignores the interweaving of inner and outer and betrays a narrowing dualism. As a Goddess, Gaea is both the giver and taker of life. But she is also the giver of immortality and the giver of rebirth. This was the meaning of those ancient burial mounds erected across the Old world. Now we seek immortality in our machines. It is a cheat which, however much it has shaped our identities, does not persuade our psyches. Hence the anxiety, neurosis, paranoia and depression which stalk modern civilisation. Technology has severed us from nature and has split transcendence from immanence. As a result, it has ruptured the ‘powerful relationship’ that exists between human beings and the energies of the land (Stewart 1985).
The idea of an ‘external’ world betrays a dualistic thinking that time and again ensure that Gaea, as mater/materia is rent asunder, split between transcendent spirit and immanent matter. In such dualistic thinking, God is spirit, a disembodied and omnipotent male mind which subjugates and controls matter from the outside above. Such a God is not immanent in creation. As originary Nature comes to be forbidden and forgotten, the original creation myth is inverted to produce the myth of divine fatherhood. The resulting split between mater and materia opens up a soul-destroying split in our psyches. In warring against Gaea, we end up at war between and within ourselves. With immortality sought through machines and mechanical invention, the technological fixers and fetishizers assume that nature is ‘dead matter’, making the absurd claim that their anti-sexual, inorganic, mechanical 'God' is somehow able to bring forth and sustain fruitfulness and fertility over, above and even against the Earth. The whole idea of ‘men as gods’ expresses the extent to which the alienated male mind experiences the physical world as a prison of the spirit. Far from being an example of secular, liberated thinking, such a notion reproduces the age old dualism of flesh and spirit. Indeed, it pushes that dualism to extremes, investing the new male deities of technology with existential powers over Nature as ‘dead matter’. The Earth is dead but the technologies live. Liberation through technology is a redemption from the 'sinful' physical world, exalting a deity undefiled by female nature. The book of Revelations refers to the ancient Goddess, the Mother of All, as Babylon. ‘the Mother of Prostitutes and of the abominations of the Earth’. (Rev 17:1-5). In time, the dragon is slain and the Earth becomes ‘dead matter’ to be abused and exploited.

‘Men as gods’ through new technology is anything but new thinking. It’s an ancient fantasy and delusion, quite a fatuous and dull one at that.
Lynn White argues that the Judaeo-Christian worldview is responsible for the instrumentalisation and exploitation of Nature. In truth, examples of such use and abuse of Nature go back to ancient civilisations. It is easy to locate the reduction of Mother Earth to ‘dead matter’ in the monotheistic patriarchal religions, but it was the commercial, scientific and industrial revolutions dating from the sixteenth century that really opened the door. Every atrocity – war, imperialism, exploitation, domination – has been sanctioned by the new gods and their scientific priesthoods. Economists, scientists, elites of all kinds claim expert knowledge of the dead matter they study and control and manipulate.
In this book I have explored the technological fixer/fetishizers’ claims with a view to exposing underlying mentalities and hidden political agendas. We ought to have learned by now that whenever scientists, technicians and engineers claim to be apolitical, taking the politics out of problems, there will be a certain kind of politics at work. Many overtly neutral ideas are covertly political. Lacking a political and moral position, it is the easiest thing in the world for a thinker or an approach to fall back on the status quo. Power as it is already constituted and distributed is ‘the real world’, and radicals and revolutionaries of all kinds who seek an alternative future are derided as ‘utopians’ and told to ‘get real’ and ‘grow up’. It soon becomes clear that to these ‘apolitical’ technocrats of the mind, the future is merely the present enlarged. In these terms, any alternative future is utopian. It is the end of history. It is the end of politics as creative self-realisation. Many of the positions are reactionary and right-wing, not so much explicitly but most of all as a mishmash of current trends, tendencies and attitudes. The positions could also be described as sexist, misogynist even. I ask again, in all this talk of ‘men as gods’, what role is there for the Goddess? Gaea? Remember her? Ring any bells? Green ideas and values have been filched from environmentalists and activists and distorted as a technocratic thinking accommodated to existing structures and relations of power.
Stewart Brand writes of ‘city planet’, as though his model of the future is the complete urbanisation of nature. And the biggest irony is that for all of the talk of the liberatory power of science and technology, the real driver of modern ‘progress’ is technology subordinated to economic and political imperatives. Subject to the accumulative logic of capital, ‘city planet’ is merely a network of electronic communications media encircling the planet, with computers rather than citizens 'speaking' from city to city, polluting the environment with electromagnetic overload. In the technocratic vision, this is the global brain accompanying the global village, but it is the death of the polis and of the mind.

The Prophets of Progress

Karl Marx called modern economists experts in the way of bourgeois stupidity and ‘sycophants’ of the bourgeois (Grundrisse 1973), It is significant that Marx’s works were subtitled the critique of political economy. From the first, Marx identified economics as an ideological project, designed to conceal and rationalise social relations and structures in order to entrench and extend power. 
So it should come as no surprise that various mouthpieces of the capital system should be found proselytising in a manner that those with a good belly-to-earth sense find incongruous. In a manner akin to the Communists, the apologists of the capital system can be found blaming their failures of their social system upon it being ‘impurely’ applied. Recalcitrant reality and fallible human beings are to blame, not the system.

Given the clear analogy between the free market and free trade fanaticism of economic liberalism and the old style Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, it is worth spending some time clarifying Marx’s views. Berlin’s phrase ‘prophets with armies at their backs’ would appear to be clearly applicable to the Communists, given Berlin’s repudiation of Marx and marxism, and given the general liberal association of the Russian Revolution with the French Revolution, of Marx with Rousseau as exponents of ‘totalitarian democracy’ (Talmon). However, things are not so simple. 

Marx was concerned to differentiate his view from that communism which is based on 'ideas or principles' 'invented' by some 'would-be universal reformer' (Marx CM REV 1973:79/80). Marx placed the emphasis upon critique and upon ‘actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes’ (Therborn 1976:324/5; CW 6 498 in Suchting 1983:172).

Marx did not present communism as a social science or system to be imposed and castigated those who criticised him for confining himself 'merely to the critical analysis of the actual facts, instead of writing recipes .. for the kitchens of the future’ (Capital I 99). Thus, for Marx, the working class 'have no ideals to realise, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant' (CSF). The emergence of the proletarian movement renders the old concern with ideals and utopias reactionary (Marx PP n.d. 140). Marx thus condemned those 'educated and propertied bourgeois' who presume to lead the party on the assumption that 'the working class is incapable of liberating itself by its own efforts' (Marx CL FI 1974:369/70 372/3 374/5; Durkheim in Gouldner ed. 1962:61/2; Meszaros 1995:468 728/9). The International was especially valued by Marx for being 'established by the working men themselves and for themselves’ (Marx FI 1974:271), for being the 'spontaneous growth of the proletarian movement' rather than being founded by 'radicals among the ruling classes for the working classes', the product of a sect or a theory (Marx 1974:99). Marx thus breaks with the old conspiratorial politics, with 'alchemists of revolution' concerned with engineering revolution (Miliband 1977:119/20), and with 'socialism from above' generally (Marx CM REV 1973:94/7; Geras 1986:134/7).
Marx explicitly repudiated those ‘doctors in social science’ who put their ‘idealistic fantasies’ before the real movement of the proletariat.

It cannot be denied that if the apostles of political indifferentism were to express themselves with such clarity, the working class would make short shrift of them and would resent being insulted by these doctrinaire bourgeois and displaced gentlemen, who are so stupid or so naive as to attempt to deny to the working class any real means of struggle. For all arms with which to fight must be drawn from society as it is and the fatal conditions of this struggle have the misfortune of not being easily adapted to the idealistic fantasies which these doctors in social science have exalted as divinities, under the names of Freedom, Autonomy, Anarchy. 

Marx PI FI 1974: 329

Marx emphasises the emergence of the material conditions for emancipation against those who ‘search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions’, people characterised by ‘their fanatical and superstitious belief in the miraculous effects of their social science.’ (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 97).

Marx, therefore, clearly distinguished between an emancipation grounded in the real movement of history and an emancipation engineered from above via the imposition of a social science. The argument above makes it crystal clear that Marx is highly critical of those prophets detached from material realities who are prepared to back their idealistic fantasies with force of arms. It is far to easy for liberals to restrict their gaze here to Eastern European Communists. The problem of idealists imposing their social science is endemic to the capital system, ever since the enclosure movement separated people from the land at the point of a gun.

The capital system has been extremist from the start. Capital has systematically pulled the ground from under people, uprooting them in order to turn them into atoms competing for scarce resources on the market. One hears it in the way that Machiavelli divides politics between extreme alternatives – do people rely on themselves or on others? do they resort to prayer or use force? Machiavelli’s answer is blunt: anyone who has to rely on prayer alone must fail; hence 'all armed prophets triumph, and the unarmed are ruined.' And although people may resist, 'one can make them believe by force.'

Our planetary engineers are armed to the teeth with the latest technologies. But for all of their promises to save the planet, I suspect that it is profits and not prophets that count here. Behind planetary engineering is capital and the accumulative imperative. The planet is being put on a life support machine just so that a little extra surplus value can be extracted from it. From this perspective, planetary engineering is an ideological project, its prophecies about saving the world concealing the real power interests seeking to prolong and extend their exploitation of the planet.

Ideology can be defined positively as a system of ideas, and that, indeed, is how most people understand it. With Marx, the concept loses its general character and becomes a critical notion connected with the historical evolution of social contradictions. For Marx, ideology denotes a form of misrepresentation grounded in material reality, a necessary deception which distorts the understanding of social reality and serves to conceal and rationalise existing power structures. 

In other words, to criticise ideas, arguments, pronouncements etc at the level of truth, reason and knowledge is to miss the real target. The erroneous statements of ideologists are easily enough identified; it is the social relations and power structures that this ideology (mis)represents that is the real target.

We have been living through the deepest recession for eighty years. Economies have been bankrupted and states have been tottering. Even the ape creatures of the Indus have spotted this. Yet the editorial in the Christmas issue of the Spectator gave itself the surprising title "Why 2012 was the best year ever". 

"It may not feel like it, but 2012 has been the greatest year in the history of the world... Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The west remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded... We are living in a golden age."

The mode of reasoning is familiar and can be found in Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature and Matt Ridley's Rational Optimist. Yes, the same Matt Ridley who, after extolling the virtues of the free market and slamming the dead hand of the state, found Northern Rock going belly up on his watch. Ridley has every reason to be optimistic so long as the state and the taxpayer is always on hand to bail out private enterprise when the markets fail.
The way out of such hypocrisy and contradiction is to admit that whilst parts of the global economy are struggling, parts are booming. It’s the ‘The sun is always shining somewhere in the world’ defence. Back in the 1980s it was the Newly Industrialising Countries, the NICs, who were all progressing. Now it is the so-called Bric countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Someday it may be Poland or Indonesia or Peru or the sub-Saharan African states. So, the view goes, the global economy as such is not in crisis, only those parts of it - western Europe, Japan and the US – that have failed to move with ‘the times’. So what some see as a global crisis is in fact nothing more than the shift of progress away from the older economies.

Well, Marx did indeed anticipate the development of the capital system to become a ‘universal mode of production’. Indeed, Marx welcomed the development for the way it prepared the material conditions of future communist society.

universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the "propertyless" mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones.

Marx The German Ideology 1999: 56





So, ironically enough, the free market, free trade proselytising on the part of The Economist and The Spectator is reinstating a long overlooked truth of Marx’s case for the emergence of communist society – capital’s creation of a universal intercourse between human beings. 

One may conclude, therefore, that with globalisation, ‘the world is catching up with Marx’s outline of the tendencies of capitalism rather than superseding it… In the long term, the hundred years since his death will be seen as a very short period; few will remember all the deviations and false starts along the way’ (Harris 1991:123). 
Of course, this is not what the likes of The Spectator or The Economist have in mind at all. On the contrary, they see "global crisis" as a mere transitory local blip in a larger story of the inexorable progress of capitalism to universal triumph. And, there, history comes to an end. The problem is that this outline of future history has its feet planted in the air, it is utterly groundless. ‘All that is solid melts into air’, wrote Marx, and this thesis proclaims nothing less than a capitalist permanent revolution that never actually goes anywhere. Where once European capitalism was dominant, now it is Asian capitalism. Centuries of democratic advance, attempting to bring power under some kind of public control and responsibility and give people rights and liberties, all is discarded in a new phase of accumulation. Foglesong identifies the ‘property contradiction’ at the heart of capitalism as the contradiction between the social character of production and its private appropriation. That contradiction is internal to the capital system and arises from capitalist relations of production. To this, Foglesong adds the ‘”capitalist democracy” contradiction’ which arises out of the conflict between formally democratic institutions in the political realm and the private ownership/control in the economic realm. This contradiction is external to the capital system, meaning that capital can seek its resolution by discarding democracy and human rights. Hence the tendency to extol the virtues of capitalism with Asian values. What ‘Asian values’? This is naked economic force that has nothing to do with moral values of any kind and everything to do with exchange values. Which is to say that, far from there being a necessary connection between capitalism and democracy, there is a contradiction which capital at bay has ever resolved by the abolition of democracy.

This universalising tendency of the capital in no way contradicts the celebrated progress of humanity. Indeed, it is central to Marx’s notion of alienation as a progressive force. Kenneth Clark in Civilisation writes that the industrial revolution ‘produced that dehumanisation which obsessed almost every great imaginative writer of the time.’ He cites Wordsworth, Blake, Burns and Carlyle who all predate Marx. All these writers, whether radicals or conservatives, were concerned with the question of whether progress was worth the price paid in dehumanisation. The prophets of capitalist progress in our own day are entirely lacking in this concern with the inhuman foundation of global capitalism, seeing only the success stories. They advocate ‘Asian values’, by which they mean long hours of hard work for very little pay and with absolutely no social or legal protection. And it is this systematic blind eye turned to realities that renders their perspectives brittle. For the ‘progress’ they celebrate is based on a cheat. It’s ‘success’ achieved through a competitive devaluation of social and environmental standards, a "race to the bottom" in which workers, businesses, communities and nations are forced to compete for investment by undercutting each on economic and social policy. The argument is nonsensical and contradicts the very rationale of economic growth, which is to increase wealth and prosperity. To argue that the route to economic success is by reducing income, social rights and environmental standards to the levels of competing nations is tantamount to saying that in order to compete with poor nations we must ourselves become poor. Such a view is illogical if the purpose of economic policy is to increase wealth and prosperity. That, of course, is a very big ‘if’. The capital system is entirely lacking in purpose. There is no ‘end’ to capitalist economic growth. No moral values, ‘Asian’ or otherwise. Instead, there is the systemic imperative to accumulate capital and expand monetary values. That’s all. The ideological (mis)representation of the capital system refers to bringing investment, creating work, bringing material wealth, generating prosperity. But none of this is the principal concern of the capital system, they are all secondary to the main business of capital accumulation. And they are all expendable. So long as the process of private capital accumulation is being facilitated, the wealth and prosperity of the people is neither here nor there. Illogical and nonsensical it may be in terms of what people understand by economic growth, but it makes perfect sense set in the context of capital’s accumulative logic.

Hence the importance of understanding that Marx did more than make a moral case against capital. Certainly, he wrote passage after passage excoriating the capital system as a dehumanisation. But what fascinated Marx most about capital was its character as ‘dead labour’. Capital expressed the power of labour in alien form. Marx grasped alienation as a progressive force, but such ‘progress’ was conditional upon human beings coming to recognise the forces that presently oppress them as their own forces in alien form. Progress would thus be achieved by turning dehumanisation into a rehumanisation. For Marx, alienated conditions express human powers in external form. Rehumanisation requires the practical reappropriation of these alienated powers and their conscious reorganisation as social powers.

The productivity that the capital system unleashed demonstrated human potentialities, potentialities which, ultimately, would be fettered by capitalist relations, the way that social production was narrowed within the confines of private appropriation. Thus Marx highlighted the way that the capital system generated antagonisms which could only be resolved by a genuine socialisation of production. And that is precisely what is missing in the triumphal celebrations of global capital. Marx never denied the productivity and universalising tendencies of capital, the very things that current apologists and apostles proclaim. What the prophets of capitalist progress have missed is capital’s crisis tendencies and contradictory dynamics and the fact that, sooner or later, in the globalised mode of production they celebrate, there will be no more hiding place, no more escape route for capital. Foglesong wrote of the ‘property contradiction’ endemic to capital and the ‘capitalist democracy contradiction’, the point at which capitalist imperatives contradict democratic rights and freedoms and lead to the suspension or abolition of democracy. To these we may add the ecology contradiction, the collision between the expansionary accumulative dynamic of capital and finite resources. It’s the end of the frontier for the capital system.

It is commonly thought that revolution only comes when things get really bad. This is simplistic. People can get so ground down by circumstances that they never raise their horizons above immediate necessity. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of the revolution of rising expectations. People rebel not when times are bad, but when they have been living through a period of rising expectations and these expectations come to be disappointed. One can relate this view to Marx’s conception of alienation as a progressive force. That is to identify the potential for rehumanisation contained in conditions of dehumanisation. Capital raises expectations with regard to progress that, ultimately, it cannot satisfy. The capital system cannot redeem its promises.

That's the problem with capitalist progress, it is always uneven, generating expectations it cannot satisfy, engendering new instabilities as it spans the globe. And it is recognition of this uneven process that is entirely lacking in the arguments of the prophets of capitalist progress. Where Marx saw alienation as a force containing the seeds of potential future progress, the prophets of capital equate capitalist alienation and dehumanisation with progress as such. Confronted with the economic failures of the capital system, and the prophets reason that the problem lies in the failure to implement the idea thoroughly and consistently. The purity of the concept is never in doubt. If the car crashes, it’s always the brakes that are to blame. This is precisely how today's apologists for the free market rationalise the crisis of 2008. The crisis in the global economy is not caused by the failure of the free market, but by the state intervention and regulation that hinders the operation of the free market. We have had a quarter of a century of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, and the result has been stagnation, a ‘slow 1929’ which began in the 1970s and which brought us to the abyss in 2008. And yet, the apostles and apologists of the free market deny that their ideology is to blame. Instead, the economy that crashed is not a genuine market economy and does not conform to the pure concept. Well, Soviet Russia never corresponded to the true concept of Communism. Rather than see that such a concept can never exist anywhere except in the Heaven of Platonic ideal forms, the apostles and apologists set about the task of bending material reality – and the people in it – into shape. Hence capitalist crisis is used as an opportunity to eviscerate society even further, dismantle state regulations, withdraw from social commitments, abolish the welfare state and thus abandon the poor and the powerless to their fate, all those who mystifyingly have failed to share in an apparently ubiquitous capitalist progress. And here we remember the negative and critical conception of ideology as the necessary mystification of contradictory, power laden social relations. Ideology is not a positive set of ideas to be debated according to the norms of reason, truth, evidence and logic. We need to identify the social relations that lie behind all prophecies of progress. One is reminded here of the career of Andrew Mellon.

Andrew Mellon American financier and secretary of the Treasury between 1921 and 1932, from the roaring free marketeering 1920s to the Great Depression. One of the richest men in the United States, Mellon was appointed to head the U.S. Treasury by President Warren G. Harding in 1921.

Mellon held that business expansion was discouraged by high tax rates, and thus set about reforming the US tax structure. He also advocated reduction of the surtax rates on incomes. As a result, Congress repealed the excess-profits tax and lowered the income tax rate. In 1926, the maximum surtax was reduced from 50 to 20 percent. Tax rates continued to be reduced. Mellon's policies are credited with stimulating the American economic boom of the 1920s, and he continued to head the Treasury under presidents Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover. The Great Depression which began with the crash of 1929 exposed the hollowness of Mellon’s free market approach. Mass unemployment and impoverishment may have been a disaster which ruined the lives of millions, but Mellon was sanguine: 'In a depression assets return to their rightful owners.' 
We should always remember that with the capital system, employment, prosperity, wealth etc are all only secondary considerations to the central dynamic of capital accumulation. Those who think economic growth is about wealth and prosperity are deluded, these are secondary consequences which may or may not result. The prophecies of endless economic expansion seduce but are, ultimately, incapable of satisfaction. Riches, they say, are the ideal of the poor man. Prophecies for promising riches will always seduce those who are poor and who are destined to remain poor. When the economic crash comes, and wealth and prosperity are withdrawn, the capitalist class reclaim what they consider to be their assets – resources that they have appropriated from nature and from labour.

Mellon was one of America’s foremost art collectors. Among his paintings, he had Raphael's “Alba Madonna,” 23 Rembrandts, and 6 Vermeers. That’s good taste. Rembrandt died in financially straitened circumstances and as for poor Vermeer. Vermeer was not widely appreciated in his lifetime and neglected for a couple of hundred years after he died, committing suicide at the early age of 43, the world, and debts, closing in all around him. The family was bankrupted and Vermeer’s wife, Catharina couldn’t save the 29 paintings still in her possession from the creditors.


A Woman Holding a Balance c1662-4 Vermeer





Mellon’s aphorism ‘in a depression all assets return to their rightful owners’ begs the question as to just who the rightful owners are. Mellon is referring to the auctioning that accompanies depression, when the expropriators and parasites move in to obtain the assets of others at firesale prices. I prefer Karl Marx’s conception of emancipation as the practical restitution of social powers to the social body. 

All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself….
Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognized and organized his forces propres (own forces) as social forces so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force, only then will human emancipation be completed. (Marx EW OJQ 1975: 234).

The promise of progress contained in the process of alienation can only be redeemed by such practical reappropriation of human power from the external forms in which it is incarnated. Does that make one just another prophet of progress, issuing the same death-dealing promises just in different words? 

To argue that techno-urban industrialism is a secularised religion entails an explicit denial of the myth of progress that we have inherited from the scientific, industrial and democratic revolutions. That is a hard draft to swallow. At least in the Hegel-Marx view of alienation as an instrument of progress, unavoidably painful in the short run, but emancipatory in the long, at least offers some comfort and return for all the hardship and effort delivered by generations along the way. Even that is a morally dubious argument, since it is tantamount to sacrificing the life and liberty of countless individuals to some anonymous historical process. But it is somehow more pleasing than having to recognise industrialism as a catastrophic mistake from the first. It’s time for hard choices, Blake or Marx? Marx can see the redeeming features in the capital system, Blake made no compromise whatsoever with the kingdom of the Beast. The conservative G.K. Chesterton saw nothing of value in industrialism. Insofar as socialism spoke up for working people there was something to be said for it. There is absolutely nothing to be said for capitalism, he declared. 

So, maybe, after all, Marx has more in common with apostles and apologists of the capital system than he would find comfortable. He did see the progressive features of the revolutionising, socialising and universalising of the mode of production. But we should pause a little before turning Marx into a prophet for whom progress was written into the historical process. Apart from individual human agents, that process is amoral, and we should be cautious of prophecies which focus upon vast impersonal processes that unfold above the heads of thinking, choosing, acting beings. Only if we bear this in mind can we avoid the cynicism and nihilism that can be associated with broad brush rejections of progress as a secular mythology and religion. Such anthropological pessimism cannot furnish a basis for life, only foster a sense of desperation and crisis of confidence that, paradoxically, encourages people to pursue, invent and cling to secular fantasies. Chesterton also argued that when human beings stop believing in God, they don’t believe in nothing, but instead believe in anything. This is worth contemplating before we declare the end of progress. What kind of progress? In answering this question we must heed the warning of William Blake:

Man must & will have Some Religion: if he has not the Religion of Jesus, he will have the Religion of Satan & will erect the Synagogue of Satan, calling the Prince of the World, God, and destroying all who do not worship Satan under the name of God.

Sagely, Blake understands that human beings must have and will have religion in some form or other. If not the religion of moral values, there will be the Religion of Satan. Directly in Blake’s sights here was Deism, but he was ultimately targeting the worship of science and technology: idolatry. Deism was a natural theology which worshipped the god of the scientists and the philosophers.

Our contemporary prophets of progress are currently pronouncing that not only have men become as gods, they must get good at being gods. And the very first thing these prophets do in acting on this imperative is to discard sentiment, values, and ideas and reach for the technology. This is precisely what Blake meant by the Religion of Satan, ‘destroying all who would not worship under Satan’. Listen to the language employed by Lovelock, Brand and Lynas as they caricature, denigrate and ultimately vilify all those who are critical of the technologies they espouse and it becomes clear that we are not dealing with a genuinely rational argument here, just another secular religion and mythology, more prophets of progress who, deaf to contrary voices, are likely to lead us to Hell of Earth.

Only those wilfully blind to the obvious can be so uncritical with respect to the claims made for technology with respect to progress. To believe that power-laden technology can achieve emancipation in some simple uni-linear sense is to place an inordinate amount of faith in the neutrality of technology in the context of specific social relations. Little by way of human emancipation can be achieved within the narrow horizons of a techno-science manufactured in the image of capitalist relations. The planetary engineers currently promising Heaven on Earth and men as gods remain firmly within those relations and defend them in the most vociferous terms against ‘leftist’ critics. However, so long as we remain within these constraints, then any "progress" can only be in the direction of technocratic elitism, alienative production and wasteful, infantilising consumption, ecological catastrophe and nuclear suicide. So long as we remain within the endless accumulative dynamic of the capital system, not one jot of industrialism’s promise of progress will be delivered. Instead, the prophets will continue to seek to seduce the people with an irredeemable promise, and all the time the dark underside of the capital system will accumulate, fester and eventually explode. 

So there it is, in its paradoxical formulation. To redeem the promise of the capital system, one must become a marxist. Failing that, the prophets of progress will lead us to Hell on a handcart. 
There is another way, one which refuses to make progress conditional upon material expansion and technological power, but instead focuses upon what Lao Tzu called "the Way." The kingdom of God is within, in the moral law implanted in each individual, which each can come to recognise in all other individuals. Finding that moral law within and sharing it with others would represent a genuine progress, facilitating the attainment of the common good in the good society which exists to ensure the flourishing of all its members. And this is a matter of ethics rather than technology. It requires that scientific knowledge and technological know-how be set within a conception of technics. And it requires a conception of human good, a form (or forms) of common life that fosters human flourishing. This is to identify the primary bond of society is the 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community’ (Finnis J.M. 1980:220 Natural Law and Natural Rights). 

Sanity will be restored when human beings abandon their fantasies of being gods, cease to venerate their technological powers and instead set their whole activity within a sense of balance, proportion, scale and equilibrium. At that moment, we will come to appreciate what life truly is, appreciate ourselves as parts of a wider God/Nature, Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura and understand that we can make no progress beyond it. Reading the technological fantasies of the planetary engineers, it soon becomes apparent that the main impulse is the neurotic concern to escape nature’s circularity, finality, mortality. So it is the beginning of wisdom to accept that from Nature we come, to Nature we return, we may borrow Nature, live off the interest, carve a little niche for ourselves, and above all appreciate Nature as the ground of our being. It is time to cease running from Nature and instead return and seek accommodation. We have had the solutions to our problems within our grasp all along. The resources which human beings need to work out their future have always been close to home, the moral resources within, the social empathy with others, and the intellectual and aesthetic ability to appreciate the true, the good and the beautiful in the world around us. We live and thrive in a participatory universe, we are a part of everything we see. 

I would like to draw to a conclusion here by thoroughly baffling our mechanical men of action with a little Taoist philosophy. Someone has to let our planetary engineers before they transport us to Hell that since there is really nowhere to go, then there is nothing we need to do. 

‘Man places himself in harmony with his body. His body tunes itself to the slow unfolding of life. Life flows in harmony with the Tao.’ 

Essence of Tao P Ball 2004 ch 2

A key principle of Taoism is wu-wei: "non-action”, “without doing," "absence of action." But wu is not the same as nothingness, and wu-wei does not present an ideal of absolute inaction; rather, it is a particularly efficacious attitude since it makes all doing possible. "The man who applies himself to study, each day increases [his efforts and ambitions]. The man who applies himself to the Tao, each day diminishes [his activity and desires]. From diminution to diminution, he manages to stop acting altogether; once he has stopped acting, there is nothing he does not do" (Chapter 48). In "ensconcing himself in wu-wei," the Taoist imitates the Tao, whose efficacy is universal for the very reason that it is "inactive." "The Tao never acts, yet there is nothing it does not do" (Chapter 37).
There is nothing the Tao does not do because the Tao is the same thing as universal spontaneity. There is no need for any particular kind of intervention in nature since everything that happens comes about of its own accord, as if by an act of a divinity or of providence. The Holy Man lets all creatures develop according to their own natures, and by thus refusing to intervene obtains the best practical results. 


Taoism may be quietist but that does not mean that it is without political implication. Indeed, Lao Tzu is concerned to emphasise that the ruler act the part of a Taoist, in conformity with the Tao. The majority of the aphorisms in the Tao Te Ching are formulas for good government. 

If lords and kings could be like the Tao and persist in this attitude of nonintervention, the Ten Thousand Creatures would soon follow its example of their own accord; and if they should then show any passion, I would tame them with the simplicity of the nameless, and then they would be passionless. Being passionless, they would be still, and peace would follow naturally. (chapter 37).

So the ruler must pass unnoticed:

The best [of all rulers] is he whose existence is unknown; next best is he who is loved and praised; next, he who is feared; next still, he who is despised.
But when the best leader’s work is done, the people say, ‘We did it ourselves.’
Whoever claims the right to rule over the people must submit to the people in his words; whoever claims the right to guide them must follow them.
Thus the Holy Man dominates without making the people bend beneath his weight; he guides without making the people suffer any harm. [Chapter 17]

This is leadership, but not of the top-down variety. Instead, power and responsibility are diffused widely so that all are capable of exercising leadership. Creating the conditions which enable the people to ‘do it themselves’ is an integral part of acting in congruity with the natural law. 
Progress? To where and to what? There is nowhere to go and nothing to do, other than for a thing to develop and flourish according to its own nature. That’s a goal that many of our greatest rational thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Marx have had in common. And it’s a goal that lies within our natural reach. It isn’t a goal that is conditional upon material wealth, industrial expansion and technological capacity. Wu-wei is the only way to success in terms of natural flourishing. Attempts to force the pace of progress by means of deliberate intervention will always, sooner or later, end in failure. "I foresee the defeat of those who would presume to gain power by action" (Chapter 29). 

I shall end with Lao Tzu’s warning to men of ambition who seek power and control: the empire that they would conquer is like a precious vessel, easily broken by handling; "ruling a large kingdom is like cooking small fish," the less stirring up the better (Chapter 60). The capital system began with the enclosure movement, separating people from the land. Marx’s career began with his journalistic protest against the persecution of the people for the theft of timber and a defence of customary rights. More than two thousand years earlier, Lao Tzu argued that it is the law that makes the thief (Chapter 57).

Robert Boyle’s ‘empire of man’ is an empire achieved by the scientific and technological conquest of nature. Such imperialism is nonsensical and self-defeating from a Taoist perspective. The principle of nonintervention is designed to achieve harmonious congruity with natural law, the "Heavenly Tao that conquers without striving" (Chapter 73). Wu-wei, non-interference and non-violence are the only means of achieving power in any enduring, ultimately successful sense. Since all other kinds of action provoke a reaction in response, then all apparently right action will inevitably be accompanied by wrong action. The only action that is without this consequence is the natural action of the Heavenly Tao:

The Tao of Heaven takes away from what has too much, and adds to what has not enough. The Tao of the ordinary man is something else; this Tao takes away from what has not enough and gives it to what has too much already. Who is capable of offering the world what he has in excess? Only he who possesses the Tao.
[Chapter 77]

(Kaltenmark 1969 ch 3)

The basic tenets of Taoism are designed to show a person how to live fully within the matrix of the natural forces around him or her. So, really, we have nowhere to go, just go; and we have nothing to do, just do. The root meaning of Tao is "path" or "way." When used as a verb, Tao means "to direct," "to guide," or "to establish communication." Tao also means "to say" or "to tell," so that a person may direct others by telling them the way they have to follow. As religion and magic, Tao designated the art of establishing communication between Heaven and Earth, between gods and men, and of performing magical or technological feats. (Lao Tzu and Taoism M Kaltenmark 1969: 23). But this is a very different notion to men becoming gods and creating Heaven on Earth. If you understand right and see your life as part of the flow of nature, you already have Heaven on Earth.

According to Taoism, all life is governed by the same permanent law: the return to the origin. To know this law is to possess a superior intelligence that Lao Tzu calls Light (ming). Attracting all creatures and rejecting none. "This is what I call his Veiled Light," says Lao Tzu (Chapter 27). This hidden and even unconscious influence exerted upon all saves all human beings and all creatures by bringing them back to their original nature.

We need only "stand still in the light." The Taoist lets himself be illumined by Heaven, the source of the inner light, and never pits himself against reality.

It’s a conception that can be found in other religions. 

Sitting quietly, doing nothing;
Spring comes, and the grass grows by itself.
(The Way of Zen).

For those technocrats and engineers of the mind still struggling to understand the concept, still awaiting the orders for what is to be done, let me quote Carl Jung in his book, The Secret of the Golden Flower:

The character of tao in its original form consists of a head, which probably must be interpreted as beginning, and then the character for going in its dual form in which it also means track, and underneath, the character for standing still, which is omitted in the later way of writing.

Standing still, yet reach our destination. Jung expresses the philosophical underpinning of Taoism beautifully, since one must decide whether it is the individual or the track which stands still! We may draw an analogy with an escalator, which carries us to our destination even though we stand still. We can choose to walk up or down, but the destination is the same and we must take care to accommodate our tread to the movement under our feet. And it is the same with the Tao. Once we choose to begin our journey, we need to accommodate ourselves to our natural surroundings and act appropriately so as to make the best use of the natural power we may legitimately draw upon. We require no sophisticated and powerful technologies to embark upon this journey and see it through from beginning to end. Understood even more deeply, human beings have a path to tread which has been there from the beginning of time and requires from us no expert knowledge and technical sophistication, only our will to travel in the appropriate way to journey’s end. The Tao Te Ching supplies information on what is required for us to travel most efficiently and effectively to a successful end. Progress? It beats nuclear power, geoengineering the climate, unmanned ships ploughing the oceans to shoot up plumes of water vapour so to increase cloud cover, the injection of sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere, iron fertilization, floating vertical pipes… and all the other technical interventions into nature hands down.

'When the sun and moon have already come out,' Yao said to Hsu Yu, 'it's a waste of light to go on burning the torches, isn't it?’


Immanence and Transcendence in Harmony

Sir George Trevelyan writes of the battle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness being fought on both the cosmic and human level. Christ leads the forces of light, the archangel Michael being 'the dragonslayer' from Revelations. The dragon or serpent that is slain, however, is the Great Mother, Nature. The watery and chthonic Earth dragon energies that are identified as the forces of darkness are the ancient sacred sites and places. Michael’s slaying of the Earth dragon energies has been described as 'solar, chivalrous, victorious day against lunar watery and reptilian night' (Wilson 1980).





We move from the One, the primordial Unity from which all things arise, to Two, the Dyad, the Duality of subject and object, representing multiplicity and strife, but containing the possibility of logos, denoting the relation of one thing to another (Theon of Smyrna, Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato, 66.) Finally, we transcend dualism with the advent of the Triad, achieving a Relation or Harmonia ("joining together") between the two extremes through a third term. The Triad centrally reflects the nature of the One in a "microcosmic" and balanced fashion. 

So maybe Michael and the Dragon must war as part of the differentiation that brings logos and the possibility of conscious reunification at a higher level. But even if that is the case, at some point peace must be declared. In the meantime, I will refuse having to choose the one over the other and, with Montaigne, will light a candle for both St Michael and his Dragon. In the end, with harmony, both win out.
In the dualistic world, light and dark separate easily as good and evil, terms which separate the New World Culture from the Old World of the Goddess. Gimbutas refers to the Indo-Aryan invasions which put an end to the ancient matriarchy. This represents the destruction of the Mother-centred Neolithic cultures by the Indo-Aryan 'heroic' warriors, the forces of light, with their shining metallic weapons, using fire as a technology to smelt the ores ripped out of the Earth's belly. These ‘heroic’ warriors created fiery shining murderous gods in their own brutal image and went to war against the planet and all those people of darkness and of the serpent who lived close to chthonian Nature. This conquest on the part of the forces of light introduced epistemologies and structures of rule, hierarchy and domination into the world, setting the course for the ‘civilisation’ to follow. The era of duality is over, it is now time for peace and harmony. This is not a return to the primordial unity of the One but a conscious evolution to harmony, a unity with differentiation.
In creating a God that is all light and transcendent, creation came to be demonised. The old gods and goddesses expressing all those aspects of nature as alive were rendered diabolic. However, the Devil reads more like the animal shadow, the repressed inner nature of those who have abandoned the Goddess, who is both dark and light, and projected their bad faith upon the external world. There is always something suspicious about those who are holier than thou. The stronger the light, the darker the shadows, the greater the sense of celestial good, the greater the awareness of evil all around. From this perspective, the extent to which the techno-fixers/fetishizers venerate nuclear power, bio-technology, geo-engineering looks like the environmental crisis is being seized as the opportunity to finally put an end to Earth Dragon Nature. It is almost as if the light-worshipping techno-fixers/fetishizers are inspired by the near-death state which are entering and preparing for the end by adjusting us to the ever-present threat of ecological or nuclear or other catastrophe. With all manner of engineering in the pipeline, it seems that the near-death state of environmental crisis is welcomed for the way it exposes the great white light of the transcendent world. With this kind of mentality, the death of life is a possibility. The idea that human technological power can put an end to nature is a delusion. In pursuing that fantasy, the forces of light will put an end to the human species, not to nature. In attacking nature, we attack ourselves, and we will be the first to go. Such criticism is easily, and routinely, dismissed as a New Age ‘back to nature’ mysticism. Not so. I argue plainly for the humanisation and naturalisation of our technologies, not their abandonment. The fact that minds are so blinkered as to ignore, not even see, the nuances in the argument shows the extent to which the delusion of ‘progress’ has taken hold. That’s how civilisation’s end. The problems are known, we see them everywhere. But a people hell-bent on destruction consistently miss opportunities to change direction.

Ecological catastrophe seems to be welcomed by some techno-fixers/fetishizers. The extent to which they embrace nuclear power is telling. It has all the hallmarks of a religious faith, suppressing or distorting all contrary evidence to present nuclear in a wholly positive light, seeing it as a transformation of the dark Mother Earth through the light released from within the atom. On a lesser level, the same applies to fracking, forcing gas out of the Earth, cracking the Earth’s protective shell open for more light. Presented in terms of slaying the Dragon Nature of the Earth, what is truly monstrous is the fact that this light extracted from the Earth is bringing about a global warming that will destroy human civilisation and bring about Hell on Earth. For all of the talk of ‘men as gods’, it seems that when men see themselves or, even worse, their technologies, as godlike, they inevitably become demonic, interfering with and impairing the fabric of life to the detriment of all. And they give it the name ‘progress’. In truth, such ‘progress’ merely charts the distance we have put between ourselves and nature, our own nature as much as anything.

Are we entitled to describe the techno-fixers/fetishizers as sexist and misogynist? The obsessive subjugation of dark Nature expresses an extreme fear of women and a contempt for the ancient Goddess. James Lovelock can see no paradox in the way he calls upon us to empathise which Gaea and yet castigates New Age mysticism. Human beings cannot empathise with a machine. When we see Gaea as a living organism, Lovelock retreats back into his machine. The brave soldiers of science turn tail and run when confronted with real female Nature. They are the sons of the light, of patriarchy. Their God is the jealous and possessive God who forbids any ecstatic re-unification with nature, the ancient Goddess. Both patriarchal religion and modern science are at one in their dualistic, antagonistic, non-participatory consciousness which ensures that men, the forces of light, are in control of Nature, even if that control is also killing them. 
The whole techno-fixing/fetishizing approach is fundamentally flawed since it is founded on a faultline that separates human beings and human powers from originary nature. All manner of alienating separations and bifurcations result from this antagonistic dualism – culture and nature, reason and feeling and many others. The worst separation of all is that between male and female. There will be no peace in the world until that separation is overcome and harmony prevails. The problem is not one of technology but of our relation to it. It is part of a bigger problem of our relation to our powers, to each other, to nature. Immanence and transcendence need to be held in balance, not opposition. The veneration of technology results from the inability of ‘men as gods’ to come to terms with women's real powers and acknowledge the legitimacy of the ancient Goddess who is both immanent and transcendent in being of this world and of the otherworld. Brand, Lynas, Lovelock et all write as though Feminism and Goddess awareness does not exist. Ecofeminism has plenty to offer on this subject, but there is not a trace of the valuable contribution that women have made to ecological thinking in the arguments of the techno-fixers/fetishizers. All power is with technology. The very name Gaea, the Earth Goddess, ought to have widened the mental vistas of the scientists and technicians, but it seems not. The techno-fixers/fetishizers see the ancient Goddess merely as a manifestation of the new 'God' of technology. ‘Men as gods’ is a clear indication that to them a divine male is the ultimate purpose of creation. It is simply the age old male attempt to cheat female power, technology rather than Mother Nature as the giver and taker of life. If immortality comes through machines, so too does death. The global arms budget now stands at $1.7 trillion. Tens of millions of human beings died in or as a result of war during the twentieth century, and the killing continues in the twenty first century. Numbers of this scale are not accidental. It is the death instinct that lies at the dark heart of the mechanical order. No wonder it is obsessed by the light, it stands in need of it. As in all patriarchy, the implication is that the Mother, both physical and divine, is the giver of all material things, not just life but also old age, illness, death. Death is the denial of mechanical power. So even though they use her name Gaia, the techno-fixers/fetishizers are concerned to deny the divinity of the Earth Mother. Is it a coincidence that just as women are re-awakening and re-claiming their natural power all over the world, giving the ancient Goddess a new voice, along comes the old ‘men as gods’ fantasy, telling us yet again what nature is, what power is, who we are, what we should believe, how we should act. How does any of this differ from the techno-urban industrial modes of thought, action and organisation that have been in preparation and in place for millennia? It doesn’t. The days of such modes are numbered. We have had this ‘progress’. If it hasn’t paid off by now, it never will. It’s an illusion and increasing numbers of people are seeing through the claims made for ‘progress’. The world is rejecting linear time, we are where we are and need to enjoy Being as part of our natural cycle. Instead of this never ending preparing and training in order to be, the time for Being is always now.

We have to be mindful of the need for growth. We cannot rest at peace in the Edenic world, in an undifferentiated unity with Nature. In such a state, our powers, natural powers, slumber and fail to realise their full potential. The problem is not so much that the monotheistic patriarchal religions cut our umbilical psychic cord to the body-mind of the Earth Mother but that they do so so severely, so ruthlessly, so completely that any re-unification at a higher level of consciousness becomes impossible. The Earth Mother is not an enemy to be destroyed and conquered but remains the living organism which encloses us, to which we must return to and relate to. In separating, we develop and differentiate ourselves only to return to create a greater harmony. That harmony is impossible if there is nothing to return to, only ‘dead matter’.

Severing the umbilical cord is one thing, but the connection always remains as a permanent psychic reality. To deny or destroy that reality within is to tear apart the web of life without. During the European witchhunts, not only women's bodies were prodded and probed but their very dreams and psyches; women were punished for retaining their connections with living nature, communing with the animals and the spirits of nature. Where these women saw divinity in all things, their persecutors saw the devil everywhere. The world of religion demonised the powers of nature, the world of science put them to death. The Earth is a mechanism, there are no living forces in nature. Apparently, that remains the scientific orthodoxy, the Earth does not meet the criteria for life. We are not dealing with the limitations of the Earth here, only the limitations of the scientific method. Is that all that science can see? The war between religion and science is a phoney war. Patriarchies in both religion and science have desacralised and desecrated the Earth in the name of ‘progress’, the result of which is to endanger us all. 

Men who see themselves as gods will resent being born of woman, will see their origins as an obscenity, loathe their dependence and deny their frailty and most of all their mortality. Goddess nature is an enemy to be overcome. Such men will seek immortality through a creation of their own, overlaying Goddess/nature by an inorganic, mechanical order. Such 'transcendence' delivers ‘progress’.

It is easy enough to name the Goddess, for her names are many; it is much more difficult to live within the contours of the Goddess Earth. Gaea is dying around us and deities are suffering everywhere. The lives of all of us are becoming more impoverished as whole countries are held in debt’s grip of death. A previous technological fix, the much vaunted ‘Green revolution’, plummeted Third World nations into huge debt and rendered them hopelessly dependent on multinational corporations and agribusinesses. We are now being prepared for more of the same. Global famine is not a problem of production but of distribution. It is also the result of land patterns and usage forced on countries by the international division of labour. The problem is entirely the result of social relations, yet it is being treated as a technical problem to be solved by genetically engineered or 'modified' crops. The real truth is that international capital is engineering the control of the world's food supply so as to control profits and peoples. Famine and food are being used as weapons and bargaining tools. The same reasoning applies to all the other technical solutions to social and political problems, they are designed to entrench and extend existing relations of power.

It is time to recognise that the ‘progress’ promised by patriarchy is a lie with anti-evolutionary implications.

Questioning the Techno-Fixers and Fetishizers

What is knowledge? Dreams, trances, omens, visions, signs. The ancients heard voices from the spirits in the under/otherworld of the dead. But we know better now. In the book Has Science Found God (2003), biologist Victor Stenger claims to show that ‘the empirical data and theories based on that data are now sufficient to make a scientific judgment: In high probability, a nonmaterial element of the universe exerting powerful control over events does not exist.’ In other words, a fact based approach to science has failed to find the non-factual basis of the universe. This means one of two things. Either the non-factual basis of the universe does not exist, or that a fact based science cannot apprehend a non-factual reality. It seems pointless to ask such a limited science to acknowledge that dreams originate in the realm of the blessed dead, within the ancestral tombs and underground chambers which evoke the dark womb of the eternal Mother. Science can make no sense of such notions and therefore they are dismissed as nonsense. There is no reason to believe that Neolithic people were more stupid than we are, so we need to ask how and why such supposed nonsense spoke so clearly to them, satisfying their quest for meaning. To the Celts, the spirit realm was 'the land of the Everlasting women'. Before dismissing such notions as so much nonsense, we need to remember the extent to which Goethe made Mother Nature central to the moral of Faust. Here, Goethe uses the phrase Ewig-Weibliche, the Eternal-Womanly, the Earth Spirit, the Eternal Mothers, the Eternal Feminine - the Goddess which human beings worship.

These voices from the under/other-world brought knowledge of healing and prophecy, and were integral to the way that men and women lived their lives. Women were oracles whose subterranean powers originated from within the Earth Herself. The oracle of Delphi sat with her python in the underground cavern temple of Gaia, inhaling the sulphurous fumes from the underworld. 

Reading the works of the techno-fixers/fetishizers, a pattern soon emerges. The apolitical stance is more apparent than real. The refusal to take sides is accompanied by a tendency to compromise with existing power structures and arrangements in the name of pragmatism. This is also accompanied by a rejection of more radical political positions as extreme, unreasoning, fundamentalist. There is very little political questioning of existing power relations, and no understanding of issues of race, sex, class and imperialism. James Lovelock’s words on the miners’ strike of 1984/5 betray a political naivety that seldom ends well. Although Gaia is cited, all the talk is of gods. There is no evidence that the techno-fixers/fetishizers have heard a word of what women have been saying for decades. In his review of Lovelock’s Gaia in Physics Today, the physicist Professor Peter Schroeder wrote: 'The very word Gaia may be sufficient to scare away prospective readers of this book. To me it conveyed a mysterious entity which would be used by New Agers and not by respectable scientists.' Who are these respectable scientists? A quick read of Free Radicals by Michael Brooks shows that the greatest scientists, including Galileo, Newton, Einstein, have rarely been respectable. And they are not plodders hamstrung by fact and evidence either, but work by intuition and imagination and inspiration. Ask a scientist about his methodology and only the most mediocre will give a clear answer.
I do not think that the techno-fixers/fetishizers are as apolitical as they like to present themselves. Their prescriptions with respect to nuclear power, GE food, biotechnology, geo-engineering fit the requirements of the capital system very easily, a system which they in no way challenge at the level of fundamentals. Indeed, there are casual dismissals of the critiques launched by the left and by the Greens, which can break out into explicit repudiation in the most ignorant and bigoted terms. Thus Lovelock identifies the ‘urban green ideology’ as a virus capable of destroying civilisation. Indeed, Lovelock refers to the way that Christianity disabled the Roman Empire and Marxism enfeebled Russia and opines that green ideology may be ‘the most deadly of them all.’ Such claims are historical rot of the highest order – Christianity is alive and well in its Roman form, with more than one billion Catholics on the planet, Stalinist Russia broke the back of the Nazi war machine whereas Tsarist Russia crumbled against Germany in the First World War. But it’s Lovelock’s political bias that is more important than his historical illiteracy. In common with the other techno-fixers/fetishizers, Lovelock sees the Greens – anarchists, radicals, socialists and maybe even feminists – as enemies, as not genuine environmentalists but as ‘political’, politically motivated whereas he is motivated only by the science. It doesn’t wash and it doesn’t make sense. The demand is that humanity should, indeed must, adopt a better way of life, but through change rather than revolution. For all of the bold thinking and even bolder claims made with respect to the new technologies, the big question that is consistently evaded is whether fundamental transformation is possible without a fundamental challenge to the military-industrial complex. It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that, under the pretext of solving the environmental crisis, the crisis is being used in order to put the new technologies in the service of the very military-industrial complex that is currently destroying the planet. 

The most insidious of the ideas of the techno-fixers and fetishizers is that technology is sufficient to resolve problems in isolation from iniquitous and unjust realities. It is these realities which are driving the ecological crisis, social and environmental justice are one and the same cause. Yet the claim is that with the application of this or that technology, injustice and oppression are suddenly gone. This is a blatant untruth, since there is no way of extinguishing oppression without the collective and organised struggle that defines politics. An apolitical stance is a conscious refusal to engage in that collective and organised struggle for emancipation. It is to take a political stance on the side of the status quo and against politics.

One can speculate as to how many of those turning political questions into technical questions are doing so in a deliberately ideological way to conceal the fundamental issues of power, authority and control, and how many do so out of genuine political innocence. In Raids and Reconstructions — Essays in Politics, Crime and Culture, Hans Magnus Enzensberger refers to the 'industrialisation of the mind' and the 'consciousness shaping media' of the contemporary world. Enzensberger argues that Marshall McLuhan is the prophet of the apolitical avant-garde, opening the way to a reactionary doctrine of salvation which lacks any understanding of class, race, sex and economics. If this is the case, then it is indeed the end of politics, since our awareness of injustice, inequality, exploitation and oppression is in the process of being abolished. Political questions are converted into technical questions, not to question the existing order, but to buttress it. We now living in a hyperreality, a digital world composed by a universal system of electronic media which controls us by the immaterial exploitation of the mind. 

Separated from our psychic roots, we have created a thoroughly alienated society that values the ‘man made’ over the natural, so that anything artificial or synthetic is considered superior to anything composed of organic materials. It is an artificial world of artificial people, full of plastics, nylons, nuclear energy, DDT or genetic engineering.

An old Jewish myth says: 'In his mother's womb, man knows the universe and forgets it at birth.' In gambling with Gaea, these ‘men as gods’ threaten our lives but also our souls, blocking the possibility of rebirth through our Mother the Earth for all eternity. In severing the connections between life and death, womb and tomb, patriarchy has replaced the ecology of hope with an ecology of fear, creating an anxiety that must forever be assuaged by ever more extreme assertions of transcendent, technical power.

A Warning...
Nuclear energy, bio-technology, GM food, geo-engineering – there is no shortage of scientific and technical expertise and power. What we are short of is wisdom, a genuine politics as creative self-realisation. The elites of business and government are gambling with Gaea. This is not the work of gods at all. This is the ages old tale of dwarfs with the powers of giants, promising Heaven but delivering only Hell on Earth. Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me. This is the umpteenth time that this false promise of progress has been delivered and it no longer washes. The claims are threadbare. The strongest ‘argument’ being employed is necessity, the fact that with an environmental crisis looming so large something must be done. Indeed it must. This gambling with Gaea threatens the planet, certainly, but most of all it threatens the lives of present and future generations. I propose a change in the way of life, committing ourselves to a society that is rich in ends and scales its means accordingly. 

An Australian Aboriginal woman Oodgeroo Noomical (Kate Walker) has this to say:

But time is running out
and time is close at hand,
for the dreamtime folk are amassing
to defend their timeless land . . .
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